This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

521 E

THE

PROSE WORKS

OF

JOHN MILTON;

WITH

A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,

INTERSPERSED WITH

TRANSLATIONS AND CRITICAL REMARKS,

BY

CHARLES SYMMONS, D. D.

OF JESUS COLLEGE, OXFORD.

IN SEVEN VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY LUKE HANSARD, NEAR LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS,

FOR J. JOHNSON; NICHOLS AND SON; F. AND C. RIVINGTON; OTRIDGE AND SON; T. PAYNE; OGILVY AND SON; CUTHELL AND MARTIN; VERNOR AND HOOD; R. LEA; J. WALKER; CLARKE AND SON; J. STOCKDALE; LACKINGTON AND CO.; LONGMAN AND CO.; CADELL AND DAVIES; J. HARDING; R. H. EVANS; J. MAWMAN; J. HATCHARD; AND MATHEWS AND LEIGH.

1806.

NACV V.3
JUDR
VAKSEL

CONTENTS

OF THE

THIRD VOLUME.

Page

EIKONOCLASTES: in answer to a Book entitled, Eikon Basilike, the Portraiture of his sacred Majesty in his Solitudes and Sufferings, Chap. XI. to the end..... 1

A DEFENCE of the People of England, in answer to Salmasius's Defence of the King..... 103

A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes: showing, that it is not lawful for any Power on Earth to compel in Matters of Religion..... 317

Considerations touching the likeliest Means to remove Hirelings out of the Church, &c..... 348

A Letter to a Friend, concerning the Ruptures of the Commonwealth..... 393

The present Means and brief Delineation of a free Commonwealth, easy to be put in practice, and without delay. In a Letter to General Monk 398

The ready and easy Way to establish a Free Commonwealth, and the Excellence thereof, compared with the Inconveniencies and Dangers of readmitting Kingship in this Nation... 401

Brief Notes upon a late Sermon, titled, "The Fear of God and the King," preached and since published by Matthew Griffith, D.D. and Chaplain to the late King, wherein many notorious Wrestings of Scripture, and other Falsities, are observed..... 431

Accedence commenced Grammar: supplied with sufficient Rules for the Use of such as, younger or elder, are desirous, without more trouble than needs, to attain the Latin Tongue; the elder Sort especially with little Teaching, and their own Industry..... 441

ΕΙΚΟΝΟΚΛΑΣΤΗΣ.

In Anſwer to a Book entitled,

ΕΙΚΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΗ,

THE PORTRAITURE OF HIS SACRED MAJESTY IN HIS SOLITUDES AND HIS SUFFERINGS.

XI. *Upon the Nineteen Propoſitions, &c.*

OF the nineteen propoſitions he names none in particular, neither ſhall the anſwer: But he inſiſts upon the old plea of "his conſcience, honour and reaſon;" uſing the plauſibility of large and indefinite words, to defend himſelf at ſuch a diſtance as may hinder the eye of common judgment from all diſtinct view and examination of his reaſoning. "He would buy the peace of his people at any rate, ſave only the parting with his conſcience and honour." Yet ſhows not how it can happen that the peace of a people, if otherwiſe to be bought at any rate, ſhould be inconſiſtent or at variance with the conſcience and honour of a king. Till then, we may receive it for a better ſentence, that nothing ſhould be more agreeable to the conſcience and honour of a king, than to preſerve his ſubjects in peace; eſpecially from civil war.

And which of the propoſitions were "obtruded on him with the point of the ſword," till he firſt with the point of the ſword thruſt from him both the propoſitions and the propounders? He never reckons thoſe violent and mercileſs obtruſions, which for almoſt twenty years he had been forcing upon tender conſciences by all ſorts of perſecution, till through the multitude of them

that were to ſuffer, it could no more be called a perſecution, but a plain war. From which when firſt the Scots, then the Engliſh, were conſtrained to defend themſelves, this their juſt defence is that which he calls here, " their making war upon his ſoul."

He grudges that " ſo many things are required of him, and nothing offered him in requital of thoſe favours which he had granted." What could ſatiate the deſires of this man, who being king of England, and maſter of almoſt two millions yearly what by hook or crook, was ſtill in want; and thoſe acts of juſtice which he was to do in duty, counts done as favours; and ſuch favours as were not done without the avaricious hope of other rewards beſides ſupreme honour, and the conſtant revenue of his place?

" This honour," he ſaith, " they did him, to put him on the giving part." And ſpake truer than he intended, it being merely for honour's ſake that they did ſo; not that it belonged to him of right: for what can he give to a parliament, who receives all he hath from the people, and for the people's good? Yet now he brings his own conditional rights to conteſt and be preferred before the people's good; and yet unleſs it be in order to their good, he hath no rights at all; reigning by the laws of the land, not by his own; which laws are in the hands of parliament to change or abrogate as they ſhall ſee beſt for the commonwealth, even to the taking away of kingſhip itſelf, when it grows too maſterful and burdenſome. For every commonwealth is in general defined, a ſociety ſufficient of itſelf, in all things conducible to well-being and commodious life. Any of which requiſite things, if it cannot have without the gift and favour of a ſingle perſon, or without leave of his private reaſon or his conſcience, it cannot be thought ſufficient of itſelf, and by conſequence no commonwealth, nor free; but a multitude of vaſſals in the poſſeſſion and domain of one abſolute lord, and wholly obnoxious to his will. If the king have power to give or deny any thing to his parliament, he muſt do it either as a perſon ſeveral from them, or as one greater; neither of which will be allowed him: not to be conſidered ſeverally from them; for as the king

king of England can do no wrong, ſo neither can he do right but in his courts and by his courts; and what is legally done in them, ſhall be deemed the king's aſſent, though he as a ſeveral perſon ſhall judge or endeavour the contrary; ſo that indeed without his courts, or againſt them, he is no king. If therefore he obtrude upon us any public miſchief, or withhold from us any general good, which is wrong in the higheſt degree, he muſt do it as a tyrant, not as a king of England, by the known maxims of our law. Neither can he, as one greater, give aught to the parliament which is not in their own power, but he muſt be greater alſo than the kingdom which they repreſent: ſo that to honour him with the giving part was a mere civility, and may be well termed the courteſy of England, not the king's due.

But the "incommunicable jewel of his conſcience" he will not give, "but reſerve to himſelf." It ſeems that his conſcience was none of the crown-jewels; for thoſe we know were in Holland, not incommunicable, to buy arms againſt his ſubjects. Being therefore but a private jewel, he could not have done a greater pleaſure to the kingdom, than by reſerving it to himſelf. But he, contrary to what is here profeſſed, would have his conſcience not an incommunicable, but a univerſal conſcience, the whole kingdom's conſcience. Thus what he ſeems to fear leſt we ſhould raviſh from him, is our chief complaint that he obtruded upon us; we never forced him to part with his conſcience, but it was he that would have forced us to part with ours.

Some things he taxes them to have offered him, "which, while he had the maſtery of his reaſon, he would never conſent to." Very likely; but had his reaſon maſtered him as it ought, and not been maſtered long ago by his ſenſe and humour (as the breeding of moſt kings hath been ever ſenſual and moſt humoured), perhaps he would have made no difficulty. Meanwhile at what a fine paſs is the kingdom, that muſt depend in greateſt exigencies upon the fantaſy of a king's reaſon, be he wiſe or fool, who arrogantly ſhall anſwer all the wiſdom of the land, that what they offer ſeems to him unreaſonable?

He prefers his "love of truth" before his love of the people. His love of truth would have led him to the ſearch of truth, and have taught him not to lean ſo much upon his own underſtanding. He met at firſt with doctrines of unaccountable prerogative; in them he reſted, becauſe they pleaſed him; they therefore pleaſed him becauſe they gave him all; and this he calls his love of truth, and prefers it before the love of his people's peace.

Some things they propoſed, "which would have wounded the inward peace of his conſcience." The more our evil hap, that three kingdoms ſhould be thus peſtered with one conſcience; who chiefly ſcrupled to grant us that, which the parliament adviſed him to, as the chief means of our public welfare and reformation. Theſe ſcruples to many perhaps will ſeem pretended; to others, upon as good grounds, may ſeem real; and that it was the juſt judgment of God, that he who was ſo cruel and ſo remorſeleſs to other men's conſciences, ſhould have a conſcience within him as cruel to himſelf; conſtraining him, as he conſtrained others, and enſnaring him in ſuch ways and counſels as were certain to be his deſtruction.

"Other things though he could approve, yet in honour and policy he thought fit to deny, leſt he ſhould ſeem to dare deny nothing." By this means he will be ſure, what with reaſon, honour, policy, or punctilios, to be found never unfurniſhed of a denial; whether it were his envy not to be overbounteous, or that the ſubmiſſneſs of our aſking ſtirred up in him a certain pleaſure of denying. Good princes have thought it their chief happineſs to be always granting; if good things, for the things ſake; if things indifferent, for the people's ſake; while this man ſits calculating variety of excuſes how he may grant leaſt; as if his whole ſtrength and royalty were placed in a mere negative.

Of one propoſition eſpecially he laments him much, that they would bind him "to a general and implicit conſent for whatever they deſired." Which though I find not among the nineteen, yet undoubtedly the oath of his coronation binds him to no leſs; neither is he at all by his office to interpoſe againſt a parliament in the making

making or not making of any law; but to take that for juſt and good legally, which is there decreed, and to ſee it executed accordingly. Nor was he ſet over us to vie wiſdom with his parliament, but to be guided by them; any of whom poſſibly may as far excel him in the gift of wiſdom, as he them in place and dignity. But much nearer is it to impoſſibility, that any king alone ſhould be wiſer than all his council; ſure enough it was not he, though no king ever before him ſo much contended to have it thought ſo. And if the parliament ſo thought not, but deſired him to follow their advice and deliberation in things of public concernment, he accounts it the ſame propoſition, as if Sampſon had been moved "to the putting out his eyes, that the Philiſtines might abuſe him." And thus out of an unwiſe or pretended fear, leſt others ſhould make a ſcorn of him for yielding to his parliament, he regards not to give cauſe of worſe ſuſpicion, that he made a ſcorn of his regal oath.

But "to exclude him from all power of denial ſeems an arrogance;" in the parliament he means: what in him then to deny againſt the parliament? None at all, by what he argues: for "by petitioning, they confeſs their inferiority, and that obliges them to reſt, if not ſatisfied, yet quieted with ſuch an anſwer as the will and reaſon of their ſuperior thinks fit to give." Firſt, petitioning, in better Engliſh, is no more than requeſting or requiring; and men require not favours only, but their due; and that not only from ſuperiors, but from equals, and inferiors alſo. The nobleſt Romans, when they ſtood for that which was a kind of regal honour, the conſulſhip, were wont in a ſubmiſſive manner to go about, and beg that higheſt dignity of the meaneſt plebeians, naming them man by man; which in their tongue was called petitio conſulatus. And the parliament of England petitioned the king, not becauſe all of them were inferior to him, but becauſe he was inferior to any one of them, which they did of civil cuſtom, and for faſhion's ſake, more than of duty; for by plain law cited before, the parliament is his ſuperior.

But what law in any trial or diſpute enjoins a freeman to reſt quieted, though not ſatisfied with the will and

reaſon of his ſuperior? It were a mad law that would ſubject reaſon to ſuperiority of place. And if our higheſt conſultations and purpoſed laws muſt be terminated by the king's will, then is the will of one man our law, and no ſubtlety of diſpute can redeem the parliament and nation from being ſlaves: neither can any tyrant require more than that his will or reaſon, though not ſatisfying, ſhould yet be reſted in, and determine all things. We may conclude therefore, that when the parliament petitioned the king, it was but merely form, let it be as "fooliſh and abſurd" as he pleaſes. It cannot certainly be ſo abſurd as what he requires, that the parliament ſhould confine their own and all the kingdom's reaſon to the will of one man, becauſe it was his hap to ſucceed his father. For neither God nor the laws have ſubjected us to his will, nor ſet his reaſon to be our ſovereign above law (which muſt needs be, if he can ſtrangle it in the birth) but ſet his perſon over us in the ſovereign execution of ſuch laws as the parliament eſtabliſh. The parliament therefore, without any uſurpation, hath had it always in their power to limit and confine the exorbitancy of kings, whether they call it their will, their reaſon, or their conſcience.

But this above all was never expected, nor is to be endured, that a king, who is bound by law and oath to follow the advice of his parliament, ſhould be permitted to except againſt them as "young ſtateſmen," and proudly to ſuſpend his following their advice, "until his ſeven years experience had ſhown him how well they could govern themſelves." Doubtleſs the law never ſuppoſed ſo great an arrogance could be in one man; that he whoſe ſeventeen years unexperience had almoſt ruined all, ſhould ſit another ſeven years ſchoolmaſter to tutor thoſe who were ſent by the whole realm to be his counſellors and teachers. And with what modeſty can he pretend to be a ſtateſman himſelf, who with his father's king-craft and his own, did never that of his own accord, which was not directly oppoſite to his profeſſed intereſt both at home and abroad; diſcontenting and alienating his ſubjects at home, weakening and deſerting his confederates abroad, and with them the common cauſe

cauſe of religion; ſo that the whole courſe of his reign, by an example of his own furniſhing, hath reſembled Phaeton more than Phœbus, and forced the parliament to drive like Jehu; which omen taken from his own mouth, God hath not diverted?

And he on the other ſide might have remembered, that the parliament ſit in that body, not as his ſubjects, but as his ſuperiors, called, not by him, but by the law; not only twice every year, but as oft as great affairs require, to be his counſellors and dictators, though he ſtomach it; nor to be diſſolved at his pleaſure, but when all grievances be firſt removed, all petitions heard and anſwered. This is not only reaſon, but the known law of the land.

"When he heard that propoſitions would be ſent him," he ſat conjecturing what they would propound; and becauſe they propounded what he expected not, he takes that to be a warrant for his denying them. But what did he expect? He expected that the parliament would reinforce "ſome old laws." But if thoſe laws were not a ſufficient remedy to all grievances, nay were found to be grievances themſelves, when did we loſe that other part of our freedom to eſtabliſh new? He thought "ſome injuries done by himſelf and others to the commonwealth were to be repaired." But how could that be, while he the chief offender took upon him to be ſole judge both of the injury and the reparation? "He ſtaid till the advantages of his crown conſidered, might induce him to condeſcend to the people's good." When as the crown itſelf with all thoſe advantages were therefore given him, that the people's good ſhould be firſt conſidered; not bargained for, and bought by inches with the bribe of more offertures and advantages to his crown. He looked "for moderate deſires of due reformation;" as if any ſuch deſires could be immoderate. He looked for ſuch a reformation "both in church and ſtate, as might preſerve" the roots of every grievance and abuſe in both ſtill growing (which he calls "the foundation and eſſentials") and would have only the excreſcences of evil pruned away for the preſent, as was plotted before, that they might grow faſt enough between triennial parliaments, to hinder them by work enough beſides from

ever ſtriking at the root. He alleges, " They ſhould have had regard to the laws in force, to the wiſdom and piety of former parliaments, to the ancient and univerſal practice of chriſtian churches." As if they who come with full authority to redreſs public grievances, which ofttimes are laws themſelves, were to have their hands bound by laws in force, or the ſuppoſition of more piety and wiſdom in their anceſtors, or the practice of churches heretofore; whoſe fathers, notwithſtanding all theſe pretences, made as vaſt alterations to free themſelves from ancient popery. For all antiquity that adds or varies from the ſcripture, is no more warranted to our ſafe imitation, than what was done the age before at Trent. Nor was there need to have deſpaired of what could be eſtabliſhed in lieu of what was to be annulled, having before his eyes the government of ſo many churches beyond the ſeas; whoſe pregnant and ſolid reaſons wrought ſo with the parliament, as to deſire a uniformity rather with all other proteſtants, than to be a ſchiſm divided from them under a conclave of thirty biſhops, and a crew of irreligious prieſts that gaped for the ſame preferment.

And whereas he blames thoſe propoſitions for not containing what they ought, what did they mention, but to vindicate and reſtore the rights of parliament invaded by cabin councils, the courts of juſtice obſtructed, and the government of the church innovated and corrupted? All theſe things he might eaſily have obſerved in them, which he affirms he could not find; but found " thoſe demanding" in parliament, who were " looked upon before as factious in the ſtate, and ſchiſmatical in the church; and demanding not only toleration for themſelves in their vanity, novelty, and confuſion, but alſo an extirpation of that government, whoſe rights they had a mind to invade." Was this man ever likely to be adviſed, who with ſuch a prejudice and diſeſteem ſets himſelf againſt his choſen and appointed counſellors? likely ever to admit of reformation, who cenſures all the government of other proteſtant churches, as bad as any papiſt could have cenſured them? And what king had ever his whole kingdom in ſuch contempt, ſo to wrong

and

and diſhonour the free elections of his people, as to judge them, whom the nation thought worthieſt to ſit with him in parliament, few elſe but ſuch as were "puniſhable by the laws?" yet knowing that time was, when to be a proteſtant, to be a chriſtian, was by law as puniſhable as to be a traitor; and that our Saviour himſelf, coming to reform his church, was accuſed of an intent to invade Cæſar's right, as good a right as the prelate biſhops ever had; the one being got by force, the other by ſpiritual uſurpation; and both by force upheld.

He admires and falls into an extaſy, that the parliament ſhould ſend him ſuch a "horrid propoſition," as the removal of epiſcopacy. But expect from him in an extaſy no other reaſons of his admiration than the dream and tautology of what he hath ſo often repeated, law, antiquity, anceſtors, proſperity, and the like, which will be therefore not worth a ſecond anſwer, but may paſs with his own compariſon into the common ſewer of other popiſh arguments.

"Had the two houſes ſued out their livery from the wardſhip of tumults," he could ſooner have believed them. It concerned them firſt to ſue out their livery from the unjuſt wardſhip of his encroaching prerogative. And had he alſo redeemed his overdated minority from a pupilage under biſhops, he would much leſs have miſtruſted his parliament; and never would have ſet ſo baſe a character upon them, as to count them no better than the vaſſals of certain nameleſs men, whom he charges to be ſuch as "hunt after faction with their hounds the tumults." And yet the biſhops could have told him, that Nimrod, the firſt that hunted after faction, is reputed by ancient tradition the firſt that founded monarchy; whence it appears, that to hunt after faction is more properly the king's game; and thoſe hounds, which he calls the vulgar, have been often hallooed to from court, of whom the mongrel ſort have been enticed; the reſt have not loſt their ſcent, but underſtood aright, that the parliament had that part to act, which he had failed in; that truſt to diſcharge, which he had broken; that eſtate and honour to preſerve, which was far beyond his, the eſtate

eſtate and honour of the commonwealth, which he had embezzled.

Yet ſo far doth ſelf-opinion or falſe principles delude and tranſport him, as to think "the concurrence of his reaſon" to the votes of parliament, not only political, but natural, "and as neceſſary to the begetting," or bringing forth of any one "complete act of public wiſdom as the ſun's influence is neceſſary to all nature's productions." So that the parliament, it ſeems, is but a female, and without his procreative reaſon, the laws which they can produce are but wind-eggs: wiſdom, it ſeems, to a king is natural, to a parliament not natural, but by conjunction with the king: yet he profeſſes to hold his kingly right by law; and if no law could be made but by the great council of a nation, which we now term a parliament, then certainly it was a parliament that firſt created kings; and not only made laws before a king was in being, but thoſe laws eſpecially whereby he holds his crown. He ought then to have ſo thought of a parliament, if he count it not male, as of his mother, which to civil being created both him and the royalty he wore. And if it hath been anciently interpreted the preſaging ſign of a future tyrant, but to dream of copulation with his mother, what can it be leſs than actual tyranny to affirm waking, that the parliament, which is his mother, can neither conceive or bring forth "any authoritative act" without his maſculine coition? Nay, that his reaſon is as celeſtial and life-giving to the parliament, as the ſun's influence is to the earth: what other notions but theſe, or ſuch like, could ſwell up Caligula to think himſelf a God?

But to be rid of theſe mortifying propoſitions, he leaves no tyrannical evaſion uneſſayed; firſt, "that they are not the joint and free deſires of both houſes, or the major part;" next, "that the choice of many members was carried on by faction." The former of theſe is already diſcovered to be an old device put firſt in practice by Charles the Fifth, ſince the reformation: who when the proteſtants of Germany for their own defence joined themſelves in league, in his declarations and remonſtrances

ſtrances laid the fault only upon ſome few (for it was dangerous to take notice of too many enemies) and accuſed them, that under colour of religion they had a purpoſe to invade his and the church's right; by which policy he deceived many of the German cities, and kept them divided from that league, until they ſaw themſelves brought into a ſnare. That other cavil againſt the people's choice puts us in mind rather what the court was wont to do, and how to tamper with elections: neither was there at that time any faction more potent, or more likely to do ſuch a buſineſs, than they themſelves who complain moſt.

But "he muſt chew ſuch morſels as propoſitions, ere he let them down." So let him; but if the kingdom ſhall taſte nothing but after his chewing, what does he make of the kingdom but a great baby? "The ſtraitneſs of his conſcience will not give him leave to ſwallow down ſuch camels of ſacrilege and injuſtice as others do." This is the phariſee up and down, "I am not as other men are." But what camels of injuſtice he could devour, all his three realms were witneſs, which was the cauſe that they almoſt periſhed for want of parliaments. And he that will be unjuſt to man, will be ſacrilegious to God; and to bereave a chriſtian conſcience of liberty for no other reaſon than the narrowneſs of his own conſcience, is the moſt unjuſt meaſure to man, and the worſt ſacrilege to God. That other, which he calls ſacrilege, of taking from the clergy that ſuperfluous wealth, which antiquity as old as Conſtantine, from the credit of a divine viſion, counted "poiſon in the church," hath been ever moſt oppoſed by men, whoſe righteouſneſs in other matters hath been leaſt obſerved. He concludes, as his manner is, with high commendation of his own "unbiaſſed rectitude," and believes nothing to be in them that diſſent from him, but faction, innovation, and particular deſigns. Of theſe repetitions I find no end, no not in his prayer; which being founded upon deceitful principles, and a fond hope that God will bleſs him in thoſe his errours, which he calls "honeſt," finds a fit anſwer of St. James, "Ye aſk and receive not, becauſe ye aſk amiſs." As for the truth and ſincerity, which he prays may be always found

found in thoſe his declarations to the people, the contrariety of his own actions will bear eternal witneſs, how little careful or ſolicitous he was, what he promiſed or what he uttered there.

XII. *Upon the Rebellion in Ireland.*

THE rebellion and horrid maſſacre of Engliſh proteſtants in Ireland, to the number of 154000 in the province of Ulſter only, by their own computation; which added to the other three, makes up the total ſum of that ſlaughter in all likelihood four times as great; although ſo ſudden and ſo violent, as at firſt to amaze all men that were not acceſſary; yet from whom, and from what counſels it firſt ſprung, neither was, nor could be poſſibly ſo ſecret, as the contrivers thereof, blinded with vain hope, or the deſpair that other plots would ſucceed, ſuppoſed. For it cannot be imaginable, that the Iriſh, guided by ſo many ſubtle and Italian heads of the Romiſh party, ſhould ſo far have loſt the uſe of reaſon, and indeed of common ſenſe, as not ſupported with other ſtrength than their own, to begin a war ſo deſperate and irreconcilable againſt both England and Scotland at once. All other nations, from whom they could expect aid, were buſied to the utmoſt in their own moſt neceſſary concernments. It remains then that either ſome authority, or ſome great aſſiſtance promiſed them from England, was that whereon they chiefly truſted. And as it is not difficult to diſcern from what inducing cauſe this inſurrection firſt aroſe, ſo neither was it hard at firſt to have applied ſome effectual remedy, though not prevention. And yet prevention was not hopeleſs, when Strafford either believed not, or did not care to believe the ſeveral warnings and diſcoveries thereof, which more than once by papiſts and by friars themſelves were brought him; beſides what was brought by depoſition, divers months before that rebellion, to the archbiſhop of Canterbury and others of the king's council; as the declaration of "no addreſſes" declares. But the aſſurance which they had in private, that no remedy ſhould be applied,

plied, was, it ſeems, one of the chief reaſons that drew on their undertaking. And long it was before that aſſurance failed them; until the biſhops and popiſh lords, who while they ſat and voted, ſtill oppoſed the ſending aid to Ireland, were expelled the houſe.

Seeing then the main incitement and authority for this rebellion muſt be needs derived from England, it will be next inquired, who was the prime author. The king here denounces a malediction temporal and eternal, not ſimply to the author, but to the "malicious author" of this bloodſhed: and by that limitation may exempt, not himſelf only, but perhaps the Iriſh rebels themſelves, who never will confeſs to God or man that any blood was ſhed by them maliciouſly; but either in the catholic cauſe, or common liberty, or ſome other ſpecious plea, which the conſcience from grounds both good and evil uſually ſuggeſts to itſelf: thereby thinking to elude the direct force of that imputation, which lies upon them.

Yet he acknowledges, "it fell out as a moſt unhappy advantage of ſome men's malice againſt him:" but indeed of moſt men's juſt ſuſpicion, by finding in it no ſuch wide departure or diſagreement from the ſcope of his former counſels and proceedings. And that he himſelf was the author of that rebellion, he denies both here and elſewhere, with many imprecations, but no ſolid evidence: What on the other ſide againſt his denial hath been affirmed in three kingdoms, being here briefly ſet in view, the reader may ſo judge as he finds cauſe.

This is moſt certain, that the king was ever friendly to the Iriſh papiſts, and in his third year, againſt the plain advice of parliament, like a kind of pope, ſold them many indulgences for money; and upon all occaſions advancing the popiſh party, and negotiating underhand by prieſts, who were made his agents, engaged the Iriſh papiſts in a war againſt the Scots proteſtants. To that end he furniſhed them, and had them trained in arms, and kept them up, either openly or underhand, the only army in his three kingdoms, till the very burſt of that rebellion. The ſummer before that diſmal October, a committee of moſt active papiſts, all ſince in the head of that rebellion, were in great favour at Whitehall; and admitted

admitted to many private conſultations with the king and queen. And to make it evident that no mean matters were the ſubject of thoſe conferences, at their requeſt he gave away his peculiar right to more than five Iriſh counties, for the payment of an inconſiderable rent. They departed not home till within two months before the rebellion; and were either from the firſt breaking out, or ſoon after, found to be the chief rebels themſelves. But what ſhould move the king beſides his own inclination to popery, and the prevalence of his queen over him, to hold ſuch frequent and cloſe meetings with a committee of Iriſh papiſts in his own houſe, while the parliament of England ſat unadviſed with, is declared by a Scots author, and of itſelf is clear enough. The parliament at the beginning of that ſummer, having put Strafford to death, impriſoned others his chief favourites, and driven the reſt to fly; the king, who had in vain tempted both the Scots and the Engliſh army to come up againſt the parliament and city, finding no compliance anſwerable to his hope from the proteſtant armies, betakes himſelf laſt to the Iriſh; who had in readineſs an army of eight thouſand papiſts, which he had refuſed ſo often to diſband, and a committee here of the ſame religion. With them, who thought the time now come, (which to bring about they had been many years before not wiſhing only, but with much induſtry complotting, to do ſome eminent ſervice for the church of Rome and their own perfidious natures, againſt a puritan parliament and the hated Engliſh their maſters) he agrees and concludes, that ſo ſoon as both armies in England were diſbanded, the Iriſh ſhould appear in arms, maſter all the proteſtants, and help the king againſt his parliament. And we need not doubt, that thoſe five counties were given to the Iriſh for other reaſon than the four northern counties had been a little before offered to the Scots. The king, in Auguſt, takes a journey into Scotland; and overtaking the Scots army then on their way home, attempts the ſecond time to pervert them, but without ſucceſs. No ſooner come into Scotland, but he lays a plot, ſo ſaith the Scots author, to remove out of the way ſuch of the nobility there as were moſt likely to

withſtand, or not to further his deſigns. This being diſcovered, he ſends from his ſide one Dillon, a papiſt lord, ſoon after a chief rebel, with letters into Ireland; and diſpatches a commiſſion under the great ſeal of Scotland, at that time in his own cuſtody, commanding that they ſhould forthwith, as had been formerly agreed, cauſe all the Iriſh to riſe in arms. Who no ſooner had received ſuch command, but obeyed, and began in maſſacre; for they knew no other way to make ſure the proteſtants, which was commanded them expreſsly; and the way, it ſeems, left to their diſcretion. He who hath a mind to read the commiſſion itſelf, and found reaſon added why it was not likely to be forged, beſides the atteſtation of ſo many Iriſh themſelves, may have recourſe to a book, entitled, "The Myſtery of Iniquity." Beſides what the parliament itſelf in the declaration of "no more addreſſes" hath affirmed, that they have one copy of that commiſſion in their own hands, atteſted by the oaths of ſome that were eye-witneſſes, and had ſeen it under the ſeal: others of the principal rebels have confeſſed, that this commiſſion was the ſummer before promiſed at London to the Iriſh commiſſioners; to whom the king then diſcovered in plain words his great deſire to be revenged on the parliament of England.

After the rebellion broke out, which in words only he deteſted, but underhand favoured and promoted by all the offices of friendſhip, correſpondence, and what poſſible aid he could afford them, the particulars whereof are too many to be inſerted here; I ſuppoſe no underſtanding man could longer doubt who was "author or inſtigator" of that rebellion. If there be who yet doubt, I refer them eſpecially to that declaration of July 1643, with that of "no addreſſes" 1647, and another full volume of examinations to be ſet out ſpeedily concerning this matter. Againſt all which teſtimonies, likelihoods, evidences, and apparent actions of his own, being ſo abundant, his bare denial, though with imprecation, can no way countervail; and leaſt of all in his own cauſe.

As for the commiſſion granted them, he thinks to evade that by retorting, that "ſome in England fight againſt

againſt him, and yet "pretend his authority." But, though a parliament by the known laws may affirm juſtly to have the king's authority, inſeparable from that court, though divided from his perſon, it is not credible that the Iriſh rebels, who ſo much tendered his perſon above his authority, and were by him ſo well received at Oxford, would be ſo far from all humanity, as to ſlander him with a particular commiſſion, ſigned and ſent them by his own hand.

And of his good affection to the rebels this chapter itſelf is not without witneſs. He holds them leſs in fault than the Scots, as from whom they might allege to have fetched "their imitation;" making no difference between men that roſe neceſſarily to defend themſelves, which no proteſtant doctrine ever diſallowed, againſt them who threatened war, and thoſe who began a voluntary and cauſeleſs rebellion, with the maſſacre of ſo many thouſands, who never meant them harm.

He falls next to flaſhes, and a multitude of words, in all which is contained no more than what might be the plea of any guiltieſt offender: He was not the author, becauſe "he hath the greateſt ſhare of loſs and diſhonour by what is committed." Who is there that offends God, or his neighbour, on whom the greateſt ſhare of loſs and diſhonour lights not in the end? But in the act of doing evil, men uſe not to conſider the event of theſe evil doings; or if they do, have then no power to curb the ſway of their own wickedneſs: ſo that the greateſt ſhare of loſs and diſhonour to happen upon themſelves, is no argument that they were not guilty. This other is as weak, that "a King's intereſt, above that of any other man, lies chiefly in the common welfare of his ſubjects;" therefore no king will do aught againſt the common welfare. For by this evaſion any tyrant might as well purge himſelf from the guilt of raiſing troubles or commotions among the people, becauſe undoubtedly his chief intereſt lies in their ſitting ſtill.

I ſaid but now, that even this chapter, if nothing elſe, might ſuffice to diſcover his good affection to the rebels, which in this that follows too notoriouſly appears;

pears; imputing this inſurrection to " the prepoſterous rigour, and unreaſonable ſeverity, the covetous zeal and uncharitable fury, of ſome men," (theſe " ſome men," by his continual paraphraſe, are meant the parliament;) and, laſtly, " to the fear of utter extirpation." If the whole Iriſhry of rebels had feed ſome advocate to ſpeak partially and ſophiſtically in their defence, he could have hardly dazzled better; yet nevertheleſs would have proved himſelf no other than a plauſible deceiver. And, perhaps (nay more than perhaps, for it is affirmed and extant under good evidence, that) thoſe feigned terrours and jealouſies were either by the king himſelf, or the popiſh prieſts which were ſent by him, put into the head of that inquiſitive people, on ſet purpoſe to engage them. For who had power " to oppreſs" them, or to relieve them being oppreſſed, but the king, or his immediate deputy? This rather ſhould have made them riſe againſt the king, than againſt the parliament. Who threatened or ever thought of their extirpation, till they themſelves had begun it to the Engliſh? As for " pre- " poſterous rigour, covetous zeal, and uncharitable fury," they had more reaſon to ſuſpect thoſe evils firſt from his own commands, whom they ſaw uſing daily no greater argument to prove the truth of his religion than by enduring no other but his own Prelatical; and, to force it upon others, made epiſcopal, ceremonial, and common-prayer book wars. But the papiſts underſtood him better than by the outſide; and knew that thoſe wars were their wars. Although if the commonwealth ſhould be afraid to ſuppreſs open idolatry, leſt the papiſts thereupon ſhould grow deſperate, this were to let them grow and become our perſecutors, while we neglected what we might have done evangelically to be their reformers: or to do as his father James did, who inſtead of taking heart and putting confidence in God by ſuch a deliverance as from the powder-plot, though it went not off, yet with the mere conceit of it, as ſome obſerve, was hit into ſuch a hectic trembling* between proteſtant and papiſt all his life after, that he never durſt

* The ſecond edition has ſhivering.

from that time do otherwiſe than equivocate or collogue with the pope and his adherents.

He would be thought to commiſerate the ſad effects of that rebellion, and to lament that "the tears and blood ſpilt there did not quench the ſparks of our civil" diſcord here. But who began theſe diſſenſions? and what can be more openly known than thoſe retardings and delays, which by himſelf were continually deviſed, to hinder and put back the relief of thoſe diſtreſſed proteſtants? which undoubtedly, had it not been then put back, might have ſaved many ſtreams of thoſe tears and that blood, whereof he ſeems here ſo ſadly to bewail the ſpilling. His manifold excuſes, diverſions, and delays, are too well known to be recited here in particular, and too many.

But "he offered to go himſelf in perſon upon that expedition," and reckons up many ſurmiſes why he thinks they would not ſuffer him. But mentions not that by his underdealing to debauch armies here at home, and by his ſecret intercourſe with the chief rebels, long ere that time every where known, he had brought the parliament into ſo juſt a diffidence of him, as that they durſt not leave the public arms to his diſpoſal, much leſs an army to his conduct.

He concludes, "That next the ſin of thoſe who began that rebellion, theirs muſt needs be who hindered the ſuppreſſing, or diverted the aids." But judgment raſhly given, ofttimes involves the judge himſelf. He finds fault with thoſe "who threatened all extremity to the rebels," and pleads much that mercy ſhould be ſhown them. It ſeems he found himſelf not ſo much concerned as thoſe who had loſt fathers, brothers, wives and children by their cruelty; whom in juſtice to retaliate is not, as he ſuppoſes, "unevangelical;" ſo long as magiſtracy and war are not laid down under the goſpel. If this his ſermon of affected mercy were not too phariſaical, how could he permit himſelf to cauſe the ſlaughter of ſo many thouſands here in England for mere prerogatives, the toys and gewgaws of his crown, for copes and ſurplices, the trinkets of his prieſts; and not

not perceive his own zeal, while he taxes others, to be moſt prepoſterous and unevangelical? Neither is there the ſame cauſe to deſtroy a whole city for the raviſhing of a ſiſter, not done out of villainy, and recompenſe offered by marriage; nor the ſame cauſe for thoſe diſciples to ſummon fire from Heaven upon the whole city where they were denied lodging; and for a nation by juſt war and execution to ſlay whole families of them, who ſo barbarouſly had ſlain whole families before. Did not all Iſrael do as much againſt the Benjamites for one rape committed by a few, and defended by the whole tribe? and did they not the ſame to Jabeſh-Gilead for not aſſiſting them in that revenge? I ſpeak not this that ſuch meaſure ſhould be meted rigorouſly to all the Iriſh, or as remembering that the parliament ever ſo decreed; but to ſhow that this his homily hath more craft and affectation in it, than of ſound doctrine.

But it was happy that his going into Ireland was not conſented to; for either he had certainly turned his raiſed forces againſt the parliament itſelf, or not gone at all; or had he gone, what work he would have made there, his own following words declare.

" He would have puniſhed ſome;" no queſtion; for ſome, perhaps, who were of leaſt uſe, muſt of neceſſity have been ſacrificed to his reputation, and the convenience of his affairs. Others he " would have diſarmed;" that is to ſay, in his own time: but " all of them he would have protected from the fury of thoſe that would have drowned them, if they had refuſed to ſwim down the popular ſtream." Theſe expreſſions are too often met, and too well underſtood, for any man to doubt his meaning. By the " fury of thoſe," he means no other than the juſtice of parliament, to whom yet he had committed the whole buſineſs. Thoſe who would have refuſed to ſwim down the popular ſtream, our conſtant key tells us to be papiſts, prelates, and their faction; theſe, by his own confeſſion here, he would have protected againſt his puritan parliament: and by this who ſees not that he and the Iriſh rebels had but one aim, one and the ſame drift, and would have forthwith joined in one body againſt us?

He goes on ſtill in his tenderneſs of the Iriſh rebels, fearing leſt " our zeal ſhould be more greedy to kill the bear for his ſkin, than for any harm he hath done." This either juſtifies the rebels to have done no harm at all, or infers his opinion that the parliament is more bloody and rapacious in the proſecution of their juſtice, than thoſe rebels were in the execution of their barbarous cruelty. Let men doubt now and diſpute to whom the king was a friend moſt—to his Engliſh parliament, or to his Iriſh rebels.

With whom, that we may yet ſee further how much he was their friend, after that the parliament had brought them every where either to famine or a low condition, he, to give them all the reſpite and advantages they could deſire, without advice of parliament, to whom he himſelf had committed the managing of that war, makes a ceſſation; in pretence to relieve the proteſtants, " overborne there with numbers;" but, as the event proved, to ſupport the papiſts, by diverting and drawing over the Engliſh army there, to his own ſervice here againſt the parliament. For that the proteſtants were then on the winning hand, it muſt needs be plain; who, notwithſtanding the miſs of thoſe forces, which at their landing here maſtered without difficulty great part of Wales and Cheſhire, yet made a ſhift to keep their own in Ireland. But the plot of this Iriſh truce is in good part diſcovered in that declaration of September 30, 1643. And if the proteſtants were but handfuls there, as he calls them, why did he ſtop and waylay, both by land and ſea, to his utmoſt power, thoſe proviſions and ſupplies which were ſent by the parliament? How were ſo many handfuls called over, as for a while ſtood him in no ſmall ſtead, and againſt our main forces here in England?

Since therefore all the reaſons that can be given of this ceſſation appear ſo falſe and frivolous, it may be juſtly feared, that the deſign itſelf was moſt wicked and pernicious. What remains then? He " appeals to God," and is caſt; likening his puniſhment to Job's trials, before he ſaw them to have Job's ending. But how could charity herſelf believe there was at all in him any religion, ſo much

much as but to fear there is a God; whenas, by what is noted in the declaration of "No more addreſſes," he vowed ſolemnly to the parliament, with imprecations upon himſelf and his poſterity, if ever he conſented to the aboliſhing of thoſe laws which were in force againſt papiſts; and, at the ſame time, as appeared plainly by the very date of his own letters to the queen and Ormond, conſented to the aboliſhing of all penal laws againſt them both in Ireland and England? If theſe were acts of a religious prince, what memory of man, written or unwritten, can tell us news of any prince that ever was irreligious? He cannot ſtand "to make prolix apologies." Then ſurely thoſe long pamphlets ſet out for declarations and proteſtations in his name were none of his; and how they ſhould be his, indeed, being ſo repugnant to the whole courſe of his actions, augments the difficulty.

But he uſurps a common ſaying, "That it is kingly to do well, and hear ill." That may be ſometimes true: but far more frequently to do ill and hear well; ſo great is the multitude of flatterers, and them that deify the name of king!

Yet, not content with theſe neighbours, we have him ſtill a perpetual preacher of his own virtues, and of that eſpecially, which who knows not to be patience perforce?

He "believes it will at laſt appear, that they who firſt began to embroil his other kingdoms, are alſo guilty of the blood of Ireland." And we believe ſo too; for now the ceſſation is become a peace by publiſhed articles, and commiſſion to bring them over againſt England, firſt only ten thouſand by the earl of Glamorgan*, next all of them, if poſſible, under Ormond, which was the laſt of all his tranſactions done as a public perſon. And no wonder; for he looked upon the blood ſpilt, whether of ſubjects or of rebels, with an indifferent eye, "as exhauſted out of his own veins;" without diſtinguiſhing,

* See this fully proved in Dr. Birch's Enquiry into the ſhare which King Charles I. had in the tranſactions of the earl of Glamorgan. The ſecond edition, 1756.

as he ought, which was good blood and which corrupt; the not letting out whereof, endangers the whole body.

And what the doctrine is, ye may perceive alſo by the prayer, which, after a ſhort ejaculation for the "poor proteſtants," prays at large for the Iriſh rebels, that God would not give them over, or "their children, to the covetouſneſs, cruelty, fierce and curſed anger" of the parliament.

He finiſhes with a deliberate and ſolemn curſe "upon himſelf and his father's houſe." Which how far God hath already brought to paſs, is to the end, that men, by ſo eminent an example, ſhould learn to tremble at his judgments; and not play with imprecations.

XIII. *Upon the calling in of the Scots, and their coming.*

IT muſt needs ſeem ſtrange, where men accuſtom themſelves to ponder and contemplate things in their firſt original and inſtitution, that kings, who, as all other officers of the public, were at firſt choſen and inſtalled only by conſent and ſuffrage of the people, to govern them as freemen by laws of their own making, and to be, in conſideration of that dignity and riches beſtowed upon them, the entruſted ſervants of the commonwealth, ſhould, notwithſtanding, grow up to that diſhoneſt encroachment, as to eſteem themſelves maſters, both of that great truſt which they ſerve, and of the people that betruſted them; counting what they ought to do, both in diſcharge of their public duty, and for the great reward of honour and revenue which they receive, as done all of mere grace and favour; as if their power over us were by nature, and from themſelves, or that God had ſold us into their hands. Indeed, if the race of kings were eminently the beſt of men, as the breed at Tutbury is of horſes, it would in reaſon then be their part only to command, ours always to obey. But kings by generation no way excelling others, and moſt commonly not being the wiſeſt or the worthieſt by far of whom they claim to have the governing; that we ſhould yield them ſubjection

ſubjection to our own ruin, or hold of them the right of our common ſafety, and our natural freedom by mere gift, (as when the conduit piſſes wine at coronations) from the ſuperfluity of their royal grace and beneficence, we may be ſure was never the intent of God, whoſe ways are juſt and equal; never the intent of nature, whoſe works are alſo regular; never of any people not wholly barbarous, whom prudence, or no more but human ſenſe, would have better guided when they firſt created kings, than ſo to nullify and tread to dirt the reſt of mankind, by exalting one perſon and his lineage without other merit looked after, but the mere contingency of a begetting, into an abſolute and unaccountable dominion over them and their poſterity. Yet this ignorant or wilful miſtake of the whole matter had taken ſo deep root in the imagination of this king, that whether to the Engliſh or to the Scot, mentioning what acts of his regal office (though God knows how unwillingly) he had paſſed, he calls them, as in other places, acts of grace and bounty; ſo here "ſpecial obligations, favours, to gratify active ſpirits, and the deſires of that party." Words not only ſounding pride and lordly uſurpation, but injuſtice, partiality, and corruption. For to the Iriſh he ſo far condeſcended, as firſt to tolerate in private, then to covenant openly the tolerating of popery: ſo far to the Scot, as to remove biſhops, eſtabliſh preſbytery, and the militia in their own hands; "preferring, as ſome thought, the deſires of Scotland before his own intereſt and honour." But being once on this ſide Tweed, his reaſon, his conſcience, and his honour became ſo frightened with a kind of falſe virginity, that to the Engliſh neither one nor other of the ſame demands could be granted, wherewith the Scots were gratified; as if our air and climate on a ſudden had changed the property and the nature both of conſcience, honour, and reaſon, or that he found none ſo fit as Engliſh to be the ſubjects of his arbitrary power. Ireland was as Ephraim, the ſtrength of his head; Scotland as Judah, was his lawgiver; but over England, as over Edom, he meant to caſt his ſhoe: and yet ſo many ſober Engliſhmen, not ſufficiently awake to conſider this, like men

enchanted with the Circæan cup of ſervitude, will not be held back from running their own heads into the yoke of bondage.

The ſum of his diſcourſe is againſt "ſettling of religion by violent means;" which, whether it were the Scots deſign upon England, they are beſt able to clear themſelves. But this of all may ſeem ſtrangeſt, that the king, who, while it was permitted him, never did thing more eagerly than to moleſt and perſecute the conſciences of moſt religious men; he who had made a war, and loſt all, rather than not uphold a hierarchy of perſecuting biſhops, ſhould have the confidence here to profeſs himſelf ſo much an enemy of thoſe that force the conſcience. For was it not he, who upon the Engliſh obtruded new ceremonies, upon the Scots a new Liturgy, and with his ſword went about to engrave * a bloody Rubric on their backs? Did he not forbid and hinder all effectual ſearch of truth; nay, like a beſieging enemy, ſtopped all her paſſages both by word and writing? Yet here can talk of "fair and equal diſputations:" where, notwithſtanding, if all ſubmit not to his judgment, as not being "rationally convicted," they muſt ſubmit (and he conceals it not) to his penalty, as counted obſtinate. But what if he himſelf, and thoſe his learned churchmen, were the convicted or the obſtinate part long ago; ſhould reformation ſuffer them to ſit lording over the church in their fat biſhoprics and pluralities, like the great whore that ſitteth upon many waters, till they would vouchſafe to be diſputed out? Or ſhould we ſit diſputing, while they ſat plotting and perſecuting? Thoſe clergymen were not "to be driven into the fold like ſheep," as his ſimile runs, but to be driven out of the fold like wolves or thieves, where they ſat fleecing thoſe flocks which they never fed.

He believes "that preſbytery, though proved to be the only inſtitution of Jeſus Chriſt, were not by the ſword to be ſet up without his conſent;" which is contrary both to the doctrine and the known practice of all proteſtant churches, if his ſword threaten thoſe who of their own accord embrace it.

* The ſecond edition has ſcore.

And

And although Chriſt and his apoſtles, being to civil affairs but private men, contended not with magiſtrates; yet when magiſtrates themſelves, and eſpecially parliaments, who have greateſt right to diſpoſe of the civil ſword, come to know religion, they ought in conſcience to defend all thoſe who receive it willingly, againſt the violence of any king or tyrant whatſoever. Neither is it therefore true, "that Chriſtianity is planted or watered with Chriſtian blood;" for there is a large difference between forcing men by the ſword to turn preſbyterians, and defending thoſe who willingly are ſo, from a furious inroad of bloody biſhops, armed with the militia of a king their pupil. And if "covetouſneſs and ambition be an argument that preſbytery hath not much of Chriſt," it argues more ſtrongly againſt epiſcopacy; which, from the time of her firſt mounting to an order above the preſbyters, had no other parents than covetouſneſs and ambition. And thoſe ſects, ſchiſms, and hereſies, which he ſpeaks of, "if they get but ſtrength and numbers," need no other pattern than epiſcopacy and himſelf, to "ſet up their ways by the like method of violence." Nor is there any thing that hath more marks of ſchiſm and ſectariſm than Engliſh epiſcopacy; whether we look at apoſtolic times, or at reformed churches; for "the univerſal way of church-government before," may as ſoon lead us into groſs errour, as their univerſally corrupted doctrine. And government, by reaſon of ambition, was likelieſt to be corrupted much the ſooner of the two. However, nothing can be to us catholic or univerſal in religion, but what the Scripture teaches; whatſoever without Scripture pleads to be univerſal in the church, in being univerſal is but the more ſchiſmatical. Much leſs can particular laws and conſtitutions impart to the church of England any power of conſiſtory or tribunal above other churches, to be the ſole judge of what is ſect or ſchiſm, as with much rigour, and without Scripture they took upon them. Yet theſe the king reſolves here to defend and maintain to his laſt, pretending, after all thoſe conferences offered, or had with him, "not to ſee more rational and religious motives than ſoldiers carry

in

in their knapſacks ;" with one thus reſolved, it was but folly to ſtand diſputing.

He imagines his " own judicious zeal to be moſt concerned in his tuition of the church." So thought Saul when he preſumed to offer ſacrifice, for which he loſt his kingdom ; ſo thought Uzziah when he went into the temple, but was thruſt out with a leproſy for his opinioned zeal, which he thought judicious. It is not the part of a king, becauſe he ought to defend the church, therefore to ſet himſelf ſupreme head over the church, or to meddle with eccleſial government, or to defend the church otherwiſe than the church would be defended; for ſuch defence is bondage: nor to defend abuſes, and ſtop all reformation under the name of " new moulds fancied and faſhioned to private deſigns." The holy things of church are in the power of other keys than were delivered to his keeping. Chriſtian liberty, purchaſed with the death of our Redeemer, and eſtabliſhed by the ſending of his free ſpirit to inhabit in us, is not now to depend upon the doubtful conſent of any earthly monarch ; nor to be again fettered with a preſumptuous negative voice, tyrannical to the parliament, but much more tyrannical to the church of God ; which was compelled to implore the aid of parliament, to remove his force and heavy hands from off our conſciences, who therefore complains now of that moſt juſt defenſive force, becauſe only it removed his violence and perſecution. If this be a violation to his conſcience, that it was hindered by the parliament from violating the more tender conſciences of ſo many thouſand good Chriſtians, let the uſurping conſcience of all tyrants be ever ſo violated !

He wonders, fox wonder! how we could ſo much " diſtruſt God's aſſiſtance," as to call in the proteſtant aid of our brethren in Scotland: why then did he, if his truſt were in God and the juſtice of his cauſe, not ſcruple to ſolicit and invite earneſtly the aſſiſtance both of papiſts and of Iriſh rebels? If the Scots were by us at length ſent home, they were not called to ſtay here always; neither was it for the people's eaſe to feed ſo many legions longer than their help was needful.

" The government of their kirk we deſpiſed" not, but their impoſing of that government upon us; not preſbytery, but archpreſbytery, claſſical, provincial, and dioceſan preſbytery, claiming to itſelf a lordly power and ſuperintendency both over flocks and paſtors, over perſons and congregations no way their own. But theſe debates, in his judgment, would have been ended better " by the beſt divines in Chriſtendom in a full and free ſynod." A moſt improbable way, and ſuch as never yet was uſed, at leaſt with good ſucceſs, by any proteſtant kingdom or ſtate ſince the reformation: every true church having wherewithal from Heaven, and the aſſiſting ſpirit of Chriſt implored, to be complete and perfect within itſelf. And the whole nation is not eaſily to be thought ſo raw, and ſo perpetually a novice, after all this light, as to need the help and direction of other nations, more than what they write in public of their opinion, in a matter ſo familiar as church-government.

In fine, he accuſes Piety with the want of Loyalty, and Religion with the breach of Allegiance, as if God and he were one maſter, whoſe commands were ſo often contrary to the commands of God. He would perſuade the Scots, that their " chief intereſt conſiſts in their fidelity to the crown." But true policy will teach them, to find a ſafer intereſt in the common friendſhip of England, than in the ruins of one ejected family.

XIV. *Upon the Covenant.*

UPON this theme his diſcourſe is long, his matter little but repetition, and therefore ſoon anſwered. Firſt, after an abuſive and ſtrange apprehenſion of covenants, as if men " pawned their ſouls" to them with whom they covenant, he digreſſes to plead for biſhops; firſt from the antiquity of their " poſſeſſion here, ſince the firſt plantation of chriſtianity in this iſland;" next from " a univerſal preſcription ſince the Apoſtles, till this laſt century." But what avails the moſt primitive antiquity againſt the plain ſenſe of Scripture? which, if the laſt century have beſt followed,

followed, it ought in our eſteem to be the firſt. And yet it hath been often proved by learned men, from the writings and epiſtles of moſt ancient chriſtians, that epiſcopacy crept not up into an order above the preſbyters, till many years after that the apoſtles were deceaſed.

He next "is unſatisfied with the covenant," not only for "ſome paſſages in it referring to himſelf," as he ſuppoſes, "with very dubious and dangerous limitations," but for binding men "by oath and covenant" to the reformation of church-diſcipline. Firſt, thoſe limitations were not more dangerous to him, than he to our liberty and religion; next, that which was there vowed, to caſt out of the church an antichriſtian hierarchy which God had not planted, but ambition and corruption had brought in, and foſtered to the church's great damage and oppreſſion, was no point of controverſy to be argued without end, but a thing of clear moral neceſſity to be forthwith done. Neither was the "covenant ſuperfluous, though former engagements, both religious and legal, bound us before:" but was the practice of all churches heretofore intending reformation. All Iſrael, though bound enough before by the law of Moſes "to all neceſſary duties;" yet with Aſa their king entered into a new covenant at the beginning of a reformation: and the Jews, after captivity, without conſent demanded of that king who was their maſter, took ſolemn oath to walk in the commandments of God. All proteſtant churches have done the like, notwithſtanding former engagements to their ſeveral duties. And although his aim were to ſow variance between the proteſtation and the covenant, to reconcile them is not difficult. The proteſtation was but one ſtep, extending only to the doctrine of the church of England, as it was diſtinct from church diſcipline; the covenant went further, as it pleaſed God to diſpenſe his light and our encouragement by degrees, and comprehended church-government: Former with latter ſteps, in the progreſs of well-doing, need not reconcilement. Nevertheleſs he breaks through to his concluſion, "that all honeſt and wiſe men ever thought themſelves ſufficiently bound by former ties of religion;" leaving Aſa, Ezra, and the whole church

church of God, in ſundry ages, to ſhift for honeſty and wiſdom from ſome other than his teſtimony. And although after-contracts abſolve not till the former be made void, yet he firſt having done that, our duty returns back, which to him was neither moral nor eternal, but conditional.

Willing to perſuade himſelf that many "good men" took the covenant, either unwarily or out of fear, he ſeems to have beſtowed ſome thoughts how theſe "good men," following his advice, may keep the covenant and not keep it. The firſt evaſion is, preſuming "that the chief end of covenanting in ſuch men's intentions was to preſerve religion in purity, and the kingdom's peace." But the covenant will more truly inform them, that purity of religion and the kingdom's peace was not then in ſtate to be preſerved, but to be reſtored; and therefore binds them not to a preſervation of what was, but to a reformation of what was evil, what was traditional, and dangerous, whether novelty or antiquity, in church or ſtate. To do this, claſhes with "no former oath" lawfully ſworn either to God or the king, and rightly underſtood.

In general, he brands all "ſuch confederations by league and covenant, as the common road uſed in all factious perturbations of ſtate and church." This kind of language reflects, with the ſame ignominy, upon all the proteſtant reformations that have been ſince Luther; and ſo indeed doth his whole book, repleniſhed throughout with hardly other words or arguments than papiſts, and eſpecially popiſh kings, have uſed heretofore againſt their proteſtant ſubjects; whom he would perſuade to be "every man his own pope, and to abſolve himſelf of thoſe ties," by the ſuggeſtion of falſe or equivocal interpretations too oft repeated to be now anſwered.

The parliament, he ſaith, "made their covenant like manna, agreeable to every man's palate." This is another of his gloſſes upon the covenant; he is content to let it be manna, but his drift is that men ſhould loath it or at leaſt expound it by their own "reliſh," and "latitude of ſenſe;" wherein, leſt any one of the ſimpler ſort ſhould fail to be his craftsmaſter, he furniſhes him with

two

two or three laxative, he terms them " general clauſes, which may ſerve ſomewhat to relieve them" againſt the covenant taken: intimating, as if " what were lawful and according to the word of God," were no otherwiſe ſo, than as every man fancied to himſelf. From ſuch learned explications and reſolutions as theſe upon the covenant, what marvel if no royaliſt or malignant refuſe to take it, as having learnt from theſe princely inſtructions his many " ſalvoes, cautions, and reſervations," how to be a covenanter and anticovenanter, how at once to be a Scot, and an Iriſh rebel.

He returns again to diſallow of " that reformation which the covenant" vows, " as being the partial advice of a few divines." But matters of this moment, as they were not to be decided there by thoſe divines, ſo neither are they to be determined here by eſſays and curtal aphoriſms, but by ſolid proofs of Scripture.

The reſt of his diſcourſe he ſpends, highly accuſing the parliament, " that the main reformation by" them " intended, was to rob the church," and much applauding himſelf both for " his forwardneſs" to all due reformation, and his averſeneſs from all ſuch kind of ſacrilege. All which, with his glorious title of the " Church's Defender," we leave him to make good by " Pharaoh's divinity," if he pleaſe, for to Joſeph's piety it will be a talk unſuitable. As for " the parity and poverty of miniſters," which he takes to be ſo ſad of " conſequence," the Scripture reckons them for two ſpecial legacies left by our Saviour to his diſciples; under which two primitive nurſes, for ſuch they were indeed, the church of God more truly flouriſhed than ever after, ſince the time that imparity and church-revenue ruſhing in, corrupted and belepered all the clergy with a worſe infection than Gehazi's; ſome one of whoſe tribe, rather than a king, I ſhould take to be compiler of that unſalted and Simonical prayer annexed: although the prayer itſelf ſtrongly prays againſt them. For never ſuch holy things as he means were given more to ſwine, nor the church's bread more to dogs, than when it fed ambitious, irreligious and dumb prelates.

XV. *Upon*

XV. *Upon the many Jealouſies, &c.*

TO wipe off jealouſies and ſcandals, the beſt way had been by clear actions, or till actions could be cleared, by evident reaſons; but mere words we are too well acquainted with. Had " his honour and reputation been dearer to him" than the luſt of reigning, how could the parliament of either nation have laid ſo often at his door the breach of words, promiſes, acts, oaths, and execrations, as they do avowedly in many of their petitions and addreſſes to him? Thither I remit the reader. And who can believe that whole parliaments, elected by the people from all parts of the land, ſhould meet in one mind and reſolution not to adviſe him, but to conſpire againſt him, in a worſe powder-plot than Cateſbie's, " to blow up," as he terms it, " the people's affection towards him, and batter down their loyalty by the engines of foul aſperſions:" Water-works rather than engines to batter with, yet thoſe aſperſions were raiſed from the foulneſs of his own actions: whereof to purge himſelf, he uſes no other argument than a general and ſo often iterated commendation of himſelf; and thinks that court holy-water hath the virtue of expiation, at leaſt with the ſilly people; to whom he familiarly imputes ſin where none is, to ſeem liberal of his forgiveneſs where none is aſked or needed.

What ways he hath taken toward the proſperity of his people, which he would ſeem " ſo earneſtly to deſire," if we do but once call to mind, it will be enough to teach us, looking on the ſmooth inſinuations here, that tyrants are not more flattered by their ſlaves, than forced to flatter others whom they fear.

For the people's " tranquillity he would willingly be the Jonah;" but leſt he ſhould be taken at his word, pretends to foreſee within ken two imaginary " winds" never heard of in the compaſs, which threaten, if he be caſt overboard, " to increaſe the ſtorm;" but that controverſy divine lot hath ended.

" He had rather not rule, than that his people ſhould be ruined:" and yet, above theſe twenty years, hath been

been ruining the people about the niceties of his ruling. He is accurate "to put a difference between the plague of malice and the ague of miſtakes; the itch of novelty, and the leproſy of diſloyalty." But had he as well known how to diſtingniſh between the venerable gray hairs of ancient religion, and the old ſcurf of ſuperſtition, between the wholeſome heat of well governing, and the feverous rage of tyrannizing, his judgment in ſtate phyſic had been of more authority.

Much he propheſies, "that the credit of thoſe men, who have caſt black ſcandals on him, ſhall ere long be quite blaſted by the ſame furnace of popular obloquy, wherein they ſought to caſt his name and honour." I believe not that a Romiſh gilded portraiture gives better oracle than a Babyloniſh golden image could do, to tell us truly who heated that furnace of obloquy, or who deſerves to be thrown in, Nebuchadnezzar or the three kingdoms. It "gave him great cauſe to ſuſpect his own innocence," that he was oppoſed by "ſo many who profeſſed ſingular piety." But this qualm was ſoon over, and he concluded rather to ſuſpect their religion than his own innocence, affirming that "many with him were both learned and religious above the ordinary ſize." But if his great ſeal, without the parliament, were not ſufficient to create lords, his parole muſt needs be far more unable to create learned and religious men; and who ſhall authorize his unlearned judgment to point them out?

He gueſſes that "many well-minded men were by popular preachers urged to oppoſe him." But the oppoſition undoubtedly proceeded and continues from heads far wiſer, and ſpirits of a nobler ſtrain; thoſe prieſt-led Herodians, with their blind guides, are in the ditch already; travelling, as they thought, to Sion, but moored in the Iſle of Wight.

He thanks God "for his conſtancy to the proteſtant religion both abroad and at home." Abroad, his letter to the pope; at home, his innovations in the church will ſpeak his conſtancy in religion what it was, without further credit to this vain boaſt.

His "uſing the aſſiſtance of ſome papiſts," as the cauſe might

might be, could not hurt his religion; but, in the ſettling of proteſtaniſm, their aid was both unſeemly and ſuſpicious, and inferred that the greateſt part of proteſtants were againſt him and his obtruded ſettlement.

But this is ſtrange indeed, that he ſhould appear now teaching the parliament what no man, till this was read, thought ever he had learned, "that difference of perſuaſion in religious matters may fall out where there is the ſameneſs of allegiance and ſubjection." If he thought ſo from the beginning, wherefore was there ſuch compulſion uſed to the puritans of England, and the whole realm of Scotland, about conforming to a liturgy? Wherefore no biſhop, no king? Wherefore epiſcopacy more agreeable to monarchy, if different perſuaſions in religion may agree in one duty and allegiance? Thus do court maxims, like court minions, riſe or fall as the king pleaſes.

Not to tax him for want of elegance as a courtier, in writing Oglio for Olla the Spaniſh word, it might be well affirmed, that there was a greater medley and diſproportioning of religions, to mix papiſts with proteſtants in a religious cauſe, than to entertain all thoſe diverſified ſects, who yet were all proteſtants, one religion, though many opinions.

Neither was it any "ſhame to proteſtants," that he, a declared papiſt, if his own letter to the pope, not yet renounced, belie him not, found ſo few proteſtants of his religion, as enforced him to call in both the counſel and the aid of papiſts to help eſtabliſh proteſtancy, who were led on, not "by the ſenſe of their allegiance," but by the hope of his apoſtacy to Rome, from diſputing to warring; his own voluntary and firſt appeal.

His hearkening to evil counſellors, charged upon him ſo often by the parliament, he puts off as "a device of thoſe men, who were ſo eager to give him better counſel." That "thoſe men" were the parliament, and that he ought to have uſed the counſel of none but thoſe, as a king, is already known. What their civility laid upon evil counſellors, he himſelf moſt commonly owned; but the event of thoſe evil counſels, "the enormities, the confuſions, the miſeries," he transfers from the guilt of his own civil broils to the juſt reſiſtance made by parlia-

ment; and imputes what miſcarriages of his they could not yet remove for his oppoſing, as if they were ſome new miſdemeanours of their bringing in, and not the inveterate diſeaſes of his own bad government; which, with a diſeaſe as bad, he falls again to magnify and commend: and may all thoſe who would be governed by his "retractions and conceſſions," rather than by laws of parliament, admire his ſelf-encomiums, and be flattered with that "crown of patience," to which he cunningly exhorted them, that his monarchical foot might have the ſetting it upon their heads!

That truſt which the parliament faithfully diſcharged in the aſſerting of our liberties, he calls, "another artifice to withdraw the people from him to their deſigns." What piece of juſtice could they have demanded for the people, which the jealouſy of a king might not have miſcalled a deſign to diſparage his government, and to ingratiate themſelves? To be more juſt, religious, wiſe, or magnanimous than the common ſort, ſtirs up in a tyrant both fear and envy; and ſtraight he cries out popularity, which, in his account, is little leſs than treaſon. The ſum is, they thought to limit or take away the remora of his negative voice, which, like to that little peſt at ſea, took upon it to arreſt and ſtop the commonwealth ſteering under full ſail to a reformation: they thought to ſhare with him in the militia, both or either of which he could not poſſibly hold without conſent of the people, and not be abſolutely a tyrant. He profeſſes "to deſire no other liberty than what he envies not his ſubjects according to law;" yet fought with might and main againſt his ſubjects, to have a ſole power over them in his hand, both againſt and beyond law. As for the philoſophical liberty which in vain he talks of, we may conclude him very ill trained up in thoſe free notions, who to civil liberty was ſo injurious.

He calls the conſcience "God's ſovereignty;" why, then, doth he conteſt with God about that ſupreme title? why did he lay reſtraints, and force enlargements upon our conſciences in things for which we were to anſwer God only and the church? God bids us "be ſubject for conſcience ſake;" that is, as to a magiſtrate, and in the

laws; not uſurping over ſpiritual things, as Lucifer beyond his ſphere. And the ſame precept bids him likewiſe, for conſcience ſake, be ſubject to the parliament, both his natural and his legal ſuperiour.

Finally, having laid the fault of theſe commotions not upon his own miſgovernment, but upon the "ambition of others, the neceſſity of ſome men's fortune, and thirſt after novelty," he bodes himſelf "much honour and reputation, that, like the ſun, ſhall riſe and recover himſelf to ſuch a ſplendour, as owls, bats, and ſuch fatal birds ſhall be unable to bear." Poets, indeed, uſed to vapour much after this manner. But to bad kings, who, without cauſe, expect future glory from their actions, it happens, as to bad poets, who ſit and ſtarve themſelves with a deluſive hope to win immortality by their bad lines. For though men ought not to "ſpeak evil of dignities" which are juſt, yet nothing hinders us to ſpeak evil, as often as it is the truth, of thoſe who in their dignities do evil. Thus did our Saviour himſelf, John the Baptiſt, and Stephen the Martyr. And thoſe black veils of his own miſdeeds he might be ſure would ever keep "his face from ſhining," till he could "refute evil ſpeaking with well doing," which grace he ſeems here to pray for; and his prayer doubtleſs as it was prayed, ſo it was heard. But even his prayer is ſo ambitious of prerogative, that it dares aſk away the prerogative of Chriſt himſelf, "To become the headſtone of the corner."

XVI. *Upon the Ordinance againſt the Common Prayer Book.*

WHAT to think of liturgies, both the ſenſe of ſcripture, and apoſtolical practice, would have taught him better, than his human reaſonings and conjectures: nevertheleſs, what weight they have, let us conſider. If it "be no news to have all innovations uſhered in with the name of reformation," ſure it is leſs news to have all reformation cenſured and oppoſed under the name of innovation, by thoſe who, being exalted in high place above their merit, fear all change, though of things never ſo ill or ſo unwiſely ſettled. So hardly can the dotage of

thoſe that dwell upon antiquity allow preſent times any ſhare of godlineſs or wiſdom.

The removing of liturgy he traduces to be done only as a "thing plauſible to the people;" whoſe rejection of it he likens, with ſmall reverence, to the crucifying of our Saviour; next, that it was done "to pleaſe thoſe men who gloried in their extemporary vein," meaning the miniſters. For whom it will be beſt to anſwer, as was anſwered for the man born blind, "They are of age, let them ſpeak for themſelves;" not how they came blind, but whether it were liturgy that held them tongue-tied.

"For the matter contained in that book," we need no better witneſs than King Edward the Sixth, who to the Corniſh rebels confeſſes it was no other than the old maſs-book done into Engliſh, all but ſome few words that were expunged. And by this argument, which King Edward ſo promptly had to uſe againſt that irreligious rabble, we may be aſſured it was the carnal fear of thoſe divines and politicians that modelled the liturgy no farther off from the old maſs, leſt by too great an alteration they ſhould incenſe the people, and be deſtitute of the ſame ſhifts to fly to, which they had taught the young king.

"For the manner of uſing ſet forms, there is no doubt but that, wholeſome" matter and good deſires rightly conceived in the heart, wholeſome words will follow of themſelves. Neither can any true Chriſtian find a reaſon why liturgy ſhould be at all admitted, a preſcription not impoſed or practiſed by thoſe firſt founders of the church, who alone had that authority: without whoſe precept or example, how conſtantly the prieſt puts on his gown and ſurplice, ſo conſtantly doth his prayer put on a ſervile yoke of liturgy. This is evident, that they "who uſe no ſet forms of prayer," have words from their affections; while others are to ſeek affections fit and proportionable to a certain doſe of prepared words; which as they are not rigorouſly forbid to any man's private infirmity, ſo to impriſon and confine by force, into a pinfold of ſet words, thoſe two moſt unimpriſonable things, our prayers, and that divine ſpirit of utterance

ance that moves them, is a tyranny that would have longer hands than thoſe giants who threatened bondage to Heaven! What we may do in the ſame form of words is not ſo much the queſtion, as whether liturgy may be forced as he forced it. It is true that we "pray to the ſame God;" muſt we, therefore, always uſe the ſame words? Let us then uſe but one word, becauſe we pray to one God. "We profeſs the ſame truths," but the liturgy comprehends not all truths: "we read the ſame ſcriptures," but never read that all thoſe ſacred expreſſions, all benefit and uſe of Scripture, as to public prayer, ſhould be denied us, except what was barrelled up in a common prayer-book with many mixtures of their own, and, which is worſe, without ſalt. But ſuppoſe them ſavory words and unmixed, ſuppoſe them manna itſelf, yet, if they ſhall be hoarded up and enjoined us, while God every morning rains down new expreſſions into our hearts; inſtead of being fit to uſe, they will be found like reſerved manna, rather to breed worms and ſtink. "We have the ſame duties upon us, and feel the ſame wants;" yet not always the ſame, nor at all times alike; but with variety of circumſtances, which aſk variety of words: whereof God hath given us plenty; not to uſe ſo copiouſly upon all other occaſions, and ſo niggardly to him alone in our devotions. As if chriſtians were now in a worſe famine of words fit for prayer, than was of food at the ſiege of Jeruſalem, when perhaps the prieſts being to remove the ſhowbread, as was accuſtomed, were compelled every ſabbath day, for want of other loaves, to bring again ſtill the ſame. If the "Lord's Prayer" had been the "warrant or the pattern of ſet liturgies," as is here affirmed, why was neither that prayer, nor any other ſet form ever after uſed, or ſo much as mentioned by the Apoſtles, much leſs commended to our uſe? Why was their care wanting in a thing ſo uſeful to the church? ſo full of danger and contention to be left undone by them to other men's penning, of whoſe authority we could not be ſo certain? Why was this forgotten by them, who declare that they have revealed to us the whole counſel of God? who, as he left our affections to be guided by his ſanctifying ſpirit,

ſo did he likewiſe our words to be put into us without our premeditation*; not only thoſe cautious words to be uſed before gentiles and tyrants, but much more thoſe filial words, of which we have ſo frequent uſe in our acceſs with freedom of ſpeech to the throne of grace. Which to lay aſide for other outward dictates of men, were to injure him and his perfect gift, who is the ſpirit, and the giver of our ability to pray; as if his miniſtration were incomplete, and that to whom he gave affections, he did not alſo afford utterance to make his gift of prayer a perfect gift; to them eſpecially, whoſe office in the church is to pray publicly.

And although the gift were only natural, yet voluntary prayers are leſs ſubject to formal and ſuperficial tempers than ſet forms: for in thoſe, at leaſt for words and matter, he who prays muſt conſult firſt with his heart, which in likelihood may ſtir up his affections; in theſe, having both words and matter ready made to his lips, which is enough to make up the outward act of prayer, his affections grow lazy, and come not up eaſily at the call of words not their own; the prayer alſo having leſs intercourſe and ſympathy with a heart wherein it was not conceived, ſaves itſelf the labour of ſo long a journey downward, and flying up in haſte on the ſpecious wings of formality, if it fall not back again headlong, inſtead of a prayer which was expected, preſents God with a ſet of ſtale and empty words.

No doubt but "oſtentation and formality" may taint the beſt duties; we are not therefore to leave duties for no duties, and to turn prayer into a kind of lurry. Cannot unpremeditated babblings be rebuked, and reſtrained in whom we find they are, but the ſpirit of God muſt be forbidden in all men? But it is the cuſtom of bad men and hypocrites, to take advantage at the leaſt abuſe of good things, that under that covert they may remove the goodneſs of thoſe things, rather than the abuſe. And how unknowingly, how weakly is the uſing of ſet

* The promiſe of the Spirit's aſſiſtance, here alluded to, was extraordinary, and belonged only to the firſt age; ſo that the author's argument is in this part inconcluſive.

forms

forms attributed here to "conſtancy," as if it were conſtancy in the cuckoo to be always in the ſame liturgy.

Much leſs can it be lawful than an Engliſhed maſs-book, compoſed, for aught we know, by men neither learned, nor godly, ſhould juſtle out, or at any time deprive us the exerciſe of that heavenly gift, which God by ſpecial promiſe pours out daily upon his church, that is to ſay, the ſpirit of prayer. Whereof to help thoſe many infirmities, which he reckons up, "rudeneſs, impertinency, flatneſs," and the like, we have a remedy of God's finding out, which is not liturgy, but his own free ſpirit. Though we know not what to pray as we ought, yet he with ſighs unutterable by any words, much leſs by a ſtinted liturgy, dwelling in us makes interceſſion for us, according to the mind and will of God, both in private and in the performance of all eccleſiaſtical duties. For it is his promiſe alſo, that where two or three gathered together in his name ſhall agree to aſk him any thing, it ſhall be granted; for he is there in the midſt of them. If then ancient churches, to remedy the infirmities of prayer, or rather the infections of Arian and Pelagian hereſies, neglecting that ordained and promiſed help of the ſpirit, betook them almoſt four hundred years after Chriſt to liturgy, (their own invention,) we are not to imitate them; nor to diſtruſt God in the removal of that truant help to our devotion, which by him never was appointed. And what is ſaid of liturgy, is ſaid alſo of directory, if it be impoſed: although to forbid the ſervice-book there be much more reaſon, as being of itſelf ſuperſtitious, offenſive, and indeed, though Engliſhed, yet ſtill the maſs-book; and public places ought to be provided of ſuch as need not the help of liturgies or directories continually, but are ſupported with miniſterial gifts anſwerable to their calling.

Laſtly, that the common-prayer book was rejected becauſe it "prayed ſo oft for him," he had no reaſon to object: for what large and laborious prayers were made for him in the pulpits, if he never heard, it is doubtful they were never heard in Heaven. We might now have expected, that his own following prayer ſhould

add much credit to ſet forms; but on the contrary we find the ſame imperfections in it, as in moſt before, which he lays here upon extemporal. Nor doth he aſk of God to be directed whether liturgies be lawful, but preſumes, and in a manner would perſuade him, that they be ſo; praying, "that the church and he may never want them." What could be prayed worſe extempore? unleſs he mean by wanting, that they may never need them.

XVII. *Of the differences in point of Church-Government.*

THE government of church by biſhops hath been ſo fully proved from the ſcriptures to be vicious and uſurped, that whether out of piety or policy maintained, it is not much material; for piety grounded upon errour can no more juſtify king Charles, than it did queen Mary, in the ſight of God or man. This however muſt not be let paſs without a ſerious obſervation; God having ſo diſpoſed the author in this chapter as to confeſs and diſcover more of myſtery and combination between tyranny and falſe religion, than from any other hand would have been credible. Here we may ſee the very dark roots of them both turned up, and how they twine and interweave one another in the earth, though above ground ſhooting up in two ſeveral branches. We may have learnt both from ſacred hiſtory, and times of reformation, that the kings of this world have both ever hated and inſtinctively feared the church of God. Whether it be for that their doctrine ſeems much to favour two things to them ſo dreadful, liberty and equality; or becauſe they are the children of that kingdom, which, as ancient prophecies have foretold, ſhall in the end break to pieces and diſſolve all their great power and dominion. And thoſe kings and potentates who have ſtrove moſt to rid themſelves of this fear, by cutting off or ſuppreſſing the true church, have drawn upon themſelves the occaſion of their own ruin, while they thought with moſt policy to prevent it. Thus Pharaoh, when once he began to fear and wax jealous of the Iſraelites, leſt they

they ſhould multiply and fight againſt him, and that his fear ſtirred him up to afflict and keep them under, as the only remedy of what he feared, ſoon found that the evil which before ſlept, came ſuddenly upon him, by the preposterous way he took to prevent* it. Paſſing by examples between, and not ſhutting wilfully our eyes, we may ſee the like ſtory brought to paſs in our own land. This king, more than any before him, except perhaps his father, from his firſt entrance to the crown, harbouring in his mind a ſtrange fear and ſuſpicion of men moſt religious, and their doctrine, which in his own language he here acknowledges, terming it "the ſeditious exorbitancy" of miniſters tongues, and doubting "leſt they," as he not chriſtianly expreſſes it, "ſhould with the keys of Heaven let out peace and loyalty from the people's hearts;" though they never preached or attempted aught that might juſtly raiſe in him ſuch thoughts†, he could not reſt, or think himſelf ſecure, ſo long as they remained in any of his three kingdoms unrooted out. But outwardly profeſſing the ſame religion with them, he could not preſently uſe violence as Pharaoh did, and that courſe had with others before but ill ſucceeded. He chooſes therefore a more myſtical way, a newer method of antichriſtian fraud, to the church more dangerous; and like to Balak the ſon of Zippor, againſt a nation of prophets thinks it beſt to hire other eſteemed prophets, and to undermine and wear out the true church by a falſe eccleſiaſtical policy. To this drift he found the government of biſhops moſt ſerviceable; an order in the church, as by men firſt corrupted, ſo mutually corrupting them who receive it, both in judgment and manners. He, by conferring biſhoprics and great livings on whom he thought moſt pliant to his will, againſt the known canons and univerſal practice of the ancient church, whereby thoſe elections were the people's right, ſought, as he confeſſes, to have "greateſt influence upon Churchmen." They on the other ſide finding themſelves in a high dignity, neither founded by ſcripture, nor allowed by reformation,

* The ſecond edition has to ſhun it.

† The ſecond edition has apprehenſions.

nor

nor ſupported by any ſpiritual gift or grace of their own, knew it their beſt courſe to have dependence only upon him: and wrought his fancy by degrees to that degenerate and unkingly perſuaſion of "No biſhop, no king." When as on the contrary all prelates in their own ſubtle ſenſe are of another mind; according to that of Pius the fourth remembered in the hiſtory of Trent*, that biſhops then grow to be moſt vigorous and potent, when princes happen to be moſt weak and impotent. Thus when both intereſt of tyranny and epiſcopacy were incorporate into each other, the king, whoſe principal ſafety and eſtabliſhment conſiſted in the righteous execution of his civil power, and not in biſhops and their wicked counſels, fatally driven on, ſet himſelf to the extirpating of thoſe men whoſe doctrine and deſire of church-diſcipline he ſo feared would be the undoing of his monarchy. And becauſe no temporal law could touch the innocence of their lives, he begins with the perſecution of their conſciences, laying ſcandals before them; and makes that the argument to inflict his unjuſt penalties both on their bodies and eſtates. In this war againſt the church, if he hath ſped ſo, as other haughty monarchs whom God heretofore hath hardened to the like enterpriſe, we ought to look up with praiſes and thankſgiving to the author of our deliverance, to whom victory and power, majeſty, honour and dominion belongs for ever.

In the meanwhile, from his own words we may perceive eaſily, that the ſpecial motives which he had to endear and deprave his judgment to the favouring and utmoſt defending of epiſcopacy, are ſuch as here we repreſent them: and how unwillingly, and with what mental reſervation he condeſcended againſt his intereſt to remove it out of the peers' houſe, hath been ſhown already. The reaſons, which he affirms wrought ſo much upon his judgment, ſhall be ſo far anſwered as they be urged.

Scripture he reports, but diſtinctly produces none; and next the "conſtant practice of all chriſtian churches, till of late years tumult, faction, pride, and covetouſneſs, invented new models under the title of Chriſt's government." Could any papiſt have ſpoken more ſcandalouſly

* The ſecond edition has in the Trentine ſtory.

againſt

againſt all reformation? Well may the parliament and beſt-affected people not now be troubled at his calumnies and reproaches, ſince he binds them in the ſame bundle with all other the reformed churches; who alſo may now further ſee, beſides their own bitter experience, what a cordial and well-meaning helper they had of him abroad, and how true to the proteſtant cauſe.

As for hiſtories to prove biſhops, the Bible, if we mean not to run into errours, vanities, and uncertainties, muſt be our only hiſtory. Which informs us that the apoſtles were not properly biſhops; next, that biſhops were not ſucceſſors of apoſtles, in the function of apoſtleſhip: and that if they were apoſtles, they could not be preciſely biſhops; if biſhops, they could not be apoſtles; this being univerſal, extraordinary, and immediate from God; that being an ordinary, fixed, and particular charge, the continual inſpection over a certain flock. And although an ignorance and deviation of the ancient churches afterward, may with as much reaſon and charity be ſuppoſed as ſudden in point of prelaty; as in other manifeſt corruptions, yet that "no example ſince the firſt age for 1500 years can be produced of any ſettled church, wherein were many miniſters and congregations, which had not ſome biſhops above them;" the eccleſiaſtical ſtory, to which he appeals for want of ſcripture, proves clearly to be a falſe and overconfident aſſertion. Sozomenus, who wrote above twelve hundred years ago, in his ſeventh book, relates from his own knowledge, that in the churches of Cyprus and Arabia (places near to Jeruſalem, and with the firſt frequented by apoſtles) they had biſhops in every village; and what could thoſe be more than preſbyters? The like he tells of other nations; and that epiſcopal churches in thoſe days did not condemn them. I add, that many weſtern churches, eminent for their faith and good works, and ſettled above four hundred years ago in France, in Piemont and Bohemia, have both taught and practiſed the ſame doctrine, and not admitted of epiſcopacy among them. And if we may believe what the papiſts themſelves have written of theſe churches, which they call Waldenſes, I find

find it in a book written almoſt four hundred years ſince, and ſet forth in the Bohemian hiſtory, that thoſe churches in Piemont* have held the ſame doctrine and government, ſince the time that Conſtantine with his miſchievous donations poiſoned Sylveſter and the whole church. Others affirm they have ſo continued there ſince the apoſtles; and Theodorus Belvederenſis in his relation of them confeſſeth, that thoſe hereſies, as he names them, were from the firſt times of chriſtianity in that place. For the reſt I refer me to that famous teſtimony of Jerome, who upon that very place which he cites here†, the epiſtle to Titus, declares openly that biſhop and preſbyter were one and the ſame thing, till by the inſtigation of Satan, partialities grew up in the church, and that biſhops rather by cuſtom than any ordainment of Chriſt, were exalted above preſbyters: whoſe interpretation we truſt ſhall be received before this intricate ſtuff tattled here of Timothy and Titus, and I know not whom their ſucceſſors, far beyond court-element, and as far beneath true edification. Theſe are his "fair grounds both from ſcripture-canons and eccleſiaſtical examples;" how undivine-like written, and how like a worldly goſpeller that underſtands nothing of theſe matters, poſterity no doubt will be able to judge; and will but little regard what he calls apoſtolical, who in his letter to the pope calls apoſtolical the Roman religion.

Nor let him think to plead, that therefore, "it was not policy of ſtate;" or obſtinacy in him which upheld epiſcopacy, becauſe the injuries and loſſes which he ſuſtained by ſo doing were to him "more conſider[able] than epiſcopacy itſelf?" for all this might Pharaoh [have] had to ſay in his excuſe of detaining the Iſrael[ites] his own and his kingdom's ſafety, ſo much [as]

* We have a very curious hiſtory of theſe churc[hes] Samuel Morland, eſq. who went commiſſioner ex[traordinary] O. Cromwell, for relief of the proteſtants in the va[lleys] It was publiſhed in folio, 1658.

† The ſecond edition has it thus, "who u[rges] which he only roves at here."

by his denial, was to him more dear than all their build-ing labours could be worth to Egypt. But whom God hardens, them alſo he blinds.

He endeavours to make good epiſcopacy not only in "religion, but from the nature of all civil government, where parity breeds confuſion and faction." But of faction and confuſion, to take no other than his own teſti-mony, where hath more been ever bred than under the imparity of his own monarchical government? of which to make at this time longer diſpute, and from civil con-ſtitutions and human conceits to debate and queſtion the convenience of divine ordinations, is neither wiſdom nor ſobriety: and to confound Moſaic Prieſthood with evan-gelic preſbytery againſt expreſs inſtitution, is as far from warrantable. As little to purpoſe is it, that we ſhould ſtand polling the reformed churches, whether they equa-lize in number "thoſe of his three kingdoms;" of whom ſo lately the far greater part, what they have long deſired to do, have now quite thrown off epiſcopacy.

Neither may we count it the language or religion of a proteſtant, ſo to vilify the beſt reformed churches (for none of th[illegible]t Lutherans retain biſhops) as to fear more th[illegible]ding of papiſts, becauſe more numer-ous, tha[illegible]oteſtant brethren, becauſe a handful. It will r[illegible] the while to ſay what "Schiſma-tics or H[illegible] had no biſho[illegible] leſt he ſhould be taken [illegible]ader, he w[illegible]ted him, if he were a d[illegible] have rem[illegible]e foremen-tio[illegible]enus; whi[illegible] that beſides [illegible]ums, who[illegible]ted ortho-[illegible]ſo, and [illegible] Phrygia, [illegible] ſuch as [illegible] village: [illegible]urrower[illegible]s for the [illegible]retical o[illegible] fathered [illegible]l bith[illegible]yters to [illegible] plac[illegible] ſeems [illegible] whom [illegible] be can [illegible]oming [illegible] of the

He

He tempts the clergy to return back again to biſhops, from the fear of "tenuity and contempt," and the aſſurance of better "thriving under the favour of princes;" againſt which temptations if the clergy cannot arm themſelves with their own ſpiritual armour, they are indeed as "poor a carcaſs" as he terms them.

Of ſecular honours and great revenues added to the dignity of prelates, ſince the ſubject of that queſtion is now removed, we need not ſpend time: but this perhaps will never be unſeaſonable to bear in mind out of Chryſoſtom, that when miniſters came to have lands, houſes, farms, coaches, horſes, and the like lumber, then religion brought forth riches in the church, and the daughter devoured the mother.

But if his judgment in epiſcopacy may be judged by the goodly choice he made of biſhops, we need not much amuſe ourſelves with the conſideration of thoſe evils, which, by his foretelling, will "neceſſarily follow" their pulling down, until he prove that the apoſtles, having no certain dioceſe or appointed place of reſidence, were properly "biſhops over thoſe preſbyters whom they ordained, or churches they planted;" wherein ofttimes their labours were both joint and promiſcuous: or that the apoſtolic power muſt "neceſſarily deſcend to biſhops, the uſe and end" of either function being ſo different. And how the church hath flouriſhed under epiſcopacy, let the multitude of their ancient and groſs errours teſtify, and the words of ſome learnedeſt and moſt zealous biſhops among them; Nazianzen in a devout paſſion, wiſhing prelaty had never been; Bazil terming them the ſlaves of ſlaves; Saint Martin, the enemies of ſaints, and confeſſing that after he was made a biſhop, he found much of that grace decay in him which he had before.

Concerning his "Coronation oath," what it was, and how far it bound him, already hath been ſpoken. This we may take for certain, that he was never ſworn to his own particular conſcience and reaſon, but to our conditions as a free people, which required him to give us ſuch laws as ourſelves ſhould* chooſe. This the Scots

* The ſecond edition has ſhall chooſe.

could

could bring him to, and would not be baffled with the pretence of a coronation-oath, after that epiſcopacy had for many years been ſettled there. Which conceſſion of his to them, and not to us, he ſeeks here to put off with evaſions that are ridiculous. And to omit no ſhifts, he alleges that the preſbyterian manners gave him no encouragement to like their modes of government. If that were ſo, yet certainly thoſe men are in moſt likelihood nearer to amendment, who ſeek a ſtricter church-diſcipline than that of epiſcopacy, under which the moſt of them learned their manners. If eſtimation were to be made of God's law by their manners, who, leaving Egypt, received it in the wilderneſs, it could reap from ſuch an inference as this nothing but rejection and diſeſteem.

For the prayer wherewith he cloſes, it had been good ſome ſafe liturgy, which he ſo commends, had rather been in his way; it would perhaps in ſome meaſure have performed the end for which they ſay liturgy was firſt invented; and have hindered him both here, and at other times, from turning his notorious errours into his prayers.

XVIII. *Upon the Uxbridge Treaty, &c.*

" IF the way of treaties be looked upon" in general, " as retiring" from beſtial force to human reaſon, his firſt aphoriſm here is in part deceived. For men may treat like beaſts as well as fight. If ſome fighting were not manlike, then either fortitude were no virtue, or no fortitude in fighting: And as politicians ofttimes through dilatory purpoſes and emulations handle the matter, there hath been no where found more beſtiality than in treating; which hath no more commendations in it, than from fighting to come to undermining, from violence to craft; and when they can no longer do as lions, to do as foxes.

The ſincereſt end of treating after war once proclaimed is, either to part with more, or to demand leſs, than was at firſt fought for, rather than to hazard more lives, or worſe miſchiefs. What the parliament in that

point

point were willing to have done, when firſt after the war begun, they petitioned him at Colebrook to vouchſafe a treaty, is not unknown. For after he had taken God to witneſs of his continual readineſs to treat, or to offer treaties to the avoiding of bloodſhed, had named Windſor the place of treaty, and paſſed his royal word not to advance further, till commiſſioners by ſuch a time were ſpeeded towards him; taking the advantage of a thick miſt, which fell that evening, weather that ſoon invited him to a deſign no leſs treacherous and obſcure; he follows at the heels of thoſe meſſengers of peace with a train of covert war; and with a bloody ſurpriſe falls on our ſecure forces, which lay quartering at Brentford in the thoughts and expectation of a treaty. And although in them who make a trade of war, and againſt a natural enemy, ſuch an onſet might in the rigour of martial * law have been excuſed, while arms were not yet by agreement ſuſpended; yet by a king, who ſeemed ſo heartily to accept of treating with his ſubjects, and profeſſes here, "he never wanted either deſire or diſpoſition to it, profeſſes to have greater confidence in his reaſon than in his ſword, and as a chriſtian to ſeek peace and enſue it," ſuch bloody and deceitful advantages would have been forborne one day at leaſt, if not much longer; in whom there had not been a thirſt rather than a deteſtation of civil war and blood, and a deſire to ſubdue rather than to treat.

In the midſt of a ſecond treaty not long after, ſought by the parliament, and after much ado obtained with him at Oxford, what ſubtle and unpeaceable deſigns he then had in chace, his own letters diſcovered: What attempts of treacherous hoſtility ſucceſsful and unſucceſsful he made againſt Briſtol, Scarborough, and other places, the proceedings of that treaty will ſoon put us in mind: and how he was ſo far from granting more of reaſon after ſo much of blood, that he denied then to grant, what before he had offered; making no other uſe of treaties pretending peace, than to gain advantages that might enable him to continue war: What marvel then

* The ſecond edition has military.

if

if "he thought it no diminution of himſelf," as oft as he ſaw his time, "to be importunate for treaties," when he ſought them only as by the upſhot appeared, "to get opportunities?" And once to a moſt cruel purpoſe, if we remember May 1643. And that meſſenger of peace from Oxford, whoſe ſecret meſſage and commiſſion, had it been effected, would have drowned the innocence of our treating, in the blood of a deſigned maſſacre. Nay, when treaties from the parliament ſought out him, no leſs than ſeven times, (oft enough to teſtify the willingneſs of their obedience, and too oft for the majeſty of a parliament to court their ſubjection) he, in the confidence of his own ſtrength, or of our diviſions, returned us nothing back but denials, or delays, to their moſt neceſſary demands; and being at loweſt, kept up ſtill and ſuſtained his almoſt famiſhed hopes with the hourly expectation of raiſing up himſelf the higher, by the greater heap which he ſat promiſing himſelf of our ſudden ruin through diſſenſion.

But he infers, as if the parliament would have compelled him to part with ſomething of "his honour as a king." What honour could he have, or call his, joined not only with the offence or diſturbance, but with the bondage and deſtruction of three nations? whereof, though he be careleſs and improvident, yet the parliament, by our laws and freedom, ought to judge, and uſe prevention; our laws elſe were but cobweb laws. And what were all his moſt rightful honours, but the people's gift and the inveſtment of that luſtre, majeſty, and honour, which for the public good, and no otherwiſe, redounds from a whole nation into one perſon? So far is any honour from being his to a common miſchief and calamity. Yet ſtill he talks on equal terms with the grand repreſentative of that people, for whoſe ſake he was a king; as if the general welfare and his ſubſervient rights were of equal moment or conſideration. His aim indeed hath ever been to magnify and exalt his borrowed rights and prerogatives above the parliament and kingdom, of whom he holds them. But when a king ſets himſelf to bandy againſt the higheſt court and reſidence of all his regal power, he then, in the ſingle

perſon of a man, fights againſt his own majeſty and kingſhip, and then indeed ſets the firſt hand to his own depoſing.

"The treaty at Uxbridge," he ſaith, "gave the faireſt hopes of a happy compoſure;" faireſt indeed, if his inſtructions to bribe our commiſſioners with the promiſe of ſecurity, rewards, and places, were fair: what other hopes it gave, no man can tell. There being but three main heads whereon to be treated; Ireland, epiſcopacy, and the militia; the firſt was anticipated and foreſtalled by a peace at any rate to be haſtened with the Iriſh rebels, ere the treaty could begin, that he might pretend his word and honour paſſed againſt "the ſpecious and popular arguments" (he calls them no better) which the parliament would urge upon him for the continuance of that juſt war. Epiſcopacy he bids the queen be confident he will never quit: which informs us by what patronage it ſtood: and the ſword he reſolves to clutch as faſt, as if God with his own hand had put it into his. This was the "moderation which he brought;" this was "as far as reaſon, honour, conſcience," and the queen, who was his regent in all theſe, "would give him leave." Laſtly, "for compoſure," inſtead of happy, how miſerable it was more likely to have been, wiſe men could then judge; when the Engliſh, during treaty, were called rebels; the Iriſh, good and catholic ſubjects; and the parliament beforehand, though for faſhion's ſake called a parliament, yet by a jeſuitical ſleight not acknowledged, though called ſo; but privately in the council books enrolled no parliament: that if accommodation had ſucceeded, upon what terms ſoever, ſuch a deviliſh fraud was prepared, that the king in his own eſteem had been abſolved from all performance, as having treated with rebels and no parliament; and they, on the other ſide, inſtead of an expected happineſs, had been brought under the hatchet. Then no doubt "war had ended," that maſſacre and tyranny might begin. Theſe jealouſies, however raiſed, let all men ſee whether they be diminiſhed or allayed, by the letters of his own cabinet opened. And yet the breach of this treaty is laid all upon the parliament and their commiſſioners, with odious

names of " pertinacy, hatred of peace, faction, and covetouſneſs," nay, his own brat " ſuperſtition" is laid to their charge; notwithſtanding his here profeſſed reſolution to continue both the order, maintenance, and authority, of prelates, as a truth of God.

And who " were moſt to blame in the unſucceſsfulneſs of that treaty," his appeal is to God's deciſion; believing to be very excuſable at that tribunal. But if ever man gloried in an unflexible ſtiffneſs, he came not behind any; and that grand maxim, always to put ſomething into his treaties, which might give colour to refuſe all that was in other things granted, and to make them ſignify nothing, was his own principal maxim and particular inſtructions to his commiſſioners. Yet all, by his own verdict, muſt be conſtrued reaſon in the king, and depraved temper in the parliament.

That the " higheſt tide of ſucceſs," with theſe principles and deſigns, " ſet him not above a treaty," no great wonder. And yet if that be ſpoken to his praiſe, the parliament therein ſurpaſſed him; who, when he was their vanquiſhed and their captive, his forces utterly broken and diſbanded, yet offered him three ſeveral times no worſe propoſals or demands, than when he ſtood fair to be their conqueror. But that imprudent ſurmiſe that his loweſt ebb could not ſet him " below a fight," was a preſumption that ruined him.

He preſaged the future " unſucceſsfulneſs of treaties, by the unwillingneſs of ſome men to treat;" and could not ſee what was preſent, that their unwillingneſs had good cauſe to proceed from the continual experience of his own obſtinacy and breach of word.

His prayer therefore of forgiveneſs to the guilty of " that treaty's breaking," he had good reaſon to ſay heartily over, as including no man in that guilt ſooner than himſelf.

As for that proteſtation following in his prayer, " how oft have I entreated for peace, but when I ſpeak thereof they make them ready to war;" unleſs he thought himſelf ſtill in that perfidious miſt between Colebrook and Hounſlow, and thought that miſt could hide him from the eye of Heaven as well as of man, after ſuch a bloody

recompenſe given to our firſt offers of peace, how could this in the ſight of Heaven without horrours of conſcience be uttered?

XIX. *Upon the various events of the War.*

IT is no new or unwonted thing, for bad men to claim as much part in God as his beſt ſervants; to uſurp and imitate their words, and appropriate to themſelves thoſe properties, which belong only to the good and righteous. This not only in Scripture is familiarly to be found, but here alſo in this chapter of Apocrypha. He tells us much, why "it pleaſed God" to ſend him victory or loſs (although what in ſo doing was the intent of God, he might be much miſtaken as to his own particular) but we are yet to learn what real good uſe he made thereof in his practice.

Thoſe numbers, which he grew to "from ſmall beginnings," were not ſuch as out of love came to protect him, for none approved his actions as a king, except courtiers and prelates, but were ſuch as fled to be protected by him from the fear of that reformation which the pravity of their lives would not bear. Such a ſnowball he might eaſily gather by rolling through thoſe cold and dark provinces of ignorance and lewdneſs, where on a ſudden he became ſo numerous. He imputes that to God's "protection," which, to them who perſiſt in a bad cauſe, is either his long-ſuffering or his hardening; and that to wholeſome "chaſtiſement," which were the gradual beginnings of a ſevere puniſhment. For if neither God nor nature put civil power in the hands of any whomſoever, but to a lawful end, and commands our obedience to the authority of law only, not to the tyrannical force of any perſon; and if the laws of our land have placed the ſword in no man's ſingle hand, ſo much as to unſheath againſt a foreign enemy, much leſs upon the native people; but have placed it in that elective body of the parliament, to whom the making, repealing, judging, and interpreting of law itſelf was alſo committed, as was fitteſt, ſo long as we intended to be a free nation, and

and not the ſlaves of one man's will; then was the king himſelf diſobedient and rebellious to that law by which he reigned: and by authority of parliament to raiſe arms againſt him in defence of law and liberty, we do not only think, but believe and know was juſtifiable both "by the word of God, the laws of the land, and all lawful oaths;" and they who ſided with him, fought againſt all theſe.

The ſame allegations, which he uſes for himſelf and his party, may as well fit any tyrant in the world: for let the parliament be called a faction when the king pleaſes, and that no law muſt be made or changed, either civil or religious, becauſe no law will content all ſides, then muſt be made or changed no law at all, but what a tyrant, be he proteſtant or papiſt, thinks fit. Which tyrannous aſſertion forced upon us by the ſword, he who fights againſt, and dies fighting, if his other ſins outweigh not, dies a martyr undoubtedly both of the faith and of the commonwealth: and I hold it not as the opinion, but as the full belief and perſuaſion of far holier and wiſer men than paraſitic preachers: who, without their dinner-doctrine, know that neither king, law, civil oaths, or religion, was ever eſtabliſhed without the parliament: and their power is the ſame to abrogate as to eſtabliſh: neither is any thing to be thought eſtabliſhed, which that houſe declares to be aboliſhed. Where the parliament ſits, there inſeparably ſits the king, there the laws, there our oaths, and whatſoever can be civil in religion. They who fought for the parliament, in the trueſt ſenſe, fought for all theſe; who fought for the king divided from his parliament, fought for the ſhadow of a king againſt all theſe; and for things that were not, as if they were eſtabliſhed. It were a thing monſtrouſly abſurd and contradictory, to give the parliament a legiſlative power, and then to upbraid them for tranſgreſſing old eſtabliſhments.

But the king and his party having loſt in this quarrel their Heaven upon earth, begin to make great reckoning of eternal life, and at an eaſy rate in *forma pauperis* canonize one another into Heaven; he them in his book, they him in the portraiture before his book: but as was

ſaid before, ſtage-work will not do it, much leſs the "juſtneſs of their cauſe," wherein moſt frequently they died in a brutiſh fierceneſs, with oaths and other damning words in their mouths; as if ſuch had been all "the only oaths" they fought for; which undoubtedly ſent them full ſail on another voyage than to Heaven. In the meanwhile they to whom God gave victory, never brought to the king at Oxford the ſtate of their conſciences, that he ſhould preſume without confeſſion, more than a pope preſumes, to tell abroad what "conflicts and accuſations," men whom he never ſpoke with, have "in their own thoughts." We never read of any Engliſh king but one that was a confeſſor, and his name was Edward; yet ſure it paſſed his ſkill to know thoughts, as this king takes upon him. But they who will not ſtick to ſlander men's inward conſciences, which they can neither ſee nor know, much leſs will care to ſlander outward actions, which they pretend to ſee, though with ſenſes never ſo vitiated.

To judge of "his condition conquered," and the manner of "dying" on that ſide, by the ſober men that choſe it, would be his ſmall advantage: it being moſt notorious, that they who were hotteſt in his cauſe, the moſt of them were men oftener drunk, than by their good will ſober, and very many of them ſo fought and ſo died *.

And that the conſcience of any man ſhould grow ſuſpicious, or be now convicted by any pretenſions in the parliament, which are now proved falſe and unintended, there can be no juſt cauſe. For neither did they ever pretend to eſtabliſh his throne without our liberty and religion, nor religion without the word of God, nor to judge of laws by their being eſtabliſhed, but to eſtabliſh them by their being good and neceſſary.

He tells the world "he often prayed, that all on his

* Hear what deſcription an hiſtorian of that party gives of thoſe on the royal ſide: "Never had any good undertaking ſo many unworthy attendants; ſuch horrid blaſphemers and wicked wretches as ours hath had: I quake to think, much more to ſpeak, what mine ears have heard from ſome of their lips: but to diſcover them is not my preſent buſineſs."

Symmon's Defence of King Charles I. p. 165.

ſide

ſide might be as faithful to God and their own ſouls, as to him." But kings, above all other men, have in their hands not to pray only, but to do. To make that prayer effectual, he ſhould have governed as well as prayed. To pray and not to govern, is for a monk, and not a king. Till then he might be well aſſured, they were more faithful to their luſt and rapine than to him.

In the wonted predication of his own virtues he goes on to tell us, that to "conquer he never deſired, but only to reſtore the laws and liberties of his people." It had been happy then he had known at laſt, that by force to reſtore laws abrogated by the legiſlative parliament, is to conquer abſolutely both them and law itſelf. And for our liberties none ever oppreſſed them more, both in peace and war; firſt like a maſter by his arbitrary power, next as an enemy by hoſtile invaſion.

And if his beſt friends feared him, and "he himſelf, in the temptation of an abſolute conqueſt," it was not only pious but friendly in the parliament, both to fear him and reſiſt him; ſince their not yielding was the only means to keep him out of that temptation, wherein he doubted his own ſtrength.

He takes himſelf to be "guilty in this war of nothing elſe, but of confirming the power of ſome men:" Thus all along he ſignifies the parliament, whom to have ſettled by an act he counts to be his only guiltineſs. So well he knew, that to continue a parliament, was to raiſe a war againſt himſelf; what were his actions then, and his government the while? For never was it heard in all our ſtory, that parliaments made war on their kings, but on their tyrants; whoſe modeſty and gratitude was more wanting to the parliament, than theirs to any of ſuch kings.

What he yielded was his fear; what he denied was his obſtinacy. Had he yielded more, fear might perchance have ſaved him; had he granted leſs, his obſtinacy had perhaps the ſooner delivered us.

"To review the occaſions of this war," will be to them never too late, who would be warned by his example from the like evils: but to wiſh only a happy concluſion, will never expiate the fault of his unhappy

beginnings. It is true, on our ſide the ſins of our lives not ſeldom fought againſt us: but on their ſide, beſides thoſe, the grand ſin of their cauſe.

How can it be otherwiſe, when he deſires here moſt unreaſonably, and indeed ſacrilegiouſly, that we ſhould be ſubject to him, though not further, yet as far as all of us may be ſubject to God; to whom this expreſſion leaves no precedency? He who deſires from men as much obedience and ſubjection, as we may all pay to God, deſires not leſs than to be a God: a ſacrilege far worſe than meddling with the biſhops' lands, as he eſteems it.

His prayer is a good prayer and a glorious; but glorying is not good, if it know not that a little leaven leavens the whole lump. It ſhould have purged out the leaven of untruth, in telling God that the blood of his ſubjects by him ſhed, was in his juſt and neceſſary defence. Yet this is remarkable; God hath here ſo ordered his prayer, that as his own lips acquitted the parliament, not long before his death, of all the blood ſpilt in this war, ſo now his prayer unwittingly draws it upon himſelf. For God imputes not to any man the blood he ſpills in a juſt cauſe; and no man ever begged his not imputing of that, which he in his juſtice could not impute: ſo that now, whether purpoſely or unaware, he hath confeſſed both to God and man the blood-guiltineſs of all this war to lie upon his own head.

XX. *Upon the Reformation of the Times.*

THIS chapter cannot punctually be anſwered without more repetitions than now can be excuſable: which perhaps have already been more humoured than was needful. As it preſents us with nothing new, ſo with his exceptions againſt reformation pitifully old, and tattered with continual uſing; not only in his book, but in the words and writings of every papiſt and popiſh king. On the ſcene he thruſts out firſt an antimaſque of bugbears, novelty and perturbation; that the ill looks and noiſe of thoſe two may as long as poſſible drive off all endeavours of a reformation. Thus ſought pope Adrian, by repreſenting

ſenting the like vain terrours, to divert and diſſipate the zeal of thoſe reforming princes of the age before in Germany. And if we credit Latimer's ſermons, our papiſts here in England pleaded the ſame dangers and inconveniencies againſt that which was reformed by Edward the Sixth. Whereas if thoſe fears had been available, chriſtianity itſelf had never been received. Which Chriſt foretold us would not be admitted, without the cenſure of novelty, and many great commotions. Theſe therefore are not to deter us.

He grants reformation to be "a good work," and confeſſes "what the indulgence of times and corruption of manners might have depraved." So did the forementioned pope, and our grandſire papiſts in this realm. Yet all of them agree in one ſong with this here, that "they are ſorry to ſee ſo little regard had to laws eſtabliſhed, and the religion ſettled."

"Popular compliance, diſſolution of all order and government in the church, ſchiſms, opinions, undecencies, confuſions, ſacrilegious invaſions, contempt of the clergy and their liturgy, diminution of princes;" all theſe complaints are to be read in the meſſages and ſpeeches almoſt of every legate from the pope to thoſe ſtates and cities which began reformation. From whence he either learned the ſame pretences, or had them naturally in him from the ſame ſpirit. Neither was there ever ſo ſincere a reformation that hath eſcaped theſe clamours.

He offered a "ſynod or convocation rightly choſen." So offered all thoſe popiſh kings heretofore; a courſe the moſt unſatisfactory, as matters have been long carried, and found by experience in the church liable to the greateſt fraud and packing; no ſolution, or redreſs of evil, but an increaſe rather; deteſted therefore by Nazianzen, and ſome other of the fathers. And let it be produced, what good hath been done by ſynods from the firſt times of reformation.

Not to juſtify what enormities the vulgar may commit in the rudeneſs of their zeal, we need but only inſtance how he bemoans "the pulling down of croſſes" and other ſuperſtitious monuments, as the effect "of a po-

pular and deceitful reformation." How little this favours of a proteſtant, is too eaſily perceived.

What he charges in defect of "piety, charity, and morality," hath been alſo charged by papiſts upon the beſt reformed churches; not as if they the accuſers were not tenfold more to be accuſed, but out of their malignity to all endeavour of amendment; as we know who accuſed to God the ſincerity of Job; an accuſation of all others the moſt eaſy, when as there lives not any mortal man ſo excellent, who in theſe things is not always deficient. But the infirmities of the beſt men, and the ſcandals of mixed hypocrites in all times of reforming, whoſe bold intruſion covets to be ever ſeen in things moſt ſacred, as they are moſt ſpecious, can lay no juſt blemiſh upon the integrity of others, much leſs upon the purpoſe of reformation itſelf. Neither can the evil doings of ſome be the excuſe of our delaying or deſerting that duty to the church, which for no reſpect of times or carnal policies can be at any time unſeaſonable.

He tells with great ſhow of piety what kind of perſons public reformers ought to be, and what they ought to do. It is ſtrange that in above twenty years, the church growing ſtill worſe and worſe under him, he could neither be as he bids others be, nor do, as he pretends here ſo well to know; nay, which is worſt of all, after the greateſt part of his reign ſpent in neither knowing nor doing aught toward a reformation either in church or ſtate, ſhould ſpend the reſidue in hindering thoſe by a ſeven years war, whom it concerned, with his conſent or without it, to do their parts in that great performance.

It is true, that the "method of reforming" may well ſubſiſt without "perturbation of the ſtate;" but that it falls out otherwiſe for the moſt part, is the plain text of ſcripture. And if by his own rule he had allowed us to "fear God firſt," and the king in due order, our allegiance might have ſtill followed our religion in a fit ſubordination. But if Chriſt's kingdom be taken for the true diſcipline of the church, and by "his kingdom" be meant the violence he uſed againſt it, and to uphold an antichriſtian hierarchy, then ſure enough it is, that Chriſt's kingdom could not be ſet up without pulling down

down his: and they were beſt chriſtians who were leaſt ſubject to him. "Chriſt's Government," out of queſtion meaning it prelatical, he thought would confirm his: and this was that which overthrew it.

He profeſſes "to own his kingdom from Chriſt, and to deſire to rule for his glory, and the church's good." The pope and the king of Spain profeſs every where as much; and both by his practice and all his reaſonings, all his enmity againſt the true church we ſee hath been the ſame with theirs, ſince the time that in his letter to the pope he aſſured them both of his full compliance. "But evil beginnings never bring forth good concluſions:" they are his own words, and he ratified them by his own ending. To the pope he engaged himſelf to hazard life and eſtate for the Roman religion, whether in compliment he did it, or in earneſt; and God, who ſtood nearer than he for complimenting minded, writ down thoſe words; that according to his reſolution, ſo it ſhould come to paſs. He prays againſt "his hypocriſy and phariſaical waſhings," a prayer to him moſt pertinent, but chokes it ſtraight with other words, which pray him deeper into his old errours and deluſions.

XXI. *Upon his Letters taken and divulged.*

THE king's letters taken at the battle of Naſeby, being of greateſt importance to let the people ſee what faith there was in all his promiſes and ſolemn proteſtations, were tranſmitted to public view by ſpecial order of the parliament. They diſcovered his good affection to papiſts and Iriſh rebels, the ſtrict* intelligence he held, the pernicious and diſhonourable peace he made with them, not ſolicited, but rather ſoliciting, which by all invocations that were holy he had in public abjured. They revealed his endeavours to bring in foreign forces, Iriſh, French, Dutch, Lorrainers, and our old invaders the Danes upon us, beſides his ſubtleties and myſterious arts in treating; to ſum up all, they ſhowed him governed by a woman. All which, though ſuſpected vehe-

* The ſecond edition has the old word ſtraight.

mently

mently before, and from good grounds believed, yet by him and his adherents peremptorily denied, were by the opening of that cabinet viſible to all men under his own hand.

The parliament therefore, to clear themſelves of aſperſing him without cauſe, and that the people might no longer be abuſed and cajoled, as they call it, by falſities and court impudence, in matters of ſo high concernment; to let them know on what terms their duty ſtood, and the kingdom's peace, conceived it moſt expedient and neceſſary, that thoſe letters ſhould be made public. This the king affirms was by them done without "honour and civility;" words, which if they contain not in them, as in the language of a courtier moſt commonly they do not, more of ſubſtance and reality, than compliment, ceremony, court-fawning and diſſembling, enter not I ſuppoſe further than the ear into any wiſe man's conſideration. Matters were not then between the parliament, and a king their enemy, in that ſtate of trifling, as to obſerve thoſe ſuperficial vanities. But if honour and civility mean, as they did of old, diſcretion, honeſty, prudence, and plain truth, it will be then maintained againſt any ſect of thoſe Cabaliſts, that the parliament, in doing what they did with thoſe letters, could ſuffer in their honour and civility no diminution. The reaſons are already heard.

And that it is with none more familiar than with kings, to tranſgreſs the bounds of all honour and civility, there ſhould not want examples good ſtore, if brevity would permit: in point of letters, this one ſhall ſuffice.

The ducheſs of Burgundy, and heir of duke Charles, had promiſed to her ſubjects, that ſhe intended no otherwiſe to govern, than by advice of the three eſtates; but to Lewis the French king had written letters, that ſhe had reſolved to commit wholly the managing of her affairs to four perſons, whom ſhe named. The three eſtates, not doubting the ſincerity of her princely word, ſend ambaſſadors to Lewis, who then beſieged Arras belonging to the duke of Burgundy. The king, taking hold of this occaſion to ſet them at diviſion among themſelves, queſtioned their credence: which when they offered

offered to produce with their inſtructions, he not only ſhows them the private letter of their ducheſs, but gives it them to carry home, wherewith to affront her; which they did, ſhe denying it ſtoutly; till they, ſpreading it before her face in a full aſſembly, convicted her of an open lie. Which, although Comines the hiſtorian much blames, as a deed too harſh and diſhonourable in them who were ſubjects, and not at war with their princeſs, yet to his maſter Lewis, who firſt divulged thoſe letters, to the open ſhaming of that young governeſs, he imputes no incivility or diſhonour at all, although betraying a certain confidence repoſed by that letter in his royal ſecrecy.

With much more reaſon then may letters not intercepted only, but won in battle from an enemy, be made public to the beſt advantages of them that win them, to the diſcovery of ſuch important truth or falſhood. Was it not more diſhonourable in himſelf to feign ſuſpicions and jealouſies, which we firſt found among thoſe letters, touching the chaſtity of his mother, thereby to gain aſſiſtance from the king of Denmark, as in vindication of his ſiſter? The damſel of Burgundy at ſight of her own letter was ſoon blank, and more ingenuous than to ſtand outfacing; but this man, whom nothing will convince, thinks by talking world without end, to make good his integrity and fair dealing, contradicted by his own hand and ſeal. They who can pick nothing out of them but phraſes, ſhall be counted bees: they that diſcern further both there and here, that conſtancy to his wife is ſet in place before laws and religion, are in his naturalities no better than ſpiders.

He would work the people to a perſuaſion, that "if he be miſerable, they cannot be happy." What ſhould hinder them? Were they all born twins of Hippocrates with him and his fortune, one birth, one burial? It were a nation miſerable indeed, not worth the name of a nation, but a race of idiots, whoſe happineſs and welfare depended upon one man. The happineſs of a nation conſiſts in true religion, piety, juſtice, prudence, temperance, fortitude, and the contempt of avarice and ambition. They in whomſoever theſe virtues dwell eminently, need not

not kings to make them happy, but are the architects of their own happineſs; and whether to themſelves or others are not leſs than kings. But in him which of theſe virtues were to be found, that might extend to the making happy, or the well-governing of ſo much as his own houſhold, which was the moſt licentious and ill-governed in the whole land?

But the opening of his letters was deſigned by the parliament "to make all reconciliation deſperate." Are the lives of ſo many good and faithful men, that died for the freedom of their country, to be ſo ſlighted, as to be forgotten in a ſtupid reconcilement without juſtice done them? What he fears not by war and ſlaughter, ſhould we fear to make deſperate by opening his letters? Which fact he would parallel with Cham's revealing of his father's nakedneſs: when he at that time could be no way eſteemed the Father of his Country, but the deſtroyer; nor had he ever before merited that former title.

"He thanks God he cannot only bear this with patience, but with charity forgive the doers." Is not this meer mockery, to thank God for what he can do, but will not? For is it patience to impute barbariſm and inhumanity to the opening of an enemy's letter, or is it charity to clothe them with curſes in his prayer, whom he hath forgiven in his diſcourſe? In which prayer, to ſhow how readily he can return good for evil to the parliament, aud that if they take away his coat he can let them have his cloak alſo; for the diſmantling of his letters he wiſhes "they may be covered with the cloak of confuſion." Which I ſuppoſe they do reſign with much willingneſs, both livery, badge and cognizance, to them who choſe rather to be the ſlaves and vaſſals of his will, than to ſtand againſt him, as men by nature free; born and created with a better title to their freedom, than any king hath to his crown.

XXII. *Upon his going to the Scots.*

THE king's coming in, whether to the Scots or Engliſh, deſerved no thanks: for neceſſity was his counſellor; and

and that he hated them both alike, his expreſſions every where manifeſt. Some ſay his purpoſe was to have come to London; till hearing how ſtrictly it was proclaimed, that no man ſhould conceal him, he diverted his courſe. But that had been a frivolous excuſe: and beſides, he himſelf rehearſing the conſultations had, before he took his journey, ſhows us clearly that he was determined to adventure "upon their loyalty who firſt began his troubles." And that the Scots had notice of it before, hath been long ſince brought to light. What prudence there could be in it, no man can imagine; malice there might be, by raiſing new jealouſies to divide friends. For beſides his diffidence of the Engliſh, it was no ſmall diſhonour that he put upon them, when rather than yield himſelf to the parliament of England, he yielded to a hireling army of Scots in England, paid for their ſervice here, not in Scotch coin, but in Engliſh ſilver; nay, who from the firſt beginning of theſe troubles, what with brotherly aſſiſtance, and what with monthly pay, have defended their own liberty and conſciences at our charge. However, it was a hazardous and raſh journey taken, "to reſolve riddles in men's loyalty," who had more reaſon to miſtruſt the riddle of ſuch a diſguiſed yielding; and to put himſelf in their hands whoſe loyalty was a riddle to him, was not the courſe to be reſolved of it, but to tempt it. What Providence denied to force, he thought it might grant to fraud, which he ſtyles Prudence; but Providence was not cozened with diſguiſes, neither outward nor inward.

To have known "his greateſt danger in his ſuppoſed ſafety, and his greateſt ſafety in his ſuppoſed danger," was to him a fatal riddle never yet reſolved; wherein rather to have employed his main ſkill, had been much more to his preſervation.

Had he "known when the game was loſt," it might have ſaved much conteſt; but the way to give over fairly, was not to ſlip out of open war into a new diſguiſe. He lays down his arms, but not his wiles; nor all his arms: for in obſtinacy he comes no leſs armed than ever cap à pè. And what were they but wiles, continually

continually to move for treaties, and yet to perſiſt the ſame man, and to fortify his mind before-hand, ſtill purpoſing to grant no more than what ſeemed good to that violent and lawleſs triumvirate within him, under the falſified names of his reaſon, honour, and conſcience, the old circulating dance of his ſhifts and evaſions?

The words of a king, as they are full of power, in the authority and ſtrength of law, ſo like Samſon, without the ſtrength of that Nazarite's lock, they have no more power in them than the words of another man.

He adores reaſon as Domitian did Minerva, and calls her the "Divineſt power," thereby to intimate as if at reaſoning, as at his own weapon, no man were ſo able as himſelf. Might we be ſo happy as to know where theſe monuments of his reaſon may be ſeen; for in his actions and his writing they appear as thinly as could be expected from the meaneſt parts, bred up in the midſt of ſo many ways extraordinary to know ſomething. He who reads his talk, would think he had left Oxford not without mature deliberation: yet his prayer confeſſes, that "he knew not what to do." Thus is verified that pſalm; "he poureth contempt upon princes, and cauſeth them to wander in the wilderneſs where there is no way." Pſal. 107.

XXIII. *Upon the Scots delivering the king to the Engliſh.*

THAT the Scots in England ſhould "ſell their king," as he himſelf here affirms, and for a "price ſo much above that," which the covetouſneſs of Judas was contented with to ſell our Saviour, is ſo foul an infamy and diſhonour caſt upon them, as befits none to vindicate but themſelves. And it were but friendly counſel to wiſh them beware the ſon, who comes among them with a firm belief, that they ſold his father. The reſt of this chapter he ſacrifices to the echo of his conſcience, outbabling creeds and aves; glorying in his reſolute obſtinacy, and as it were triumphing how "evident it is now, that not evil counſellors," but he himſelf hath been the author of all our troubles. Herein only we ſhall diſ-

agree

agree to the world's end, while he, who ſought ſo manifeſtly to have annihilated all our laws and liberties, hath the confidence to perſuade us, that he hath fought and ſuffered all this while in their defence.

But he who neither by his own letters and commiſſions under hand and ſeal, nor by his own actions held as in a mirror before his face, will be convinced to ſee his faults, can much leſs be won upon by any force of words, neither he, nor any that take after him; who in that reſpect are no more to be diſputed with, than they who deny principles. No queſtion then but the parliament did wiſely in their decree at laſt, to make no more addreſſes. For how unalterable his will was, that would have been our Lord, how utterly averſe from the parliament and reformation during his confinement, we may behold in this chapter. But to be ever anſwering fruitleſs repetitions, I ſhould become liable to anſwer for the ſame myſelf. He borrows David's pſalms, as he charges the aſſembly of divines in his twentieth diſcourſe, "To have ſet forth old catechiſms and confeſſions of faith new dreſſed:" had he borrowed David's heart, it had been much the holier theft. For ſuch kind of borrowing as this, if it be not bettered by the borrower, among good authors is accounted plagiary. However, this was more tolerable than Pamela's prayer, ſtolen out of Sir Philip.

XXIV. *Upon the denying him the attendance of his Chaplains.*

A Chaplain is a thing ſo diminutive and inconſiderable, that how he ſhould come here among matters of ſo great concernment, to take ſuch room up in the diſcourſes of a prince, if it be not wondered, is to be ſmiled at. Certainly by me, ſo mean an argument ſhall not be written; but I ſhall huddle him, as he does prayers. The ſcripture owns no ſuch order, no ſuch function in the church; and the church not owning them, they are left, for aught I know, to ſuch a further examining as the ſons of Sceva the Jew met with. Biſhops or preſbyters we know, and deacons we know, but what are

chaplains? In ſtate perhaps they may be liſted among the upper ſervingmen of ſome great houſehold, and be admitted to ſome ſuch place, as may ſtyle them the ſewers, or the yeomen-uſhers of devotion, where the maſter is too reſty, or too rich to ſay his own prayers, or to bleſs his own table. Wherefore ſhould the parliament then take ſuch implements of the court cupboard into their conſideration? They knew them to have been the main corrupters at the king's elbow; they knew the king to have been always their moſt attentive ſcholar and imitator, and of a child to have ſucked from them and their cloſet-work all his impotent principles of tyranny and ſuperſtition. While therefore they had any hope left of his reclaiming, theſe ſowers of malignant tares they kept aſunder from him, and ſent to him ſuch of the miniſters and other zealous perſons, as they thought were beſt able to inſtruct him, and to convert him. What could religion herſelf have done more, to the ſaving of a ſoul? But when they found him paſt cure, and that he to himſelf was grown the moſt evil counſellor of all, they denied him not his chaplains, as many as were fitting, and ſome of them attended him, or elſe were at his call to the very laſt. Yet here he makes more lamentation for the want of his chaplains, than ſuperſtitious Micah did to the Danites, who had taken away his houſehold prieſt: "Ye have taken away my Gods which I made, and the prieſt, and what have I more?" And perhaps the whole ſtory of Micah might ſquare not unfitly to this argument: "Now know I," ſaith he, "that the Lord will do me good, ſeeing I have a Levite to my prieſt." Micah had as great a care, that his prieſt ſhould be Moſaical, as the king had, that his ſhould be Apoſtolical; yet both in an errour touching their prieſts. Houſehold and private oriſons were not to be officiated by prieſts; for neither did public prayer appertain only to their office. Kings heretofore, David, Solomon, and Jehoſophat, who might not touch the prieſthood, yet might pray in public, yea in the temple, while the prieſts themſelves ſtood an hearkened. What ailed this king then, that he could not chew his own matins without the prieſt's Ore tenus? Yet is it like he could not pray at home, who can here

publiſh

publiſh a whole prayerbook of his own, and ſignifies in ſome part of this chapter, almoſt as good a mind to be a prieſt himſelf, as Micah had to let his ſon be! There was doubtleſs therefore ſome other matter in it, which made him ſo deſirous to have his chaplains about him, who were not only the contrivers, but very oft the inſtruments alſo of his deſigns.

The miniſters which were ſent him, no marvel he endured not; for they preached repentance to him: the others gave him eaſy confeſſion, eaſy abſolution, nay ſtrengthened his hands, and hardened his heart, by applauding him in his wilful ways. To them he was an Ahab, to theſe a Conſtantine; it muſt follow then, that they to him were as unwelcome as Elijah was to Ahab, theſe as dear and pleaſing as Amaziah the prieſt of Bethel was to Jeroboam. Theſe had learned well the leſſon that would pleaſe; "Prophecy not againſt Bethel, for it is the king's chapel, the king's court;" and had taught the king to ſay of thoſe miniſters, which the parliament had ſent, "Amos hath conſpired againſt me, the land is not able to bear all his words."

Returning to our firſt parallel, this king looked upon his prelates, "as orphans under the ſacrilegious eyes of many rapacious reformers:" and there was as great fear of ſacrilege between Micah and his mother, till with their holy treaſure, about the loſs whereof there was ſuch curſing, they made a graven and a molten image, and got a prieſt of their own. To let go his criticizing about the "ſound of prayers, imperious, rude, or paſſionate," modes of his own deviſing, we are in danger to fall again upon the flats and ſhallows of liturgy. Which if I ſhould repeat again, would turn my anſwers into Reſponſories, and beget another liturgy, having too much of one already.

This only I ſhall add, that if the heart, as he alleges, cannot ſafely "join with another man's extemporal ſufficiency," becauſe we know not ſo exactly what they mean to ſay; then thoſe public prayers made in the temple by thoſe forenamed kings, and by the apoſtles in the congregation, and by the ancient chriſtians for above three

hundred years before liturgies came in, were with the people made in vain.

After he hath acknowledged, that kings heretofore prayed without chaplains, even publickly in the temple itſelf, and that every "private believer is inveſted with a royal prieſthood;" yet like one that reliſhed not what he "taſted of the heavenly gift, and the good word of God," whoſe name he ſo confidently takes into his mouth, he frames to himſelf impertinent and vain reaſons, why he ſhould rather pray by the officiating mouth of a cloſet chaplain. "Their prayers," ſaith he, "are more prevalent, they flow from minds more enlightened, from affections leſs diſtracted." Admit this true, which is not, this might be ſomething ſaid as to their prayers for him, but what avails it to their praying with him? If his own mind "be encumbered with ſecular affairs," what helps it his particular prayer, though the mind of his chaplain be not wandering, either after new preferment, or his dinner? The fervency of one man in prayer cannot ſupererogate for the coldneſs of another; neither can his ſpiritual defects in that duty be made out, in the acceptance of God, by another man's abilities. Let him endeavour to have more light in himſelf, and not to walk by another man's lamp, but to get oil into his own. Let him caſt from him, as in a chriſtian warfare, that ſecular encumbrance, which either diſtracts or overloads him; his load elſe will never be the leſs heavy, becauſe another man's is light. Thus theſe pious flouriſhes and colours, examined thoroughly, are like the apples of Aſphaltis, appearing goodly to the ſudden eye, but look well upon them, or at leaſt but touch them, and they turn into cinders.

In his prayer he remembers what "voices of joy and gladneſs" there were in his chapel, "God's houſe," in his opinion, between the ſinging men and the organs; and this was "unity of ſpirit in the bond of peace;" the vanity, ſuperſtition, and miſdevotion of which place, was a ſcandal far and near: Wherein ſo many things were ſung, and prayed in thoſe ſongs, which were not underſtood; and yet he who makes a difficulty how the people

ple can join their hearts to extemporal prayers, though diſtinctly heard and underſtood, makes no queſtion how they ſhould join their hearts in unity to ſongs not underſtood.

I believe that God is no more moved with a prayer elaborately penned, than men truly charitable are moved with the penned ſpeech of a beggar.

Finally, O ye miniſters, ye pluraliſts, whoſe lips preſerve not knowledge, but the way ever open to your bellies, read here what work he makes among your wares, your gallipots, your balms and cordials, in print; and not only your ſweet ſippets in widows houſes, but the huge gobbets wherewith he charges you to have devoured houſes and all; the "houſes of your brethren, your king, and your God." Cry him up for a ſaint in your pulpits, while he cries you down for atheiſts into Hell.

XXV. *Upon his penitential Meditations and Vows at Holmby.*

IT is not hard for any man, who hath a Bible in his hands, to borrow good words and holy ſayings in abundance; but to make them his own, is a work of grace only from above. He borrows here many penitential verſes out of David's pſalms. So did many among thoſe Iſraelites, who had revolted from the true worſhip of God, "invent to themſelves inſtruments of muſic like David," and probably pſalms alſo like his; and yet the prophet Amos complains heavily againſt them. But to prove how ſhort this is of true repentance, I will recite the penitence of others, who have repented in words not borrowed, but their own, and yet by the doom of Scripture itſelf, are judged reprobates.

"Cain ſaid unto the Lord, My iniquity is greater than I can bear: behold thou haſt driven me this day from the face of the earth, and from thy face ſhall I be hid.

"And when Eſau heard the words of his father, he cried with an exceeding bitter cry, and ſaid, Bleſs me, even me alſo, O my father; yet found no place of repentance, though he ſought it carefully with tears. Heb. 12.

" And Pharaoh ſaid to Moſes, the Lord is righteous, I and my people are wicked; I have ſinned againſt the Lord your God, and againſt you.

" And Balaam ſaid, Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my laſt end be like his.

" And Saul ſaid to Samuel, I have ſinned, for I have tranſgreſſed the commandment of the Lord; yet honour me now, I pray thee, before the elders of my people.

" And when Ahab heard the words of Elijah, he rent his clothes, and put ſackcloth upon his fleſh, and faſted, and lay in ſackcloth, and went ſoftly.

" Jehoram alſo rent his clothes, and the people looked, and behold he had ſackcloth upon his fleſh;" yet in the very act of his humiliation he could ſay, " God do ſo, and more alſo to me, if the head of Eliſha ſhall ſtand on him this day.

" Therefore ſaith the Lord, they have not cried unto me with their heart, when they howled upon their beds. They return, but not to the moſt high. Hoſea vii.

" And Judas ſaid, I have ſinned, in that I have betrayed innocent blood.

" And Simon Magus ſaid, Pray ye to the Lord for me, that none of theſe things come upon me."

All theſe took the pains both to confeſs and to repent in their own words, and many of them in their own tears, not in David's. But tranſported with the vain oſtentation of imitating David's language, not his life, obſerve how he brings a curſe upon himſelf and his father's houſe (God ſo diſpoſing it) by his uſurped and ill-imitated prayer, " Let thy anger I beſeech thee be againſt me and my father's houſe; as for theſe ſheep, what have they done?" For if David indeed ſinned in numbering the people, of which fault he in earneſt made that confeſſion, and acquitted the whole people from the guilt of that ſin; then doth this king, uſing the ſame words, bear witneſs againſt himſelf to be the guilty perſon; and either in his ſoul and conſcience here acquits the parliament and the people, or elſe abuſes the words of David, and diſſembles groſsly to the very face of God; which is apparent in the next line; wherein he accuſes even the church itſelf to God, as if ſhe were the church's enemy,

enemy, for having overcome his tyranny by the powerful and miraculous might of God's manifeſt arm: For to other ſtrength, in the midſt of our diviſions and diſorders, who can attribute our victories? Thus had this miſerable man no worſe enemies to ſolicit and mature his own deſtruction, from the haſtened ſentence of divine juſtice, than the obdurate curſes, which proceeded againſt himſelf out of his own mouth.

Hitherto his meditations, now his vows; which, as the vows of hypocrites uſe to be, are moſt commonly abſurd, and ſome wicked. Jacob vowed, that God ſhould be his God, if he granted him but what was neceſſary to perform that vow, life and ſubſiſtence; but the obedience proffered here is nothing ſo cheap. He, who took ſo heinouſly to be offered nineteen propoſitions from the parliament, capitulates here with God almoſt in as many articles.

" If he will continue that light," or rather that darkneſs of the Goſpel, which is among his prelates, ſettle their luxuries, and make them gorgeous biſhops;

If he will " reſtore" the grievances and miſchiefs of thoſe obſolete and popiſh laws, which the parliament without his conſent had abrogated, and will ſuffer juſtice to be executed according to his ſenſe;

" If he will ſuppreſs the many ſchiſms in church," to contradict himſelf in that which he hath foretold muſt and ſhall come to paſs, and will remove reformation as the greateſt ſchiſm of all, and factions in ſtate, by which he means in every leaf the parliament;

If he will " reſtore him" to his negative voice and the militia, as much as to ſay, to arbitrary power, which he wrongfully avers to be the " Right of his Predeceſſors;"

" If he will turn the hearts of his people" to their old cathedral and parochial ſervice in the liturgy, and their paſſive obedience to the king;

" If he will quench" the army, and withdraw our forces from withſtanding the piracy of Rupert, and the plotted Iriſh invaſion;

" If he will bleſs him with the freedom" of Biſhops again in the houſe of peers, and of fugitive delinquents in the houſe of commons, and deliver the honour of parliament into his hands, from the moſt natural and due

protection of the people, that entruſted them with the dangerous enterpriſe of being faithful to their country againſt the rage and malice of his tyrannous oppoſition;

" If he will keep him from that great offence" of following the counſel of his parliament, and enacting what they adviſe him to; which in all reaſon, and by the known law, and oath of his coronation he ought to do, and not to call that ſacrilege, which neceſſity through the continuance of his own civil war hath compelled him to; neceſſity, which made David eat the ſhowbread, made Ezekiah take all the ſilver which was found in God's houſe, and cut off the gold which overlaid thoſe doors and pillars, and gave it to Senacherib; neceſſity, which ofttimes made the primitive church to ſell her ſacred utenſils, even to the communion-chalice;

" If he will reſtore him to a capacity of glorifying him by doing" that both in church and ſtate, which muſt needs diſhonour and pollute his name;

" If he will bring him again with peace, honour, and ſafety, to his chief city," without repenting, without ſatisfying for the blood ſpilt, only for a few politic conceſſions, which are as good as nothing;

" If he will put again the ſword into his hand, to puniſh" thoſe that have delivered us, and to protect delinquents againſt the juſtice of parliament;

Then, if it be poſſible to reconcile contradictions, he will praiſe him by diſpleaſing him, and ſerve him by diſſerving him.

" His glory," in the gaudy copes and painted windows, mitres, rochets, altars, and the chaunted ſervice-book, " ſhall be dearer to him," than the eſtabliſhing his crown in righteouſneſs, and the ſpiritual power of religion.

" He will pardon thoſe that have offended him in particular," but there ſhall want no ſubtle ways to be even with them upon another ſcore of their ſuppoſed offences againſt the commonwealth; whereby he may at once affect the glory of a ſeeming juſtice, and deſtroy them pleaſantly, while he feigns to forgive them as to his own particular, and outwardly bewails them.

Theſe are the conditions of his treating with God, to whom he bates nothing of what he ſtood upon with the parliament:

ırliament: as if commiſſions of array could deal with
m alſo.

But of all theſe conditions, as it is now evident in our
es, God accepted none, but that final petition, which
ſo oft, no doubt but by the ſecret judgment of God,
ıportunes againſt his own head; praying God, "That
s mercies might be ſo toward him, as his reſolutions
truth and peace were toward his people." It follows
en, God having cut him off, without granting any of
eſe mercies, that his reſolutions were as feigned, as his
ws were fruſtrate.

XVI. *Upon the Army's ſurpriſal of the King at Holmby.*

TO give account to royaliſts what was done with their
ınquiſhed king, yielded up into our hands, is not to be
pected from them, whom God hath made his conque-
rs. And for brethren to debate and rip up their falling
ıt in the ear of a common enemy, thereby making him
e judge, or at leaſt the well-pleaſed auditor of their
ſagreement, is neither wiſe nor comely. To the king
erefore, were he living, or to his party yet remaining,
to this action, there belongs no anſwer. Emulations,
l men know, are incident among military men, and are,
they exceed not, pardonable. But ſome of the former
my, eminent enough for their own martial deeds, and
evalent in the houſe of commons, touched with envy
be ſo far outdone by a new model which they con-
mned, took advantage of preſbyterian and independent
ımes, and the virulence of ſome miniſters, to raiſe diſ-
rbance. And the war being then ended, thought
ghtly to have diſcarded them, who had faithfully done
e work, without their due pay, and the reward of their
vincible valour. But they who had the ſword yet in
eir hands, diſdaining to be made the firſt objects of
gratitude and oppreſſion, after all that expenſe of their
ood for juſtice, and the common liberty, ſeized upon
e king their priſoner, whom nothing but their match-
s deeds had brought ſo low as to ſurrender up his per-
ı: though he, to ſtir up new diſcord, choſe rather to
give

give up himſelf a captive to his own countrymen, who leſs had won him. This in likelihood might have grown to ſome height of miſchief; partly through the ſtrife which was kindling between our elder and our younger warriors, but chiefly through the ſeditious tongues of ſome falſe miniſters, more zealous againſt ſchiſms, than againſt their own ſimony and pluralities, or watchful of the common enemy, whoſe ſubtile inſinuations had got ſo far in among them, as with all diligence to blow the coals. But it pleaſed God, not to embroil and put to confuſion his whole people for the perverſeneſs of a few. The growth of our diſſenſion was either prevented, or ſoon quieted: the enemy ſoon deceived of his rejoicing, and the king eſpecially diſappointed of not the meaneſt morſel that his hope preſented him, to ruin us by our diviſion. And being now ſo nigh the end, we may the better be at leiſure to ſtay a while, and hear him commenting upon his own captivity.

He ſaith of his ſurpriſal, that it was a "motion eccentric and irregular." What then? his own alluſion from the celeſtial bodies puts us in mind, that irregular motions may be neceſſary on earth ſometimes, as well as conſtantly in Heaven. That is not always beſt, which is moſt regular to written law. Great worthies heretofore by diſobeying law, ofttimes have ſaved the commonwealth; and the law afterward by firm decree hath approved that planetary motion, that unblamable exorbitancy in them.

He means no good to either independent or preſbyterian, and yet his parable, like that of Balaam, is overruled to portend them good, far beſide his intention. Thoſe twins, that ſtrove encloſed in the womb of Rebecca, were the ſeed of Abraham; the younger undoubtedly gained the heavenly birthright; the elder, though ſupplanted in his ſimile, ſhall yet no queſtion find a better portion than Eſau found, and far above his uncircumciſed prelates.

He cenſures, and in cenſuring ſeems to hope it will be an ill omen, that they who build Jeruſalem divided their tongues and hands. But his hope failed him with his example; for that there were diviſions both of tongues and

and hands at the building of Jeruſalem, the ſtory would have certified him; and yet the work proſpered; and if God will, ſo may this, notwithſtanding all the craft and malignant wiles of Sanballat and Tobiah, adding what fuel they can to our diſſenſions; or the indignity of his compariſon, that likens us to thoſe ſeditious zealots, whoſe inteſtine fury brought deſtruction to the laſt Jeruſalem.

It being now no more in his hand to be revenged on his oppoſers, he ſeeks to ſatiate his fancy with the imagination of ſome revenge upon them from above; and like one who in a drowth obſerves the ſky, he ſits and watches when any thing will drop, that might ſolace him with the likeneſs of a puniſhment from Heaven upon us; which he ſtraight expounds how he pleaſes. No evil can befal the parliament or city, but he poſitively interprets it a judgment upon them for his ſake; as if the very manuſcript of God's judgments had been delivered to his cuſtody and expoſition. But his reading declares it well to be a falſe copy which he uſes: diſpenſing often to his own bad deeds and ſucceſſes the teſtimony of divine favour, and to the good deeds and ſucceſſes of other men divine wrath and vengeance. But to counterfeit the hand of God, is the boldeſt of all forgery: And he who without warrant, but his own fantaſtic ſurmiſe, takes upon him perpetually to unfold the ſecret and unſearchable myſteries of high providence, is likely for the moſt part to miſtake and ſlander them; and approaches to the madneſs of thoſe reprobate thoughts, that would wreſt the ſword of juſtice out of God's hand, and employ it more juſtly in their own conceit. It was a ſmall thing, to contend with the parliament about the ſole power of the militia, when we ſee him doing little leſs than laying hands on the weapons of God himſelf, which are his judgments, to wield and manage them by the ſway and bent of his own frail cogitations. Therefore "they that by tumults firſt occaſioned the raiſing of armies" in his doom muſt needs "be chaſtened by their own army for new tumults."

Firſt, note here his confeſſion, that thoſe tumults were the firſt occaſion of raiſing armies, and by conſequence that

that he himſelf raiſed them firſt, againſt thoſe ſuppoſed tumults. But who occaſioned thoſe tumults, or who made them ſo, being at firſt nothing more than the unarmed and peaceable concourſe of people, hath been diſcuſſed already. And that thoſe pretended tumults were chaſtiſed by their own army for new tumults, is not proved by a game at tic-tac with words; "tumults and armies, armies and tumults," but ſeems more like the method of a juſtice irrational than divine.

If the city were chaſtened by the army for new tumults, the reaſon is by himſelf ſet down evident and immediate, "their new tumults." With what ſenſe can it be referred then to another far-fetched and imaginary cauſe, that happened ſo many years before, and in his ſuppoſition only as a cauſe? Manlius defended the Capitol and the Romans from their enemies the Gauls: Manlius for ſedition afterward was by the Romans thrown headlong from the Capitol; therefore Manlius was puniſhed by divine juſtice for defending the Capitol, becauſe in that place puniſhed for ſedition, and by thoſe whom he defended. This is his logic upon divine juſtice; and was the ſame before upon the death of Sir John Hotham. And here again, "ſuch as were content to ſee him driven away by unſuppreſſed tumults, are now forced to fly to an army." Was this a judgment? Was it not a mercy rather, that they had a noble and victorious army ſo near at hand to fly to?

From God's juſtice he comes down to man's juſtice. Thoſe few of both houſes, who at firſt withdrew with him for the vain pretence of tumults, were counted deſerters; therefore thoſe many muſt be alſo deſerters, who withdrew afterwards from real tumults: as if it were the place, that made a parliament, and not the end and cauſe. Becauſe it is denied that thoſe were tumults, from which the king made ſhow of being driven, is it therefore of neceſſity implied, that there could be never any tumults for the future? If ſome men fly in craft, may not other men have cauſe to fly in earneſt? But mark the difference between their flight and his; they ſoon returned in ſafety to their places, he not till after many years, and then a captive to receive his puniſhment. So that

that their flying, whether the cauſe be conſidered, or the event, or both, neither juſtified him, nor condemned themſelves.

But he will needs have vengeance to purſue and overtake them; though to bring it in, it coſt him an inconvenient and obnoxious compariſon, "As the mice and rats overtook a German biſhop." I would our mice and rats had been as orthodoxal here, and had ſo purſued all his biſhops out of England; then vermin had rid away vermin, which now hath loſt the lives of too many thouſand honeſt men to do.

"He cannot but obſerve this divine juſtice, yet with ſorrow and pity." But ſorrow and pity in a weak and overmaſtered enemy is looked upon no otherwiſe than as the aſhes of his revenge burnt out upon himſelf: or as the damp of a cooled fury, when we ſay, it gives. But in this manner to ſit ſpelling and obſerving divine juſtice upon every accident and ſlight diſturbance, that may happen humanly to the affairs of men, is but another fragment of his broken revenge; and yet the ſhrewdeſt and the cunningeſt obloquy, that can be thrown upon their actions. For if he can perſuade men, that the parliament and their cauſe is purſued with divine vengeance, he hath attained his end, to make all men forſake them, and think the worſt that can be thought of them.

Nor is he only content to ſuborn divine juſtice in his cenſure of what is paſt, but he aſſumes the perſon of Chriſt himſelf, to prognoſticate over us what he wiſhes would come. So little is any thing or perſon ſacred from him, no not in Heaven, which he will not uſe, and put on, if it may ſerve him plauſibly to wreak his ſpleen, or eaſe his mind upon the parliament. Although, if ever fatal blindneſs did both attend and puniſh wilfulneſs, if ever any enjoyed not comforts for neglecting counſel belonging to their peace, it was in none more conſpicuouſly brought to paſs than in himſelf: and his predictions againſt the parliament and their adherents have for the moſt part been verified upon his own head, and upon his chief counſellors.

He concludes with high praiſes of the army. But praiſes

praiſes in an enemy are ſuperfluous, or ſmell of craft; and the army ſhall not need his praiſes, nor the parliament fare worſe for his accuſing prayers that follow. Wherein, as his charity can be no way comparable to that of Chriſt, ſo neither can his aſſurance, that they whom he ſeems to pray for, in doing what they did againſt him, "knew not what they did." It was but arrogance therefore, and not charity, to lay ſuch ignorance to others in the ſight of God, till he himſelf had been infallible, like him whoſe peculiar words he overweeningly aſſumes.

XXVII. *Entitled, to the Prince of Wales.*

WHAT the king wrote to his ſon, as a father, concerns not us; what he wrote to him as a king of England, concerns not him; God and the parliament having now otherwiſe diſpoſed of England. But becauſe I ſee it done with ſome artifice and labour, to poſſeſs the people, that they might amend their preſent condition, by his, or by his ſon's reſtorement, I ſhall ſhow point by point, that although the king had been reinſtalled to his deſire, or that his ſon admitted ſhould obſerve exactly all his father's precepts, yet that this would be ſo far from conducing to our happineſs, either as a remedy to the preſent diſtempers, or a prevention of the like to come, that it would inevitably throw us back again into all our paſt and fulfilled miſeries; would force us to fight over again all our tedious wars, and put us to another fatal ſtruggling for liberty and life, more dubious than the former. In which, as our ſucceſs hath been no other than our cauſe; ſo it will be evident to all poſterity, that his misfortunes were the mere conſequence of his perverſe judgment.

Firſt, he argues from the experience of thoſe troubles, which both he and his ſon have had, to the improvement of their piety and patience; and by the way bears witneſs in his own words, that the corrupt education of his youth, which was but glanced at only in ſome former paſſages of this anſwer, was a thing neither of mean conſideration, nor untruly charged upon him or his ſon: himſelf con-

ſeſſing here, that "court-delights are prone either to root up all true virtue and honour, or to be contented only with ſome leaves and withering formalities of them, without any real fruits tending to the public good." Which preſents him ſtill in his own words another Rehoboam, ſoftened by a far worſe court than Solomon's, and ſo corrupted by flatteries, which he affirms to be unſeparable, to the overturning of all peace, and the loſs of his own honour and kingdoms. That he came therefore thus bred up and nurtured to the throne far worſe than Rehoboam, unleſs he be of thoſe who equalized his father to king Solomon, we have here his own confeſſion. And how voluptuouſly, how idly reigning in the hands of other men, he either tyrannized or trifled away thoſe ſeventeen years of peace, without care or thought, as if to be a king had been nothing elſe in his apprehenſion, but to eat and drink, and have his will, and take his pleaſure; though there be who can relate his domeſtic life to the exactneſs of a diary, there ſhall be here no mention made. This yet we might have then foreſeen, that he who ſpent his leiſure ſo remiſsly and ſo corruptly to his own pleaſing, would one day or other be worſe buſied and employed to our ſorrow. And that he acted in good earneſt what Rehoboam did but threaten, to make his little finger heavier than his father's loins, and to whip us up with his two-twiſted ſcorpions, both temporal and ſpiritual tyranny, all his kingdoms have felt. What good uſe he made afterwards of his adverſity, both his impenitence and obſtinacy to the end (for he was no Manaſſeh) and the ſequel of theſe his meditated reſolutions, abundantly expreſs; retaining, commending, teaching, to his ſon all thoſe putrid and pernicious documents both of ſtate and of religion, inſtilled by wicked doctors, and received by him as in a veſſel nothing better ſeaſoned, which were the firſt occaſion both of his own and all our miſeries. And if he, in the beſt maturity of his years and underſtanding, made no better uſe to himſelf or others of his ſo long and manifold afflictions, either looking up to God, or looking down upon the reaſon of his own affairs; there can be no probability, that his ſon, bred up, not in the ſoft effeminacies of a court only, but in the rugged

rugged and more boiſterous licence of undiſciplined camps and garriſons, for years unable to reflect with judgment upon his own condition, and thus ill inſtructed by his father, ſhould give his mind to walk by any other rules than theſe, bequeathed him as on his father's death-bed, and as the choiceſt of all that experience, which his moſt ſerious obſervation and retirement in good or evil days had taught him. David indeed, by ſuffering without juſt cauſe, learned that meekneſs and that wiſdom by adverſity, which made him much the fitter man to reign. But they who ſuffer as oppreſſors, tyrants, violators of law, and perſecutors of reformation, without appearance of repenting; if they once get hold again of that dignity and power, which they had loſt, are but whetted and enraged by what they ſuffered, againſt thoſe whom they look upon as them that cauſed their ſufferings.

How he hath been "ſubject to the ſceptre of God's word and ſpirit," though acknowledged to be the beſt government; and what his diſpenſation of civil power hath been, with what juſtice, and what honour to the public peace; it is but looking back upon the whole catalogue of his deeds, and that will be ſufficient to remember us. "The cup of God's phyſic," as he calls it, what alteration it wrought in him to a firm healthfulneſs from any ſurfeit, or exceſs whereof the people generally thought him ſick, if any man would go about to prove, we have his own teſtimony following here, that it wrought none at all.

Firſt, he hath the ſame fixed opinion and eſteem of his old Epheſian goddeſs, called the Church of England, as he had ever; and charges ſtrictly his ſon after him to perſevere in that antipapal ſchiſm (for it is not much better) as that which will be neceſſary both for his ſoul's and the kingdom's peace. But if this can be any foundation of the kingdom's peace, which was the firſt cauſe of our diſtractions, let common ſenſe be judge. It is a rule and principle worthy to be known by chriſtians, that no ſcripture, no nor ſo much as any ancient creed, binds our faith, or our obedience to any Church whatſoever, denominated by a particular name; far leſs, if it

be diſtinguiſhed by a ſeveral government from that which indeed catholic. No man was ever bid be ſubject to ne church of Corinth, Rome, or Aſia, but to the church ithout addition, as it held faithful to the rules of ſcripure, and the government eſtabliſhed in all places by the poſtles; which at firſt was univerſally the ſame in all hurches and congregations; not differing or diſtinguiſhed y the diverſity of countries, territories or civil bounds. hat church, that from the name of a diſtinct place kes authority to ſet up a diſtinct faith or government, is ſchiſm and faction, not a church. It were an injury to ondemn the papiſt of abſurdity and contradiction, for dhering to his catholic romiſh religion, if we, for the leaſure of a king and his politic conſiderations, ſhall dhere to a catholic engliſh.

But ſuppoſe the church of England were as it ought o be, how is it to us the ſafer by being ſo named nd eſtabliſhed, whenas that very name and eſtabliſhment, y his contriving, or approbation, ſerved for nothing lſe but to delude us and amuſe us, while the church of ngland inſenſibly was almoſt changed and tranſlated ito the church of Rome. Which as every man knows general to be true, ſo the particular treaties and tranſctions tending to that concluſion are at large diſcovered a book entitled the "Engliſh Pope." But when the eople, diſcerning theſe abuſes, began to call for reformaon, in order to which the parliament demanded of the ng to uneſtabliſh that prelatical government, which ithout ſcripture had uſurped over us; ſtraight as Phaoh accuſed of idleneſs the Iſraelites that ſought leave to o and ſacrifice to God, he lays faction to their charge. nd that we may not hope to have ever any thing reormed in the church either by him or his ſon, he forearms him, "that the devil of rebellion doth moſt commonly turn himſelf into an angel of reformation:" and ys enough to make him hate it, as the worſt of evils, nd the bane of his crown: nay he counſels him to "let othing ſeem little or deſpicable to him, ſo as not ſpeedily nd effectually to ſuppreſs errours and ſchiſms." Wherey we may perceive plainly, that our conſciences were eſtined to the ſame ſervitude and perſecution, if not

worſe than before, whether under him, or if it ſhould ſo happen, under his ſon; who count all proteſtant churches erroneous and ſchiſmatical, which are not epiſcopal. His next precept is concerning our civil liberties; which by his ſole voice and predominant will muſt be circumſcribed, and not permitted to extend a hand's breadth further than his interpretation of the laws already ſettled. And although all human laws are but the offspring of that frailty, that fallibility and imperfection, which was in their authors, whereby many laws in the change of ignorant and obſcure ages, may be found both ſcandalous, and full of grievance to their poſterity that made them, and no law is further good than mutable upon juſt occaſion; yet if the removing of an old law, or the making of a new would ſave the kingdom, we ſhall not have it, unleſs his arbitrary voice will ſo far ſlacken the ſtiff curb of his prerogative, as to grant it us; who are as freeborn to make our own laws, as our fathers were, who made theſe we have. Where are then the engliſh liberties, which we boaſt to have been left us by our progenitors? To that he anſwers, that "our libertics conſiſt in the enjoyment of the fruits of our induſtry, and the benefit of thoſe laws, to which we ourſelves have conſented." Firſt, for the enjoyment of thoſe fruits, which our induſtry and labours have made our own upon our own, what privilege is that above what the Turks, Jews, and Moors enjoy under the turkiſh monarchy? For without that kind of juſtice, which is alſo in Algiers, among thieves and pirates between themſelves, no kind of government, no ſociety, juſt or unjuſt, could ſtand; no combination or conſpiracy could ſtick together. Which he alſo acknowledges in theſe words: "that if the crown upon his head be ſo heavy as to oppreſs the whole body, the weakneſs of inferiour members cannot return any thing of ſtrength, honour, or ſafety to the head; but that a neceſſary debilitation muſt follow." So that this liberty of the ſubject concerns himſelf and the ſubſiſtence of his own regal power in the firſt place, and before the conſideration of any right belonging to the ſubject. We expect therefore ſomething more, that muſt diſtinguiſh free government from ſlaviſh. But inſtead

ad of that, this king, though ever talking and pro-
ıg as ſmooth as now, ſuffered it in his own hearing to
ɔreached and pleaded without control or check, by
ı whom he moſt favoured and upheld, that the ſub-
had no property of his own goods, but that all was
ing's right.

ext, for the "benefit of thoſe laws, to which we
ılves have conſented," we never had it under him;
ot to ſpeak of laws ill executed, when the parlia-
t, and in them the people, have conſented to divers
, and, according to our ancient rights, demanded
ı, he took upon him to have a negative will, as the
cendent and ultimate law above all our laws; and
le us forcibly by laws, to which we ourſelves did not
ent, but complained of. Thus theſe two heads,
ein the utmoſt of his allowance here will give our
ties leave to conſiſt, the one of them ſhall be ſo far
made good to us, as may ſupport his own intereſt
crown from ruin or debilitation; and ſo far turkiſh
ls enjoy as much liberty under Mahomet and the
ıd Signior: the other we neither yet have enjoyed
r him, nor were ever like to do under the tyranny of
gative voice, which he claims above the unanimous
ent and power of a whole nation, virtually in the
ament.

ı which negative voice to have been caſt by the doom
ar, and put to death by thoſe who vanquiſhed him
eir own defence, he reckons to himſelf more than a
tive martyrdom. But martyrs bear witneſs to the
, not to themſelves. If I bear witneſs of myſelf,
Chriſt, my witneſs is not true. He who writes
elf martyr by his own inſcription, is like an ill painter,
by writing on the ſhapeleſs picture which he hath
n, is fain to tell paſſengers what ſhape it is: which
no man could imagine: no more than how a martyr-
can belong to him, who therefore dies for his re-
ı, becauſe it is eſtabliſhed. Certainly if Agrippa
turned chriſtian, as he was once turning, and had put
eath ſcribes and phariſees for obſerving the law of
es, and refuſing chriſtianity, they had died a truer
yrdom. For thoſe laws were eſtabliſhed by God

and Moſes, theſe by no warrantable authors of religion, whoſe laws in all other beſt reformed churches are rejected. And if to die for an eſtabliſhment of religion be martyrdom, then romiſh prieſts executed for that, which had ſo many hundred years been eſtabliſhed in this land, are no worſe martyrs than he. Laſtly, if to die for the teſtimony of his own conſcience, be enough to make him a martyr, what heretic dying for direct blaſphemy, as ſome have done conſtantly, may not boaſt a martyrdom? As for the conſtitution or repeal of civil laws, that power lying only in the parliament, which he by the very law of his coronation was to grant them, not to debar them, not to preſerve a leſſer law with the contempt and violation of a greater; it will conclude him not ſo much as in a civil and metaphorical ſenſe to have died a martyr of our laws, but a plain tranſgreſſor of them. And ſhould the parliament endued with legiſlative power, make our laws, and be after to diſpute them piece-meal with the reaſon, conſcience, humour, paſſion, fancy, folly, obſtinacy, or other ends of one man, whoſe ſole word and will ſhall baffle and unmake what all the wiſdom of a parliament hath been deliberately framing; what a ridiculous and contemptible thing a parliament would ſoon be, and what a baſe unworthy nation we, who boaſt our freedom, and ſend them with the manifeſt peril of their lives to preſerve it, they who are not marked by deſtiny for ſlaves may apprehend! In this ſervile condition to have kept us ſtill under hatches, he both reſolves here to the laſt, and ſo inſtructs his ſon.

As to thoſe offered condeſcenſions of a "charitable connivance, or toleration," if we conſider what went before, and what follows, they moulder into nothing. For, what with not ſuffering ever ſo little to ſeem a deſpicable ſchiſm, without effectual ſuppreſſion, as he warned him before, and what with no oppoſition of law, government, or eſtabliſhed religion to be permitted, which is his following proviſo, and wholly within his own conſtruction; what a miſerable and ſuſpected toleration, under ſpies and haunting promooters we ſhould enjoy, is apparent. Beſides that it is ſo far beneath the honour of a parliament and free nation, to beg and ſupplicate the godſhip of one frail

frail man, for the bare and ſimple toleration of what they all conſent to be both juſt, pious, and beſt pleaſing to God, while that which is erroneous, unjuſt, and miſchievous in the church or ſtate, ſhall by him alone againſt them all be kept up and eſtabliſhed, and they cenſured the while for a covetuous, ambitious, and ſacrilegious faction.

Another bait to allure the people is the charge he lays upon his ſon to be tender of them. Which if we ſhould believe in part, becauſe they are his herd, his cattle, the ſtock upon his ground, as he accounts them, whom to waſte and deſtroy would undo himſelf, yet the inducement, which he brings to move him, renders the motion itſelf ſomething ſuſpicious. For if princes need no palliations, as he tells his ſon, wherefore is it that he himſelf hath ſo often uſed them? Princes, of all other men, have not more change of raiment in their wardrobes, than variety of ſhifts and palliations in their ſolemn actings and pretences to the people.

To try next if he can entnare the prime men of thoſe who have oppoſed him, whom, more truly than his meaning was, he calls the "patrons and vindicators of the people," he gives out indemnity, and offers acts of oblivion. But they who with a good conſcience and upright heart did their civil duties in the ſight of God, and in their ſeveral places, to reſiſt tyranny and the violence of ſuperſtition banded both againſt them, he may be ſure will never ſeek to be forgiven that, which may be juſtly attributed to their immortal praiſe; nor will aſſent ever to the guilty blotting out of thoſe actions before men, by which their faith aſſures them they chiefly ſtand approved, and are had in remembrance before the throne of God.

He exhorts his ſon "not to ſtudy revenge." But how far he, or at leaſt they about him intend to follow that exhortation, was ſeen lately at the Hague, and now lateſt at Madrid; where to execute in the baſeſt manner, though but the ſmalleſt part of that ſavage and barbarous revenge, which they do nothing elſe but ſtudy and contemplate, they cared not to let the world know them for profeſſed traitors and aſſaſſinators of all law both divine and human, even of that laſt and moſt extenſive law kept inviolable to public perſons among all fair enemies in

the midſt of uttermoſt defiance and hoſtility. How implacable therefore they would be, after any terms of cloſure or admittance for the future, or any like opportunity given them hereafter, it will be wiſdom and our ſafety to believe rather, and prevent, than to make trial. And it will concern the multitude, though courted here, to take heed how they ſeek to hide or colour their own ficklenes and inſtability with a bad repentance of their well-doing, and their fidelity to the better cauſe; to which at firſt ſo cheerfully and conſcientiouſly they joined themſelves.

He returns again to extol the church of England, and again requires his ſon by the joint authority of "a father and a king, not to let his heart receive the leaſt check or diſaffection againſt it." And not without cauſe, for by that means "having ſole influence upon the clergy, and they upon the people, after long ſearch and many diſputes," he could not poſſibly find a more compendious and politic way to uphold and ſettle tyranny, than by ſubduing firſt the conſciences of vulgar men, with the inſenſible poiſon of their ſlaviſh doctrine: for then the body and beſotted mind without much reluctancy was likelieſt to admit the yoke.

He commends alſo "parliaments held with freedom and with honour." But I would aſk how that can be, while he only muſt be the ſole free perſon in that number; and would have the power with his unaccountable denial, to diſhonour them by rejecting all their counſels, to confine their lawgiving power, which is the foundation of our freedom, and to change at his pleaſure the very name of a parliament into the name of a faction.

The concluſion therefore muſt needs be quite contrary to what he concludes; that nothing can be more unhappy, more diſhonourable, more unſafe for all, than when a wiſe, grave, and honourable parliament ſhall have laboured, debated, argued, conſulted, and, as he himſelf ſpeaks, "contributed" for the public good all their counſels in common, to be then fruſtrated, diſappointed, denied and repulſed by the ſingle whiff of a negative, from the mouth of one wilful man; nay, to be blaſted, to be ſtruck as mute and motionleſs as a parliament of tapeſtry in the hangings; or elſe after all their pains and travel

o be diſſolved, and caſt away like ſo many noughts in rithmetic, unleſs it be to turn the O of their inſignificance nto a lamentation with the people, who had ſo vainly ent them. For this is not to "enact all things by pub-c conſent," as he would have us be perſuaded, this is to nact nothing but by the private conſent and leave of one ot negative tyrant; this is miſchief without remedy, a ifling and obſtructing evil that hath no vent, no outlet, o paſſage through: grant him this, and the parliament ath no more freedom than if it ſate in his nooſe, hich when he pleaſes to draw together with one twitch f his negative, ſhall throttle a whole nation, to the wiſh f Caligula, in one neck. This with the power of the ilitia in his own hands over our bodies and eſtates, and ie prelates to enthral our conſciences either by fraud or rce, is the ſum of that happineſs and liberty we were look for, whether in his own reſtitution, or in theſe recepts given to his ſon. Which unavoidably would ave ſet us in the ſame ſtate of miſery, wherein we were efore; and have either compelled us to ſubmit like ondſlaves, or put us back to a ſecond wandering over at horrid wilderneſs of diſtraction and civil ſlaughter, hich, not without the ſtrong and miraculous hand of od aſſiſting us, we have meaſured out, and ſurvived. nd who knows, if we make ſo ſlight of this incompa-ble deliverance, which God hath beſtowed upon us, but at we ſhall, like thoſe fooliſh Iſraelites, who depoſed od and Samuel to ſet up a king, "cry out" one day, becauſe of our king," which we have been mad upon; nd then God, as he foretold them, will no more deliver s.

There remains now but little more of his diſcourſe, hereof to take a ſhort view will not be amiſs. His ords make ſemblance as if he were magnanimouſly ex-ciſing himſelf, and ſo teaching his ſon, "to want as ell as to wear a crown; and would ſeem to account it not worth taking up or enjoying, upon ſordid, diſho-ourable, and irreligious terms;" and yet to his very laſt id nothing more induſtriouſly, than ſtrive to take up id enjoy again his ſequeſtered crown, upon the moſt rdid, diſloyal, diſhonourable, and irreligious terms, not

of making peace only, but of joining and incorporating with the murderous Iriſh, formerly by himſelf declared againſt, for "wicked and deteſtable rebels, odious to God and all good men." And who but thoſe rebels now are the chief ſtrength and confidence of his ſon? While the preſbyter Scot that woos and ſolicits him, is neglected and put off, as if no terms were to him ſordid, irreligious and diſhonourable, but the ſcottiſh and preſbyterian, never to be complied with, till the fear of inſtant periſhing ſtarve him out at length to ſome unſound and hypocritical agreement.

He bids his ſon "keep to the true principles of piety, virtue, and honour, and he ſhall never want a kingdom." And I ſay, people of England! keep ye to thoſe principles, and ye ſhall never want a king. Nay, after ſuch a fair deliverance as this, with ſo much fortitude and valour ſhown againſt a tyrant, that people that ſhould ſeek a king, claiming what this man claims, would ſhow themſelves to be by nature ſlaves, and arrant beaſts; not fit for that liberty, which they cried out and bellowed for, but fitter to be led back again into their old ſervitude, like a ſort of clamouring and fighting brutes, broke looſe from their copy-holds, that know not how to uſe or poſſeſs the liberty which they fought for; but with the fair words and promiſes of an old exaſperated foe, are ready to be ſtroked and tamed again, into the wonted and well-pleaſing ſtate of their true norman villanage, to them beſt agreeable.

The laſt ſentence, whereon he ſeems to venture the whole weight of all his former reaſons and argumentations, "That religion to their God, and loyalty to their king, cannot be parted, without the ſin and infelicity of a people," is contrary to the plain teaching of Chriſt, that "No man can ſerve two maſters; but, if he hold to the one, he muſt reject and forſake the other." If God, then, and earthly kings be for the moſt part not ſeveral only, but oppoſite maſters, it will as oft happen, that they who will ſerve their king muſt forſake their God; and they who will ſerve God muſt forſake their king; which then will neither be their ſin, nor their infelicity; but their wiſdom, their piety, and their true happineſs; as

to

to be deluded by theſe unſound and ſubtle oſtentations here, would be their miſery; and in all likelihood much greater than what they hitherto have undergone: if now again intoxicated and moped with theſe royal, and therefore ſo delicious becauſe royal, rudiments of bondage, the cup of deception, ſpiced and tempered to their bane, they ſhould deliver up themſelves to theſe glozing words and illuſions of him, whoſe rage and utmoſt violence they have ſuſtained, and overcome ſo nobly.

XXVIII. *Entitled Meditations upon Death.*

IT might be well thought by him, who reads no further than the title of this laſt eſſay, that it required no anſwer. For all other human things are diſputed, and will be variouſly thought of to the world's end. But this buſineſs of death is a plain caſe, and admits no controverſy: in that centre all opinions meet. Nevertheleſs, ſince out of thoſe few mortifying hours, that ſhould have been intireſt to themſelves, and moſt at peace from all paſſion and diſquiet, he can afford ſpare time to inveigh bitterly againſt that juſtice which was done upon him; it will be needful to ſay ſomething in defence of thoſe proceedings, though briefly, in regard ſo much on this ſubject hath been written lately.

It happened once, as we find in Eſdras and Joſephus, authors not leſs believed than any under ſacred, to be a great and ſolemn debate in the court of Darius, what thing was to be counted ſtrongeſt of all other. He that could reſolve this, in reward of his excellent wiſdom, ſhould be clad in purple, drink in gold, ſleep on a bed of gold, and ſit next Darius. None but they doubtleſs who were reputed wiſe, had the queſtion propounded to them: who after ſome reſpite given them by the king to conſider, in full aſſembly of all his lords and graveſt counſellors, returned ſeverally what they thought. The firſt held, that wine was ſtrongeſt, another that the king was ſtrongeſt. But Zorobabel prince of the captive Jews, and heir to the crown of Judah, being one of them, proved women to be ſtronger than the king, for that he himſelf, had

had ſeen a concubine take his crown from off his head to ſet it upon her own: and others beſides him have likewiſe ſeen the like feat done, and not in jeſt. Yet he proved on, and it was ſo yielded by the king himſelf, and all his ſages, that neither wine, nor women, nor the king, but truth of all other things was the ſtrongeſt. For me, though neither aſked, nor in a nation that gives ſuch rewards to wiſdom, I ſhall pronounce my ſentence ſomewhat different from Zorobabel; and ſhall defend that either truth and juſtice are all one, (for truth is but juſtice in our knowledge, and juſtice is but truth in our practice: and he indeed ſo explains himſelf, in ſaying that with truth is no accepting of perſons, which is the property of juſtice:) or elſe if there be any odds, that juſtice, though not ſtronger than truth, yet by her office is to put forth and exhibit more ſtrength in the affairs of mankind. For truth is properly no more than contemplation; and her utmoſt efficiency is but teaching: but juſtice in her very eſſence is all ſtrength and activity; and hath a ſword put into her hand, to uſe againſt all violence and oppreſſion on the earth. She it is moſt truly, who accepts no perſon, and exempts none from the ſeverity of her ſtroke. She never ſuffers injury to prevail, but when falſehood firſt prevails over truth; and that alſo is a kind of juſtice done on them who are ſo deluded. Though wicked kings and tyrants counterfeit her ſword, as ſome did that buckler, fabled to fall from heaven into the capitol, yet ſhe communicates her power to none but ſuch as like herſelf are juſt, or at leaſt will do juſtice. For it were extreme partiality and injuſtice, the flat denial and overthrow of herſelf, to put her own authentic ſword into the hand of an unjuſt and wicked man, or ſo far to accept and exalt one mortal perſon above his equals, that he alone ſhall have the puniſhing of all other men tranſgreſſing, and not receive like puniſhment from men, when he himſelf ſhall be found the higheſt tranſgreſſor.

We may conclude therefore, that juſtice above all other things, is and ought to be the ſtrongeſt: ſhe is the ſtrength, the kingdom, the power, and majeſty of all ages. Truth, herſelf would ſubſcribe to this, though Darius and all the monarchs of the world ſhould deny. And if by

by ſentence thus written, it were my happineſs to ſet free the minds of Engliſhmen from longing to return poorly under that captivity of kings, from which the ſtrength and ſupreme ſword of juſtice hath delivered them, I ſhall have done a work not much inferiour to that of Zorobabel: who by well praiſing and extolling the force of truth, in that contemplative ſtrength conquered Darius; and freed his country and the people of God, from the captivity of Babylon. Which I ſhall yet not deſpair to do, if they in this land, whoſe minds are yet captive, be but as ingenuous to acknowledge the ſtrength and ſupremacy of juſtice, as that heathen king was to confeſs the ſtrength of truth: or let them but, as he did, grant that, and they will ſoon perceive, that truth reſigns all her outward ſtrength to juſtice: juſtice therefore muſt needs be ſtrongeſt, both in her own and in the ſtrength of truth. But if a king may do among men whatſoever is his will and pleaſure, and notwithſtanding be unaccountable to men, then contrary to his magnified wiſdom of Zorobabel, neither truth nor juſtice, but the king is ſtrongeſt of all other things, which that perſian monarch himſelf, in the midſt of all his pride and glory durſt not aſſume.

Let us ſee therefore what this king hath to affirm, why the ſentence of juſtice, and the weight of that ſword, which ſhe delivers into the hands of men, ſhould be more partial to him offending, than to all others of human race. Firſt he pleads, that "no law of God or man gives to ſubjects any power of judicature without or againſt him." Which aſſertion ſhall be proved in every part to be moſt untrue. The firſt expreſs law of God given to mankind was that to Noah, as a law, in general, to all the ſons of men. And by that moſt ancient and univerſal law, "Whoſoever ſheddeth man's blood, by man ſhall his blood be ſhed;" we find here no exception. If a king therefore do this; to a king, and that by men alſo, the ſame ſhall be done. This in the law of Moſes, which came next, ſeveral times is repeated, and in one place remarkably, Numb. xxxv. "Ye ſhall take no ſatisfaction for the life of a murderer, but he ſhall ſurely be put to death: the land cannot be cleanſed of the blood that is ſhed therein, but by the blood of him that

that ſhed it." This is ſo ſpoken as that which concerned all Iſrael, not one man alone, to ſee performed; and if no ſatisfaction were to be taken, then certainly no exception. Nay the king, when they ſhould ſet up any, was to obſerve the whole law, and not only to ſee it done, but to "do it; that his heart might not be lifted up above his brethren," to dream of vain and reaſonleſs prerogatives or exemptions, whereby the law itſelf muſt needs be founded in unrighteouſneſs.

And were that true, which is moſt falſe, that all kings are the Lord's anointed, it were yet abſurd to think, that the anointment of God ſhould be, as it were, a charm againſt law, and give them privilege, who puniſh others, to ſin themſelves unpuniſhably. The high prieſt was the Lord's anointed as well as any king, and with the ſame conſecrated oil: yet Solomon had put to death Abiathar, had it not been for other reſpects than that anointment. If God himſelf ſay to kings, "touch not mine anointed," meaning his choſen people, as is evident in that pſalm, yet no man will argue thence, that he protects them from civil laws if they offend; then certainly, though David as a private man, and in his own cauſe, feared to lift his hand againſt the Lord's anointed, much leſs can this forbid the law, or diſarm juſtice from having legal power againſt any king. No other ſupreme magiſtrate, in what kind of government ſoever, lays claim to any ſuch enormous privilege; wherefore then ſhould any king, who is but one kind of magiſtrate, and ſet over the people for no other end than they?

Next in order of time to the laws of Moſes are thoſe of Chriſt, who declares profeſſedly his judicature to be ſpiritual, abſtract from civil managements, and therefore leaves all nations to their own particular laws, and way of government. Yet becauſe the church hath a kind of juriſdiction within her own bounds, and that alſo, though in proceſs of time much corrupted and plainly turned into a corporal judicature, yet much approved by this king; it will be firm enough and valid againſt him, if ſubjects, by the laws of church alſo, be "inveſted with a power of judicature" both without and againſt their king, though pretending,

pretending, and by them acknowledged "next and immediately under Chriſt ſupreme head and governor." Theodoſius, one of the beſt chriſtian emperors, having made a ſlaughter of the Theſſalonians for ſedition, but too cruelly, was excommunicated to his face by St. Ambroſe, who was his ſubject; and excommunion is the utmoſt of eccleſiaſtical judicature, a ſpiritual putting to death. But this, ye will ſay, was only an example. Read then the ſtory; and it will appear, both that Ambroſe avouched it for the law of God, and Theodoſius confeſſed it of his own accord to be ſo; "and that the law of God was not to be made void in him, for any reverence to his imperial power." From hence, not to be tedious, I ſhall paſs into our own land of Britain; and ſhow that ſubjects here have exerciſed the utmoſt of ſpiritual judicature, and more than ſpiritual againſt their kings, his predeceſſors. Vortiger, for committing inceſt with his daughter, was by St. German, at that time his ſubject, curſed and condemned in a britiſh counſel about the year 448; and thereupon ſoon after was depoſed. Mauricus, a king in Wales, for breach of oath and the murder of Cynetus, was excommunicated and curſed, with all his offspring, by Oudoceus biſhop of Llandaff in full ſynod, about the year 560; and not reſtored, till he had repented. Morcant, another king in Wales, having ſlain Frioc his uncle, was fain to come in perſon, and receive judgment from the ſame biſhop and his clergy; who upon his penitence acquitted him, for no other cauſe than leſt the kingdom ſhould be deſtitute of a ſucceſſor in the royal line. Theſe examples are of the primitive, britiſh, and epiſcopal church; long ere they had any commerce or communion with the church of Rome. What power afterwards of depoſing kings, and ſo conſequently of putting them to death, was aſſumed and practiſed by the canon law, I omit, as a thing generally known. Certainly, if whole councils of the romiſh church have in the midſt of their dimneſs diſcerned ſo much of truth, as to decree at Conſtance, and at Baſil, and many of them to avouch at Trent alſo, that a council is above the pope, and may judge him, though by them not denied to be the vicar

of

of Chriſt; we in our clearer light may be aſhamed not to diſcern further, that a parliament is by all equity and right above a king, and may judge him, whoſe reaſons and pretenſions to hold of God only, as his immediate vicegerent, we know how far fetched they are, and inſufficient.

As for the laws of man, it would aſk a volume to repeat all that might be cited in this point againſt him from all antiquity. In Greece, Oreſtes, the ſon of Agamemnon, and by ſucceſſion king of Argos, was in that country judged and condemned to death for killing his mother: whence eſcaping, he was judged again, though a ſtranger, before the great council of Arcopagus in Athens. And this memorable act of judicature was the firſt, that brought the juſtice of that grave ſenate into fame and high eſtimation over all Greece for many ages after. And in the ſame city, tyrants were to undergo legal ſentence by the laws of Solon. The kings of Sparta, though deſcended lineally from Hercules, eſteemed a god among them, were often judged, and ſometimes put to death by the moſt juſt and renowned laws of Lycurgus; who, though a king, thought it moſt unequal to bind his ſubjects by any law, to which he bound not himſelf. In Rome, the laws made by Valerius Publicola, ſoon after the expelling of Tarquin and his race, expelled without a written law, the law being afterward written; and what the ſenate decreed againſt Nero, that he ſhould be judged, and puniſhed according to the laws of their anceſtors, and what in like manner was decreed againſt other emperors, is vulgarly known; as it was known to thoſe heathen, and found juſt by nature ere any law mentioned it. And that the chriſtian civil law warrants like power of judicature to ſubjects againſt tyrants, is written clearly by the beſt and famouſeſt civilians. For if it was decreed by Theodoſius, and ſtands yet firm in the code of Juſtinian, that the law is above the emperor, then certainly the emperor being under law, the law may judge him; and if judge him, may puniſh him, proving tyrannous: how elſe is the law above him, or to what purpoſe? Theſe are neceſſary deductions; and thereafter hath been done in all ages and kingdoms, oftener than to be here recited.

But

But what need we any further ſearch after the law of other lands, for that which is ſo fully and ſo plainly ſet down lawful in our own? Where ancient books tell us, Bracton, Fleta, and others, that the king is under law, and inferiour to his court of parliament; that although his place "to do juſtice" be higheſt, yet that he ſtands as liable "to receive juſtice," as the meaneſt of his kingdom. Nay, Alfred the moſt worthy king, and by ſome accounted firſt abſolute monarch of the Saxons here, ſo ordained; as is cited out of an ancient law-book called "the Mirror;" in "rights of the kingdom," p. 31, where it is complained on, "as the ſovereign abuſe of all," that "the king ſhould be deemed above the law, whereas he ought to be the ſubject to it by his oath." Of which oath anciently it was the laſt clauſe, that the king "ſhould be as liable, and obedient to ſuffer right, as others of his people." And indeed it were but fond and ſenſeleſs, that the king ſhould be accountable to every petty ſuit in leſſer courts, as we all know he was, and not be ſubject to the judicature of parliament in the main matters of our common ſafety or deſtruction; that he ſhould be anſwerable in the ordinary courſe of law for any wrong done to a private perſon, and not anſwerable in court of parliament for deſtroying the whole kingdom. By all this, and much more that might be added, as in an argument overcopious rather than barren, we ſee it manifeſt that all laws, both of God and man, are made without exemption of any perſon whomſoever; and that if kings preſume to overtop the law by which they reign for the public good, they are by law to be reduced into order; and that can no way be more juſtly, than by thoſe who exalt them to that high place. For who ſhould better underſtand their own laws, and when they are tranſgreſt, than they who are governed by them, and whoſe conſent firſt made them? And who can have more right to take knowledge of things done within a free nation, than they within themſelves?

Thoſe objected oaths of allegiance and ſupremacy we ſwore, not to his perſon, but as it was inveſted with his authority; and his authority was by the people firſt given him conditionally, in law, and under law, and under oath

alſo

alſo for the kingdom's good, and not otherwiſe; the oaths then were interchanged, and mutual; ſtood and fell togetherſ; he ſwore fidelity to his truſt; (not as a deluding ceremony, but as a real condition of their admitting him for king; and the conqueror himſelf ſwore it oftener than at his crowning:) they ſwore homage and fealty to his perſon in that truſt. There was no reaſon why the kingdom ſhould be further bound by oaths to him, than he by his coronation oath to us, which he hath every way broken: and having broken, the ancient crown oath of Alfred above-mentioned conceals not his penalty.

As for the covenant, if that be meant, certainly no diſcreet perſon can imagine it ſhould bind us to him in any ſtricter ſenſe than thoſe oaths formerly. The acts of hoſtility, which we received from him, were no ſuch dear obligements, that we ſhould owe him more fealty and defence for being our enemy, than we could before when we took him only for a king. They were accuſed by him and his party to pretend liberty and reformation, but to have no other end than to make themſelves great and to deſtroy the king's perſon and authority. For which reaſon they added that third article, teſtifying to the world, that as they were reſolved to endeavour firſt a reformation in the church, to extirpate prelacy, to preſerve the rights of parliament, and the liberties of the kingdom, ſo they intended, ſo far as it might conſiſt with the preſervation and defence of theſe, to preſerve the king's perſon and authority; but not otherwiſe. As far as this comes to, they covenant and ſwear in the ſixth article, to preſerve and defend the perſons and authority of one another, and all thoſe that enter into that league; ſo that this covenant gives no unlimitable exemption to the king's perſon, but gives to all as much defence and preſervation as to him, and to him as much as to their own perſons, and no more; that is to ſay, in order and ſubordination to thoſe main ends, for which we live and are a nation of men joined in ſociety either chriſtian, or at leaſt human. But if the covenant were made abſolute, to preſerve and defend any one whomſoever, without reſpect had, either to the true religion,

or

or thoſe other ſuperiour things to be defended and preſerved however, it cannot then be doubted, but that the covenant was rather a moſt fooliſh, haſty, and unlawful vow, than a deliberate and well-weighed covenant; ſwearing us into labyrinths and repugnances, no way to be ſolved or reconciled, and therefore no way to be kept; as firſt offending againſt the law of God, to vow the abſolute preſervation, defence, and maintaining of one man, though in his ſins and offences never ſo great and heinous againſt God or his neighbour; and to except a perſon from juſtice, whereas his law excepts none. Secondly, it offends againſt the law of this nation, wherein, as hath been proved, kings in receiving juſtice, and undergoing due trial, are not differenced from the meaneſt ſubject. Laſtly, it contradicts and offends againſt the covenant itſelf, which vows in the fourth article to bring to open trial and condign puniſhment all thoſe that ſhall be found guilty of ſuch crimes and delinquencies, whereof the king, by his own letters and other undeniable teſtimonies not brought to light till afterward, was found and convicted to be chief actor in what they thought him, at the time of taking that covenant, to be overruled only by evil counſellors; and thoſe, or whomſoever they ſhould diſcover to be principal, they vowed to try, either by their own "ſupreme judicatories," (for ſo even then they called them,) "or by others having power from them to that effect." So that to have brought the king to condign puniſhment hath not broke the covenant, but it would have broke the covenant to have ſaved him from thoſe judicatories, which both nations declared in that covenant to be ſupreme againſt any perſon whatſoever. And beſides all this, to ſwear in covenant the bringing of his evil counſellors and accomplices to condign puniſhment, and not only to leave unpuniſhed and untouched the grand offender, but to receive him back again from the accompliſhment of ſo many violences and miſchiefs, dipped from head to foot, and ſtained over with the blood of thouſands that were his faithful ſubjects, forced to their own defence againſt a civil war by him firſt raiſed upon them; and to receive him thus, in this gory pickle, to all his dignities and honours,

covering the ignominions and horrid purple robe of innocent blood, that ſat ſo cloſe about him, with the glorious purple of royalty and ſupreme rule, the reward of higheſt excellence and virtue here on earth; were not only to ſwear and covenant the performance of an unjuſt vow, the ſtrangeſt and moſt impious to the face of God, but were the moſt unwiſe and unprudential act as to civil government. For ſo long as a king ſhall find by experience, that, do the worſt he can, his ſubjects, overawed by the religion of their own covenant, will only proſecute his evil inſtruments, not dare to touch his perſon; and that whatever hath been on his part offended or tranſgreſſed, he ſhall come off at laſt with the ſame reverence to his perſon, and the ſame honour as for well doing, he will not fail to find them work; ſeeking far and near, and inviting to his court all the concourſe of evil counſellors, or agents, that may be found: who, tempted with preferments and his promiſe to uphold them, will hazard eaſily their own heads, and the chance of ten to one but they ſhall prevail at laſt, over men ſo quelled and fitted to be ſlaves by the falſe conceit of a religious covenant. And they in that ſuperſtition neither wholly yielding, nor to the utmoſt reſiſting, at the upſhot of all their fooliſh war and expenſe, will find to have done no more but fetched a compaſs only of their miſeries, ending at the ſame point of ſlavery, and in the ſame diſtractions wherein they firſt begun. But when kings themſelves are made as liable to puniſhment as their evil counſellors, it will be both as dangerous from the king himſelf as from his parliament, to thoſe that evil counſel him: and they, who elſe would be his readieſt agents in evil, will then not fear to diſſuade or to diſobey him, not only in reſpect of themſelves and their own lives, which for his ſake they would not ſeem to value, but in reſpect of that danger which the king himſelf may incur, whom they would ſeem to love and ſerve with greateſt fidelity. On all theſe grounds therefore of the covenant itſelf, whether religious or political, it appears likelieſt, that both the Engliſh parliament and the Scotch commiſſioners, thus interpreting the covenant, (as indeed at that time they were the beſt and moſt authentical interpreters joined together)

together) anſwered the king unanimouſly, in their letter dated January the 13th, 1645, that till ſecurity and ſatisfaction firſt given to both kingdoms for the blood ſpilled, for the Iriſh rebels brought over, and for the war in Ireland by him fomented, they could in nowiſe yield their conſent to his return. Here was ſatisfaction, full two years and upward after the covenant taken, demanded of the king by both nations in parliament for crimes at leaſt capital, wherewith they charged him. And what ſatisfaction could be given for ſo much blood, but juſtice upon him that ſpilled it? till which done, they neither took themſelves bound to grant him the exerciſe of his regal office by any meaning of the covenant which they then declared (though other meanings have been ſince contrived) nor ſo much regarded the ſafety of his perſon, as to admit of his return among them from the midſt of thoſe whom they declared to be his greateſt enemies; nay from himſelf as from an actual enemy, not as from a king, they demanded ſecurity. But if the covenant, all this notwithſtanding, ſwore otherwiſe to preſerve him than in the preſervation of true religion and our liberties, againſt which he fought, if not in arms, yet in reſolution, to his dying day, and now after death ſtill fights again in this his book, the covenant was better broken, than he ſaved. And God hath teſtified by all propitious and the moſt evident ſign, whereby in theſe latter times he is wont to teſtify what pleaſes him, that ſuch a ſolemn and for many ages unexampled act of due puniſhment was no mockery of juſtice, but a moſt grateful and well-pleaſing ſacrifice. Neither was it to cover their perjury, as he accuſes, but to uncover his perjury to the oath of his coronation.

The reſt of his diſcourſe quite forgets the title; and turns his meditations upon death into obloquy and bitter vehemence againſt his "judges and accuſers;" imitating therein, not our Saviour, but his grandmother Mary queen of Scots, as alſo in the moſt of his other ſcruples, exceptions and evaſions; and from whom he ſeems to have learnt, as it were by heart, or elſe by kind, that which is thought by his admirers to be the moſt virtuous, moſt manly, moſt chriſtian, and moſt martyr like, both

of his words and ſpeeches here, and of his anſwers and behaviour at his trial.

" It is a ſad fate," he ſaith, " to have his enemies both accuſers, parties and judges." Sad indeed, but no ſufficient plea to acquit him from being ſo judged. For what malefactor might not ſometimes plead the like? If his own crimes have made all men his enemies, who elſe can judge him? They of the powder-plot againſt his father might as well have pleaded the ſame. Nay, at the reſurrection it may as well be pleaded, that the ſaints, who then ſhall judge the world, are " both enemies, judges, parties, and accuſers."

So much he thinks to abound in his own defence, that he undertakes an unmeaſurable taſk, to beſpeak " the ſingular care and protection of God over all kings," as being the greateſt patrons of law, juſtice, order, and religion on earth. But what patrons they be, God in the ſcripture oft enough hath expreſſed; and the earth itſelf hath too long groaned under the burden of their injuſtice, diſorder, and irreligion. Therefore " to bind their kings in chains, and their nobles with links of iron," is an honour belonging to his ſaints; not to build Babel, (which was Nimrod's work, the firſt king, and the beginning of his kingdom was Babel,) but to deſtroy it, eſpecially that ſpiritual Babel: and firſt to overcome thoſe European kings, which receive their power, not from God, but from the beaſt; and are counted no better than his ten horns. " Theſe ſhall hate the great whore," and yet " ſhall give their kingdoms to the beaſt that carries her; they ſhall commit fornication with her," and yet " ſhall burn her with fire," and yet " ſhall lament the fall of Babylon," where they fornicated with her. Revelations chap. 17 and 18.

Thus ſhall they be to and fro, doubtful and ambiguous in all their doings, until at laſt, " joining their armies with the beaſt," whoſe power firſt raiſed them, they ſhall periſh with him by the " King of kings," againſt whom they have rebelled; and " the fowls ſhall eat their fleſh." This is their doom written, Revel. xix. and the utmoſt that we find concerning them in theſe latter days; which we have much more cauſe to believe, than his unwarranted

unwarranted revelation here, propheſying what ſhall follow after his death, with the ſpirit of enmity, not of St. John.

He would fain bring us out of conceit with the good ſucceſs, which God hath vouchſafed us. We meaſure not our cauſe by our ſucceſs, but our ſucceſs by our cauſe. Yet certainly in a good cauſe ſucceſs is a good confirmation; for God hath promiſed it to good men almoſt in every leaf of ſcripture. If it argue not for us, we are ſure it argues not againſt us; but as much or more for us, than ill ſucceſs argues for them; for to the wicked God hath denounced ill ſucceſs in all they take in hand.

He hopes much of thoſe "ſofter tempers," as he calls them, and "leſs advantaged by his ruin, that their conſciences do already" gripe them. It is true, there be a ſort of moody, hotbrained, and always unedified conſciences; apt to engage their leaders into great and dangerous affairs paſt retirement, and then upon a ſudden qualm and ſwimming of their conſcience, to betray them baſely in the midſt of what was chiefly undertaken for their ſakes*. Let ſuch men never meet with any faithful parliament to hazard for them; never with any noble ſpirit to conduct and lead them out; but let them live and die in ſervile condition and their ſcrupulous queaſineſs, if no inſtruction will confirm them! Others there be, in whoſe conſciences the loſs of gain, and thoſe advantages they hoped for, hath ſprung a ſudden leak. Theſe are they that cry out, the covenant broken! and to keep it better ſlide back into neutrality, or join actually with incendiaries and malignants. But God hath eminently begun to puniſh thoſe, firſt, in Scotland, then in Ulſter, who have provoked him with the moſt hateful kind of mockery, to break his covenant under pretence of ſtricteſt keeping it; and hath ſubjected them to thoſe malignants, with whom they ſcrupled not to be aſſociates. In God therefore we ſhall not fear what their falſe fraternity can do againſt us.

He ſeeks again with cunning words to turn our ſucceſs into our ſin. But might call to mind, that the ſcripture

* A ſevere rebuke this to the Preſbyterians.

ſpeaks of thoſe alſo, who "when God ſlew them, then ſought him;" yet did but "flatter him with their mouth, and lyed to him with their tongues; for their heart was not right with him." And there was one, who in the time of his affliction treſpaſſed more againſt God. This was that king Ahaz.

He glories much in the foregiveneſs of his enemies; ſo did his grandmother at her death. Wiſe men would ſooner have believed him, had he not ſo often told us ſo. But he hopes to erect "the trophies of his charity over us." And trophies of charity no doubt will be as glorious as trumpets before the alms of hypocrites; and more eſpecially the trophies of ſuch an aſpiring charity, as offers in his prayer to ſhare victory with God's compaſſion, which is over all his works. Such prayers as theſe may haply catch the people, as was intended: but how they pleaſe God is to be much doubted, though prayed in ſecret, much leſs written to be divulged. Which perhaps may gain him after death a ſhort, contemptible, and ſoon fading reward; not what he aims at, to ſtir the conſtancy and ſolid firmneſs of any wiſe man, or to unſettle the conſcience of any knowing chriſtian, (if he could ever aim at a thing ſo hopeleſs, and above the genius of his cleric elocution,) but to catch the worthleſs approbation of an inconſtant, irrational, and image-doting rabble; that like a credulous and hapleſs herd, begotten to ſervility, and enchanted with theſe popular inſtitutes of tyranny, ſubſcribed with a new device of the king's picture at his prayers, hold out both their ears with ſuch delight and raviſhment to be ſtigmatized and bored through, in witneſs of their own voluntary and beloved baſeneſs. The reſt, whom perhaps ignorance without malice, or ſome errour, leſs than fatal, hath for the time miſled, on this ſide ſorcery or obduration, may find the grace and good guidance, to bethink themſelves and recover.

A

DEFENCE

OF THE

PEOPLE OF ENGLAND,

IN ANSWER TO

SALMASIUS'S DEFENCE OF THE KING.*

THE PREFACE.

ALTHOUGH I fear, leſt, if in defending the people of England, I ſhould be as copious in words, and empty of matter, as moſt men think Salmaſius has been in his defence of the king, I might ſeem to deſerve juſtly to be accounted a verboſe and ſilly defender; yet ſince no man thinks himſelf obliged to make ſo much haſte, though in the handling but of any ordinary ſubject, as not to premiſe ſome introduction at leaſt, according as the weight of the ſubject requires; if I take the ſame courſe in handling almoſt the greateſt ſubject that ever was (without being too tedious in it) I am in hopes of attaining two things, which indeed I earneſtly deſire: the one, not to be at all wanting, as far as in me lies, to this moſt noble cauſe, and moſt worthy to be recorded to all future ages: the other, that I may appear to have avoided myſelf that frivolouſneſs of matter, and redundancy of words, which I blame in my antagoniſt. For I am about to diſcourſe of matters, neither inconſiderable nor common, but how a moſt potent king, after he had trampled upon the laws of the nation, and given a ſhock to its religion, and begun to rule at his own will and pleaſure, was at laſt ſubdued in the field by his own ſubjects, who had undergone a long ſlavery under him; how afterwards he was caſt into priſon, and when he gave no ground,

* This tranſlation of the author's "Defenſio pro Populo Anglicano" Mr. Toland aſcribes to Mr. Waſhington, a gentleman of the Temple.

either by words or actions, to hope better things of him, he was finally by the ſupreme council of the kingdom condemned to die, and beheaded before the very gates of the royal palace. I ſhall likewiſe relate (which will much conduce to the eaſing men's minds of a great ſuperſtition) by what right, eſpecially according to our law, this judgment was given, and all theſe matters tranſacted; and ſhall eaſily defend my valiant and worthy countrymen (who have extremely well deſerved of all ſubjects and nations in the world) from the moſt wicked calumnies both of domeſtic and foreign railers, and eſpecially from the reproaches of this moſt vain and empty ſophiſter, who ſets up for a captain and ringleader to all the reſt. For what king's majeſty ſitting upon an exalted throne, ever ſhone ſo brightly, as that of the people of England then did, when ſhaking off that old ſuperſtition, which had prevailed a long time, they gave judgment upon the king himſelf, or rather upon an enemy who had been their king, caught as it were in a net by his own laws, (who alone of all mortals challenged to himſelf impunity by a divine right) and ſcrupled not to inflict the ſame puniſhment upon him, being guilty, which he would have inflicted upon any other? But why do I mention theſe things as performed by the people, which almoſt open their voice themſelves, and teſtify the preſence of God throughout? who, as often as it ſeems good to his infinite wiſdom, uſes to throw down proud and unruly kings, exalting themſelves above the condition of human nature, and utterly to extirpate them and all their family. By his manifeſt impulſe being ſet on work to recover our almoſt loſt liberty, following him as our guide, and adoring the impreſſes of his divine power manifeſted upon all occaſions, we went on in no obſcure, but an illuſtrious paſſage, pointed out and made plain to us by God himſelf. Which things, if I ſhould ſo much as hope by any diligence or ability of mine, ſuch as it is, to diſcourſe of as I ought to do, and to commit them ſo to writing, as that perhaps all nations and all ages may read them, it would be a very vain thing in me. For what ſtyle can be auguſt and magnificent enough, what man has parts ſufficient to undertake ſo great a taſk? Since we find by

experience, that in ſo many ages as are gone over the world, there has been but here and there a man found, who has been able worthily to recount the actions of great heroes, and potent ſtates; can any man have ſo good an opinion of his own talents, as to think himſelf capable to reach theſe glorious and wonderful works of Almighty God, by any language, by any ſtyle of his? Which enterpriſe, though ſome of the moſt eminent perſons in our commonwealth have prevailed upon me by their authority to undertake, and would have it be my buſineſs to vindicate with my pen againſt envy and calumny (which are proof againſt arms) thoſe glorious performances of theirs, (whoſe opinion of me I take as a very great honour that they ſhould pitch upon me before others to be ſerviceable in this kind to thoſe moſt valiant deliverers of my native country; and true it is, that from my very youth, I have been bent extremely upon ſuch ſort of ſtudies, as inclined me, if not to do great things myſelf, at leaſt to celebrate thoſe that did) yet as having no confidence in any ſuch advantages, I have recourſe to the divine aſſiſtance; and invoke the great and holy God, the giver of all good gifts, that I may as ſubſtantially, and as truly, diſcourſe and refute the faucineſs and lies of this foreign declamator, as our noble generals piouſly and ſucceſsfully by force of arms broke the king's pride, and his unruly domineering, and afterwards put an end to both by inflicting a memorable puniſhment upon himſelf, and as thoroughly as a ſingle perſon did with eaſe but of late confute and confound the king himſelf riſing as it were from the grave, and recommending himſelf to the people in a book publiſhed after his death, with new artifices and allurements of words and expreſſions. Which antagoniſt of mine, though he be a foreigner, and, though he deny it a thouſand times over, but a poor grammarian; yet not contented with the ſalary due to him in that capacity, choſe to turn a pragmatical coxcomb, and not only to intrude in ſtate-affairs, but into the affairs of a foreign ſtate: though he brings along with him neither modeſty, nor underſtanding, nor any other qualification requiſite in ſo great an arbitrator, but faucineſs, and a little grammar only. Indeed

if

if he had publiſhed here, and in Engliſh, the ſame things as he has now wrote in Latin, ſuch as it is, I think no man would have thought it worth while to return an anſwer to them, but would partly deſpiſe them as common, and exploded over and over already, and partly abhor them as ſordid and tyrannical maxims, not to be endured even by the moſt abject of ſlaves: nay, men that have ſided with the king, would have had theſe thoughts of his book. But ſince he has ſwoln it to a conſiderable bulk, and diſperſed it amongſt foreigners, who are altogether ignorant of our affairs and conſtitution; it is fit that they who miſtake them, ſhould be better informed; and that he, who is ſo very forward to ſpeak ill of others, ſhould be treated in his own kind. If it be aſked, why we did not then attack him ſooner, why we ſuffered him to triumph ſo long, and pride himſelf in our ſilence? For others I am not to anſwer; for myſelf I can boldly ſay, that I had neither words nor arguments long to ſeek for the defence of ſo good a cauſe, if I had enjoyed ſuch a meaſure of health, as would have endured the fatigue of writing. And being but weak in body, I am forced to write by piecemeal, and break off almoſt every hour, though the ſubject be ſuch as requires an unintermitted ſtudy and intenſeneſs of mind. But though this bodily indiſpoſition may be a hindrance to me in ſetting forth the juſt praiſes of my moſt worthy countrymen, who have been the ſaviours of their native country, and whoſe exploits, worthy of immortality, are already famous all the world over; yet I hope it will be no difficult matter for me to defend them from the inſolence of this ſilly little ſcholar, and from that ſaucy tongue of his, at leaſt. Nature and laws would be in an ill caſe, if ſlavery ſhould find what to ſay for itſelf, and liberty be mute: and if tyrants ſhould find men to plead for them, and they that can maſter and vanquiſh tyrants, ſhould not be able to find advocates. And it were a deplorable thing indeed, if the reaſon mankind is endued withal, and which is the gift of God, ſhould not furniſh more arguments for men's preſervation, for their deliverance, and, as much as the nature of the thing will bear, for making them equal to one another, than for their oppreſſion,

preſſion, and for their uttter ruin under the domineering power of one ſingle perſon. Let me therefore enter upon this noble cauſe with a cheerfulneſs, grounded upon this aſſurance, that my adverſary's cauſe is maintained by nothing but fraud, fallacy, ignorance and barbarity; whereas mine has light, truth, reaſon, the practice and the learning of the beſt ages of the world, of its ſide.

But now, having ſaid enough for an introduction, ſince we have to do with critics; let us in the firſt place conſider the title of this choice piece: "Defenſio Regia pro Car. Primo, ad Car. Secundum: a Royal Defence (or the king's defence) for Charles the Firſt, to Charles the Second." You undertake a wonderful piece of work, whoever you are; to plead the father's cauſe before his own ſon: a hundred to one but you carry it. But I ſummon you, Salmaſius, who heretofore ſculked under a wrong name, and now go by no name at all, to appear before another tribunal, and before other judges, where perhaps you may not hear thoſe little applauſes, which you uſe to be ſo fond of in your ſchool. But why this royal defence dedicated to the king's own ſon? We need not put him to the torture; he confeſſes why. "At the king's charge," ſays he. O mercenary and chargeable advocate! could you not afford to write a defence for Charles the father, whom you pretend to have been the beſt of kings, to Charles the ſon, the moſt indigent of all kings, but it muſt be at the poor king's own charge? But though you are a knave, you would not make yourſelf ridiculous, in calling it the king's defence; for you having ſold it, it is no longer yours, but the king's indeed: who bought it at the price of a hundred jacobuſſes, a great ſum for a poor king to diſburſe. I know very well what I ſay: and it is well enough known who brought the gold, and the purſe wrought with beads: we know who ſaw you reach out greedy fiſts, under pretence of embracing the king's chaplain, who brought the preſent, but indeed to embrace the preſent itſelf, and by accepting it to exhauſt almoſt all the king's treaſury.

But now the man comes himſelf, the door creaks; the actor comes upon the ſtage.

In

In ſilence now, and with attention wait,
That ye may learn what th' Eunuch has to prate.
Terent.

For whatever the matter is with him, he blufters more than ordinary. "A horrible meſſage had lately ſtruck our ears, but our minds more, with a heinous wound concerning a parricide committed in England in the perſon of a king, by a wicked conſpiracy of ſacrilegious men." Indeed that horrible meſſage muſt either have had a much longer ſword than that which Peter drew, or thoſe ears muſt have been of a wonderful length, that it could wound at ſuch a diſtance; for it could not ſo much as in the leaſt offend any ears but thoſe of an aſs. For what harm is it to you, that are foreigners? are any of you hurt by it, if we amongſt ourſelves put our own enemies, our own traitors to death, be they commoners, noblemen, or kings? Do you, Salmaſius, let alone what does not concern you: for I have a horrible meſſage to bring of you too; which I am miſtaken if it ſtrike not a more heinous wound into the ears of all grammarians and critics, provided they have any learning and delicacy in them, to wit, your crowding ſo many barbarous expreſſions together in one period in the perſon of (Ariſtarchus) a grammarian; and that ſo great a critic as you, hired at the king's charge to write a defence of the king his father, ſhould not only ſet ſo fulſome a preface before it, much like thoſe lamentable ditties that uſed to be ſung at funerals, and which can move compaſſion in none but a coxcomb; but in the very firſt ſentence ſhould provoke your readers to laughter with ſo many barbariſms all at once. "Perſona regis," you cry. Where do you find any ſuch Latin? or are you telling us ſome tale or other of a Perkin Warbec, who taking upon him the perſon of a king, has, forſooth, committed ſome horrible parricide in England? which expreſſion, though dropping careleſly from your pen, has more truth in it than you are aware of. For a tyrant is but like a king upon a ſtage, a man in a vizor, and acting the part of a king in a play; he is not really a king. But as for theſe galliciſms, that are ſo frequent in your book, I won't laſh you for them myſelf, for I am not at leiſure; but ſhall deliver

deliver you over to your fellow grammarians, to be laughed to ſcorn, and whipped by them. What follows is much more heinous, than what was decreed by our ſupreme magiſtracy to be done to the king, ſhould be ſaid by you to have been done "by a wicked conſpiracy of ſacrilegious perſons." Have you the impudence, you rogue, to talk at this rate of the acts and decrees of the chief magiſtrates of a nation, that lately was a moſt potent kingdom, and is now a more potent commonwealth? Whoſe proceedings no king ever took upon him by word of mouth, or otherwiſe, to vilify and ſet at nought. The illuſtrious ſtates of Holland therefore, the genuine offspring of thoſe deliverers of their country, have deſervedly by their edict condemned to utter darkneſs this defence of tyrants, ſo pernicious to the liberty of all nations; the author of which every free ſtate ought to forbid their country, or to baniſh out of it; and that ſtate particularly that feeds with a ſtipend ſo ungrateful and ſo ſavage an enemy to their commonwealth, whoſe very fundamentals, and the cauſes of their becoming a free ſtate, this fellow endeavours to undermine as well as ours, and at one and the ſame time to ſubvert both; loading with calumnies the moſt worthy aſſerters of liberty there, under our names. Conſider with yourſelves, ye moſt illuſtrious ſtates of the United Netherlands, who it was that put this aſſerter of kingly power upon ſetting pen to paper? who it was, that but lately began to play Rex in your country? what counſels were taken, what endeavours uſed, and what diſturbances enſued thereupon in Holland? and to what paſs things might have been brought by this time? How ſlavery and a new maſter were ready prepared for you; and how near expiring that liberty of yours, aſſerted and vindicated by ſo many years war and toil, would have been ere now, if it had not taken breath again by the timely death of a certain raſh young gentleman. But our author begins to ſtrut again, and to feign wonderful tragedies; "whomſoever this dreadful news reached (to wit, the news of Salmaſius's parricidial barbariſms) all of a ſudden, as if they had been ſtruck with lightning, their hair ſtood an end, and their tongues clove to the roof of their

their mouth." Which let natural philoſophers take notice of (for this ſecret in nature was never diſcovered before) that lightning makes men's hair ſtand on end. But who knows not that little effeminate minds are apt to be amazed at the news of any extraordinary great action; and that then they ſhow themſelves to be, what they really were before, no better than ſo many ſtocks? "ſome could not refrain from tears;" ſome little women at court, I ſuppoſe, or if there be any more effeminate than they, of whoſe number Salmaſius himſelf being one, is by a new metamorphoſis become a fountain near akin to his name (Salmacis) and with his counterfeit flood of tears prepared over night, endeavours to emaſculate generous minds: I adviſe therefore, and wiſh them to have a care;

——Infamis ne quem malè fortibus undis
Salmacis enervet.—
——Ne, ſi vir cum venerit, exeat indè
Semivir, & tactis ſubitò molleſcat in undis.

Abſtain, as manhood you eſteem,
From Salmacis' pernicious ſtream:
If but one moment there you ſtay,
Too dear you'll for your bathing pay.—
Depart nor man nor woman, but a ſight
Diſgracing both, a loath'd hermaphrodite.

"They that had more courage" (which yet he expreſſes in miſerable bald Latin, as if he could not ſo much as ſpeak of men of courage and magnanimity in proper words) "were ſet on fire with indignation to that degree, that they could hardly contain themſelves." Thoſe furious Hectors we value not of a ruſh. We have been accuſtomed to rout ſuch bullies in the field with a true ſober courage; a courage becoming men that can contain themſelves, and are in their right wits. "There were none that did not curſe the authors of ſo horrible a villany." But yet, you ſay, their tongues clove to the roof of their mouths; and if you mean this of our fugitives only, I wiſh they had clove there to this day; for we know very well, that there is nothing more common with them, than to have their mouths full of curſes and impre-

imprecations, which indeed all good men abominate, but withal deſpiſe. As for others, it is hardly credible, that when they heard the news of our having inflicted a capital puniſhment upon the king, there ſhould any be found, eſpecially in a free ſtate, ſo naturally adapted to ſlavery as either to ſpeak ill of us, or ſo much as to cenſure what we had done. Nay, it is highly probable, that all good men applauded us, and gave God thanks for ſo illuſtrious, ſo exalted a piece of juſtice; and for a caution ſo very uſeful to other princes. In the mean time, as for thoſe fierce, thoſe ſteel-hearted men, that, you ſay, take on for, and bewail ſo pitifully, the lamentable and wonderful death I know not who; them I ſay, together with their tinkling advocate, the dulleſt that ever appeared ſince the name of a king was born and known in the world, we ſhall even let whine on, till they cry their eyes out. But in the mean time, what ſchoolboy, what little inſignificant monk could not have made a more elegant ſpeech for the king, and in better Latin than this royal advocate has done? But it would be folly in me to make ſuch particular animadverſions upon his childiſhneſs and frenzies throughout his book, as I do here upon a few in the beginning of it; which yet I would be willing enough to do (for we hear that he is ſwelled with pride and conceit to the utmoſt degree imaginable) if the undigeſted and immethodical bulk of his book did not protect him. He was reſolved to take a courſe like the ſoldier in Terence, to ſave his bacon; and it was very cunning in him, to ſtuff his book with ſo much puerility, and ſo many ſilly whimſies, that it might nauſeate the ſmarteſt man in the world to death to take notice of them all. Only I thought it might not be amiſs to give a ſpecimen of him in the preface; and to let the ſerious reader have a taſte of him at firſt, that he might gueſs by the firſt diſh that is ſerved up, how noble an entertainment the reſt are like to make; and that he may imagine with himſelf what an infinite number of fooleries and impertinencies muſt needs be heaped up together in the body of the book, when they ſtand ſo thick in the very entrance into it, where, of all other places, they ought to have been ſhunned. His tittle-tattle that follows, and

his

his ſermons fit for nothing but to be wormeaten, I can eaſily paſs by, as for any thing in them relating to us, we doubt not in the leaſt, but that what has been written and publiſhed by authority of parliament, will have far greater weight with all wiſe and ſober men, than the calumnies and lies of one ſingle impudent little fellow; who being hired by our fugitives, their country's enemies, has ſcraped together, and not ſcrupled to publiſh in print, whatever little ſtory any one of them that employed him put into his head. And that all men may plainly ſee how little conſcience he makes of ſetting down any thing right or wrong, good or bad, I deſire no other witneſs than Salmaſius himſelf. In his book, entitled, "Apparatus contra Primatum Papæ," he ſays, 'there are moſt weighty reaſons why the church ought to lay aſide epiſcopacy, and return to the apoſtolical inſtitution of preſbyters: that a far greater miſchief has been introduced into the church by epiſcopacy, than the ſchiſms themſelves were, which were before apprehended: that the plague which epiſcopacy introduced, depreſſed the whole body of the church under a miſerable tyranny; nay, had put a yoke even upon the necks of kings and princes: that it would be more beneficial to the church, if the whole hierarchy itſelf were extirpated, than if the pope only, who is the head of it, were laid aſide,' page 160. 'That it would be very much for the good of the church, if epiſcopacy were taken away, together with the papacy: that if epiſcopacy were once taken down, the papacy would fall of itſelf, as being founded upon it,' page 171. He ſays, 'he can ſhow very good reaſons why epiſcopacy ought to be put down in thoſe kingdoms, that have renounced the pope's ſupremacy; but that he can ſee no reaſon for retaining it there: that a reformation is not entire, that is defective in this point: that no reaſon can be alleged, no probable cauſe aſſigned, why the ſupremacy of the pope being once diſowned, epiſcopacy ſhould notwithſtanding be retained,' page 197.—Though he had wrote all this, and a great deal more to this effect, but four years ago, he is now become ſo vain and ſo impudent withal, as to accuſe the parliament of England, 'for not only turning the biſhops out of the houſe

houſe of lords, but for aboliſhing epiſcopacy itſelf.' Nay, he perſuades us to receive epiſcopacy, and defends it by the very ſame reaſons and arguments, which with a great deal of earneſtneſs he had confuted himſelf in that former book; to wit, 'that biſhops were neceſſary and ought to have been retained, to prevent the ſpringing up of a thouſand pernicious ſects and hereſies.' Crafty turncoat! are you not aſhamed to ſhift hands thus in things that are ſacred, and (I had almoſt ſaid) to betray the church; whoſe moſt ſolemn inſtitutions you ſeem to have aſſerted and vindicated with ſo much noiſe, that when it ſhould ſeem for your intereſt to change ſides, you might undo and ſubvert all again with the more diſgrace and infamy to yourſelf? It is notoriouſly known, that when both houſes of parliament, being extremely deſirous to reform the church of England by the pattern of our reformed churches, had reſolved to aboliſh epiſcopacy, the king firſt interpoſed, and afterwards waged war againſt them chiefly for that very cauſe; which proved fatal to him. Go now and boaſt of your having defended the king; who, that you might the better defend him, do now openly betray and impugn the cauſe of the church, whoſe defence you yourſelf had formerly undertaken; and whoſe ſevereſt cenſures ought to be inflicted upon you. As for the preſent form of our government, ſince ſuch a foreign inſignificant profeſſor as you, having laid aſide your boxes and deſks ſtuffed with nothing but trifles, which you might have ſpent your time better in putting into order, will needs turn buſybody, and be troubleſome in other men's matters, I ſhall return you this anſwer, or rather not to you, but to them that are wiſer than yourſelf, viz. That the form of it is ſuch as our preſent diſtractions will admit of; not ſuch as were to be wiſhed, but ſuch as the obſtinate diviſions, that are amongſt us, will bear. What ſtate ſoever is peſtered with factions, and defends itſelf by force of arms, is very juſt in having regard to thoſe only that are ſound and untainted, and in overlooking or ſecluding the reſt, be they of the nobility or the common people; nay, though profiting by experience, they ſhould refuſe to be governed any longer either by a king or a houſe of

lords. But in railing at that ſupreme council, as you call it, and at the chairman there, you make yourſelf very ridiculous; for that council is not the ſupreme council, as you dream it is, but appointed by authority of parliament, for a certain time only; and conſiſting of forty perſons, for the moſt part members of parliament, any one of whom may be preſident, if the reſt vote him into the chair. And there is nothing more common, than for our parliaments to appoint committees of their own members; who, when ſo appointed, have power to meet where they pleaſe, and hold a kind of a little parliament amongſt themſelves. And the moſt weighty affairs are often referred to them, for expedition and ſecrecy; the care of the navy, the army, the treaſury; in ſhort, all things whatſoever relating either to war or peace. Whether this be called a council, or any thing elſe, the thing is ancient, though the name may be new; and it is ſuch an inſtitution, as no government can be duly adminiſtered without it. As for our putting the king to death, and changing the government, forbear your bawling, don't ſpit your venom, till, going along with you through every chapter, I ſhow, whether you will or no, "by what law, by what right and juſtice" all that was done. But if you inſiſt to know "by what right, by what law;" by that law, I tell you, which God and nature have enacted, viz. that whatever things are for the univerſal good of the whole ſtate, are for that reaſon lawful and juſt. So wiſe men of old uſed to anſwer ſuch as you. You find fault with us for "repealing laws, that had obtained for ſo many years;" but you do not tell us whether thoſe laws were good or bad, nor, if you did, ſhould we heed what you ſaid; for, you buſy puppy, what have you to do with our laws? I wiſh our magiſtrates had repealed more than they have, both laws and lawyers; if they had, they would have conſulted the intereſt of the chriſtian religion, and that of the people better than they have done. It frets you, that "hob-goblins, ſons of the earth, ſcarce gentlemen at home, ſcarce known to their own countrymen, ſhould preſume to do ſuch things." But you ought to have remembered, what not only the ſcriptures, but Horace would have taught you, viz.

——Valet

——Valet ima ſummis
Mutare, & inſignem attenuat Deus,
Obſcura promens, &c.

The power that did create, can change the ſcene
Of things; make mean of great, and great of mean;
The brighteſt glory can eclipſe with night;
And place the moſt obſcure in dazzling light.

But take this into the bargain. Some of thoſe who, I ſay, be ſcarce gentlemen, are not at all inferiour in th to any of your party. Others, whoſe anceſtors re not noble, have taken a courſe to attain to true ility by their own induſtry and virtue, and are not in- iour to men of the nobleſt deſcent. They had rather called "ſons of the earth," provided it be their own th (their own native country) and act like men at home, n, being deſtitute of houſe or land, to relieve the ne- ities of nature in a foreign country by ſelling of ſmoke; thou doſt, an inconſiderable fellow and a jack-ſtraw, l who dependeſt upon the good-will of thy maſters for oor ſtipend; for whom it were better to diſpenſe with labours, and return to thy own kindred and country- n, if thou hadſt not this one piece of cunning, to bab- out ſome ſilly prelections and fooleries at ſo good a e amongſt foreigners. You find fault with our magiſ- tes for admitting ſuch "a common ſewer of all ſorts of s." Why ſhould they not? It belongs to the church caſt them out of the communion of the faithful; not he magiſtrate to baniſh them the country, provided y do not offend againſt the civil laws of the ſtate. n at firſt united into civil ſocieties, that they might ſafely, and enjoy their liberty, without being wronged oppreſſed; and that they might live religiouſly, and ording to the doctrine of chriſtianity, they united mſelves into churches. Civil ſocieties have laws, and rches have a diſcipline peculiar to themſelves, and differing from each other. And this has been the aſion of ſo many wars in Chriſtendom; to wit, be- ſe the civil magiſtrate and the church confounded their ſdictions. Therefore we do not admit of the popiſh

ſect, ſo as to tolerate papiſts at all; for we do not look upon that as a religion, but rather as a hierarchical tyranny, under a cloak of religion, clothed with the ſpoils of the civil power, which it has uſurped to itſelf, contrary to our Saviour's own doctrine. As for the independents, we never had any ſuch amongſt us, as you deſcribe; they that we call independents, are only ſuch as hold that no claſſis or ſynods have a ſuperiority over any particular church, and that therefore they ought all to be plucked up by the roots, as branches, or rather as the very trunk of hierarchy itſelf; which is your own opinion too. And from hence it was that the name of independents prevailed amongſt the vulgar. The reſt of your preface is ſpent in endeavouring not only to ſtir up the hatred of all kings and monarchs againſt us, but to perſuade them to make a general war upon us. Mithridates of old, though in a different cauſe, endeavoured to ſtir up all princes to make war upon the Romans, by laying to their charge almoſt juſt the ſame things that you do to ours: viz. that the Romans aimed at nothing but the ſubverſion of all kingdoms, that they had no regard to any thing, whether ſacred or civil, that from their very firſt riſe, they never enjoyed any thing but what they had acquired by force, that they were robbers, and the greateſt enemies in the world to monarchy. Thus Mithridates expreſſed himſelf in a letter to Arſaces, king of the Parthians. But how came you, whoſe buſineſs it is to make ſilly ſpeeches from your deſk, to have the confidence to imagine, that by your perſuaſions to take up arms, and ſounding an alarm as it were, you ſhould be able ſo much as to influence a king amongſt boys at play; eſpecially, with ſo ſhrill a voice, and unſavoury breath, that I believe, if you were to have been the trumpeter, not ſo much as Homer's mice would have waged war againſt the frogs? So little do we fear, you ſlug you, any war or danger from foreign princes through your ſilly rhetoric, who accuſeſt us to them, juſt as if you were at play, "that we toſs kings heads like balls; play at bowls with crowns; and regard ſceptres no more than if they were fools' ſtaves with heads on:" but you in the mean time, you ſilly loggerhead, deſerve to have your bones well

well thraſhed with a fool's ſtaff, for thinking to ſtir up kings and princes to war by ſuch childiſh arguments. Then you cry aloud to all nations, who, I know full well, will never heed what you ſay. You call upon that wretched and barbarous crew of Iriſh rebels too, to aſſert the king's party. Which one thing is ſufficient evidence how much you are both a fool and a knave, and how you outdo almoſt all mankind in villany, impudence, and madneſs; who ſcruple not to implore the loyalty and aid of an execrable people, devoted to the ſlaughter, whom the king himſelf always abhorred, or ſo pretended, to have any thing to do with, by reaſon of the guilt of ſo much innocent blood, which they had contracted. And that very perfidiouſneſs and cruelty, which he endeavoured as much as he could to conceal, and to clear himſelf from any ſuſpicion of, you the moſt villanous of mortals, as fearing neither God nor man, voluntarily and openly take upon yourſelf. Go on then, undertake the king's defence at the encouragement, and by the aſſiſtance of the Iriſh. You take care, and ſo you might well, leſt any ſhould imagine, that you were about to bereave Cicero or Demoſthenes of the praiſe due to their eloquence, by telling us beforehand, that "you conceive you ought not to ſpeak like an orator." It is wiſely ſaid of a fool; you conceive you ought not to do what is not in your power to do: and who, that knows you never ſo little, ever expects any thing like an orator from you? Who neither uſes, nor is able to publiſh any thing that is elaborate, diſtinct, or has ſo much as ſenſe in it; but like a ſecond Criſpin, or that little Grecian Tzetzes, you do but write a great deal, take no pains to write well; nor could write any thing well, though you took never ſo much pains. "This cauſe ſhall be argued (ſay you) in the hearing, and as it were before the tribunal of all mankind." That is what we like ſo well, that we could now wiſh we had a diſcreet and intelligent adverſary, and not ſuch a hairbrained blunderbuſs, as you, to deal with. You conclude very tragically, like Ajax in his raving; "I will proclaim to Heaven and earth the injuſtice, the villany, the perfidiouſneſs and cruelty of theſe men, and will deliver them over convicted to all poſterity." O

flowers! that ſuch a witleſs, ſenſeleſs bawler, one that was born but to ſpoil or tranſcribe good authors, ſhould think himſelf able to write any thing of his own, that will reach poſterity, whom, together with his frivolous ſcribbles, the very next age will bury in oblivion; unleſs this defence of the king perhaps may be beholden to the anſwer I give to it, for being looked into now and then. And I would entreat the illuſtrious ſtates of Holland, to take off their prohibition, and ſuffer the book to be publicly ſold. For when I have detected the vanity, ignorance, and falſehood, that it is full of, the farther it ſpreads, the more effectually it will be ſuppreſſed. Now let us hear how he convicts us.

A

DEFENCE

OF THE

PEOPLE OF ENGLAND.

CHAP. I.

I PERSUADE myſelf, Salmaſius, that you being a vain flaſhy man, are not a little proud of being the king of Great Britain's defender, who himſelf was ſtyled the "defender of the faith." For my part, I think you deſerve your titles both alike; for the king defended the faith, and you have defended him ſo, that betwixt you, you have ſpoiled both your cauſes: which I ſhall make appear throughout the whole enſuing diſcourſe, and particularly in this very chapter. You told us in the 12th page of your preface, that "ſo good and ſo juſt a cauſe ought not to be embelliſhed with any flouriſhes of rhetoric; that the king needed no other defence, than by a bare narrative of his ſtory:" and yet in your firſt chapter, in which you had promiſed us that bare narrative, you neither tell the ſtory right, nor do you abſtain from making uſe of all the ſkill you have in rhetoric to ſet it off. So that, if we muſt take your own judgment, we muſt believe the king's cauſe to be neither good nor juſt. But by the way I would adviſe you not to have ſo good an opinion of yourſelf (for no body elſe has ſo of you) as to imagine that you are able to ſpeak well upon any ſubject, who can neither play the part of an orator, nor an hiſtorian, nor expreſs yourſelf in a ſtyle that would not be ridiculous even in a lawyer; but like a mountebank's juggler, with big ſwelling words in your preface, you raiſed our expectation, as if ſome mighty matter were to enſue: in which your deſign was not ſo much to introduce a true narrative of the king's ſtory, as to make your own empty intended flouriſhes go off the better.

For " being now about to give us an account of the matter of fact, you find yourſelf encompaſſed and affrighted with ſo many monſters of novelty, that you are at a loſs what to ſay firſt, what next, and what laſt of all." I will tell you what the matter is with you. In the firſt place, you find yourſelf affrighted and aſtoniſhed at your own monſtrous lies, and then you find that empty head of yours not encompaſſed, but carried round with ſo many trifles and fooleries, that you not only now do not, but never did know what was fit to be ſpoken, and in what method. " Among the many difficulties, that you find in expreſſing the heinouſneſs of ſo incredible a piece of impiety, this one offers itſelf, you ſay, which is eaſily ſaid, and muſt often be repeated; to wit, that the ſun itſelf never beheld a more outrageous action." But by your good leave, Sir, the ſun has beheld many things, that blind Bernard never ſaw. But we are content you ſhould mention the ſun over and over. And it will be a piece of prudence in you ſo to do. For though our wickedneſs does not require it, the coldneſs of the defence that you are making, does. " The original of kings, you ſay, is as ancient as that of the ſun." May the gods and goddeſſes, Damaſippus, bleſs thee with an everlaſting ſolſtice; that thou mayeſt always be warm, thou that canſt not ſtir a foot without the ſun. Perhaps you would avoid the imputation of being called a doctor Umbraticus. But alas! you are in perfect darkneſs, that make no difference betwixt a paternal power, and a regal: and that when you had called kings fathers of their country, could fancy that with that metaphor you had perſuaded us, that whatever is applicable to a father, is ſo to a king. Alas! there is a great difference betwixt them. Our fathers begot us. Our king made not us, but we him. Nature has given fathers to us all, but we ourſelves appointed our own king. So that the people is not for the king, but the king for them. " We bear with a father, though he be harſh and ſevere;" and ſo we do with a king. But we do not bear with a father, if he be a tyrant. If a father murder his ſon, he himſelf muſt die for it; and why ſhould not a king be ſubject to the ſame law, which certainly is a moſt juſt one? Eſpecially conſidering that

that a father cannot by any poſſibility diveſt himſelf of that relation, but a king eaſily may make himſelf neither king nor father of his people. If this action of ours be conſidered according to its quality, as you call it, I, who am both an Engliſhman born, and was an eye-witneſs of the tranſactions of theſe times, tell you, who are both a foreigner and an utter ſtranger to our affairs; that we have put to death neither a good, nor a juſt, nor a merciful, nor a devout, nor a godly, nor a peaceable king, as you ſtyle him; but an enemy, that has been ſo to us almoſt ten years to an end; nor one that was a father, but a deſtroyer of his country. You confeſs, that ſuch things have been practiſed; for yourſelf have not the impudence to deny it: but not by proteſtants upon a protēſtant king. As if he deſerved the name of a proteſtant, that, in a letter to the pope, could give him the title of moſt holy father; that was always more favourable to the papiſts than to thoſe of his own profeſſion. And being ſuch, he is not the firſt of his own family, that has been put to death by proteſtants. Was not his grandmother depoſed and baniſhed, and at laſt beheaded by proteſtants? And were not her own countrymen, that were proteſtants too, well enough pleaſed with it? Nay, if I ſhould ſay they were parties to it, I ſhould not lie. But there being ſo few proteſtant kings, it is no great wonder, if it never happened that one of them has been put to death. But that it is lawful to depoſe a tyrant, and to puniſh him according to his deſerts; nay, that this is the opinion of very eminent divines, and of ſuch as have been moſt inſtrumental in the late reformation, do you deny it if you dare. You confeſs, that many kings have come to an unnatural death: ſome by the ſword, ſome poiſoned, ſome ſtrangled, and ſome in a dungeon; but for a king to be arraigned in a court of judicature, to be put to plead for his life, to have ſentence of death pronounced againſt him, and that ſentence executed; this you think a more lamentable inſtance than all the reſt, and make it a prodigious piece of impiety. Tell me, thou ſuperlative fool, whether it be not more juſt, more agreeable to the rules of humanity, and the laws of all human ſocieties, to bring a criminal, be

his

his offence what it will, before a court of juſtice, to give him leave to ſpeak for himſelf; and, if the law condemn him, then to put him to death as he has deſerved, ſo as he may have time to repent or to recollect himſelf; than pre-preſently, as ſoon as ever he is taken, to butcher him without more ado? Do you think there is a malefactor in the world, that if he might have his choice, would not chooſe to be thus dealt withal? And if this ſort of proceeding againſt a private perſon be accounted the fairer of the two, why ſhould it not be counted ſo againſt a prince? Nay, why ſhould we not think, that himſelf liked it better? You would have had him killed privately, and none to have ſeen it, either that future ages might have loſt the advantage of ſo good an example; or that they that did this glorious action, might ſeem to have avoided the light, and to have acted contrary to law and juſtice. You aggravate the matter by telling us, that it was not done in an uproar, or brought about by any faction amongſt great men, or in the heat of a rebellion, either of the people, or the ſoldiers: that there was no hatred, no fear, no ambition, no blind precipitate raſhneſs in the caſe; but that it was long conſulted on, and done with deliberation. You did well in leaving off being an * Advocate, and turn grammarian, who from the accidents and circumſtances of a thing, which in themſelves conſidered ſway neither one way nor other, argue in diſpraiſe of it, before you have proved the thing itſelf to be either good or bad. See how open you lie: if the action you are diſcourſing of be commendable and praiſeworthy, they that did it deſerve the greater honour, in that they were prepoſſeſſed with no paſſions, but did what they did for virtue's ſake. If there were great difficulty in the enterpriſe, they did well in not going about it rathly, but upon advice and conſideration. Though for my own part, when I call to mind with how unexpected an importunity and fervency of mind, and with how unanimous a conſent, the whole army, and a great part of the people from almoſt every county in the kingdom, cried out with one voice for juſtice againſt the king, as being

* Salmaſius was once an advocate, that is, a counſellor at law.

the

the ſole author of all their calamities: I cannot but think, that theſe things were brought about by a divine impulſe. Whatever the matter was, whether we conſider the magiſtrates, or the body of the people, no men ever undertook with more courage, and which our adverſaries themſelves confeſs, in a more ſedate temper of mind, ſo brave an action, an action that might have become thoſe famous heroes, of whom we read in former ages; an action, by which they ennobled not only laws, and their execution, which ſeem for the future equally reſtored to high and low againſt one another; but even juſtice, and to have rendered it, after ſo ſignal a judgment, more illuſtrious and greater than in its own ſelf. We are now come to an end of the 3d page of the firſt book, and have not the bare narrative he promiſed us yet. He complains that our principles are, that a king, whoſe government is burdenſome and odious, may lawfully be depoſed: and "by this doctrine," ſays he, "if they had had a king a thouſand times better than they had, they would not have ſpared his life." Obſerve the man's ſubtle way of arguing. For I would willingly be informed what conſequence there is in this, unleſs he allows, that a king's government may be burdenſome and odious, who is a thouſand times better than our king was. So that now he has brought things to this paſs, to make the king that he defends, a thouſand times worſe than ſome whoſe government notwithſtanding is burdenſome and odious, that is, it may be, the moſt monſtrous tyrant that ever reigned. I wiſh ye joy, O ye kings, of ſo able a defender! now the narrative begins. "They put him to ſeveral ſorts of torments." Give an inſtance. "They removed him from priſon to priſon;" and ſo they might lawfully do; for having been a tyrant, he became an open enemy, and was taken in war. "Often changing his keepers." Leſt they themſelves ſhould change. "Sometimes they gave him hopes of liberty; nay, and ſometimes even of reſtoring him to his crown, upon articles of agreement." It ſeems then the taking away his life was not done upon ſo much premeditation, as he talked of before; and that we did not lay hold on all opportunities and means, that offered themſelves, to renounce our king. Thoſe things that

that in the beginning of the war we demanded of him, when he had almoſt brought us under, which things if they were denied us, we could enjoy no liberty, nor live in any ſafety; thoſe very things we petitioned him for when he was our priſoner, in a humble, ſubmiſſive way, not once, nor twice, but thrice, and oftener, and were as often denied. When we had now loſt all hopes of the king's complying with us, then was that noble order of parliament made, that from that time forward, there ſhould no articles be ſent to the king; ſo that we left off applying ourſelves to him, not from the time that he began to be a tyrant, but from the time that we found him incurable. But afterward ſome parliament-men ſet upon a new project, and meeting with a convenient opportunity to put it in practice, paſs a vote to ſend further propoſals once more to the king. Whoſe wickedneſs and folly neareſt reſembles that of the Roman ſenate, who contrary to the opinion of M. Tullius, and all honeſt men, voted to ſend embaſſadors to M. Antony; and the event had been the ſame, but that it pleaſed God Almighty in his providence, to order it otherwiſe, and to aſſert our liberty, though he ſuffered them to be enſlaved: for though the king did not agree to any thing, that might conduce to a firm peace, and ſettlement of things, more than he had before, they go and vote themſelves ſatisfied. Then the ſounder part of the houſe finding themſelves and the commonwealth betrayed, implore the aid of that valiant and always faithful army to the commonwealth. Upon which occaſion I can obſerve only this, which yet I am loth to utter; to wit, that our ſoldiers underſtood themſelves better than our ſenators, and that they ſaved the commonwealth by their arms, when the other by their votes had almoſt ruined it. Then he relates a great many things in a doleful, lamentable ſtrain; but he does it ſo ſenſeleſsly, that he ſeems rather to beg of his readers, that they would be ſorrowful, than to ſtir up any ſuch paſſion in them. It grieves him "to think that the king ſhould undergo a capital puniſhment, after ſuch a manner as no other king ever had done." Though he had often told us before, that there never was a king that underwent a capital puniſh-

ment

ment at all. Do you uſe to compare ways and manners, ye coxcomb, when you have no things, nor actions to compare with one another? "He ſuffered death," ſays he, "as a robber, as a murderer, as a parricide, as a traitor, as a tyrant." Is this defending the king? Or is it not rather giving a more ſevere ſentence againſt him, than that that we gave? How came you ſo all on a ſudden to be of our mind? He complains "that executioners in vizards [perſonati carnifices] cut off the king's head." What ſhall we do with this fellow? He told us before, of "a murder committed on one in the diſguiſe of a king [in perſonâ regis]:" now he ſays, it was done in the diſguiſe of an executioner. It were to no purpoſe, to take particular notice of every ſilly thing he ſays. He tells ſtories of "boxes on the ear, and kicks, that," he ſays, "were given the king by common ſoldiers, and that it was four ſhillings apiece to ſee his dead body." Theſe, and ſuch like ſtories, which partly are falſe, and partly impertinent, betray the ignorance and childiſhneſs of our poor ſcholar; but are far from making any reader ever a whit the ſadder. In good faith his ſon Charles had done better to have hired ſome ballad-ſinger, to have bewailed his father's misfortunes, than this doleful, ſhall I call him, or rather moſt ridiculous orator, who is ſo dry and inſipid, that there is not the leaſt ſpirit in any thing he ſays. Now the narrative is done, and it is hard to ſay what he does next, he runs on ſo ſordidly and irregular. Now he is angry, then he wonders; he neither cares what he talks, nor how; repeats the ſame things ten times over, that could not but look ill, though he had ſaid them but once. And I perſuade myſelf, the extemporary rhymes of ſome antic juck-pudding may deſerve printing better; ſo far am I from thinking aught he ſays worthy of a ſerious anſwer. I paſs by his ſtyling the king a "protector of religion," who choſe to make war upon the church, rather than part with thoſe church-tyrants, and enemies of all religion, the biſhops; and how is it poſſible, that he ſhould "maintain religion in its purity," that was himſelf a ſlave to thoſe impure traditions and ceremonies of theirs? And for our "ſectaries, whoſe ſacrilegious meetings," you ſay, "have public

public allowance;" inſtance in any of their principles, the profeſſion of which is not openly allowed of, and countenanced in Holland. But in the mean time, there is not a more ſacrilegious wretch in nature than yourſelf, that allways took liberty to ſpeak ill of all ſorts of people. "They could not wound the commonwealth more dangerouſly, than by taking off its maſter." Learn, ye abject, homeborn ſlave; unleſs ye take away the maſter, ye deſtroy the commonwealth. That that has a maſter, is one man's property. The word maſter denotes a private, not a public relation. "They perſecute moſt unjuſtly thoſe miniſters, that abhorred this action of theirs." Leſt you ſhould not know what miniſters he means, I will tell you in a few words what manner of men they were; they were thoſe very men, that by their writings and ſermons juſtified taking up arms againſt the king, and ſtirred the people up to it: that daily curſed, as Deborah did Meroz, all ſuch as would not furniſh the parliament either with arms, or men, or money. That taught the people out of their pulpits, that they were not about to fight againſt a king, but a greater tyrant than either Saul or Ahab ever were; nay, more a Nero than Nero himſelf. As ſoon as the biſhops, and thoſe clergymen, whom they daily inveighed againſt, and branded with the odious names of pluraliſts and nonreſidents, were taken out of their way, they preſently jump, ſome into two, ſome into three of their beſt benefices; being now warm themſelves, they ſoon unworthily neglected their charge. Their covetouſneſs brake through all reſtraints of modeſty and religion, and themſelves now labour under the ſame infamy, that they had loaded their predeceſſors with; and becauſe their covetouſneſs is not yet ſatisfied, and their ambition has accuſtomed them to raiſe tumults, and be enemies to peace, they cannot reſt at quiet yet, but preach up ſedition againſt the magiſtracy, as it is now eſtabliſhed, as they had formerly done againſt the king. They now tell the people, that he was cruelly murdered; upon whom themſelves having heaped all their curſes, had devoted him to deſtruction, whom they had delivered up as it were to the parliament, to be deſpoiled of his royalty,

ılty, and purſued with a holy war. They now com-
n, that the ſectaries are not extirpated; which is a
ı abſurd thing to expect the magiſtrates ſhould be
: to do, who never yet were able, do what they could,
extirpate avarice and ambition, thoſe two moſt per-
ous hereſies, and more deſtructive to the church
ı all the reſt, out of the very order and tribe of the
iſters themſelves. For the ſects which they inveigh
inſt, I confeſs there are ſuch amongſt us, but they are
:ure, and make no noiſe in the world: the ſects that
/ are of, are public and notorious, and much more
gerous to the church of God. Simon Magus and Dio-
ıes were the ringleaders of them. Yet are we ſo far
ı perſecuting theſe men, though they are peſtilent
ugh, that though we know them to be ill-affected to
government, and deſirous of, and endeavouring to work
ıange, we allow them but too much liberty. You,
: are both a Frenchman and a vagabond, ſeem diſ-
ıſed that "the Engliſh more fierce and cruel than
r own maſtiffs," as your barking eloquence has it,
ave no regard to the lawful ſucceſſor and heir of the
wn: take no care of the king's youngeſt ſon, nor of
queen of Bohemia." I will make ye no anſwer; you
l anſwer yourſelf. "When the frame of a govern-
ıt is changed from a monarchy to any other, the new
lellers have no regard to ſucceſſion:" the application
aſy; it is in your book De primatu Papæ. "The
ıt change throughout three kingdoms," you ſay, "was
ıght about by a ſmall number of men in one of
n." If this were true, that ſmall number of men
ld have deſerved to have dominion over the reſt;
ant men over fainthearted cowards. "Theſe are
/ that preſumptuouſly took upon them to change,"
quum regni regimen, in alium qui à pluribus tyrannis
:atur. It is well for them that you cannot find fault
ı them, without committing a barbarous ſoleciſm;
ſhame all grammarians. "The Engliſh will never
able to waſh out this ſtain." Nay, you, though a
: and a ſtain to all learned men, were never yet able
ſtain the renown and everlaſting glory of the Engliſh
on, that with ſo great a reſolution, as we hardly
find

find the like recorded in any hiſtory, having ſtruggled with, and overcome, not only their enemies in the field, but the ſuperſtitious perſuaſions of the common people, have purchaſed to themſelves in general amongſt all poſterity the name of deliverers: the body of the people having undertook and performed an enterpriſe, which in other nations is thought to proceed only from a magnanimity that is peculiar to heroes. What "the proteſtants and primitive chriſtians" have done, or would do upon ſuch an occaſion, I will tell ye hereafter, when we come to debate the merits of the cauſe: in diſcourſing it before, I ſhould be guilty of your fault, who outdo the moſt impertinent talkers in nature. You wonder how we ſhall be able to anſwer the Jeſuits. Meddle with your own matters, you runagate, and be aſhamed of your actions, ſince the church is aſhamed of you; who, though but of late you ſet yourſelf ſo fiercely and with ſo much oſtentation againſt the pope's ſupremacy and epiſcopal government, are now become yourſelf a very creature of the biſhops. You confeſs, that "ſome proteſtants, whom you do not name, have aſſerted it lawful to depoſe a tyrant:" but though you do not think fit to name them, I will, becauſe you ſay "they are far worſe than the very Jeſuits themſelves;" they are no other than Luther, and Zuinglius, and Calvin, and Bucer, and Pareus, and many others. "But then," you ſay, "they refer it to the judgment of learned and wiſe men, who ſhall be accounted a tyrant. But what for men were theſe? Were they wiſe men, were they men of learning? Were they anywiſe remarkable, either for virtue or nobility?" You may well allow a people, that has felt the heavy yoke of ſlavery to be wiſe, and learned, and noble enough, to know what is fit to be done to the tyrant that has oppreſſed them; though they neither conſult with foreigners nor grammarians. But that this man was a tyrant, not only the parliaments of England and Scotland have declared by their actions and expreſs words; but almoſt all the people of both nations aſſented to it, till ſuch time as by the tricks and artifices of the biſhops they were divided into two factions: and what if it has pleaſed God to chooſe ſuch men, to execute his vengeance upon

ıpon the greateſt potentates on earth, as he choſe to be nade partakers of the benefit of the goſpel? "Not nany wiſe, not many learned, not many powerful, not nany noble: that by thoſe that are not, he ınight bring o nought thoſe that are; and that no fleſh might glory in iis ſight." And who are you, that babble to the contrary? lare you affect the reputation of a learned man? I onfeſs you are pretty well verſed in phraſe-books, and exicons, and gloſſaries; inſomuch that you ſeem to have pent your time in nothing elſe. But you do not make ppear, that you have read any good authors with ſo nuch judgment as to have benefited by them. Other opies, and various lections, and words omitted, and orruptions of texts, and the like, theſe you are full f; but no footſtep of any ſolid learning appears in ll you have writ: or do ye think yourſelf a wiſe nan, that quarrel and contend about the meaneſt rifles that may be? That being altogether ignorant in ſtronomy and phyſic, yet are always railing at the rofeſſors of both, whom all men credit in what things elong to their own ſciences, that would be ready to urſe them to the pit of Hell, that ſhould offer to de- rive you of the vain glory of having corrected or ſup- lied the leaſt word or letter in any copy you have cri- iciſed upon. And yet you are mad to hear yourſelf alled a grammarian. In certain trifling diſcourſes of ours, you call Dr. Hammond knave in plain terms, ho was one of this king's chaplains, and one that he alued above all the reſt, for no other reaſon but be- auſe he had called you a grammarian. And I do not ueſtion, but you would have been as ready to have rown the ſame reproach upon the king himſelf, if you ad heard that he had approved his chaplain's judgment f you. Take notice now, how much I (who am but ne of thoſe many Engliſh, that you have the impudence call madmen, and unlearned, and ignoble, and icked) ſlight and deſpiſe you, (for that the Engliſh na- on in general ſhould take any notice in public of ſuch a orm as you are, would be an infinite undervaluing of emſelves) who, though one ſhould turn you topſy- urvy, and inſide out, are but a grammarian: nay, as

if you had made a fooliſher wiſh than Midas did, whatever you meddle with, except when you make ſoleciſms, is grammar still. Whoſoever therefore he be, though from among the dregs of that common people that you are ſo keen upon, (for as for thoſe men of eminency amongſt us, whoſe great actions evidenced to all men their nobility, and virtue, and conduct, I will not diſgrace them ſo much, as to compare you to them, or them to you) but whoſoever, I ſay, among the dregs of that common people has but ſucked in this principle, that he was not born for his prince, but for God and his country; he deſerves the reputation of a learned, and an honeſt, and a wiſe man more, and is of greater uſe in the world than yourſelf. For ſuch a one is learned without letters; you have letters, but no learning, that underſtand ſo many languages, turn over ſo many volumes, and yet are but aſleep when all is done.

CHAPTER II.

THE argument that Salmaſius, toward the concluſion of his firſt chapter, urged as irrefragable, to wit, that it was really ſo, becauſe all men unanimouſly agreed in it; that very argument, than which, as he applied it, there is nothing more falſe, I, that am now about to diſcourſe of the right of kings, may turn upon himſelf with a great deal of truth. For, whereas he defines "a king" (if that may be ſaid to be defined which he makes infinite) "to be a perſon in whom the ſupreme power of the kingdom reſides, who is anſwerable to God alone, who may do whatſoever pleaſes him, who is bound by no law:" I will undertake to demonſtrate, not by mine, but by his own reaſons and authorities, that there never was a nation or people of any account (for to ranſack all the uncivilized parts of the world were to no purpoſe) that ever allowed this to be their king's right, or put ſuch exorbitant power into his hand, as "that he ſhould not be bound by any law, that he might do what he would, that he ſhould judge all, but be judged of none." Nor can I perſuade myſelf, that there ever was any one

perſon

perſon beſides Salmaſius of ſo flaviſh a ſpirit, as to aſſert the outrageous enormities of tyrants to be the rights of kings. Thoſe amongſt us that were the greateſt royaliſts, always abhorred this ſordid opinion: and Salmaſius himſelf, as appears by ſome other writings of his before he was bribed, was quite of another mind. Inſomuch, that what he here gives out, does not look like the dictates of a free ſubject under a free government, much leſs in ſo famous a commonwealth as that of Holland, and the moſt eminent univerſity there: but ſeems to have been penned by ſome deſpicable ſlave, that lay rotting in a priſon, or a dungeon. If whatever a king has a mind to do, the right of kings will bear him out in (which was a leſſon that the bloody tyrant Antoninus Caracalla, though his ſtep-mother Julia preached it to him, and endeavoured to inure him to the practice of it, by making him commit inceſt with herſelf, yet could hardly ſuck in) then there neither is, nor ever was that king, that deſerved the name of a tyrant. They may ſafely violate all the laws of God and man: their very being kings keeps them innocent. What crime was ever any of them guilty of? They did but make uſe of their own right upon their own vaſſals. No king can commit ſuch horrible cruelties and outrages, as will not be within this right of kings. So that there is no pretence left for any complaints or expoſtulations with any of them. And dare you aſſert, that "this right of kings," as you call it, "is grounded upon the law of nations, or rather upon that of nature," you brute beaſt? for you deſerve not the name of a man, that are ſo cruel and unjuſt towards all thoſe of your own kind; that endeavour as much as in you lies, ſo to bear down and vilify the whole race of mankind, that were made after the image of God, as to aſſert and maintain, that thoſe cruel and unmerciful taſkmaſters, that through the ſuperſtitious whimſies, or ſloth, or treachery of ſome perſons, get into the chair, are provided and appointed by nature herſelf, that mild and gentle mother of us all, to be the governors of thoſe nations they enſlave. By which peſtilent doctrine of yours, having rendered them more fierce and untractable, you not only enable them to make havoc of, and trample under

foot their miſerable ſubjects; but endeavour to arm them for that very purpoſe with the law of nature, the right of kings, and the very conſtitutions of government, than which nothing can be more impious or ridiculous. By my conſent, as Dionyſius formerly of a tyrant became a ſchoolmaſter, ſo you of a grammarian ſhould become a tyrant; not that you may have that regal licenſe of doing other people harm, but a fair opportunity of periſhing miſerably yourſelf: that, as Tiberius complained, when he had confined himſelf to the iſland Capreæ, you may be reduced into ſuch a condition, as to be ſenſible that you periſh daily. But let us look a little more narrowly into this right of kings that you talk of. "This was the ſenſe of the eaſtern, and of the weſtern part of the world." I ſhall not anſwer you with what Ariſtotle and Cicero, (who are both as credible authors as any we have) tell us, viz. That the people of Aſia eaſily ſubmit to ſlavery, but the Syrians and the Jews are even born to it from the womb. I confeſs there are but few, and thoſe men of great wiſdom and courage, that are either deſirous of liberty, or capable of uſing it. The greateſt part of the world chooſe to live under maſters; but yet they would have them juſt ones. As for ſuch as are unjuſt and tyrannical, neither was God ever ſo much an enemy to mankind, as to enjoin a neceſſity of ſubmitting to them; nor was there ever any people ſo deſtitute of all ſenſe, and ſunk into ſuch a depth of deſpair, as to impoſe ſo cruel a law upon themſelves and their poſterity. Firſt, you produce "the words of king Solomon in his Eccleſiaſtes." And we are as willing to appeal to the ſcripture as you. As for Solomon's authority, we will conſider that hereafter, when perhaps we ſhall be better able to underſtand it. Firſt, let us hear God himſelf ſpeak, Deut. xvii. 14. "When thou art come into the land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, and ſhalt ſay, I will ſet a king over me, like as the nations that are round about me." Which paſſage I could wiſh all men would ſeriouſly conſider: for hence it appears by the teſtimony of God himſelf; firſt, that all nations are at liberty to erect what form of government they will amongſt themſelves, and to change it when and into what they will.

This

This God affirms in expreſs terms concerning the Hebrew nation; and it does not appear but that other nations are, as to this reſpect, in the ſame condition. Another remark that this place yields us, is, that a commonwealth is a more perfect form of government than a monarchy, and more ſuitable to the condition of mankind, and in the opinion of God himſelf, better for his own people; for himſelf appointed it, and could hardly be prevailed withal a great while after, and at their own importunate deſire, to let them change it into a monarchy. But to make it appear, that he gave them their choice to be governed by a ſingle perſon, or by more, ſo they were juſtly governed, in caſe they ſhould in time to come reſolve upon a king, he preſcribes laws for this king of theirs to obſerve, whereby he was forbidden to multiply to himſelf horſes and wives, or to heap up riches: whence he might eaſily infer, that no power was put into his hands over others, but according to law, ſince even thoſe actions of his life, which related only to himſelf, were under a law. He was commanded therefore to tranſcribe with his own hand all the precepts of the law, and having writ them out, to obſerve and keep them, that his mind might not be lifted up above his brethren. It is evident from hence, that as well the prince as the people was bound by the law of Moſes. To this purpoſe Joſephus writes, a proper and able interpreter of the laws of his own country, who was admirably well verſed in the Jewiſh policy, and infinitely preferable to a thouſand obſcure ignorant rabbins: he has it thus in the fourth book of his Antiquities, Ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ἂν κράτιστον, &c. "An Ariſtocracy is the beſt form of government; wherefore do not you endeavour to ſettle any other; it is enough for you, that God preſides over ye, but if you will have a king, let him guide himſelf by the law of God, rather than by his own wiſdom; and lay a reſtraint upon him, if he offer at more power than the ſtate of your affairs will allow of." Thus he expreſſes himſelf upon this place in Deuteronomy. Another Jewiſh author, Philo Judæus, who was Joſephus's contemporary, a very ſtudious man in the law of Moſes, upon which he wrote a large commentary: when in his book concerning the creation of

the king, he interprets this chapter of Deuteronomy, he ſets a king looſe from the law no otherwiſe than as an enemy may be ſaid to be ſo: "They," ſays he, "that to the prejudice and deſtruction of the people acquire great power to themſelves, deſerve not the name of kings, but that of enemies: for their actions are the ſame with thoſe of an irreconcilable enemy. Nay, they, that under a pretence of government are injurious, are worſe than open enemies. We may fence ourſelves againſt the latter; but the malice of the former is ſo much the more peſtilent, becauſe it is not always eaſy to be diſcovered." But when it is diſcovered, why ſhould they not be dealt with as enemies? The ſame author in his ſecond book, Allegoriar. Legis, "A king," ſays he, "and a tyrant, are contraries." And a little after, "A king ought not only to command, but alſo to obey." All this is very true, you will ſay, a king ought to obſerve the laws, as well as any other man. But what if he will not, what law is there to puniſh him? I anſwer, the ſame law that there is to puniſh other men; for I find no exceptions. There is no expreſs law to puniſh the prieſts, or any other inferiour magiſtrates, who all of them, if this opinion of the exemption of kings from the penalties of the law would hold, might, by the ſame reaſon, claim impunity, what guilt ſoever they contract, becauſe there is no poſitive law for their puniſhment; and yet I ſuppoſe none of them ever challenged ſuch a prerogative, nor would it ever be allowed them, if they ſhould. Hitherto we have learned from the very text of God's own law, that a king ought to obey the laws, and not lift himſelf up above his brethren. Let us now conſider whether Solomon preached up any other doctrine, chap. viii. ver. 2. "I counſel thee to keep the king's commandment, and that in regard of the oath of God. Be not haſty to go out of his ſight; ſtand not in an evil thing; for he doth whatſoever pleaſeth him. Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may ſay unto him, what doſt thou?" It is well enough known, that here the preacher directs not his precepts to the Sanhedrim, or to a parliament, but to private perſons; and ſuch he commands to "keep the king's command-

ment, and that in regard of the oath of God." But as they ſwear allegiance to kings, do not kings likewiſe ſwear to obey and maintain the laws of God, and thoſe of their own country? So the Reubenites and Gadites promiſe obedience to Joſhua, Joſh. i. 17. "According as we hearkened unto Moſes in all things, ſo will we hearken unto thee; only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moſes." Here is an expreſs condition. Hear the preacher elſe, ch. ix. ver. 17. "The words of wiſe men are heard in quiet, more than the cry of him that ruleth among fools." The next caution that Solomon gives us, is, "Be not haſty to go out of his ſight; ſtand not in an evil thing; for he doth whatſoever pleaſeth him." That is, he does what he will to malefactors, whom the law authorizes him to puniſh, and againſt whom he may proceed with mercy or ſeverity, as he ſees occaſion. Here is nothing like tyranny; nothing that a good man needs be afraid of. "Where the word of a king is, there is power; and who may ſay to him, What doſt thou?" And yet we read of one, that not only ſaid to a king, "What doſt thou?" but told him, "Thou haſt done fooliſhly." But Samuel, you may ſay, was an extraordinary perſon. I anſwer you with your own words, which follow in the forty-ninth page of your book, "What was there extraordinary," ſay you, "in Saul or David?" And ſo ſay I, what was there in Samuel extraordinary? He was a prophet, you will ſay; ſo are they that now follow his example; for they act according to the will of God, either his revealed, or his ſacred will, which yourſelf grant in your 50th page. The preacher therefore in this place prudently adviſes private perſons not to contend with princes; for it is even dangerous to contend with any man, that is either rich or powerful. But what then? muſt therefore the nobility of a nation, and all the inferiour magiſtrates, and the whole body of the people not dare to mutter when a king raves and acts like a madman? Muſt they not oppoſe a fooliſh, wicked, and outrageous tyrant, that perhaps ſeeks the deſtruction of all good men? Muſt they not endeavour to prevent his turning all divine and human things upſide down? Muſt they ſuffer him to maſſacre

his people, burn their cities, and commit ſuch outrages upon them daily; and finally, to have perfect liberty to do what he liſts without control?

O de Cappadocis eques cataſtis!
Thou ſlaviſh knight of Cappadocia!

Whom all free people, if you can have the confidence hereafter to ſet your foot within a free country, ought to caſt out from amongſt them, and ſend to ſome remote parts of the world, as a prodigy of dire portent; or to condemn to ſome perpetual drudgery, as one devoted to ſlavery, ſolemnly obliging themſelves, if they ever let you go, to undergo a worſe ſlavery under ſome cruel, ſilly tyrant: no man living can either deviſe himſelf, or borrow from any other, expreſſions ſo full of cruelty and contempt, as may not juſtly be applied to you. But go on. "When the Iſraelites aſked a king of God, they ſaid, they would ſet up a king that ſhould have the ſame rule and dominion over them, that the kings of their neighbour countries exerciſed over their ſubjects. But the kings of the Eaſt we know had an unlimited power," as Virgil teſtifies,

" —— Regem non ſic Ægyptus & ingens
" Lydia, nec populi Parthorum, & Medus, Hydaſpes
" Obſervant."——————
" No Eaſtern nation ever did adore
" The majeſty of ſovereign princes more."

Firſt, what is that to us, what ſort of kings the Iſraelites deſired? Eſpecially ſince God was angry with them, not only for deſiring ſuch a king as other nations had, and not ſuch a king as his own law deſcribes, but barely for deſiring a king at all? Nor is it credible, that they ſhould deſire an unjuſt king, and one that ſhould be out of the reach of all laws, who could not bear the government of Samuel's ſons, though under the power of laws; but from their covetouſneſs ſought refuge in a king. And laſtly, the verſe that you quote out of Virgil does not prove, that the kings of the Eaſt had an abſolute

ſolute unlimited power; for thoſe bees, that he there ſpeaks of, and who reverence their kings, he ſays, more than the Egyptians or Medes do theirs, by the authority of the ſame poet:

—— " Magnis agitant ſub legibus ævum."
" Live under certain fundamental laws."

They do not live under a king then, that is tied to no law. But now I will let you ſee how little reaſon you have to think I bear you an ill-will. Moſt people think you a knave; but I will make it appear, that you have only put on a knave's vizor for the preſent. In your introduction to your diſcourſe of the pope's ſupremacy, you ſay, that ſome divines in the council of Trent made uſe of the government, that is ſaid to be amongſt bees, to prove the pope's ſupremacy. This fancy you borrow from them, and urge it here with the ſame malice that they did there. Now that very ſame anſwer that you gave them, whilſt you were an honeſt man, now that you are become a knave, you ſhall give yourſelf, and pull off with your own hand that vizor you have now put on: " The bees," ſay you, " are a ſtate, and ſo natural philoſophers call them; they have a king, but a harmleſs one; he is a leader, or captain, rather than a king; he never beats, nor pulls, nor kills his ſubject bees." No wonder they are ſo obſervant of him then: but in good faith, you had but ill luck to meddle with theſe bees; for though they are bees of Trent, they ſhow you to be a drone. Ariſtotle, a moſt exact writer of politics, affirms that the Aſiatic monarchy, which yet himſelf calls barbarous, was according to law, Politic. 3. And whereas he reckons up five ſeveral ſorts of monarchies, four of thoſe five he makes governments according to laws, and with the conſent of the people; and yet he calls them tyrannical forms of government, becauſe they lodge ſo much power in one man's hand. But the kingdom of the Lacedemonians, he ſays, is moſt properly a kingdom, becauſe there all power is not in the king. The fifth ſort of monarchy, which he calls παμβασίλεια, that is, where the king is all in all; and to which he

he refers that, that you call the right of kings, which is a liberty to do what they liſt; he neither tells us when, nor where any ſuch form of government ever obtained. Nor ſeems he to have mentioned it for any other purpoſe, than to ſhow how unjuſt, abſurd, and tyrannical a government it is. You ſay, that when Samuel would deter the people from chooſing a king, he propounded to them this right of kings. But whence had Samuel it? Had he it from the written law of God? That cannot be. We have obſerved already, that the ſcriptures afford us a quite other ſcheme of ſovereignty. Had Samuel it then immediately from God himſelf by revelation? That is not likely neither; for God diſlikes it, diſcommends it, finds fault with it, ſo that Samuel does not expound to the people any right of kings appointed by God; but a corrupt and depraved manner of governing, taken up by the pride and ambition of princes. He tells not the people what their kings ought to do, but what they would do. He told them the manner of their king, as before he told us the manner of the prieſts, the ſons of Eli; for he uſes the ſame word in both places (which you in the thirty-third page of your book, by a Hebrew ſoleciſm too, call (משפט.) That manner of theirs was wicked, and odious, and tyrannical: it was no right, but great wrong. The fathers have commented upon this place too: I will inſtance in one, that may ſtand for a great many; and that is Sulpitius Severus, a contemporary and intimate friend of St. Jerome, and, in St. Auguſtin's opinion, a man of great wiſdom and learning. He tells us in his ſacred hiſtory, that Samuel in that place acquaints the people with the imperious rule of kings, and how they uſe to lord it over their ſubjects. Certainly it cannot be the right of kings to domineer and be imperious. But according to Salluſt, that lawful power and authority that kings were entruſted with, for the preſervation of the public liberty, and the good of the commonwealth, quickly degenerated into pride and tyranny: and this is the ſenſe of all orthodox divines, and of all lawyers upon that place of Samuel. And you might have learned from Sichardus, that moſt of the rabbins too were of the ſame mind; at leaſt, not any one of them ever aſſerted, that

that the abſolute inherent right of kings is there diſcourſed of. Yourſelf in your fifth chapter, page 106, complain, That " not only Clemens Alexandrinus, but all other expoſitors miſtake themſelves upon this text:" and you, I will warrant ye, are the only man, that have had the good luck to hit the mark. Now, what a piece of folly and impudence is this in you to maintain, in oppoſition to all orthodox expoſitors, that thoſe very actions, which God ſo much condemns, are the right of kings, and to pretend law for them? Though yourſelf confeſs, that that right is very often exerciſed in committing outrages, being injurious, contumelious, and the like. Was any man ever to that degree ſui juris, ſo much his own maſter, as that he might lawfully prey upon mankind, bear down all that ſtood in his way, and turn all things upſide down? Did the Romans ever maintain, as you ſay they did, that any man might do theſe things ſuo jure, by virtue of ſome inherent right in himſelf? Salluſt indeed makes C. Memmius, a tribune of the people, in an invective ſpeech of his againſt the pride of the nobility, and their eſcaping unpuniſhed, howſoever they miſbehaved themſelves, to uſe theſe words, viz. " To do whatever one has a mind to, without fear of puniſhment, is to be a king." This ſaying you catched hold of, thinking it would make for your purpoſe; but conſider it a little better, and you will find yourſelf deceived. Does he in that place aſſert the right of kings? or does he not blame the common people, and chide them for their ſloth, in ſuffering their nobility to lord it over them, as if they were out of the reach of all law, and in ſubmitting again to that kingly tyranny, which, together with their kings themſelves, their anceſtors had lawfully and juſtly rejected and baniſhed from amongſt them? If you had conſulted Tully, you would have underſtood both Salluſt and Samuel better. In his oration pro C. Rabirio, " There is none of us ignorant," ſays he, " of the manner of kings. Theſe are their lordly dictates: mind what I ſay, and do accordingly." Many paſſages to this purpoſe he quotes out of poets, and calls them not the right, but the cuſtom or manner of kings; and he ſays, we ought to read and conſider them, not only for

for curioſity ſake, but that we may learn to beware of them, and avoid them. You perceive how miſerably you are come off with Salluſt, who, though he be as much an enemy to tyranny as any other author whatſoever, you thought would have patronized this tyrannical right that you are eſtabliſhing. Take my word for it, the right of kings ſeems to be tottering, and even to further its own ruin, by relying upon ſuch weak props for its ſupport; and by endeavouring to maintain itſelf by ſuch examples and authorities, as would haſten its downfal, if it were further off than it is. "The extremity of right or law," you ſay, "is the height of injury, Summum jus ſumma injuria; this ſaying is verified moſt properly in kings, who, when they go to the utmoſt of their right, fall into thoſe courſes, in which Samuel makes the rights of kings to conſiſt." And it is a miſerable right, which, when you have ſaid all you can for, you can no otherwiſe defend, than by confeſſing, that it is the greateſt injury that may be. The extremity of right or law is ſaid to be, when a man ties himſelf up to niceties, dwells upon letters and ſyllables, and in the mean time neglects the intent and equity of the law; or when a written law is cunningly and maliciouſly interpreted; this Cicero makes to have been the riſe of that common ſaying. But ſince it is certain that all right flows from the fountain of juſtice, ſo that nothing can poſſibly be any man's right that is not juſt, it is a moſt wicked thing in you to affirm, that for a king to be unjuſt, rapacious, tyrannical, and as ill as the worſt of them ever was, is according to the right of kings; and to tell us that a holy prophet would have perſuaded the people to ſuch a ſenſeleſs thing. For whether written or unwritten, whether extreme or remiſs, what right can any man have to be injurious? Which, leſt you ſhould confeſs to be true of other men, but not of kings, I have one man's authority to object to you, who, I think, was a king likewiſe, and profeſſes that that right of kings, that you ſpeak of, is odious both to God and himſelf: it is in the 94th pſalm, "Shall the throne of iniquity have fellowſhip with thee, that frameth mif-

chief

ſf by a law?" Be not therefore ſo injurious to God,
o aſcribe this doctrine to him, viz. that all manner
wicked and flagitious actions are but the right of
gs; ſince himſelf tells us, that he abhors all fellowſhip
ı wicked princes for this very reaſon, becauſe, under
tence of ſovereignty, they create miſery and vexa-
ı to their ſubjects. Neither bring up a falſe accuſa-
ı againſt a prophet of God; for by making him to
ch us in this place what the right of kings is, you
not produce the right Samuel, but ſuch another
ɔty ſhadow as was raiſed by the witch of Endor.
ɔugh for my own part, I verily believe that that in-
ıal Samuel would not have been ſo great a liar, but
: he would have confeſſed, that what you call the
ıt of kings, is tyranny. We read indeed of im-
ies countenanced by law, Jus datum ſceleri: you
rſelf confeſs, that they are bad kings that have made
of this boundleſs licenſe of theirs to do every thing.
w, this right that you have introduced for the de-
ction of mankind, not proceeding from God, as I
e proved it does not, muſt needs come from the
il; and that it does really ſo, will appear more
rly hereafter. "By virtue of this liberty, ſay you,
ıces may if they will." And for this, you pretend
have Cicero's authority. I am always willing to
ıtion your authorities, for it generally happens, that
very authors you quote them out of, give you an
ver themſelves. Hear elſe what Cicero ſays in his
Philippic, "What cauſe of war can be more juſt
warrantable than to avoid ſlavery? For though a
ple may have the good fortune to live under a
ıle maſter, yet thoſe are in a miſerable condition,
ſe prince may tyrannize over them if he will."
y, that is, can; has power enough ſo to do. If he
ınt it of his right, he would contradict himſelf, and
:e that an unjuſt cauſe of war, which himſelf had
ıned with the ſame breath to be a moſt juſt one.
s not therefore the right of all kings that you de-
ɔe, but the injuriouſneſs, and force, and violence
ome. Then you tell us what private men may do.
. private man," ſay you, "may lie, may be un-
grateful;"

grateful;" and ſo may kings, but what then? May they therefore plunder, murder, raviſh, without control? It is equally prejudicial and deſtructive to the commonwealth, whether it be their own prince, or a robber, or a foreign enemy, that ſpoils, maſſacres, and enſlaves them. And queſtionleſs, being both alike enemies of human ſociety, the one, as well as the other, may lawfully be oppoſed and puniſhed; and their own prince the rather, becauſe he, though raiſed to that dignity by the honours that his people have conferred upon him, and being bound by his oath to defend the public ſafety, betrays it notwithſtanding all. At laſt you grant, that "Moſes preſcribes laws, according to which the king that the people of Iſrael ſhould chooſe, ought to govern, though different from this right that Samuel propoſes;" which words contain a double contradiction to what you have ſaid before. For whereas you had affirmed, that a king was bound by no law, here you confeſs he is. And you ſet up two contrary rights, one deſcribed by Moſes, and another by Samuel, which is abſurd. "But," ſays the prophet, "you ſhall be ſervants to your king." Though I ſhould grant that the Iſraelites were really ſo, it would not preſently follow, that it was the right of their kings to have them ſo; but that by the uſurpation and injuſtice of moſt of them, they were reduced to that condition. For the prophet had foretold them, that that importunate petition of theirs would bring a puniſhment from God upon them; not becauſe it would be their king's right ſo to haraſs them, but becauſe they themſelves had deſerved it ſhould be ſo. If kings are out of the reach of the law, ſo as that they may do what they liſt, they are more abſolute than any maſters, and their ſubjects in a more deſpicable condition than the worſt of ſlaves. The law of God provided ſome redreſs from them, though of another nation, if their maſters were cruel and unreaſonable towards them. And can we imagine, that the whole body of the people of a free nation, though oppreſſed and tyrannized over, and preyed upon, ſhould be left remedileſs? That they had no law to protect them, no ſanctuary to betake themſelves to? Can we think, that they were delivered from the bondage they were under

to

to the Egyptian kings, to be reduced into a worſe to one of their own brethren? All which being neither agreeable to the law of God, nor to common ſenſe, nothing can be more evident, than that the prophet declares to the people the manner, and not the right of kings; nor the manner of all kings, but of moſt. Then you come to the rabbins, and quote two of them, but you have as bad luck with them here, as you had before. For it is plain, that that other chapter that rabbi Joſes ſpeaks of, and which contains, he ſays, the right of kings, is that in Deuteronomy, and not in Samuel. For rabbi Judas ſays very truly, and againſt you, that that diſcourſe of Samuel's was intended only to frighten the people. It is a moſt pernicious doctrine, to maintain that to be any one's right, which in itſelf is flat injuſtice, unleſs you have a mind to ſpeak by contraries. And that Samuel intended to affrighten them, appears by the 18th verſe, "And ye ſhall cry out in that day, becauſe of your king, which ye ſhall have choſen you, and I will not hear you in that day, ſaith the Lord." That was to be their puniſhment for their obſtinacy in perſiſting to deſire a king, againſt the mind and will of God; and yet they are not forbidden here either to pray againſt him, or to endeavour to rid themſelves of him. For if they might lawfully pray to God againſt him, without doubt they might uſe all lawful means for their own deliverance. For what man living, when he finds himſelf in any calamity, betakes himſelf to God, ſo as to neglect his own duty, in order to a redreſs, and rely upon his lazy prayers only? But be it how it will, what is all this to the right of kings, or of the Engliſh people? who neither aſked a king againſt the will of God, nor had one appointed us by God, but by the right that all nations have to appoint their own governors, appointed a king over us by laws of our own, neither in obedience to, nor againſt any command of God? And this being the caſe, for aught I ſee, we have done well in depoſing our king, and are to be commended for it, ſince the Iſraelites ſinned in aſking one. And this the event has made appear; for we, when we had a king, prayed to God againſt him, and he heard us, and delivered us:

but

but the Jews (who not being under a kingly government, deſired a king), he ſuffered to live in ſlavery under one, till, at laſt, after their return from the Babyloniſh captivity, they betook themſelves to their former government again. Then you come to give us a diſplay of your talmudical learning; but you have as ill ſucceſs with that as you have had with all the reſt. For, whilſt you are endeavouring to prove, that kings are not liable to any temporal judicature, you quote an authority out of the treatiſe of the Sanhedrim, "that the king neither is judged of others, nor does himſelf judge any." Which is againſt the people's own petition in Samuel; for they deſired a king that might judge them. You labour in vain to ſalve this, by telling us, that it is to be underſtood of thoſe kings, that reigned after the Babyloniſh captivity. For then, what ſay ye to Maimonides? He makes this difference betwixt the kings of Iſrael and thoſe of Juda; that the kings of the poſterity of David judge, and are judged; but the kings of Iſrael do neither. You contradict and quarrel with yourſelf or your rabbins, and ſtill do my work for me. This, ſay you, is not to be underſtood of the kings of Iſrael in their firſt inſtitution; for in the 17th verſe it is ſaid, "you ſhall be his ſervants;" that is, he ſhall uſe you to it, not that he ſhall have any right to make you ſo. Or if you underſtand it of their king's right, it is but a judgment of God upon them for aſking a king; the effects of which they were ſenſible of under moſt of their kings, though not perhaps under all. But you need no antagoniſts, you are ſuch a perpetual adverſary to yourſelf. For you tell us now a ſtory, as if you were arguing on my ſide, how that firſt Ariſtobulus, and after him Jannæus, ſurnamed Alexander, did not receive that kingly right that they pretended to, from the Sanhedrim, that great treaſury and oracle of the laws of that nation, but uſurped it by degrees againſt the will of the ſenate. For whoſe ſake, you ſay, that childiſh fable of the principal men of that aſſembly being ſtruck dead by the angel Gabriel was firſt invented. And thus you confeſs, that this magnificent prerogative, upon which you ſeem mainly to rely, viz. "that kings are not to be judged by any upon earth, was grounded upon this worſe than

an

old wife's tale, that is, upon a rabbinical fable." But that the Hebrew kings were liable to be called in queſtion for their actions, and to be puniſhed with ſtripes, if they were found faulty, Sichardus ſhows at large out of the writings of the rabbins, to which author you are indebted for all that you employ of that ſort of learning, and yet you have the impudence to be thwarting with him. Nay, we read in the ſcripture, that Saul thought himſelf bound by a decree of his own making; and in obedience thereunto, that he caſt lots with his ſon Jonathan which of them two ſhould die. Uzzias likewiſe, when he was thruſt out of the temple by the prieſts as a leper, ſubmitted as every private perſon in ſuch a caſe ought to do, and ceaſed to be a king. Suppoſe he ſhould have refuſed to go out of the temple, and lay down the government, and live alone, and had reſolved to aſſert that kingly right of not being ſubject to any law, do you think the prieſts, and the people of the Jews, would have ſuffered the temple to be defiled, the laws violated, and live themſelves in danger of the infection? It ſeems there are laws againſt a leprous king, but none againſt a tyrant. Can any man poſſibly be ſo mad and fooliſh as to fancy, that the laws ſhould ſo far provide for the people's health, as though ſome noiſome diſtemper ſhould ſeize upon the king himſelf, yet to prevent the infection's reaching them, and make no proviſion for the ſecurity of their lives and eſtates, and the very being of the whole ſtate, againſt the tyranny of a cruel, unjuſt prince, which is incomparably the greater miſchief of the two? "But," ſay you, "there can be no precedent ſhown of any one king that has been arraigned in a court of juſtice, and condemned to die." Sichardus anſwers that well enough. It is all one, ſays he, as if one ſhould argue on this manner: The emperor of Germany never was ſummoned to appear before one of the prince electors; therefore, if the prince elector Palatine ſhould impeach the emperor, he were not bound to plead to it; though it appears by the golden bull, that Charles the fourth ſubjected himſelf and his ſucceſſors to that cognizance and juriſdiction. But no wonder if kings were indulged in their ambition, and

their exorbitancies paſſed by, when the times were ſo corrupt and depraved, that even private men, if they had either money or intereſt, might eſcape the law, though guilty of crimes of never ſo high a nature. That ἀνυπεύθυνον, that you ſpeak of, that is to be wholly independent upon any other, and accountable to none upon earth, which you ſay is peculiar to the majeſty of ſovereign princes, Ariſtotle in the 4th book of his Pol. Ch. 10. calls a moſt tyrannical form of government, and not in the leaſt to be endured by a free people. And that kings are not liable to be queſtioned for their actions, you prove by the teſtimony of a very worthy author, that barbarous tyrant Mark Antony; one of thoſe that ſubverted the commonwealth of Rome: and yet he himſelf, when he undertook an expedition againſt the Parthians, ſummoned Herod before him, to anſwer to a charge of murder, and would have puniſhed him, but that Herod bribed him. So that Antony's aſſerting this prerogative royal, and your defence of king Charles, come both out of one and the ſame ſpring. "And it is very reaſonable," ſay you, "that it ſhould be ſo; for kings derive their authority from God alone." What kings are thoſe, I pray, that do ſo? For I deny, that there ever were any ſuch kings in the world, that derived their authority from God alone. Saul, the firſt king of Iſrael, had never reigned, but that the people deſired a king, even againſt the will of God; and though he was proclaimed king once at Mizpah, yet after that he lived a private life, and looked to his father's cattle, till he was created ſo the ſecond time by the people at Gilgal. And what think ye of David? Though he had been anointed once by God, was he not anointed a ſecond time in Hebron by the tribe of Judah, and after that by all the people of Iſrael, and that after a mutual covenant betwixt him and them? 2 Sam. v. 1 Chron. xi. Now, a covenant lays an obligation upon kings, and reſtrains them within bounds. Solomon, you ſay, "ſucceeded him in the throne of the Lord, and was acceptable to all men:" 1 Chron. xxix. So that it is ſomething to be well-pleaſing in the eyes of the people. Jehoiadah the prieſt made Joaſh king, but firſt he made him and the

people enter into a covenant to one another, 2 Kings xi. I confeſs that theſe kings, and all that reigned of David's poſterity, were appointed to the kingdom both by God and the people; but of all other kings, of what country ſoever, I affirm, that they are made ſo by the people only; nor can you make it appear, that they are appointed by God, any otherwiſe than as all other things, great and ſmall, are ſaid to be appointed by him, becauſe nothing comes to paſs without his providence. So that I allow the throne of David was in a peculiar manner called "the throne of the Lord:" whereas the thrones of other princes are no otherwiſe God's, than all other things in the world are his; which if you would, you might have learnt out of the ſame chapter, ver. 11, 12. "Thine, O Lord, is the greatneſs, &c. for all that is in the heaven and in the earth is thine. Both riches and honour come of thee, and thou reigneſt over all." And this is ſo often repeated, not to puff up kings, but to put them in mind, though they think themſelves Gods, that yet there is a God above them, to whom they owe whatever they are and have. And thus we eaſily underſtand what the poets, and the Eſſenes among the Jews mean, when they tell us, that it is by God that kings reign, and that they are of Jupiter; for ſo all of us are of God, we are all his offspring. So that this univerſal right of Almighty God's, and the intereſt that he has in princes, and their thrones, and all that belongs to them, does not at all derogate from the people's right; but that notwithſtanding all this, all other kings, not particularly and by name appointed by God, owe their ſovereignty to the people only, and conſequently are accountable to them for the management of it. The truth of which doctrine, though the common people are apt to flatter their kings, yet they themſelves acknowledge, whether good ones, as Sarpedon in Homer is deſcribed to have been; or bad ones, as thoſe tyrants in the lyrick poet:

Γλαῦκε, τίη δὴ νῶι τετιμήμισθα, μαλίστα, &c.

Glaucus, in Lycia we're ador'd like Gods:
What makes 'twixt us and others ſo great odds?

He reſolves the queſtion himſelf: "Becauſe, ſays he, we excel others in heroical virtues: Let us fight manfully then, ſays he, leſt our countrymen tax us with ſloth and cowardice." In which words he intimates to us, both that kings derive their grandeur from the people, and that for their conduct and behaviour in war they are accountable to them. Bad kings indeed, though to caſt ſome terrour into people's minds, and beget a reverence of themſelves, they declare to the world, that God only is the author of kingly government; in their hearts and minds they reverence no other deity but that of fortune, according to that paſſage in Horace:

Te Dacus aſper, te profugi Scythæ,
Regumque matres barbarorum, &
Purpurei metuunt tyranni.

Injurioſo ne pede proruas
Stantem columnam, neu populus frequens
Ad arma ceſſantes, ad arma
Concitet, imperiumque frangat.

"All barb'rous people, and their princes too,
"All purple tyrants honour you;
"The very wand'ring Scythians do.

"Support the pillar of the Roman ſtate,
"Leſt all men be involv'd in one man's fate.
"Continue us in wealth and peace;
"Let wars and tumults ever ceaſe."

So that if it is by God that kings now-a-days reign, it is by God too that the people aſſert their own liberty; ſince all things are of him, and by him. I am ſure the ſcripture bears witneſs to both; that by him kings reign, and that by him they are caſt down from their thrones. And yet experience teaches us, that both theſe things are brought about by the people, oftener than by God. Be this right of kings, therefore, what it will, the right of the people is as much from God as it. And whenever any people, without ſome viſible deſignation of God

God himſelf, appoint a king over them, they have the ſame right to put him down, that they had to ſet him up at firſt. And certainly it is a more godlike action to depoſe a tyrant than to ſet up one: and there appears much more of God in the people, when they depoſe an unjuſt prince, than in a king that oppreſſes an innocent people. Nay, the people have a warrant from God to judge wicked princes; for God has conferred this very honour upon thoſe that are dear to him, that celebrating the praiſes of Chriſt their own king, "they ſhall bind in chains the kings of the nations, (under which appellation all tyrants under the goſpel are included) and execute the judgments written upon them that challenge to themſelves an exemption from all written laws," Pſalm cxlix. So that there is but little reaſon left for that wicked and fooliſh opinion, that kings, who commonly are the worſt of men, ſhould be ſo high in God's account, as that he ſhould have put the world under them, to be at their beck, and be governed according to their humour; and that for their ſakes alone he ſhould have reduced all mankind, whom he made after his own image, into the ſame condition with brutes. After all this, rather than ſay nothing, you produce M. Aurelius as a countenancer of tyranny; but you had better have let him alone. I cannot ſay whether he ever affirmed, that princes are accountable only before God's tribunal. But Xiphiline indeed, out of whom you quote thoſe words of M. Aurelius, mentions a certain government, which he calls an Autarchy, of which he makes God the only judge: περὶ αὐταρχίας ὁ θεὸς μόνος κρίνειν δικαίαι. But that this word Autarchy and Monarchy are ſynonymous, I cannot eaſily perſuade myſelf to believe. And the more I read what goes before, the leſs I find myſelf inclinable to think ſo. And certainly whoever conſiders the context, will not eaſily apprehend what coherence this ſentence has with it, and muſt needs wonder how it comes ſo abruptly into the text; eſpecially ſince Marcus Aurelius, that mirror of princes, carried himſelf towards the people, as Capitolinus tells us, juſt as if Rome had been a commonwealth ſtill. And we all know, that when it was ſo, the ſupreme

power was in the people. The ſame emperor honoured the memory of Thraſeas, and Helvidius, and Cato, and Dio, and Brutus; who all were tyrant-ſlayers, or affected the reputation of being thought ſo. In the firſt book that he writes of his own life, he ſays, that he propoſed to himſelf a form of government, under which all men might equally enjoy the benefit of the law, and right and juſtice be equally adminiſtered to all. And in his fourth book he ſays, the law is maſter, and not he. He acknowledged the right of the ſenate and the people, and their intereſt in all things: we are ſo far, ſays he, from having any thing of our own, that we live in your houſes. Theſe things Xiphiline relates of him. So little did he arrogate aught to himſelf by virtue of his ſovereign right. When he died, he recommended his ſon to the Romans for his ſucceſſor, if they ſhould think he deſerved it. So far was he from pretending to a commiſſion from Heaven to exerciſe that abſolute and imaginary right of ſovereignty, that Autarchy, that you tell us of. "All the Latin and Greek books are full of authorities of this nature." But we have heard none of them yet. "So are the Jewiſh authors." And yet, you ſay, "the Jews in many things allowed but too little to their princes." Nay, you will find that both the Greeks and the Latins allowed much leſs to tyrants. And how little the Jews allowed them would appear, if that book that Samuel "wrote of the manner of the kingdom" were extant; which book, the Hebrew doctors tell us, their kings tore in pieces and burnt, that they might be more at liberty to tyrannize over the people without control or fear of puniſhment. Now look about ye again, and catch hold of ſomewhat or other. In the laſt place, you come to wreſt David's words in the xvii. Pſalm, "let my ſentence come forth from thy preſence." Therefore, ſays Barnachmoni, "God only can judge the king." And yet it is moſt likely, that David penned this pſalm when he was perſecuted by Saul, at which time, though himſelf were anointed, he did not decline being judged even by Jonathan: "Notwithſtanding, if there be iniquity in me, ſlay me thyſelf. 1 Sam. xx. At leaſt, in this pſalm he does no more than what any

any perſon in the world would do upon the like occaſion; being falſely accuſed by men, he appeals to the judgment of God himſelf, "let thine eyes look upon the thing that is right; thou haſt proved and viſited mine heart, &c." What relation has this to a temporal judicature? Certainly they do no good office to this right of kings, that thus diſcover the weakneſs of its foundation. Then you come with that threadbare argument, which of all others is moſt in vogue with our courtiers, "againſt thee, thee only have I ſinned," Pſalm li. 6. As if David in the midſt of his repentance, when overwhelmed with ſorrow, and almoſt drowned in tears, he was humbly imploring God's mercy, had any thoughts of this kingly right of his when his heart was ſo low, that he thought he deſerved not the right of a ſlave. And can we think, that he deſpiſed all the people of God, his own brethren, to that degree, as to believe that he might murder them, plunder them, and commit adultery with their wives, and yet not ſin againſt them all this while? So holy a man could never be guilty of ſuch inſufferable pride, nor have ſo little knowledge either of himſelf, or of his duty to his neighbour. So without doubt when he ſays, "againſt thee only," he meant, againſt thee chiefly have I ſinned, &c. But whatever he means, the words of a pſalm are too full of poetry, and this pſalm too full of paſſion, to afford us any exact definitions of right and juſtice; nor is it proper to argue any thing of that nature from them. "But David was never queſtioned for this, nor made to plead for his life before the Sanhedrim." What then? How ſhould they know, that any ſuch thing had been, which was done ſo privately, that perhaps for ſome years after not above one or two were privy to it, as ſuch ſecrets there are in moſt courts? 2 Sam. 12. "Thou haſt done this thing in ſecret." Beſides, what if the ſenate ſhould neglect to puniſh private perſons? Would any infer, that therefore they ought not to be puniſhed at all? But the reaſon why David was not proceeded againſt as a malefactor, is not much in the dark: he had condemned himſelf in the 5th verſe, "The man that hath done this thing ſhall ſurely die." To which the prophet preſently replies,

"Thou art the man." So that in the prophet's judgment, as well as his own, he was worthy of death: but God, by his ſovereign right over all things, and of his great mercy to David, abſolves him from the guilt of his ſin, and the ſentence of death which he had pronounced againſt himſelf; verſe 13th, "The Lord hath put away thy ſin, thou ſhalt not die." The next thing you do is to rail at ſome bloody advocate or other, and you take a deal of pains to refute the concluſion of his diſcourſe. Let him look to that; I will endeavour to be as ſhort as I can in what I have undertaken to perform. But ſome things I muſt not paſs by without taking notice of; as firſt and foremoſt your notorious contradictions; for in the 30th page you ſay, "The Iſraelites do not deprecate an unjuſt, rapacious, tyrannical king, one as bad as the worſt of kings are." And yet, page 42, you are very ſmart upon your advocate, for maintaining that the Iſraelites aſked for a tyrant: "Would they have leaped out of the fryingpan into the fire," ſay you, "and groan under the cruelty of the worſt of tyrants, rather than live under bad judges, eſpecially being uſed to ſuch a form of government?" Firſt, you ſaid the Hebrews would rather live under tyrants than judges, here you ſay they would rather live under judges than tyrants; and that "they deſired nothing leſs than a tyrant." So that your advocate may anſwer you out of your own book. For according to your principles it is every king's right to be a tyrant. What you ſay next is very true, "the ſupreme power was then in the people, which appears by their own rejecting their judges, and making choice of a kingly government." Remember this, when I ſhall have occaſion to make uſe of it. You ſay, that God gave the children of Iſrael a king as a thing good and profitable for them, and deny that he gave them one in his anger, as a puniſhment for their ſin. But that will receive an eaſy anſwer; for to what purpoſe ſhould they cry to God becauſe of the king that they had choſen, if it were not becauſe a kingly government is an evil thing; not in itſelf, but becauſe it moſt commonly does, as Samuel forewarns the people that theirs would, degenerate

nerate into pride and tyranny? If you are not yet ſatisfied, hark what you ſay yourſelf; acknowledge your own hand, and bluſh; it is in your "Apparatus ad Primatum: God gave them a king in his anger," ſay you, "being offended at their ſin in rejecting him from ruling over them; and ſo the chriſtian church, as a puniſhment for its forſaking the pure worſhip of God, has been ſubjected to the more than kingly government of one mortal head." So that if your own compariſon holds, either God gave the children of Iſrael a king as an evil thing, and as a puniſhment, or he has ſet up the pope for the good of the church. Was there ever any thing more light and mad than this man is? Who would truſt him in the ſmalleſt matters, that in things of ſo great concern ſays and unſays without any conſideration in the world? You tell us in your twenty-ninth page, "that by the conſtitution of all nations, kings are bound by no law." That "this had been the judgment both of the eaſtern and weſtern part of the world." And yet, page 43, you ſay, "That all the kings of the eaſt ruled κατὰ νόμον, according to law, nay, that the very kings of Egypt in all matters whatſoever, whether great or ſmall, were tied to laws." Though in the beginning of this chapter you had undertook to demonſtrate, That "kings are bound by no laws, that they give laws to others, but have none preſcribed to themſelves." For my part I have no reaſon to be angry with you, for either you are mad, or of our ſide. You do not defend the king's cauſe, but argue againſt him, and play the fool with him: or if you are in earneſt, that epigram of Catullus,

> Tantò peſſimus omnium Poeta,
> Quantò tu optimus omnium Patronus.
>
> The worſt of poets, I myſelf declare,
> By how much you the beſt of patrons are.

That epigram, I ſay, may be turned, and very properly applied to you; for there never was ſo good a poet as you are a bad patron. Unleſs that ſtupidity, that you complain

plain your advocate is "immerſed over head and ears in," has blinded the eyes of your own underſtanding too, I will make you now ſenſible that you are become a very brute yourſelf. For now you come and confeſs, that "the kings of all nations have laws preſcribed to them." But then you ſay again, "They are not ſo under the power of them, as to be liable to cenſure or puniſhment of death, if they break them." Which yet you have proved neither from ſcripture, nor from any good author. Obſerve then in ſhort; to preſcribe municipal laws to ſuch as are not bound by them, is ſilly and ridiculous: and to puniſh all others, but leave ſome one man at liberty to commit all ſort of impieties without fear of puniſhment, is moſt unjuſt; the law being general, and not making any exception; neither of which can be ſuppoſed to hold place in the conſtitutions of any wiſe lawmaker, much leſs in thoſe of God's own making. But that all may perceive how unable you are to prove out of the writings of the Jews, what you undertook in this chapter to make appear by them, you confeſs of your own accord, That "there are ſome rabbins, who affirm that their forefathers ought not to have had any other king than God himſelf; and that he ſet other kings over them for their puniſhment." And of thoſe men's opinion I declare myſelf to be. It is not fitting or decent, that any man ſhould be a king, that does not far excel all his ſubjects. But where men are equals, as in all governments very many are, they ought to have an equal intereſt in the government, and hold it by turns. But that all men ſhould be ſlaves to one that is their equal, or (as it happens moſt commonly) far inferiour to them, and very often a fool, who can ſo much as entertain ſuch a thought without indignation? Nor does "it make for the honour of a kingly government, that our Saviour was of the poſterity of ſome kings," more than it does for the commendation of the worſt of kings, that he was the offspring of ſome of them too. "The Meſſias is a king." We acknowledge him ſo to be, and rejoice that he is ſo; and pray that his kingdom may come, for he is worthy: nor is there any other equal, or next to him. And yet a kingly government being

ing put into the hands of unworthy and undeſerving
rſons, as moſt commonly it is, may well be thought to
ve done more harm than good to mankind. Nor
es it follow for all this that all kings, as ſuch, are
rants. But ſuppoſe it did, as for argument-ſake I will
low it does, leſt you ſhould think I am too hard with
; make you the beſt uſe of it you can. "Then, ſay
u, God himſelf may properly be ſaid to be the king of
rants, nay, himſelf, the worſt of all tyrants." If the
ſt of theſe concluſions does not follow, another does,
hich may be drawn from moſt parts of your book, viz.
hat you perpetually contradict, not only the ſcriptures,
t your own ſelf. For in the very laſt foregoing period
u had affirmed, that "God was the king of all things,
ving himſelf created them." Now he created tyrants
d devils, and conſequently, by your own reaſon, is the
ng of ſuch. The ſecond of theſe concluſions we deteſt,
d wiſh that blaſphemous mouth of yours were ſtopped
, with which you affirm God to be the worſt of tyrants,
he be, as you often ſay he is, the king and lord of
ch. Nor do you much advantage your cauſe by telling
, that "Moſes was a king, and had the abſolute and
preme power of a king." For we could be content
at any other were ſo, that could "refer our matters to
od, as Moſes did, and conſult with him about our
airs," Exod. xviii. 19. But neither did Moſes, not-
ithſtanding his great familiarity with God, ever aſſume
liberty of doing what he would himſelf. What ſays he
f himſelf; "the people come unto me to inquire of
od." They came not then to receive Moſes's own
ictates and commands. Then ſays Jethro, ver. 19.
Be thou for the people to Godward, that thou mayſt
ring their cauſes unto God." And Moſes himſelf ſays,
eut. iv. 5. "I have taught you ſtatutes and judgments,
ven as the Lord my God commanded me." Hence it
that he is ſaid to have been "faithful in all the houſe
f God." Numb. xii. 7. So that the Lord Jehovah
imſelf was the people's king, and Moſes no other than as
were an interpreter or a meſſenger betwixt him and
em. Nor can you, without impiety and ſacrilege,
ansfer this abſolute ſupreme power and authority, from
God

God to a man; (not having any warrant from the word of God ſo to do) which Moſes uſed only as a deputy or ſubſtitute to God; under whoſe eye, and in whoſe preſence, himſelf and the people always were. But now, for an aggravation of your wickedneſs, though here you make Moſes to have exerciſed an abſolute and unlimited power in your "Apparat. ad Primat." page 230, you ſay, that "he, together with the ſeventy elders, ruled the people, and that himſelf was the chief of the people, but not their maſter." If Moſes therefore were a king, as certainly he was, and the beſt of kings, and had a ſupreme and legal power, as you ſay he had, and yet neither was the people's maſter nor governed them alone; then, according to you, kings, though indued with the ſupreme power, are not by virtue of that ſovereign and kingly right of theirs lords over the people, nor ought to govern them alone; much leſs, according to their own will and pleaſure. After all this, you have the impudence to feign a command from God to that people, "to ſet up a king over them, as ſoon as they ſhould be poſſeſſed of the Holy land," Deut. xvii. For you craftily leave out the former words, "and ſhalt ſay, I will ſet a king over me," &c. And now call to mind what you ſaid before, page 42, and what I ſaid I ſhould have occaſion to make uſe of, viz. "That the power was then in the people, and that they were entirely free." What follows, argues you either mad or irreligious; take whether you liſt: "God," ſay you, "having ſo long before appointed a kingly government, as beſt and moſt proper for that people; What ſhall we ſay to Samuel's oppoſing it, and God's own acting, as if himſelf were againſt it? How do theſe things agree?" He finds himſelf caught; and obſerve now with how great malice againſt the prophet, and impiety againſt God, he endeavours to diſentangle himſelf. "We muſt conſider," ſays he, "that Samuel's own ſons then judged the people, and the people rejected them becauſe of their corruption; now Samuel was loth his ſons ſhould be laid aſide, and God, to gratify the prophet, intimated to him, as if himſelf were not very well pleaſed with it." Speak out, ye wretch, and never mince the matter; you mean, God dealt deceitfully with Samuel, and he with

with the people. It is not your advocate, but yourſelf that are "frantic and diſtracted;" who caſt off all reverence to God Almighty, ſo you may but ſeem to honour the king. Would Samuel prefer the intereſt of his ſons, and their ambition, and their covetouſneſs, before the general good of all the people, when they aſked a thing that would be good and profitable for them? Can we think, that he would impoſe upon them by cunning and ſubtilty, and make them believe things that were not? Or if we ſhould ſuppoſe all this true of Samuel, would God himſelf countenance and gratify him in it; would he diſſemble with the people? So that either that was not the right of kings, which Samuel taught the people; or elſe that right, by the teſtimony both of God and the prophet, was an evil thing, was burdenſome, injurious, unprofitable, and chargeable to the commonwealth: or laſtly, (which muſt not be admitted) God and the prophet deceived the people. God frequently proteſts, that he was extremely diſpleaſed with them for aſking a king. V. 7th. "They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I ſhould not reign over them." As if it were a kind of idolatry to ask a king that would even ſuffer himſelf to be adored, and aſſume almoſt divine honour to himſelf. And certainly, they that ſubject themſelves to a worldly maſter, and ſet him above all laws, come but a little ſhort of chooſing a ſtrange God: and a ſtrange one it commonly is; brutiſh, and void of all ſenſe and reaſon. So 1ſt of Sam. chap. 10th, v. 19th, "And ye have this day rejected your God, who himſelf ſaved you out of all your adverſities and your tribulation, and ye have ſaid unto him, nay, but ſet a king over us; &c." and chap. 12th, v. 12th, "Ye ſaid unto me, nay, but a king ſhall reign over us; when the Lord your God was your king:" and v. the 17th, "See that your wickedneſs is great, that ye have done in the ſight of the Lord, in aſking you a king." And Hoſea ſpeaks contemptibly of the king, chap. xiii. v. 10, 11. "I will be thy king; where is any other that may ſave in all thy cities, and thy judges of whom thou ſaidſt, give me a king, and princes? I gave thee a king in mine anger, and took him away in my wrath." And Gideon, that warlike judge, that was greater

greater than a king; "I will not rule over you," ſays he, "neither ſhall my ſon rule over you; the Lord ſhall rule over you," Judges, chap. viii. Intimating thereby, that it is not fit for a man, but for God only, to exerciſe dominion over men. And hence Joſephus in his book againſt Appion, an Egyptian Grammarian, and a foul-mouthed fellow, like you, calls the commonwealth of the Hebrews a Theocracy, becauſe the principality was in God only. In Iſaiah, chap. xxvi. v. 13. the people in their repentance, complain that it had been miſchievous to them, "that other lords beſides God himſelf, had had dominion over them." All which places prove clearly, that God gave the Iſraelites a king in his anger; but now who can forbear laughing at the uſe you make of Abimelech's ſtory? Of whom it is ſaid, when he was killed, partly by a woman that hurled a piece of milſtone upon him, and partly by his own armour-bearer, that "God rendered the wickedneſs of Abimelech." "This hiſtory," ſay you, "proves ſtrongly, that God only is the judge and avenger of kings." Yea, if this argument hold, he is the only judge and puniſher of tyrants, villanous raſcals, and baſtards. Whoever can get into the ſaddle, whether by right or by wrong, has thereby obtained a ſovereign kingly right over the people, is out of all danger of puniſhment, all inferiour magiſtrates muſt lay down their arms at his feet, the people muſt not dare to mutter. But what if ſome great notorious robber had periſhed in war, as Abimelech did, would any man infer from thence, that God only is the judge and puniſher of highwaymen? Or what if Abimelech had been condemned by the law, and died by an executioner's hand, would not God then have rendered his wickedneſs? You never read, that the judges of the children of Iſrael were ever proceeded againſt according to law: and yet you confeſs, that "where the government is an ariſtocracy, the prince, if there be any, may and ought to be called in queſtion, if he break the laws." This in your 47th page. And why may not a tyrant as well be proceeded againſt in a kingly government? why, becauſe God rendered the wickedneſs of Abimelech. So did the woman, and ſo did his own armour-bearer; over both which he pretended to a right

a right of ſovereignty. And what if the magiſtrates had rendered his wickedneſs? Do not they bear the ſword for that very purpoſe, for the puniſhment of malefactors? Having done with his powerful argument from the hiſtory of Abimelech's death, he betakes himſelf, as his cuſtom is, to ſlanders and calumnies; nothing but dirt and filth comes from him; but for thoſe things that he promiſed to make appear, he hath not proved any one of them, either from the ſcriptures or from the writings of the rabbins. He alleges no reaſon why kings ſhould be above all laws, and they only of all mortal men exempt from puniſhment, if they deſerve it. He falls foul upon thoſe very authors and authorities that he makes uſe of, and by his own diſcourſe demonſtrates the truth of the opinion that he argues againſt. And perceiving, that he is like to do but little good with his arguments, he endeavours to bring an odium upon us, by loading us with ſlanderous accuſations, as having put to death the moſt virtuous innocent prince that ever reigned. "Was king Solomon, ſays he, better than king Charles the Firſt?" I confeſs ſome have ventured to compare his father king James with Solomon; nay, to make king James the better gentleman of the two. Solomon was David's ſon, David had been Saul's muſician; but king James was the ſon of the earl of Darnly, who, as Buchanan tells us, becauſe David the muſician got into the queen's bedchamber at an unſeaſonable time, killed him a little after; for he could not get to him then, becauſe he had bolted the door on the inſide. So that king James being the ſon of an earl, was the better gentlemen; and was frequently called a ſecond Solomon, though it is not very certain, that himſelf was not the ſon of David the muſician too. But how could it ever come into your head, to make a compariſon between king Charles and Solomon? For that very king Charles whom you praiſe thus to the ſky, that very man's obſtinacy, and covetouſneſs, and cruelty, his hard uſage of all good and honeſt men, the wars that he raiſed, the ſpoilings, and plunderings, and conflagrations, that he occaſioned, and the death of innumerable of his ſubjects, that he was the cauſe of, does his ſon Charles, at this very time, whilſt I am a writing, con-

ſuſe

feſs and bewail on the ſtool of repentance in Scotland, and renounces there that kingly right that you aſſert. But ſince you delight in parallels, let us compare king Charles and king Solomon together a little: "Solomon began his reign with the death of his brother," who had juſtly deſerved it; king Charles began his with his father's funeral, I do not ſay with his murder: and yet all the marks and tokens of poiſon that may be appeared in his dead body; but that ſuſpicion lighted upon the duke of Buckingham only, whom the king notwithſtanding cleared to the parliament, though he had killed the king and his father; and not only ſo but he diſſolved the parliament, leſt the matter ſhould be inquired into. "Solomon oppreſſed the people with heavy taxes;" but he ſpent that money upon the temple of God, and in raiſing other public buildings: King Charles ſpent his in extravagances. Solomon was enticed to idolatry by many wives: this man by one. Solomon, though he were ſeduced himſelf, we read not that he ſeduced others; but king Charles ſeduced and enticed others, not only by large and ample rewards to corrupt the church, but by his edicts and eccleſiaſtical conſtitutions he compelled them to ſet up altars, which all proteſtants abhor, and to bow down to crucifixes painted over them on the wall. "But yet for all this, Solomon was not condemned to die." Nor does it follow becauſe he was not, that therefore he ought not to have been. Perhaps there were many circumſtances, that made it then not expedient. But not long after the people both by words and actions made appear what they took to be their right, when ten tribes of twelve revolted from his ſon; and if he had not ſaved himſelf by flight, it is very likely they would have ſtoned him, notwithſtanding his threats and big ſwelling words.

CHAP. III.

HAVING proved ſufficiently, that the kings of the Jews were ſubject to the ſame laws that the people were; that there are no exceptions made in their favour in ſcripture; that it is a moſt falſe aſſertion grounded upon no reaſon, nor warranted by any authority to ſay, that kings may do what they liſt with impunity; that God has exempted them from all human juriſdiction, and reſerved them to his own tribunal only: let us now conſider, whether the goſpel preach up any ſuch doctrine, and enjoin that blind obedience, which the law was ſo far from doing, that it commanded the contrary; let us conſider, whether or no the goſpel, that heavenly promulgation, as it were, of chriſtian liberty, reduce us to a condition of ſlavery to kings and tyrants, from whoſe imperious rule even the old law, that miſtreſs of ſlavery, diſcharged the people of God, when it obtained. Your firſt argument you take from the perſon of Chriſt himſelf. But, alas! who does not know, that he put himſelf into the condition, not of a private perſon only, but even of a ſervant, that we might be made free? Nor is this to be underſtood of ſome internal ſpiritual liberty only; how inconſiſtent elſe would that ſong of his mother's be with the deſign of his coming into the world, "He hath ſcattered the proud in the imagination of their heart, he hath put down the mighty from their ſeat, and hath exalted the humble and meek?" How ill ſuited to their occaſion would theſe expreſſions be, if the coming of Chriſt rather eſtabliſhed and ſtrengthened a tyrannical government, and made a blind ſubjection the duty of all chriſtians? He himſelf having been born, and lived and died under a tyrannical government, has thereby purchaſed liberty for us. As he gives us his grace to ſubmit patiently to a condition of ſlavery, if there be a neceſſity of it; ſo if by any honeſt ways and means we can rid ourſelves, and obtain our liberty, he is ſo far from reſtraining us, that he encourages us ſo to do. Hence it is that St. Paul not only of an evangelical, but

alſo of a civil liberty, ſays thus, 1 Cor. vii. 21. "Art thou called, being a ſervant? care not for it; but if thou mayſt be made free, uſe it rather; you are bought with a price, be not ye ſervants of men." So that you are very impertinent in endeavouring to argue us into ſlavery by the example of our Saviour; who, by ſubmitting to ſuch a condition himſelf, has confirmed even our civil liberties. He took upon him indeed in our ſtead the form of a ſervant, but he always retained his purpoſe of being a deliverer; and thence it was, that he taught us a quite other notion of the right of kings, than this that you endeavour to make good. You, I ſay, that preach up not kingſhip, but tyranny, and that in a commonwealth; by enjoining not only a neceſſary, but a religious ſubjection to whatever tyrant gets into the chair, whether he come to it by ſucceſſion, or by conqueſt, or chance, or any how. And now I will turn your own weapons againſt you; and oppoſe you, as I uſe to do, with your own authorities. When the collectors of the tribute money came to Chriſt for tribute in Galilee, he aſked Peter, Mat. 17. "Of whom the kings of the earth took cuſtom or tribute, of their own children, or of ſtrangers?" Peter ſaith unto him, "of ſtrangers;" Jeſus ſaith unto him, "then are the children free; notwithſtanding leſt we ſhould offend them, &c. give unto them for thee and for me." Expoſitors differ upon this place, whom this tribute was paid to; ſome ſay it was paid to the prieſts, for the uſe of the ſanctuary; others that it was paid to the emperor. I am of opinion, that it was the revenue of the ſanctuary, but paid to Herod, who perverted the inſtitution of it, and took it to himſelf. Joſephus mentions divers ſorts of tribute, which he and his ſons exacted, all which Agrippa afterwards remitted. And this very tribute, though ſmall in itſelf, yet being accompanied with many more, was a heavy burden. The Jews, even the pooreſt of them in the time of their commonwealth, paid a poll; ſo that it was ſome conſiderable oppreſſion that our Saviour ſpoke of: and from hence he took occaſion to tax Herod's injuſtice (under whoſe government, and within whoſe juriſdiction he then was) in that, whereas the kings of the earth, who affect uſually the title of fathers

of

of their country, do not uſe to oppreſs their own children, that is, their own natural-born ſubjects, with heavy and unreaſonable exactions, but lay ſuch burdens upon ſtrangers and conquered enemies; he, quite contrary, oppreſſed not ſtrangers, but his own people. But let what will be here meant by children, either natural-born ſubjects, or the children of God, and thoſe of the elect only, or chriſtians in general, as St. Auguſtine underſtands the place; this is certain, that if Peter was a child, and therefore free, then by conſequence we are ſo too, by our Saviour's own teſtimony, either as Engliſhmen, or as chriſtians, and that it therefore is not the right of kings to exact heavy tributes from their own countrymen, and thoſe freeborn ſubjects. Chriſt himſelf profeſſes, that he paid not this tribute as a thing that was due, but that he might not bring trouble upon himſelf by offending thoſe that demanded it. The work that he came into this world to do, was quite of another nature. But if our Saviour deny, that it is the right of kings to burden their freeborn ſubjects with grievous exactions; he would certainly much leſs allow it to be their right to ſpoil, maſſacre, and torture their own countrymen, and thoſe chriſtians too. He diſcourſed after ſuch a manner of the right of kings, that thoſe to whom he ſpoke ſuſpected his principles as laying too great a reſtraint upon ſovereignty, and not allowing the licenſe that tyrants aſſume to themſelves to be the rights of kings. It was not for nothing, that the Phariſees put ſuch queſtions to him, tempting him; and that at the ſame time they told him, that he regarded not the perſon of any man: nor was it for nothing, that he was angry when ſuch queſtions were propoſed to him, Matth. xxii. If one ſhould endeavour to enſnare you with little queſtions, and catch at your anſwers, to ground an accuſation againſt you upon your own principles concerning the right of kings, and all this under a monarchy, would you be angry with him? You would have but very little reaſon. It is evident, that our Saviour's principles concerning government were not agreeable to the humour of princes. His anſwer too implies as much; by which he rather turned them away, than inſtructed them. He aſked for the tribute-money. "Whoſe image and

ſuperſcription is it?" ſays he. They tell him it was Cæſar's. "Give then to Cæſar," ſays he, "the things that are Cæſar's; and to God, the things that are God's." And how comes it to paſs, that the people ſhould not have given to them the things that are theirs? "Render to all men their dues," ſays St. Paul, Rom. xiii. So that Cæſar muſt not engroſs all to himſelf. Our liberty is not Cæſar's; it is a bleſſing we have received from God himſelf; it is what we are born to; to lay this down at Cæſar's feet, which we derive not from him, which we are not beholden to him for, were an unworthy action, and a degrading of our very nature. If one ſhould conſider attentively the countenance of a man, and inquire after whoſe image ſo noble a creature were framed; would not any one that heard him preſently make anſwer, That he was made after the image of God himſelf? Being therefore peculiarly God's own, and conſequently things that are to be given to him, we are entirely free by nature, and cannot without the greateſt ſacrilege imaginable be reduced into a condition of ſlavery to any man, eſpecially to a wicked, unjuſt, cruel tyrant. Our Saviour does not take upon him to determine what things are God's, and what Cæſar's; he leaves that as he found it. If the piece of money, which they ſhowed him, was the ſame that was paid to God, as in Veſpaſian's time it was; then our Saviour is ſo far from having put an end to the controverſy, that he has but entangled it, and made it more perplexed than it was before: for it is impoſſible the ſame thing ſhould be given both to God, and to Cæſar. But, you ſay, he intimates to them what things were Cæſar's; to wit, that piece of money, becauſe it bore the emperor's ſtamp; and what of all that? How does this advantage your cauſe? You get not the emperor, or yourſelf, a penny by this concluſion. Either Chriſt allowed nothing at all to be Cæſar's, but that piece of money that he then had in his hand, and thereby aſſerted the people's intereſt in every thing elſe; or elſe, if (as you would have us underſtand him) he affirms all money that has the emperor's ſtamp upon it, to be the emperor's own, he contradicts himſelf, and indeed gives the magiſtrate a property in every man's eſtate, whenas he himſelf

ſelf paid his tribute-money with a proteſtation, that it was more than what either Peter or he were bound to do. The ground you rely on is very weak; for money bears the prince's image, not as a token of its being his, but of its being good metal, and that none may preſume to counterfeit it. If the writing princes names, or ſetting their ſtamps upon a thing, veſt the property of it in them, it were a good ready way for them to invade all property. Or rather, if whatever ſubjects have been abſolutely at their prince's diſpoſal, which is your aſſertion, that piece of money was not Cæſar's, becauſe his image was ſtamped on it, but becauſe of right it belonged to him before it was coined. So that nothing can be more manifeſt, than that our Saviour in this place never intended to teach us our duty to magiſtrates (he would have ſpoken more plainly, if he had) but to reprehend the malice and wickedneſs of the hypocritical Phariſees. When they told him, that Herod laid wait to kill him; did he return an humble, ſubmiſſive anſwer? "Go, tell that fox," ſays he, &c. intimating, that kings have no other right to deſtroy their ſubjects, than foxes have to devour the things they prey upon. Say you, "he ſuffered death under a tyrant." How could he poſſibly under any other? But from hence you conclude, that he aſſerted it to be the right of kings to commit murder and act injuſtice. You would make an excellent moraliſt. But our Saviour, though he became a ſervant, not to make us ſo, but that we might be free; yet carried he himſelf ſo with relation to the magiſtracy, as not to aſcribe any more to them than their due. Now, let us come at laſt to inquire what his doctrine was upon this ſubject. The ſons of Zebedee were ambitious of honour and power in the kingdom of Chriſt, which they perſuaded themſelves he would ſhortly ſet up in the world; he reproves them ſo, as withal to let all Chriſtians know what form of civil government he deſires they ſhould ſettle amongſt themſelves. "Ye know," ſays he, "that the princes of the Gentiles exerciſe dominion over them; and they that are great exerciſe authority upon them: but it ſhall not be ſo among you; but whoſoever will be great among you, let him be your miniſter; and whoſoever

will be chief among you, let him be your ſervant." Unleſs you had been diſtracted, you could never have imagined, that this place makes for you: and yet you urge it, and think it furniſhes you with an argument to prove, that our kings are abſolute lords and maſters over us and ours. May it be our fortune to have to do with ſuch enemies in war, as will fall blindfold and naked into our camp inſtead of their own: as you conſtantly do, who allege that for yourſelf, that of all things in the world makes moſt againſt you. The Iſraelites aſked God for a king, ſuch a king as other nations round about them had. God diſſauded them by many arguments, whereof our Saviour here gives us an epitome; "You know that the princes of the Gentiles exerciſe dominion over them." But yet, becauſe the Iſraelites perſiſted in their deſire of a king, God gave them one, though in his wrath. Our Saviour, leſt Chriſtians ſhould deſire a king, ſuch a one at leaſt as might rule, as he ſays the princes of the Gentiles did, prevents them with an injunction to the contrary; "but it ſhall not be ſo among you." What can be ſaid plainer than this? That ſtately, imperious ſway and dominion, that kings uſe to exerciſe, ſhall not be amongſt you; what ſpecious titles ſoever they may aſſume to themſelves, as that of benefactors; or the like. "But he that will be great amongſt you" (and who is greater than the prince?) "let him be your ſervant." So that the lawyer, whoever he be, that you are ſo ſmart upon, was not ſo much out of the way, but had our Saviour's own authority to back him, when he ſaid that Chriſtian princes were indeed no other than the people's ſervants; it is very certain that all good magiſtrates are ſo. Inſomuch that chriſtians either muſt have no king at all, or if they have, that king muſt be the people's ſervant. Abſolute lordſhip and chriſtianity are inconſiſtent. Moſes himſelf, by whoſe miniſtry that ſervile œconomy of the old law was inſtituted, did not exerciſe an arbitrary, haughty power and authority, but bore the burden of the people, and carried them in his boſom, as a nurſing father does a ſucking child, Numb. xi. and what is that of a nurſing father but a miniſterial employment? Plato would not have the magiſtrates called lords,

lords, but ſervants and helpers of the people; nor the people ſervants, but maintainers of their magiſtrates, becauſe they give meat, drink, and wages to their kings themſelves. Ariſtotle calls the magiſtrates, keepers and miniſters of the laws. Plato, miniſters and ſervants. The apoſtle calls them miniſters of God; but they are miniſters and ſervants of the people, and of the laws, nevertheleſs for all that; the laws and the magiſtrates were both created for the good of the people: and yet this is it, that you call "the opinion of the fanatic maſtiffs in England." I ſhould not have thought the people of England were maſtiff dogs, if ſuch a mongrel cur as thou art did not bark at them ſo curriſhly. The maſter, if it ſhall pleaſe ye, of St. Lupus*, complains it ſeems, that the maſtiffs are mad (fanatics). Germanus heretofore, whoſe colleague that Lupus of Triers was, depoſed our inceſtuous king Vortigern by his own authority. And therefore St. Lupus deſpiſes thee, the maſter not of a Holy Wolf, but of ſome hunger-ſtarved thieving little wolf or other, as being more contemptible than that maſter of vipers, of whom Martial makes mention, who haſt by relation a barking ſhe-wolf at home too, that domineers over thee moſt wretchedly; at whoſe inſtigations, as I am informed, thou haſt wrote this ſtuff. And therefore it is the leſs wonder, that thou ſhouldſt endeavour to obtrude an abſolute regal government upon others, who haſt been accuſtomed to bear a female rule ſo ſervilely at home thyſelf. Be therefore, in the name of God, the maſter of a wolf, leſt a ſhe-wolf be thy miſtreſs; be a wolf thyſelf, be a monſter made up of a man and a wolf; whatever thou art, the Engliſh maſtiffs will but make a laughing-ſtock of thee. But I am not now at leiſure to hunt for wolves, and will put an end therefore to this digreſſion. You that but a while ago wrote a book againſt all manner of ſuperiority in the church, now call St. Peter the prince of the apoſtles. How inconſtant you are in your principles! But what ſays Peter? "Submit yourſelves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord's ſake, whether it be to the king as ſupreme, or to

* Lupus in Latin ſignifies a wolf.

governours, as unto them that are ſent by him for the puniſhment of evildoers, and the praiſe of them that do well: for ſo is the will of God," &c. This epiſtle Peter wrote, not only to private perſons, but thoſe ſtrangers ſcattered and diſperſed through Aſia; who, in thoſe places where they ſojourned, had no other right, than what the laws of hoſpitality entitled them to. Do you think ſuch men's caſe to be the ſame with that of natives, freeborn ſubjects, nobility, ſenates, aſſemblies of eſtates, parliaments? nay, is not the caſe far different of private perſons, though in their own country; and ſenators, or magiſtrates, without whom kings themſelves cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt? But let us ſuppoſe, that St. Peter had directed his epiſtle to the natural-born ſubjects, and thoſe not private perſons neither; ſuppoſe he had writ to the ſenate of Rome; what then? No law that is grounded upon a reaſon, expreſsly ſet down in the law itſelf, obligeth further than the reaſon of it extends. "Be ſubject," ſays he, ὑποταγητε: that is, according to the genuine ſenſe and import of the word, "be ſubordinate, or legally ſubject." For the law, Ariſtotle ſays, is order. "Submit for the Lord's ſake." Why ſo? Becauſe a king is an officer "appointed by God for the puniſhment of evildoers, and the praiſe of them that do well; for ſo is the will of God:" to wit, that we ſhould ſubmit and yield obedience to ſuch as are here deſcribed. There is not a word ſpoken of any other. You ſee the ground of this precept, and how well it is laid. The apoſtle adds in the 16th verſe, as free; therefore not as ſlaves. What now? if princes pervert the deſign of magiſtracy, and uſe the power, that is put into their hands, to the ruin and deſtruction of good men, and the praiſe and encouragement of evil doers; muſt we all be condemned to perpetual ſlavery, not private perſons only, but our nobility, all our inferiour magiſtrates, our very parliament itſelf? Is not temporal government called a human ordinance? How comes it to paſs then, that mankind ſhould have power to appoint and conſtitute what may be good and profitable for one another; and want power to reſtrain or ſuppreſs things that are univerſally miſchievous and deſtructive? That prince, you ſay, to whom St. Peter enjoins

ſubjection,

ſubjection, was Nero the tyrant: and from thence you infer, that it is our duty to ſubmit and yield obedience to ſuch. But it is not certain, that this epiſtle was writ in Nero's reign: it is as likely to have been writ in Claudius's time. And they that are commanded to ſubmit, were private perſons and ſtrangers; they were no conſuls, no magiſtrates: it was not the Roman ſenate, that St. Peter directed his epiſtle to. Now let us hear what uſe you make of St. Paul (for you take a freedom with the apoſtles, I find, that you will not allow us to take with princes; you make St. Peter the chief of them to-day, and to-morrow put another in his place). St. Paul in his 13th chap. to the Romans, has theſe words: "Let every ſoul be ſubject unto the higher powers, for there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God." I confeſs he writes this to the Romans, not to ſtrangers diſperſed, as Peter did; but however he writes to private perſons, and thoſe of the meaner rank; and yet he gives us a true and clear account of the reaſon, the original, and the deſign of government; and ſhows us the true and proper ground of our obedience, that it is far from impoſing a neceſſity upon us of being ſlaves. "Let every ſoul, ſays he; that is, let every man ſubmit." Chryſoſtom tells us, "that St. Paul's deſign in this diſcourſe, was to make it appear, that our Saviour did not go about to introduce principles inconſiſtent with the civil government, but ſuch as ſtrengthened it, and ſettled it upon the ſureſt foundations." He never intended then by ſetting Nero or any other tyrant out of the reach of all laws, to enſlave mankind under his luſt and cruelty. "He intended too, (ſays the ſame author) to diſſuade from unneceſſary and cauſeleſs wars." But he does not condemn a war taken up againſt a tyrant, a boſom enemy of his own country, and conſequently the moſt dangerous that may be. "It was commonly ſaid in thoſe days, that the doctrine of the Apoſtles was ſeditious, themſelves perſons that endeavoured to ſhake the ſettled laws and government of the world; that this was what they aimed at in all they ſaid and did." The Apoſtle in this chapter ſtops the mouths of ſuch gainſayers: ſo that the Apoſtles did not write in defence of tyrants as you do; but they aſſerted ſuch things

things as made them ſuſpected to be enemies to the government they lived under, things that ſtood in need of being explained and interpreted, and having another ſenſe put upon them than was generally received. St. Chryſoſtom has now taught us what the Apoſtle's deſign was in this diſcourſe; let us now examine his words: "Let every ſoul be ſubject to the higher powers." He tells us not what thoſe higher powers are, nor who they are; for he never intended to overthrow all governments, and the ſeveral conſtitutions of nations, and ſubject all to ſome one man's will. Every good emperor acknowledged, that the laws of the empire, and the authority of the ſenate was above himſelf; and the ſame principle and notion of government has obtained all along in civilized nations. Pindar, as he is cited by Herodotus, calls the law πάντων βασιλέα, king over all. Orpheus in his hymns calls it the king both of Gods and men: and he gives the reaſon why it is ſo; becauſe, ſays he, it is that that ſits at the helm of all human affairs. Plato in his book de Legibus, calls it τὸ κρατῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει: that that ought to have the greateſt ſway in the commonwealth. In his epiſtles he commends that form of government, in which the law is made lord and maſter, and no ſcope given to any man to tyrannize over the laws. Ariſtotle is of the ſame opinion in his Politicks; and ſo is Cicero in his book de Legibus, that the laws ought to govern the magiſtrates, as they do the people. The law therefore having always been accounted the higheſt power on earth, by the judgment of the moſt learned and wiſe men that ever were, and by the conſtitutions of the beſt-ordered ſtates; and it being very certain, that the doctrine of the goſpel is neither contrary to reaſon, nor the law of nations, that man is truly and properly ſubject to the higher powers, who obeys the law and the magiſtrates, ſo far as they govern according to law: So that St. Paul does not only command the people, but princes themſelves to be in ſubjection; who are not above the laws, but bound by them, "for there is no power but of God:" that is, no form, no lawful conſtitution of any government. The moſt ancient laws that are known to us were formerly aſcribed to God as their author. For the law, ſays

Cicero in his Philippics, is no other than a rule of well grounded reaſon, derived from God himſelf, enjoining whatever is juſt and right, and forbidding the contrary. So that the inſtitution of magiſtracy is Jure Divino, and the end of it is, that mankind might live under certain laws, and be governed by them. But what particular form of government each nation would live under, and what perſons ſhould be intruſted with the magiſtracy, without doubt, was left to the choice of each nation. Hence St. Peter calls kings and deputies, human ordinances. And Hoſea, in the 8th chapter of his prophecy, "they have ſet up kings, but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not." For in the commonwealth of the Hebrews, where, upon matters of great and weighty importance, they could have acceſs to God himſelf, and conſult with him, they could not chooſe a king themſelves by law, but were to refer the matter to him. Other nations have received no ſuch command. Sometimes the very form of government, if it be amiſs, or at leaſt thoſe perſons that have the power in their hands, are not of God, but of men, or of the devil, Luke iv. "All this power will I give unto thee, for it is delivered unto me, and I give it to whom I will." Hence the devil is called the prince of this world; and in the 12th of the Revelations, the dragon gave to the beaſt his power, and his throne, and great authority. So that we muſt not underſtand St. Paul, as if he ſpoke of all ſorts of magiſtrates in general, but of lawful magiſtrates; and ſo they are deſcribed in what follows. We muſt alſo underſtand him of the powers themſelves; not of thoſe men, always, in whoſe hands they are lodged. St. Chryſoſtom ſpeaks very well and clearly upon this occaſion. "What?" ſays he, "is every prince then appointed by God to be ſo? I ſay no ſuch thing," ſays he. "St. Paul ſpeaks not of the perſon of the magiſtrate, but of the magiſtracy itſelf. He does not ſay, there is no prince but who is of God. He ſays there is no power but of God." Thus far St. Chryſoſtom; for what powers are, are ordained of God: ſo that Paul ſpeaks only of a lawful magiſtracy. For what is evil and amiſs cannot be ſaid to be ordained, becauſe it is diſorderly; order and diſorder

diſorder cannot conſiſt together in the ſame ſubject. The Apoſtle ſays, " the powers that be;" and you interpret his words as if he had ſaid, " the powers that now be;" that you may prove, that the Romans ought in conſcience to obey Nero, who you take for granted was then emperor. I am very well content you ſhould read the words ſo, and draw that concluſion from them. The conſequence will be, that Engliſhmen ought to yield obedience to the preſent government, as it is now eſtabliſhed according to a new model; becauſe you muſt needs acknowledge, that it is the preſent government, and ordained of God, as much at leaſt as Nero's was. And leſt you ſhould object, that Nero came to the empire by a lawful ſucceſſion, it is apparent from the Roman hiſtory, that both he and Tiberius got into the chair by the tricks and artifices of their mothers, and had no right at all to the ſucceſſion. So that you are inconſiſtent with yourſelf, and retract from your own principles, in affirming that the Romans owed ſubjection to the government that then was; and yet denying that Engliſhmen owe ſubjection to the government that now is. But it is no wonder, to hear you contradict yourſelf. There are no two things in the world more directly oppoſite and contrary to one another, than you are to yourſelf. But what will become of you, poor wretch? You have quite undone the young king with your witticiſms, and ruined his fortunes utterly; for according to your own doctrine you muſt needs confeſs, that this preſent government in England is ordained of God, and that all Engliſhmen are bound in conſcience to ſubmit to it. Take notice, all ye critics and textuaries; do not you preſume to meddle with this text. Thus Salmaſius corrects that paſſage in the epiſtle to the Romans: he has made a diſcovery, that the words ought not to be read, " the powers that are; but, the powers that now are:" and all this to prove, that all men owed ſubjection and obedience to Nero the tyrant, whom he ſuppoſed to have been then emperor. This Epiſtle, which you ſay was writ in Nero's time, was writ in his predeceſſor's time, who was an honeſt well-meaning man: and this learned men evince by undeniable arguments. But beſides,

ſides, the five firſt years of Nero's reign were without exception. So that this threadbare argument, which ſo many men have at their tongues end, and have been deceived by, to wit, that tyrants are to be obeyed, becauſe St. Paul enjoins a ſubjection to Nero, is evident to have been but a cunning invention of ſome ignorant parſon. He that reſiſts the powers, to wit, a lawful power, reſiſts the ordinance of God. Kings themſelves come under the penalty of this law, when they reſiſt the ſenate, and act contrary to the laws. But do they reſiſt the ordinance of God, that reſiſt an unlawful power, or a perſon that goes about to overthrow and deſtroy a lawful one? No man living in his right wits can maintain ſuch an aſſertion. The words immediately after make it as clear as the ſun, that the apoſtle ſpeaks only of a lawful power; for he gives us in them a definition of magiſtrates, and thereby explains to us who are the perſons thus authorized, and upon what account we are to yield obedience, leſt we ſhould be apt to miſtake and ground extravagant notions upon his diſcourſe. "The magiſtrates," ſays he, "are not a terrour to good works, but to evil: Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame: for he is the miniſter of God to thee for good. He beareth not the ſword in vain; for he is the miniſter of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." What honeſt man would not willingly ſubmit to ſuch a magiſtracy as is here deſcribed? And that not only to avoid wrath, and for fear of puniſhment, but for conſcience ſake. Without magiſtrates, and ſome form or other of civil government, no commonwealth, no human ſociety can ſubſiſt, there were no living in the world. But whatever power enables a man, or whatſoever magiſtrate takes upon him, to act contrary to what St. Paul makes the duty of thoſe that are in authority; neither is that power, nor that magiſtrate ordained of God. And conſequently to ſuch a magiſtracy no ſubjection is commanded, nor is any due, nor are the people forbidden to reſiſt ſuch authority; for in ſo doing they do not reſiſt the power, nor the magiſtracy, as they are here excellently well deſcribed; but they reſiſt a robber, a tyrant,

a tyrant, an enemy; who if he may notwithſtanding in ſome ſenſe be called a magiſtrate, upon this account only, becauſe he has power in his hands, which perhaps God may have inveſted him with for our puniſhment; by the ſame reaſon the devil may be called a magiſtrate. This is moſt certain, that there can be but one true definition of one and the ſame thing. So that if St. Paul in this place define what a magiſtrate is, which he certainly does, and that accurately well; he cannot poſſibly define a tyrant, the moſt contrary thing imaginable, in the ſame words. Hence I infer, that he commands us to ſubmit to ſuch magiſtrates only as he himſelf defines and deſcribes, and not to tyrants, which are quite other things. "For this cauſe you pay tribute alſo:" he gives a reaſon together with a command. Hence St. Chryſoſtom; "why do we pay tribute to princes? Do we not," adds he, "thereby reward them for the care they take of our ſafety? We ſhould not have paid them any tribute, if we had not been convinced, that it was good for us to live under a government." So that I muſt here repeat what I have ſaid already, that ſince ſubjection is not abſolutely enjoined, but on a particular reaſon, that reaſon muſt be the rule of our ſubjection: where that reaſon holds, we are rebels if we ſubmit not; where it holds not, we are cowards and ſlaves if we do. "But," ſay you, "the Engliſh are far from being freemen; for they are wicked and flagitious." I will not reckon up here the vices of the French, though they live under a kingly government; neither will I excuſe my own countrymen too far: but this I may ſafely ſay, whatever vices they have, they have learnt them under a kingly government; as the Iſraelites learnt a great deal of wickedneſs in Egypt. And as they, when they were brought into the wilderneſs, and lived under the immediate government of God himſelf, could hardly reform, juſt ſo it is with us. But there are good hopes of many amongſt us; that I may not here celebrate thoſe men who are eminent for their piety and virtue and love of the truth; of which ſort I perſuade myſelf we have as great a number, as where you think there are moſt ſuch. "But they have laid a heavy yoke upon the Engliſh nation:"

tion:" what if they have, upon thoſe of them that endeavoured to lay a heavy yoke upon all the reſt? Upon thoſe that have deſerved to be put under the hatches? As for the reſt, I queſtion not but they are very well content to be at the expenſe of maintaining their own liberty, the public treaſury being exhauſted by the civil wars. Now he betakes himſelf to the fabulous rabbins again: he aſſerts frequently, that kings are bound by no laws; and yet he proves, that according to the ſenſe of the rabbins, "a king may be guilty of treaſon, by ſuffering an invaſion upon the rights of his crown." So kings are bound by laws, and they are not bound by them; they may be criminals, and yet they may not be ſo. This man contradicts himſelf ſo perpetually, that contradiction and he ſeem to be of kin to one another. You ſay that God himſelf put many kingdoms under the yoke of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon. I confeſs he did ſo for a time, Jer. xxvii. 7. but do you make appear, if you can, that he put the Engliſh nation into a condition of ſlavery to Charles Stuart for a minute. I confeſs he ſuffered them to be enſlaved by him for ſome time; but I never yet heard, that himſelf appointed it ſo to be. Or if you will have it ſo, that God ſhall be ſaid to put a nation under ſlavery, when a tyrant prevails; why may he not as well be ſaid to deliver them from his tyranny, when the people prevail and get the upper hand? Shall his tyranny be ſaid to be of God, and not our liberty? There is no evil in the city, that the Lord hath not done, Amos iii. So that famine, peſtilence, ſedition, war, all of them are of God; and is it therefore unlawful for a people afflicted with any of theſe plagues, to endeavour to get rid of them? Certainly they would do their utmoſt, though they know them to be ſent by God, unleſs himſelf miraculouſly from heaven ſhould command the contrary: and why may they not by the ſame reaſon rid themſelves of a tyrant, if they are ſtronger than he? Why ſhould we ſuppoſe his weakneſs to be appointed by God for the ruin and deſtruction of the commonwealth, rather than the power and ſtrength of all the people for the good of the ſtate? Far be it from all commonwealths, from all ſocieties of freeborn men, to maintain not only

high

ſuch pernicious, but ſuch ſtupid and ſenſeleſs principles; principles that ſubvert all civil ſociety, that to gratify a few tyrants, level all mankind with brutes; and by ſetting princes out of the reach of human laws, give them an equal power over both. I paſs by thoſe fooliſh dilemmas that you now make, which that you might take occaſion to propoſe, you feign ſome or other to aſſert, that the "ſuperlative power of princes is derived from the people;" though for my own part I do not at all doubt, but that all the power that any magiſtrates have is ſo. Hence Cicero, in his Orat. pro Flacco, "Our wiſe and holy anceſtors," ſays he, "appointed thoſe things to obtain for laws, that the people enacted." And hence it is, that Lucius Craſſus, an excellent Roman orator, and at that time preſident of the ſenate, when in a controverſy betwixt them and the common people, he aſſerted their rights, "I beſeech you, ſays he, ſuffer not us to live in ſubjection to any, but yourſelves, to the entire body of whom we can and ought to ſubmit." For though the Roman ſenate governed the people, the people themſelves had appointed them to be their governors, and had put that power into their hands. We read the term of Majeſty more frequently applied to the people of Rome, than to their kings. Tully in Orat. pro Flancio, "it is the condition of all free people, (ſays he) and eſpecially of this people, the lord of all nations, by their votes to give or take away, to or from any, as themſelves ſee cauſe. It is the duty of the magiſtrates patiently to ſubmit to what the body of the people enact. Thoſe that are not ambitious of honour, have the leſs obligation upon them to court the people: thoſe that affect preferment, muſt not be weary of entreating them." Should I ſcruple to call a king the ſervant of his people, when I hear the Roman ſenate, that reigned over ſo many kings, profeſs themſelves to be but the people's ſervants? You will object perhaps, and ſay, that all this is very true in a popular ſtate; but the caſe was altered afterwards, when the regal law transferred all the people's right unto Auguſtus and his ſucceſſors. But what think you then of Tiberius, whom yourſelf confeſs to have been a very great tyrant, as he certainly was? Suetonius ſays of him, that

that when he was once called Lord or Maſter, though after the enacting of that Lex Regia, he deſired the perſon that gave him that appellation, to forbear abuſing him. How does this ſound in your ears? a tyrant thinks one of his ſubjects abuſes him in calling him Lord. The ſame emperor in one of his ſpeeches to the ſenate, "I have ſaid," ſays he, "frequently, heretofore, and now I ſay it again, that a good prince, whom you have inveſted with ſo great power as I am intruſted with, ought to ſerve the ſenate and the body of the people, and ſometimes even particular perſons; nor do I repent of having ſaid ſo: I confeſs that you have been good, and juſt, and indulgent maſters to me, and that you are yet ſo." You may ſay, that he diſſembled in all this, as he was a great proficient in the art of hypocriſy; but that is all one. No man endeavours to appear otherwiſe than he ought to be. Hence Tacitus tells us, that it was the cuſtom in Rome for the emperors in the Circus, to worſhip the people; and that both Nero and other emperors practiſed it. Claudian in his panegyric upon Honorius mentions the ſame cuſtom. By which ſort of adoration what could poſſibly be meant, but that the emperors of Rome, even after the enacting of the Lex Regia, confeſſed the whole body of the people to be their ſuperiours? But I find, as I ſuſpected at firſt, and ſo I told ye, that you have ſpent more time and pains in turning over gloſſaries, and criticiſing upon texts, and propagating ſuch-like laborious trifles, than in reading ſound authors ſo as to improve your knowledge by them. For had you been never ſo little verſed in the writings of learned men in former ages, you would not have accounted an opinion new, and the product of ſome enthuſiaſtic heads, which has been aſſerted and maintained by the greateſt philoſophers, and moſt famous politicians in the world. You endeavour to expoſe one Martin, who you tell us was a tailor, and one William a tanner; but if they are ſuch as you deſcribe them, I think they and you may very well go together; though they themſelves would be able to inſtruct you, and unfold thoſe myſterious riddles that you propoſe: as, "Whether or no they that in a monarchy would have the king but a ſervant to the commonwealth,

will ſay the ſame thing of the whole body of the people in a popular ſtate? And whether all the people ſerve in a democracy, or only ſome part or other ſerve the reſt?" And when they have been an Œdipus to you, by my conſent you ſhall be a ſphinx to them in good earneſt, and throw yourſelf headlong from ſome precipice or other, and break your neck; for elſe I am afraid you will never have done with your riddles and fooleries. You aſk, "Whether or no, when St. Paul names kings, he meant the people?" I confeſs St. Paul commands us to pray for kings, but he had commanded us to pray for the people before, ver. 1. But there are ſome for all that, both among kings and common people, that we are forbidden to pray for; and if a man may not ſo much as be prayed for, may he not be puniſhed? What ſhould hinder? But, "when Paul wrote this epiſtle, he that reigned was the moſt profligate perſon in the world." That is falſe. For Ludovicus Capellus makes it evident, that this epiſtle likewiſe was writ in Claudius's time. When St. Paul has occaſion to ſpeak of Nero, he calls him not a king, but a lion; that is, a wild, ſavage beaſt, from whoſe jaws he is glad he was delivered, 2 Tim. iv. So that it is for kings, not for beaſts, that we are to pray, that under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life, in all godlineſs, and honeſty. Kings and their intereſt are not the things here intended to be advanced and ſecured; it is the public peace, godlineſs and honeſty, whoſe eſtabliſhment we are commanded to endeavour after, and to pray for. But is there any people in the world, that would not chooſe rather to live an honeſt and careful life, though never free from war and troubles, in the defence of themſelves and their families, whether againſt tyrants or enemies (for I make no difference) than under the power of a tyrant or an enemy, to ſpin out a life equally troubleſome, accompanied with ſlavery and ignominy? That the latter is the more deſirable of the two, I will prove by a teſtimony of your own; not becauſe I think your authority worth quoting, but that all men may obſerve how double-tongued you are, and how mercenary your pen is. "Who would not rather," ſay you, "bear with thoſe diſſenſions, that through the emulation of great men

often happen in an ariſtocratical government, than live under the tyrannical government of one, where nothing but certain miſery and ruin is to be looked for? The people of Rome preferred their commonwealth, though never ſo much ſhattered with civil broils, before the intolerable yoke of their emperors. When a people, to avoid ſedition, ſubmits to a monarchy, and finds by experience, that this is the worſt evil of the two, they often deſire to return to their former government again." Theſe are your own words, and more you have to this purpoſe in that diſcourſe concerning biſhops, which under a feigned name you wrote againſt Petavius the Jeſuit; though yourſelf are more a Jeſuit than he, nay worſe than any of that crew. We have already heard the ſenſe of the ſcripture upon this ſubject; and it has been worth our while to take ſome pains to find it out. But perhaps it will not be ſo to inquire into the judgment of the fathers, and to ranſack their volumes: for if they aſſert any thing, which is not warranted by the word of God, we may ſafely reject their authority, be it never ſo great; and particularly that expreſſion that you allege out of Irenæus, "that God in his providence orders it ſo, that ſuch kings reign as are ſuitable to, and proper for the people they are to govern, all circumſtances conſidered." That expreſſion, I ſay, is directly contrary to ſcripture. For though God himſelf declared openly, that it was better for his own people to be governed by judges, than by kings, yet he left it to them to change that form of government for a worſe, if they would themſelves. And we read frequently, that when the body of the people has been good, they have had a wicked king, and contrariwiſe that a good king has ſometimes reigned, when the people have been wicked. So that wiſe and prudent men are to conſider and ſee what is profitable and fit for the people in general; for it is very certain, that the ſame form of government is not equally convenient for all nations, nor for the ſame nation at all times; but ſometimes one, ſometimes another may be more proper, according as the induſtry and valour of the people may increaſe or decay. But if you deprive the people of this liberty of ſetting up what government they

like beſt among themſelves, you take that from them, in which the life of all civil liberty conſiſts. Then you tell us of Juſtin Martyr, of his humble and ſubmiſſive behaviour to the Antonines, thoſe beſt of emperors; as if any body would not do the like to princes of ſuch moderation as they were. "How much worſe chriſtians are we in theſe days, than thoſe were? They were content to live under a prince of another religion." Alas! they were private perſons, and infinitely inferior to the contrary party in ſtrength and number. "But now papiſts will not endure a proteſtant prince, nor proteſtants one that is popiſh." You do well and diſcreetly in ſhowing yourſelf to be neither papiſt nor proteſtant. And you are very liberal in your conceſſions; for now you confeſs, that all ſorts of chriſtians agree in that very thing, that you alone take upon you with ſo much impudence and wickedneſs, to cry down and oppoſe. And how unlike thoſe fathers that you commend, do you ſhow yourſelf: they wrote apologies for the chriſtians to heathen princes; you in defence of a wicked popiſh king, againſt chriſtians and proteſtants. Then you entertain us with a number of impertinent quotations out of Athenagoras and Tertullian: things that we have already heard out of the writings of the apoſtles, much more clearly and intelligibly expreſt. But Tertullian was quite of a different opinion from yours, of a king's being a lord and maſter over his ſubjects: which you either knew not, or wickedly diſſembled. For he, though he were a chriſtian, and directed his diſcourſe to a heathen emperor, had the confidence to tell him, that an emperor ought not to be called Lord. "Auguſtus himſelf, ſays he, that formed this empire, refuſed that appellation: it is a title proper to God only. Not but that the title of Lord and Maſter may in ſome ſenſe be aſcribed to the emperor: but there is a peculiar ſenſe of that word, which is proper to God only; and in that ſenſe, I will not aſcribe it to the emperor. I am the emperor's freeman. God alone is my Lord and Maſter." And the ſame author, in the ſame diſcourſe; "how inconſiſtent," ſays he, "are thoſe two appellations, Father of his country, and Lord and Maſter?" And now I wiſh you much joy of Tertullian's authority,

authority, whom it had been a great deal better you had let alone. But Tertullian calls them parricides that ſlew Domitian. And he does well, for ſo they were, his wife and ſervants conſpired againſt him. And they ſet one Parthenius and Stephanus, who were accuſed for concealing part of the public treaſure, to make him away. If the ſenate and the people of Rome had proceeded againſt him according to the cuſtom of their anceſtors; had given judgment of death againſt him, as they did once againſt Nero; and had made ſearch for him to put him to death; do ye think Tertullian would have called them parricides? If he had, he would have deſerved to be hanged, as you do. I give the ſame anſwer to your quotation out of Origen, that I have given already to what you have cited out of Irenæus. Athanaſius indeed ſays, that kings are not accountable before human tribunals. But I wonder who told Athanaſius this! I do not hear, that he produces any authority from Scripture, to confirm this aſſertion. And I will rather believe kings and emperors themſelves, who deny that they themſelves have any ſuch privilege, than I will Athanaſius. Then you quote Ambroſius, who after he had been a proconſul, and after that became a catechumen, at laſt got into a biſhopric: but for his authority, I ſay, that his interpretation of thoſe words of David, "againſt thee only I have ſinned," is both ignorant and adulatory. He was willing all others ſhould be enthralled to the emperor, that he might enthral the emperor to himſelf. We all know with what a papal pride and arrogancy he treated Theodoſius the emperor, how he took upon him to declare him guilty of that maſſacre at Theſſalonica, and to forbid him coming into the church; how miſerably raw in divinity, and unacquainted with the doctrine of the goſpel, he ſhowed himſelf upon that occaſion; when the emperor fell down at his feet, he commanded him to get him out of the porch. At laſt, when he was received again into the communion of the church, and had offered, becauſe he continued ſtanding near to the altar, the magiſterial prelate commanded him out of the rails: "O Emperor," ſays he, "theſe inner places are for the prieſts only, it is not lawful for others to come

within them!" Does this ſound like the behaviour of a miniſter of the goſpel, or like that of a Jewiſh high prieſt? And yet this man, ſuch as we hear he was, would have the emperor ride other people, that himſelf might ride him, which is a common trick of almoſt all eccleſiaſtics. With words to this purpoſe, he put back the emperor as inferior to himſelf: "You rule over men," ſaith he, "that are partakers of the ſame nature, and fellow-ſervants with yourſelf: for there is one only Lord and King over all, to wit, the Creator of all." This is very pretty! This piece of truth, which the craft and flattery of clergymen has all along endeavoured to ſuppreſs and obſcure, was then brought to light by the furious paſſion, or to ſpeak more mildly, by the ignorant indiſcreet zeal of one of them. After you have diſplayed Ambroſe's ignorance, you ſhow your own, or rather, vent a hereſy in affirming pointblank, That "under the Old Teſtament, there was no ſuch thing as forgiveneſs of ſins upon the account of Chriſt's ſufferings, ſince David confeſſed his tranſgreſſion, ſaying, againſt thee only have I ſinned," Pſ. lviii. It is the orthodox tenet, that there never was any remiſſion of ſins, but by the blood of the Lamb that was ſlain from the beginning of the world. I know not whoſe diſciple you are, that ſet up for a broacher of new hereſies: but certain I am, that that great divine's diſciple, whom you are ſo angry with, did not miſtake himſelf, when he ſaid, that any one of David's ſubjects might have ſaid, "againſt thee only have I ſinned," as properly, and with as much right, as David himſelf. Then you quote St. Auſtin, and produce a company of Hipponenſian divines. What you allege out of St. Auſtin makes not at all againſt us. We confeſs that, as the prophet Daniel has it, it is God that changeth times, ſets up one kingdom, and pulls down another; we only deſire to have it allowed us, that he makes uſe of men as his inſtruments. If God alone gave a kingdom to king Charles, God alone has taken it from him again, and given it to the parliament, and to the people. If therefore our allegiance was due to king Charles, becauſe God had given him a kingdom; for the ſame reaſon it is now due to the preſent magiſtracy.

magiſtracy. For yourſelf confeſs, that God has given our magiſtrates ſuch power as he uſes to give to wicked princes, for the puniſhment of the nation. And the conſequence of this will be, that according to your own opinion, our preſent magiſtrates being raiſed and appointed by God, cannot lawfully be depoſed by any, but God himſelf. Thus you overthrow the opinion you pretend to maintain, which is a thing very frequent with you: your apology for the king carries its death's-wound in it. You have attained to ſuch a prodigious degree of madneſs and ſtupidity, as to prove it unlawful upon any account whatſoever, to lift up one's finger againſt magiſtrates, and with the very next breath to affirm, that it is the duty of their ſubjects to riſe up in rebellion againſt them. You tell us, that St. Jerom calls Iſhmael, that ſlew Gedaliah, a parricide or traitor: and it is very true, that he was ſo: for Gedaliah was deputy governor of Judæa, a good man, and ſlain by Iſhmael without any cauſe. The ſame author in his comment upon the book of Eccleſiaſtes, ſays, that Solomon's command to keep the king's commandment, is the ſame with St. Paul's doctrine upon the ſame ſubject; and deſerves commendation for having made a more moderate conſtruction of that text, than moſt of his contemporaries. You ſay, you will forbear inquiring into the ſentiments of learned men that lived ſince St. Auſtin's time: but to ſhow, that you had rather diſpenſe with a lie, than not quote any author that you think makes for you, in the very next period but one you produce the authorities of Iſidore, Gregory, and Otho, Spaniſh and Dutch authors, that lived in the moſt barbarous and ignorant ages of all; whoſe authorities, if you knew how much we deſpiſe, you would not have told a lie to have quoted them. But would you know the reaſon why he dares not come ſo low as to the preſent times? why he does as it were hide himſelf, and diſappear, when he comes towards our own times? The reaſon is, becauſe he knows full well, that as many eminent divines as there are of the reformed churches, ſo many adverſaries he would have to encounter. Let him take up the cudgels, if he thinks fit; he will quickly find himſelf run down with innumerable

authorities out of Luther, Zuinglius, Calvin, Bucer, Martyr, Paræus, and the reſt. I could oppoſe you with teſtimonies out of divines, that have flouriſhed even in Leyden. Though that famous univerſity and renowned commonwealth, which has been as it were a ſanctuary for liberty, thoſe fountains and ſtreams of all polite learning, have not yet been able to waſh away that ſlaviſh ruſt that ſticks to you, and infuſe a little humanity into you. Finding yourſelf deſtitute of any aſſiſtance or help from orthodox proteſtant divines, you have the impudence to betake yourſelf to the Sorboniſts, whoſe college you know is devoted to the Romiſh religion, and conſequently but of very weak authority amongſt proteſtants. We are willing to deliver ſo wicked an aſſertor of tyranny as you, to be drowned in the Sorbonne, as being aſhamed to own ſo deſpicable a ſlave as you ſhow yourſelf to be, by maintaining that the whole body of a nation is not equal in power to the moſt ſlothful degenerate prince that may be. You labour in vain to lay that upon the pope, which all free nations, and all orthodox divines own and aſſert. But the pope and his clergy, when they were in a low condition, and but of ſmall account in the world, were the firſt authors of this pernicious abſurd doctrine of yours; and when by preaching ſuch doctrine they had gotten power into their own hands, they became the worſt of tyrants themſelves. Yet they engaged all princes to them by the cloſeſt tie imaginable, perſuading the world, that was now beſotted with their ſuperſtition, that it was unlawful to depoſe princes, though never ſo bad, unleſs the pope diſpenſed with their allegiance to them, by abſolving them from their oaths. But you avoid orthodox writers, and endeavour to burden the truth with prejudice and calumny, by making the pope the firſt aſſertor of what is a known and common received opinion amongſt them; which if you did not do it cunningly, you would make yourſelf appear to be neither papiſt nor proteſtant, but a kind of mongrel Idumean Herodian. For as they of old adored one moſt inhuman bloody tyrant for the Meſſias, ſo you would have the world fall down and worſhip all. You boaſt, that "you have confirmed your opinion by the teſtimonies of the fathers

fathers that flouriſhed in the four firſt centuries; whoſe writings only are evangelical, and according to the truth of the chriſtian religion." This man is paſt all ſhame! how many things did they preach, how many things have they publiſhed, which Chriſt and his apoſtles never taught? How many things are there in their writings, in which all proteſtant divines differ from them? But what is that opinion that you have confirmed by their authorities? "Why, that evil princes are appointed by God." Allow that, as all other pernicious and deſtructive things are. What then? why, "that therefore they have no judge but God alone, that they are above all human laws; that there is no law, written or unwritten, no law of nature, nor of God, to call them to account before their own ſubjects." But how comes that to paſs? Certain I am that there is no law againſt it: no penal law excepts kings. And all reaſon and juſtice requires, that thoſe that offend, ſhould be puniſhed according to their deſerts, without reſpect of perſons. Nor have you hitherto produced any one law, either written or unwritten, of God or of nature, by which this is forbidden. What ſtands in the way then? Why may not kings be proceeded againſt? Why, "becauſe they are appointed by God, be they never ſo bad." I do not know whether I had beſt call you a knave, or a fool, or ignorant, unlearned barbarian. You ſhow yourſelf a vile wretch, by propagating a doctrine ſo deſtructive and pernicious; and you are a fool for backing it with ſuch ſilly arguments. God ſays in Iſa. liv. "I have created the ſlayer to deſtroy." Then by your reaſon a murderer is above the laws. Turn this topſyturvy, and conſider it as long as you will, you will find the conſequence to be the ſame with your own. For the pope is appointed by God, juſt as tyrants are, and ſet up for the puniſhment of the church, which I have already demonſtrated out of your own writings. "And yet," ſay you, Wal. Meſ. pag. 412. "becauſe he has raiſed his primacy to an inſufferable height of power, ſo as that he has made it neither better nor worſe than plain downright tyranny, both he and his biſhops may be put down more lawfully, than they were at firſt ſet up." You tell us, that the pope and the

the biſhops (though God in his wrath appointed them) may yet lawfully be rooted out of the church, becauſe they are tyrants; and yet you deny that it is lawful to depoſe a tyrant in the commonwealth, and that for no other reaſon, than becauſe God appointed him, though he did it in his anger. What ridiculous ſtuff is this! for whereas the pope cannot hurt a man's conſcience againſt his own will, for in the conſciences of men it is that his kingdom conſiſts, yet you are for depoſing him as a grievous tyrant, in whoſe own power it is not to be a tyrant; and yet you maintain, that a tyrant properly and truly ſo called, a tyrant that has all our lives and eſtates within his reach, without whoſe aſſiſtance the pope himſelf could not exerciſe his tyranny in the church, ought for conſcience ſake to be born withal and ſubmitted to. Theſe aſſertions compared with one another betray your childiſhneſs to that degree, that no man can read your books, but muſt of neceſſity take notice of your ignorance, raſhneſs, and incogitancy. But you allege another reaſon, "human affairs would be turned upſide down." They would ſo, and be changed for the better. Human affairs would certainly be in a deplorable condition, if being once troubled and diſordered, there was a neceſſity of their continuing always ſo. I ſay, they would be changed for the better, for the king's power would revert to the people, from whom it was firſt derived, and conferred upon one of themſelves; and the power would be tranſferred from him that abuſed it, to them that were prejudiced and injured by the abuſe of it; than which nothing can be more juſt, for there could not well be an umpire in ſuch a caſe; who would ſtand to the judgment of a foreigner? all mankind would equally be ſubject to the laws; there would be no Gods of fleſh and blood: which kind of deities whoever goes about to ſet up in the world, they are equally injurious to church and commonwealth. Now I muſt turn your own weapons upon you again. You ſay, "there can be no greater hereſy than this, to ſet up one man in Chriſt's ſeat. Theſe two are infallible marks of Antichriſt, infallibility in ſpirituals, and omnipotence in temporals." Apparat. ad Prim. pag. 171. Do you pretend that kings are infallible? If

you

you do not, why do you make them omnipotent? And how comes it to paſs, that an unlimited power in one man ſhould be accounted leſs deſtructive to temporal things, than it is to eccleſiaſtical? Or do you think, that God takes no care at all of civil affairs? If he takes none himſelf, I am ſure he does not forbid us to take care which way they go. If he does take any care about them, certainly he would have the ſame reformation made in the commonwealth, that he would have made in the church, eſpecially it being obvious to every man's experience, that infallibility and omnipotency being arrogated to one man, are equally miſchievous in both. God has not ſo modelled the government of the world as to make it the duty of any civil community to ſubmit to the cruelties of tyrants, and yet to leave the church at liberty to free themſelves from ſlavery and tyranny; nay, rather quite contrary, he has put no arms into the church's hand but thoſe of patience and innocence, prayer and eccleſiaſtical diſcipline; but in the commonwealth, all the magiſtracy are by him entruſted with the preſervation and execution of the laws, with the power of puniſhing and revenging; he has put the ſword into their hands. I cannot but ſmile at this man's prepoſterous whimſics; in eccleſiaſtics he is Helvidius, Thraſeas, a perfect tyrannicide. In politics no man more a lackey and ſlave to tyrants than he. If his doctrine hold, not we only that have depoſed our king, but the proteſtants in general, who againſt the minds of their princes have rejected the pope, are all rebels alike. But I have confounded him long enough with his own arguments. Such is the nature of the beaſt, leſt his adverſary ſhould be unprovided, he himſelf furniſhes him with weapons. Never did any man give his antagoniſt greater advantages againſt himſelf than he does. They that he has to do withal, will be ſooner weary of purſuing him, than he of flying.

CHAP. IV.

PERHAPS you think, Salmaſius, that you have done enough to ingratiate yourſelf with princes; that you have deſerved well of them: but if they conſider their own intereſt, and take their meaſures according to what it really is, not according to the falſe gloſs that your flatteries have put upon it, there never was any man in the world that deſerved ſo ill of them as you, none more deſtructive and pernicious to them and their intereſt in the whole world than yourſelf. For by exalting the power of kings above all human laws, you tell all mankind that are ſubject to ſuch a government, that they are no better than ſlaves, and make them but the more deſirous of liberty by diſcovering to them their errour, and putting that into their heads, that they never ſo much as dreamt of before, to wit, that they are ſlaves to their princes. And without doubt ſuch a ſort of government will be more irkſome and unſufferable, by how much the more you perſuade the world, that it is not by the allowance and ſubmiſſion of nations, that kings have obtained this exorbitant power; but that is abſolutely eſſential to ſuch a form of government, and of the nature of the thing itſelf. So that whether you make the world of your mind or no, your doctrine muſt needs be miſchievous and deſtructive, and ſuch as cannot but be abhorred of all princes. For if you ſhould work men into a perſuaſion, that the right of kings is without all bounds, they would no longer be ſubject to a kingly government; if you miſs of your aim, yet you make men weary of kings, by telling them that they aſſume ſuch a power to themſelves, as of right belonging to them. But if princes will allow of thoſe principles that I aſſert; if they will ſuffer themſelves and their own power to be circumſcribed by laws, inſtead of an uncertain, weak, and violent government, full of cares and fears, they will reign peaceably, quietly, and ſecurely. If they ſlight this counſel of mine, though wholeſome in itſelf, becauſe of the meanneſs of the author, they ſhall know that it

is

is not my counſel only, but what was anciently adviſed by one of the wiſeſt of kings. For Lycurgus king of Lacedemon, when he obſerved that his own relations that were princes of Argos and Meſſana, by endeavouring to introduce an arbitrary government, had ruined themſelves and their people; he, that he might benefit his country, and ſecure the ſucceſſion to his own family, could think upon no better expedient, than to communicate his power to the ſenate, and taking the great men of the realm into part of the government with himſelf; and by this means the crown continued in his family for many ages. But whether it was Lycurgus, or, as ſome learned men are of opinion, Theopompus, that introduced that mixed form of government among the Lacedemonians, ſomewhat more than a hundred years after Lycurgus's time (of whom it is recorded, that he uſed to boaſt, that by advancing the power of the ſenate above that of the prince, he had ſettled the kingdom upon a ſure foundation, and was like to leave it in a laſting and durable condition to his poſterity) which of them ſoever it was, I ſay, he has left a good example to modern princes; and was as creditable a counſellor, as his counſel was ſafe. For that all men ſhould ſubmit to any one man, ſo as to acknowledge a power in him ſuperiour to all human laws, neither did any law ever enact, nor indeed was it poſſible that any ſuch law ſhould ever be; for that cannot be ſaid to be a law that ſtrikes at the root of all laws, and takes them quite away: it being apparent that your poſitions are inconſiſtent with the nature of all laws, being ſuch as render them no laws at all. You endeavour notwithſtanding, in this fourth chapter, to make good by examples, what you have not been able to do by any reaſons that you have alleged hitherto. Let us conſider whether your examples help your cauſe; for they many times make things plain, which the laws are either altogether ſilent in, or do but hint at. We will begin firſt with the Jews, whom we ſuppoſe to have known moſt of the mind of God; and then, according to your own method, we will come to the times of chriſtianity. And firſt, for thoſe times in which the Iſraelites being ſubject to kings, who, or howſoever they were,

did

did their utmoſt to caſt that ſlaviſh yoke from off their necks. Eglon the king of Moab had made a conqueſt of them; the ſeat of his empire was at Jericho; he was no contemner of the true God; when his name was mentioned, he roſe from his ſeat: the Iſraelites had ſerved him eighteen years; they ſent a preſent to him, not as to an enemy, but to their own prince; notwithſtanding which outward veneration and profeſſion of ſubjection, they killed him by a wile, as an enemy to their country. You will ſay perhaps, that Ehud, who did that action, had a warrant from God for ſo doing. He had ſo, it is like; and what greater argument of its being a warrantable and praiſeworthy action? God uſes not to put men upon things that are unjuſt, treacherous, and cruel, but upon ſuch things as are virtuous and laudable. But we read no where that there was any poſitive command from Heaven in the caſe. "The Iſraelites called upon God;" ſo did we. And God ſtirred up a ſaviour for them; ſo he did for us. Eglon of a neighbouring prince became a prince of the Jews; of an enemy to them he became their king. Our gentleman of an Engliſh king became an enemy to the Engliſh nation; ſo that he ceaſed to be a king. Thoſe capacities are inconſiſtent. No man can be a member of the ſtate, and an enemy to it at the ſame time. Antony was never looked upon by the Romans as a conſul, nor Nero as an emperor, after the ſenate had voted them both enemies. This Cicero tells us in his Fourth Philippic: "If Antony be a conſul," ſays he, "Brutus is an enemy; but if Brutus be a ſaviour and preſerver of the commonwealth, Antony is an enemy: none but robbers count him a conſul." By the ſame reaſon, ſay I, who but enemies to their country look upon a tyrant as a king? So that Eglon's being a foreigner, and king Charles a prince of our own, will make no difference in the caſe; both being enemies and both tyrants, they are in the ſame circumſtances. If Ehud killed him juſtly, we have done ſo too in putting our king to death. Samſon that renowned champion of the Hebrews, though his countrymen blamed him for it, "Doſt thou not know," ſay they, "that the Philiſtines have dominion over us?" Yet againſt thoſe Philiſtines, under

under whoſe dominion he was, he himſelf undertook a war in his own perſon, without any other help; and whether he acted in purſuance of a command from Heaven, or was prompted by his own valour only; or whatſoever inducement he had, he did not put to death one, but many that tyrannized over his country, having firſt called upon God by prayer, and implored his aſſiſtance. So that Samſon counted it no act of impiety, but quite contrary, to kill thoſe that enſlaved his country, though they had dominion over himſelf too; and though the greater part of his countrymen ſubmitted to their tyranny. "But yet David, who was both a king and a prophet, would not take away Saul's life, becauſe he was God's anointed." Does it follow, that becauſe David refuſed to do a thing, therefore we are obliged not to do that very thing? David was a private perſon, and would not kill the king; is that a precedent for a parliament, for a whole nation? David would not revenge his own quarrel, by putting his enemy to death by ſtealth; does it follow, that therefore the magiſtrates muſt not puniſh a malefactor according to law? He would not kill a king; muſt not an aſſembly of the ſtates therefore puniſh a tyrant? he ſcrupled the killing of God's anointed; muſt the people therefore ſcruple to condemn their own anointed? eſpecially one that after having ſo long profeſſed hoſtility againſt his own people, and waſhed off that anointing of his, whether ſacred or civil, with the blood of his own ſubjects. I confeſs that thoſe kings, whom God by his prophets anointed to be kings, or appointed to ſome ſpecial ſervice, as he did Cyrus, Iſa. xliv. may not improperly be called the Lord's anointed; but all other princes, according to the ſeveral ways of their coming to the government, are the people's anointed, or the army's, or many times the anointed of their own faction only. But taking it for granted, that all kings are God's anointed, you can never prove, that therefore they are above all laws, and not to be called in queſtion, what villanies ſoever they commit. What if David laid a charge upon himſelf and other private perſons, not to ſtretch forth their hands againſt the Lord's anointed? Does not God himſelf command princes not ſo much as

"to

"to touch his anointed?" Which were no other than his people, Pſal. cv. He preferred that anointing, wherewith his people were anointed, before that of kings, if any ſuch thing were. Would any man offer to infer from this place of the Pſalmiſt, that believers are not to be called in queſtion, though they offend againſt the laws, becauſe God commands princes not to touch his anointed? King Solomon was about to put to death Abiathar the prieſt, though he were God's anointed too; and did not ſpare him becauſe of his anointing, but becauſe he had been his father's friend. If that ſacred and civil anointing, wherewith the high prieſt of the Jews was anointed, whereby he was not only conſtituted high prieſt, but a temporal magiſtrate in many caſes, did not exempt him from the penalty of the laws; how comes a civil anointing only to exempt a tyrant? But you ſay, "Saul was a tyrant, and worthy of death:" What then? It does not follow, that becauſe he deſerved it, that David in the circumſtances he was then under had power to put him to death without the people's authority, or the command of the magiſtracy. But was Saul a tyrant? I wiſh you would ſay ſo; indeed you do ſo, though you had ſaid before in your Second Book, page 32, That "he was no tyrant, but a good king, and choſen of God." Why ſhould falſe accuſers, and men guilty of forgery be branded, and you eſcape without the like ignominious mark? For they practiſe their villanies with leſs treachery and deceit than you write, and treat of matters of the greateſt moment. Saul was a good king, when it ſerved your turn to have him ſo; and now he is a tyrant, becauſe it ſuits with your preſent purpoſe. But it is no wonder, that you make a tyrant of a good king; for your principles look as if they were invented for no other deſign, than to make all good kings ſo. But yet David, though he would not put to death his father-in-law, for cauſes and reaſons that we have nothing to do withal, yet in his own defence, he raiſed an army, took and poſſeſſed cities that belonged to Saul, and would have defended Keilah againſt the king's forces, had he not underſtood, that the citizens would be falſe to him. Suppoſe Saul had beſieged the town, and himſelf had

had been the firſt that had ſcaled the walls; do you think David would preſently have thrown down his arms, and have betrayed all thoſe that aſſiſted him to his anointed enemy? I believe not. What reaſon have we to think David would have ſtuck to do what we have done, who when his occaſions and circumſtances ſo required, proffered his aſſiſtance to the Philiſtines, who were then the profeſſed enemies of his country, and did that againſt Saul, which I am ſure we ſhould never have done againſt our tyrant? I am weary of mentioning your lies, and aſhamed of them. You ſay, it is a maxim of the Engliſh, "That enemies are rather to be ſpared than friends;" and that therefore "we conceived we ought not to ſpare our king's life, becauſe he had been our friend." You impudent liar, what mortal ever heard this whimſy before you invented it? But we will excuſe it. You could not bring in that thread-bare flouriſh, of our being more fierce than our own maſtiffs, (which now comes in the fifth time, and will as oft again before we come to the end of your book) without ſome ſuch introduction. We are not ſo much more fierce than our own maſtiffs, as you are more hungry than any dog whatſoever, who return ſo greedily to what you have vomited up ſo often. Then you tell us, that David commanded the Amalekite to be put to death, who pretended to have killed Saul. But that inſtance, neither in reſpect to the fact, nor the perſon, has any affinity with what we are diſcourſing of. I do not well underſtand what cauſe David had to be ſo ſevere upon that man, for pretending to have haſtened the king's death, and in effect to have put him out of his pain, when he was dying; unleſs it were to take away from the Iſraelites all ſuſpicion of his own having been inſtrumental in it, whom they might look upon as one that had revolted to the Philiſtines, and was part of their army. Juſt ſuch another action as this of David's do all men blame in Domitian, who put to death Epaphroditus, becauſe he had helped Nero to kill himſelf. After all this, as another inſtance of your impudence, you call him not only the "anointed of the Lord," but "the Lord's Chriſt," who a little before you had ſaid was a tyrant, and acted by the impulſe of ſome evil ſpirit.

Such mean thoughts you have of that reverend name, that you are not aſhamed to give it to a tyrant, whom you yourſelf confeſs to have been poſſeſſed with the devil. Now I come to that precedent, from which every man that is not blind, muſt needs infer the right of the people to be ſuperiour to that of kings. When Solomon was dead, the people aſſembled themſelves at Sichem to make Rehoboam king. Thither himſelf went, as one that ſtood for the place, that he might not ſeem to claim the ſucceſſion as his inheritance, nor the ſame right over a freeborn people, that every man has over his father's ſheep and oxen. The people propoſe conditions, upon which they were willing to admit him to the government. He deſires three days time to adviſe; he conſults with the old men; they tell him no ſuch thing, as that he had an abſolute right to ſucceed, but perſuade him to comply with the people, and ſpeak them fair, it being in their power whether he ſhould reign or not. Then he adviſes with the young men that were brought up with him; they, as if Salmaſius's phrenzy had taken them, thunder this right of kings into his ears; perſuade him to threaten the people with whips and ſcorpions: and he anſwered the people as they adviſed him. When all Iſrael ſaw, that the king hearkened not to them, then they openly proteſt the right of the people, and their own liberty; "What portion have we in David? To thy tents, O Iſrael! now look to thine own houſe, David." When the king ſent Adoram to them, they ſtoned him with ſtones, and perhaps they would not have ſtuck to have ſerved the king himſelf ſo, but he made haſte and got out of the way. The next news is of a great army raiſed by Rehoboam, to reduce the Iſraelites to their allegiance. God forbids him to proceed, "Go not up," ſays he, "to war againſt your brethren the children of Iſrael; for this thing is of me." Now conſider, heretofore the people had deſired a king; God was diſpleaſed with them for it, but yet permitted them to make a king according to that right that all nations have to appoint their own governors. Now the people reject Rehoboam from ruling them; and this God not only ſuffers them to do, but forbids Rehoboam to make war againſt them for it,

and ſtops him in his undertaking; and teaches him withal, that thoſe that had revolted from him were not rebels in ſo doing; but that he ought to look upon them as brethren. Now recollect yourſelf: you ſay, that all kings are of God, and that therefore the people ought not to reſiſt them, be they never ſuch tyrants. I anſwer you, the convention of the people, their votes, their acts, are likewiſe of God, and that by the teſtimony of God himſelf in this place; and conſequently according to your argument, by the authority of God himſelf, princes ought not to reſiſt the people. For as certain as it is, that kings are of God, and whatever argument you may draw from thence to enforce a ſubjection and obedience to them: ſo certain is it, that free aſſemblies of the body of the people are of God, and that naturally affords the ſame argument for their right of reſtraining princes from going beyond their bounds, and rejecting them if there be occaſion; nor is their ſo doing a juſtifiable cauſe of war, any more than the people of Iſrael's rejecting Rehoboam was. You aſk why the people did not revolt from Solomon? Who but you would aſk ſuch an impertinent queſtion? You ſee they did revolt from a tyrant, and were neither puniſhed nor blamed for it. It is true, Solomon fell into ſome vices, but he was not therefore a tyrant; he made amends for his vices by many excellent virtues, that he was famous for, by many benefits which accrued to the nation of the Jews by his government. But admit that he had been a tyrant: many times the circumſtances of a nation are ſuch, that the people will not, and many times ſuch, that they cannot depoſe a tyrant. You ſee they did it when it was in their power. "But," ſay you, "Jeroboam's act was ever had in deteſtation; it was looked upon as an unjuſt revolt from a lawful prince; he and his ſucceſſors were accounted rebels." I confeſs we find his revolt from the true worſhip of God often found fault with; but I no where find him blamed for revolting from Rehoboam; and his ſucceſſors are frequently ſpoken of as wicked princes, but not as rebels. "Acting contrary to law and right," ſay you, "cannot introduce, or eſtabliſh a right." I pray, what becomes then

of your right of kings? Thus do you perpetually baffle yourſelf. You ſay, "Adulteries, murders, theſts are daily committed with impunity." Are you not aware, that here you give an anſwer to your own queſtion, how it comes to paſs, that tyrants do ſo often eſcape unpuniſhed? You ſay, "Thoſe kings were rebels, and yet the prophets do no where diſſuade the people from their allegiance." And why do you, you raſcally falſe prophet, endeavour to perſuade the people of England not to yield obedience to their preſent magiſtrates, though in your opinion they are rebels? "This Engliſh faction of robbers," ſay you, "allege for themſelves, that by ſome immediate voice from Heaven, they were put upon their bloody enterpriſe." It is notoriouſly evident, that you were diſtracted when you wrote theſe lines; for as you have put the words together, they are neither Latin, nor ſenſe. And that the Engliſh pretend to any ſuch warrant, as a juſtification of their actions, is one of thoſe many lies and fictions, that your book is full of. But I proceed to urge you with examples. Libna, a great city, revolted from Joram, becauſe he had forſaken God: it was the king therefore that was guilty, not the city, nor is the city blamed for it. He that conſiders the reaſon that is given why that city rejected his government, muſt conclude, that the Holy Ghoſt rather approves of what they did than condemns them for it. "Theſe kind of revolts are no precedents," ſay you. But why were you then ſo vain, as to promiſe in the beginning of this chapter, that you would argue from examples, whereas all the examples that you allege, are mere negatives, which prove nothing? and when we urge examples that are ſolid and poſitive, you ſay they are no precedents. Who would endure ſuch a way of arguing? You challenged us at precedents; we produced them; and what do you do? you hang back, and get out of the way. I proceed: Jehu, at the command of a prophet, ſlew a king; nay, he ordered the death of Ahaziah, his own liege prince. If God would not have tyrants put to death by their own ſubjects, if it were a wicked thing ſo to do, a thing of a bad example; why did God himſelf command it? If he commanded it, it

was

was a lawful, commendable, and a praiſeworthy action. It was not therefore lawful to kill a tyrant, becauſe God commanded it; but God commanded it, becauſe, antecedently to his command, it was a juſtifiable and a lawful action. Again, Jehoiada, the high prieſt did not ſcruple to depoſe Athaliah, and kill her, though ſhe had been ſeven years in actual poſſeſſion of the crown. "But," ſay you, "ſhe took upon her the government, when ſhe had no right to it." And did not you ſay yourſelf, but a while ago, "That Tiberius aſſumed the ſovereignty, when it belonged not at all to him?" And yet you then affirmed, that, according to our Saviour's doctrine, we ought to yield obedience to ſuch tyrants as he was. It were a moſt ridiculous thing to imagine, that a prince, who gets in by uſurpation, may lawfully be depoſed; but one that rules tyrannically may not. "But," ſay you, "Athaliah could not poſſibly reign according to the law of the Jewiſh kingdom, 'Thou ſhalt ſet over thee a king,' ſays God Almighty; he does not ſay, Thou ſhalt ſet over thee a queen." If this argument have any weight, I may as well ſay, the command of God was, that the people ſhould ſet over themſelves a king, not a tyrant. So that I am even with you. Amazias was a ſlothful, idolatrous prince, and was put to death, not by a few conſpirators; but rather, it ſhould ſeem, by the nobility, and by the body of the people. For he fled from Jeruſalem, had none to ſtand by him, and they purſued him to Lachiſh: they took counſel againſt him, ſays the hiſtory, becauſe he had forſaken God: and we do not find that Azarias his ſon proſecuted thoſe that had cut off his father. You quote a great many frivolous paſſages out of the rabbins, to prove that the kings of the Jews were ſuperiour to the Sanhedrim. You do not conſider Zedekiah's own words, Jerem. xxxviii. "The king is not he that can do any thing againſt you." So that this was the prince's own ſtyle. Thus he confeſſed himſelf inferiour to the great council of the realm. "Perhaps," ſay you, "he meant, that he durſt not deny them any thing for fear of ſedition." But what does your perhaps ſignify, whoſe moſt poſitive aſſerting any thing is not worth a louſe? For nothing in nature can

be more fickle and inconſiſtent than you are. How oft have you appeared in this diſcourſe inconſiſtent with yourſelf; unſaying with one breath what you have ſaid with another? Here, again, you make compariſons betwixt king Charles, and ſome of the good kings of Judah. You ſpeak contemptibly of David, as if he were not worthy to come in competition with him. "Conſider David," ſay you, "an adulterer, a murderer; king Charles was guilty of no ſuch crimes. Solomon his ſon, who was accounted wiſe," &c. Who can with patience hear this filthy, raſcally fool, ſpeak ſo irreverently of perſons eminent both in greatneſs and piety? Dare you compare king David with king Charles; a moſt religious king and prophet, with a ſuperſtitious prince, and who was but a novice in the chriſtian religion; a moſt prudent wiſe prince with a weak one; a valiant prince with a cowardly one; finally, a moſt juſt prince with a moſt unjuſt one? Have you the impudence to commend his chaſtity and ſobriety, who is known to have committed all manner of lewdneſs in company with his confident the duke of Buckingham? It were to no purpoſe to inquire into the private actions of his life, who publicly at plays would embrace and kiſs the ladies laſciviouſly, and handle virgins and matrons breaſts, not to mention the reſt. I adviſe you therefore, you counterfeit Plutarch, to abſtain from ſuch like parallels, leſt I be forced to publiſh thoſe things concerning king Charles, which I am willing to conceal. Hitherto we have entertained ourſelves with what the people of the Jews have acted or attempted againſt tyrants, and by what right they did it in thoſe times, when God himſelf did immediately, as it were, by his voice from heaven govern their commonwealth. The ages that ſucceeded, do not afford us any authority, as from themſelves, but confirm us in our opinion by their imitating the actions of their forefathers. For after the Babyloniſh captivity, when God did not give any new command concerning the crown, though the royal line was not extinct, we find the people return to the old moſaical form of government again. They were one while tributaries to Antiochus, king of Syria; yet when he enjoined them things that

were

e contrary to the law of God, they reſiſted him, and leputies, under the conduct of their prieſts, the Mac- ees, and by force regained their former liberty. After , whoever was accounted moſt worthy of it, had the icipality conferred upon him. Till at laſt, Harcanus ſon of Simon, the brother of Judah, the Maccabee, ing ſpoiled David's ſepulchre, entertained foreign iers, and began to inveſt the prieſthood with a kind regal power. After whoſe time his ſon Ariſtobulus the firſt that aſſumed the crown; he was a tyrant ed, and yet the people ſtirred not againſt him, which o great wonder, for he reigned but one year. And himſelf being overtaken with a grievous diſeaſe, and nting of his own cruelty and wickedneſs, deſired ing more than to die, and had his wiſh. His brother xander ſucceeded him; "and againſt him," you "the people raiſed no inſurrection, though he were rant too." And this lie might have gone down with f Joſephus's hiſtory had not been extant. We ſhould have had no memory of thoſe times, but what your ppus would afford us, out of whom you tranſcribe a few eleſs and uſeleſs apophthegms of the Phariſees. The ory is thus: Alexander adminiſtered the public affairs both in war and peace; and though he kept in pay at numbers of Piſidians and Cilicians, yet could he protect himſelf from the rage of the people: but laſt he was ſacrificing they fell upon him, and had oft ſinothered him with boughs of palm trees and on trees. Afterward the whole nation made war n him ſix years, during which time, when many ſands of the Jews had been ſlain, and he himſelf g at length deſirous of peace, demanded of them, t they would have him to do to ſatisfy them; they him nothing could do that but his blood, nay, that ſhould hardly pardon him after his death. This ory you perceived was not for your purpoſe, and ſo you it off with a few phariſaical ſentences; when it had much better, either to have let it quite alone, or to e given a true relation of it: but you truſt to lies e than to the truth of your cauſe. Even thoſe eight dred Phariſees, whom he commanded to be crucified,

were of their number that had taken up arms againſt him. And they with the reſt of the people had ſolemnly proteſted, that if they could ſubdue the king's forces, and get his perſon into their power, they would put him to death. After the death of Alexander, his wife Alexandra took the government upon her, as Athaliah had formerly done, not according to law (for you have confeſſed, that the laws of the Jews admitted not a female to wear the crown) but ſhe got it partly by force, for ſhe maintained an army of foreigners; and partly by favour, for ſhe had brought over the Phariſees to her intereſt, which ſort of men were of the greateſt authority with the people. Them ſhe had made her own, by putting the power into their hands, and retaining to herſelf only the name. Juſt as the Scotch preſbyterians lately allowed Charles the name of king, but upon condition, that he would let them be king in effect. After the death of Alexandra, Hyrcanus and Ariſtobulus, her ſons, contended for the ſovereignty: Ariſtobulus was more induſtrious, and having a greater party, forced his elder brother out of the kingdom. A while after, when Pompey paſſed through Syria, in his return from the Mithridatic war; the Jews, ſuppoſing they had now an opportunity of regaining their liberty, by referring their cauſe to him, diſpatch an embaſſy to him in their own names; they renounce both the brothers; complain that they had enſlaved them. Pompey depoſed Ariſtobulus, leaves the prieſthood, and ſuch a principality as the laws allowed to Hyrcanus the elder. From that time forward he was called High prieſt, and Ethnarcha. After theſe times in the reign of Archelaus, the ſon of Herod, the Jews ſent fifty ambaſſadors to Auguſtus Cæſar; accuſed Herod that was dead, and Archelaus his ſon, that then reigned; they depoſed him as much as in them lay, and petitioned the emperor, that the people of the Jews might be governed without a king. Cæſar was moved at their entreaty, and did not appoint a king over them, but a governor, whom they called an Ethnarch. When that governor had preſided ten years over Judea, the people ſent ambaſſadors again to Rome, and accuſed him of tyranny. Cæſar heard them graciouſly; ſent

ſent for the governor, condemned him to perpetual exile, and baniſhed him to Vienna. Anſwer me now, that people that accuſed their own princes, that deſired their condemnation, that deſired their puniſhment, would not they themſelves rather, if it had been in their power, and that they might have had their choice; would not they, I ſay, rather have put them to death themſelves? You do not deny, but that the people and the nobles often took up arms againſt the Roman deputies, when by their avarice, or their cruelty, their government was burdenſome and oppreſſive. But you give a ridiculous reaſon for this, as all the reſt of yours are. You ſay, "they were not yet accuſtomed to the yoke;" very like they were not, under Alexander, Herod, and his ſon. "But," ſay you, "they would not raiſe war againſt Caius Cæſar, nor Petronius." I confeſs they did not, and they did very prudently in abſtaining, for they were not able. Will you hear their own words, on that occaſion? "We will not make war," ſay they, "becauſe we cannot." That thing, which they themſelves acknowledge they refrained from for want of ability, you, falſe hypocrite, pretend they abſtained from out of religion. Then with a great deal of toil you do juſt nothing at all; for you endeavour to prove out of the fathers (though you had done it as ſuperficially before) that kings are to be prayed for. That good kings are to be prayed for, no man denies; nay, and bad ones too, as long as there are any hopes of them: ſo we ought to pray for highwaymen, and for our enemies. But how? not that they may plunder, ſpoil, and murder us; but that they may repent. We pray both for thieves and enemies; and yet who ever dreamt, but that it was lawful to put the laws in execution againſt one, and to fight againſt the other? I value not the Egyptian liturgy that you quote; but the prieſt that you mention, who prayed that Commodus might ſucceed his father in the empire, did not pray for any thing in my opinion, but imprecated all the miſchiefs imaginable to the Roman ſtate. You ſay, "that we have broken our faith, which we engaged more than once in ſolemn aſſemblies to preſerve the authority and majeſty of the king. But becauſe hereafter you are more

more large upon that ſubject, I ſhall paſs it by in this place; and talk with you when you come to it again. You return then to the fathers; concerning whom take this in ſhort. Whatever they ſay, which is not warranted by the authority of the ſcriptures, or by good reaſon, ſhall be of no more regard with me, than if any other ordinary man had ſaid it. The firſt that you quote is Tertullian, who is no orthodox writer, notorious for many errours; whoſe authority, if he were of your opinion, would ſtand you in no ſtead. But what ſays he? He condemns tumults and rebellions. So do we. But in ſaying ſo, we do not mean to deſtroy all the people's rights and privileges, all the authority of ſenates, the power of all magiſtrates, the king only excepted. The fathers declaim againſt ſeditions raſhly raiſed by the giddy heat of the multitude; they ſpeak not of the inferiour magiſtrates, of ſenates, of parliaments encouraging the people to a lawful oppoſing of a tyrant. Hence Ambroſe, whom you quote; "Not to reſiſt, ſays he, but to weep and to ſigh, theſe are the bulwarks of the prieſthood; what one is there of our little number, who dare ſay to the emperor, I do not like your laws? This is not allowed the prieſts, and ſhall laymen pretend to it?" It is evident of what ſort of perſons he ſpeaks, viz. of the prieſts, and ſuch of the people as are private men, not of the magiſtrates. You ſee by how weak and prepoſterous a reaſon he lighted a torch as it were to the diſſenſions, that were afterwards to ariſe betwixt the laity and the clergy concerning even civil or temporal laws. But becauſe you think you preſſed hardeſt upon us with the examples of the primitive chriſtians; who though they were haraſſed as much as a people could be, yet, you ſay, "they never took up arms againſt the emperor:" I will make it appear, in the firſt place, that for the moſt part they could not: ſecondly, that whenever they could, they did: and thirdly, that whether they did or did not, they were ſuch a ſort of people, as that their example deſerves but to have little ſway with us. Firſt therefore, no man can be ignorant of this, that when the commonwealth of Rome expired, the whole and ſovereign power in the empire was ſettled in the emperor; that all the ſoldiers were

vere under his pay; inſomuch that if the whole body of the ſenate, the equeſtrain order, and all the common people had endeavoured to work a change, they might have made way for a maſſacre of themſelves, but could not in any probability retrieve their loſt liberty: for the empire would ſtill have continued, though they might perhaps have been ſo lucky as to have killed the emperor. This being ſo, what could the chriſtians do? It is true, here were a great many of them; but they were diſperſed, they were generally perſons of mean quality, and but of ſmall intereſt in the world. How many of them would one legion have been able to keep in awe? Could ſo inconſiderable a body of men as they were in thoſe days, ever expect to accompliſh an enterpriſe that many famous generals, and whole armies of tried ſoldiers had loſt their lives in attempting? When about 300 years after our Saviour's nativity, which was near upon 20 years before the reign of Conſtantine the Great, when Diocleſian was emperor, there was but one chriſtian legion in the whole Roman empire; which legion, for no other reaſon than becauſe it conſiſted of chriſtians, was ſlain by the reſt of the army at a town in France called Octodurum. "The chriſtians," ſay you, "conſpired not with Caſſius, with Albinus, with Niger;" and does Tertullian think they merited by not being willing to loſe their lives in the quarrels of infidels? It is evident therefore, that the chriſtians could not free themſelves from the yoke of the Roman emperors; and it could be no ways advantageous to their intereſt to conſpire with infidels, as long as heathen emperors reigned. But that afterwards the chriſtians made war upon tyrants and defended themſelves by force of arms when there was occaſion, and many times revenged upon tyrants their enormities, I am now about to make appear. In the firſt place, Conſtantine, being a chriſtian, made war upon Licinius, and put him off, who was his partner in the ſovereign power, becauſe he moleſted the eaſtern chriſtians; by which act of his he declared thus much at leaſt, that one magiſtrate might puniſh another: for he for his ſubjects ſake puniſhed Licinius, who to all intents was as abſolute in the empire as himſelf, and did not leave the vengeance

to

to God alone: Licinius might have done the ſame to Conſtantine, if there had been the like occaſion. So then, if the matter be not wholly reſerved to God's own tribunal, but that men have ſomething to do in the caſe, why did not the parliament of England ſtand in the ſame relation to King Charles, that Conſtantine did to Licinius? The ſoldiers made Conſtantine what he was: but our laws have made our parliaments equal, nay, ſuperiour to our kings. The inhabitants of Conſtantinople reſiſted Conſtantius an Arian emperor, by force of arms, as long as they were able; they oppoſed Hermogenes whom he had ſent with a military power to depoſe Paul an orthodox biſhop; the houſe whither he had betaken himſelf for ſecurity they fired about his ears, and at laſt killed him rightout. Conſtans threatened to make war upon his brother Conſtantius, unleſs he would reſtore Paul and Athanaſius to their biſhoprics. You ſee thoſe holy fathers, when their biſhoprics were in danger, were not aſhamed to ſtir up their prince's own brother to make war upon him. Not long after, the chriſtian ſoldiers, who then made whom they would emperors, put to death Conſtans the ſon of Conſtantinus, becauſe he behaved himſelf diſſolutely and proudly in the government, and tranſlated the empire to Magnentius. Nay, thoſe very perſons that ſaluted Julian by the name of emperor, againſt Conſtantius's will, who was actually in poſſeſſion of the empire, (for Julian was not then an apoſtate, but a virtuous and valiant perſon) are they not amongſt the number of thoſe primitive chriſtians, whoſe example you propoſe to us for our intimation? Which action of theirs, when Conſtantius by his letters to the people very ſharply and earneſtly forbad, (which letters were openly read to them) they all cried out unanimouſly, that themſelves had but done what the provincial magiſtrates, the army, and the authority of the commonwealth had decreed. The ſame perſons declared war againſt Conſtantius, and contributed as much as in them lay, to deprive him both of his government and his life. How did the inhabitants of Antioch behave themſelves, who were none of the worſt ſort of chriſtians? I will warrant you they prayed for Julian, after he became an apoſtate,

whom

whom they uſed to rail at in his own preſence, and ſcoffing at his long beard bid him make ropes of it: upon the news of whoſe death they offered public thankſgivings, made feaſts, and gave other public demonſtrations of joy. Do you think they uſed when he was alive, to pray for the continuance of his life and health? Nay, is it not reported, that a chriſtian ſoldier, in his own army, was the author of his death? Sozomen, a writer of eccleſiaſtical hiſtory, does not deny it, but commends him that did it, if the fact were ſo. "For it is no wonder," ſays he, "that ſome of his own ſoldiers might think within himſelf, that not only the Greeks, but all mankind hitherto had agreed, that it was a commendable action to kill a tyrant; and that they deſerve all men's praiſe, who are willing to die themſelves to procure the liberty of all others: ſo that that ſoldier ought not raſhly to be condemned, who in the cauſe of God and of religion, was ſo zealous and valiant." Theſe are the words of Sozomen, a good and religious man of that age. By which we may eaſily apprehend what the general opinion of pious men in thoſe days was upon this point. Ambroſe himſelf being commanded by the emperor Valentinian the younger, to depart from Milan, refuſed to obey him, but defended himſelf and the palace by force of arms againſt the emperor's officers, and took upon him, contrary to his own doctrine, to reſiſt the higher powers. There was a great ſedition raiſed at Conſtantinople againſt the emperor Arcadius, more than once, by reaſon of Chryſoſtom's exile. Hitherto I have ſhown how the primitive chriſtians behaved themſelves, towards tyrants; how not only the chriſtian ſoldiers, and the people, but the fathers of the church themſelves, have both made war upon them, and oppoſed them with force, and all this before St. Auſtin's time: for you yourſelf are pleaſed to go down no lower; and therefore I make no mention of Valentinian the ſon of Placidia, who was ſlain by Maximus a ſenator, for committing adultery with his wife: nor do I mention Avitus the emperor, whom, becauſe he diſbanded the ſoldiers, and betook himſelf wholly to a luxurious life, the Roman ſenate immediately depoſed;

depoſed; becauſe theſe things came to paſs ſome years after St. Auſtin's death. But all this I give you: ſuppoſe I had not mentioned the practice of the primitive chriſtians; ſuppoſe they never had ſtirred in oppoſition to tyrants; ſuppoſe they had accounted it unlawful ſo to do; I will make it appear, that they were not ſuch perſons, as that we ought to rely upon their authority, or can ſafely follow their example. Long before Conſtantine's time the generality of chriſtians had loſt much of the primitive ſanctity and integrity both of their doctrine and manners. Afterwards, when he had vaſtly enriched the church, they began to fall in love with honour and civil power, and then the chriſtian religion went to wreck. Firſt luxury and ſloth, and then a great drove of hereſies and immoralities broke looſe among them; and theſe begot envy, hatred and diſcord, which abounded every where. At laſt, they that were linked together into one brotherhood by that holy band of religion, were as much at variance and ſtrife among themſelves as the moſt bitter enemies in the world could be. No reverence for, no conſideration of their duty was left among them: the ſoldiers and commanders of the army, as oft as they pleaſed themſelves, created new emperors, and ſometimes killed good ones as well as bad. I need not mention ſuch as Verannio, Maximus, Eugenius, whom the ſoldiers all of a ſudden advanced and made them emperors; nor Gratian, an excellent prince; nor Valentinian the younger, who was none of the worſt, and yet were put to death by them. It is true, theſe things were acted by the ſoldiers, and ſoldiers in the field; but thoſe ſoldiers were chriſtians, and lived in that age which you call evangelical, and whoſe example you propoſe to us for our imitation. Now you ſhall hear how the clergy managed themſelves: paſtors and biſhops, and ſometimes thoſe very fathers whom we admire and extol to ſo high a degree, every one of whom was a leader of their ſeveral flocks; thoſe very men, I ſay, fought for their biſhoprics, as tyrants did for their ſovereignty; ſometimes throughout the city, ſometimes in the very churches, ſometimes at the altar, clergymen and laymen fought promiſ-

promiſcuouſly; they ſlew one another, and great ſlaughters were made on both ſides. You may remember Damaſus and Urciſinus, who were contemporaries with Ambroſe. It would be too long to relate the tumultuary inſurrections of the inhabitants of Conſtantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria, eſpecially thoſe under the conduct and management of Cyrillus, whom you extol as a preacher up of obedience; when the monks in that fight, within the city, had almoſt ſlain Oreſtes, Theodoſius's deputy. Now who can ſufficiently wonder at your impudence, or careleſneſs and neglect? "Till St. Auſtin's time, ſay you, and lower down than the age that he lived in, there is not any mention extant in hiſtory, of any private perſon, of any commander, or of any number of conſpirators, that have put their prince to death, or taken up arms againſt him." I have named to you, out of known and approved hiſtories, both private perſons and magiſtrates, that with their own hands have ſlain not only bad but very good princes: whole armies of chriſtians, many biſhops among them, that have fought againſt their own emperors. You produce ſome of the fathers, that with a great flouriſh of words, perſuade or boaſt of obedience to princes: and I, on the other ſide, produce both thoſe ſame fathers, and others beſides them, that by their actions have declined obedience to their princes, even in lawful things; have defended themſelves with a military force againſt them; others that have oppoſed forcibly, and wounded their deputies; and others that, being competitors for biſhoprics, have maintained civil wars againſt one another: as if it were lawful for chriſtians to wage war with chriſtians for a biſhopric, and citizens with citizens; but unlawful to fight againſt a tyrant, in defence of our liberty, of our wives and children, and of our lives themſelves. Who would own ſuch fathers as theſe? You produce St. Auſtin, who, you ſay, aſſerts, that "the power of a maſter over his ſervants, and a prince over his ſubjects, is one and the ſame thing." But I anſwer; if St. Auſtin aſſert any ſuch thing, he aſſerts what neither our Saviour, nor any of his Apoſtles ever aſſerted; though for the confirmation of that aſſertion,

tion, than which nothing can be more falſe, he pretends to rely wholly upon their authority. The three or four laſt pages of this fourth chapter, are ſtuffed with mere lies, or things careleſly and looſely put together, that are little to the purpoſe: and that every one that reads them, will diſcover by what has been ſaid already. For what concerns the pope, againſt whom you declaim ſo loudly, I am content you ſhould bawl at him, till you are hoarſe. But whereas you endeavour to perſuade the ignorant, that "all that called themſelves chriſtians, yielded an entire obedience to princes, whether good or bad, till the papal power grew to that height, that it was acknowleged ſuperiour to that of the civil magiſtrate, and till he took upon him to abſolve ſubjects from their allegiance:" I have ſufficiently proved by many examples before and ſince the age that St. Auguſtine lived in, that nothing can be more falſe. Neither does that ſeem to have much more truth in it, which you ſay in the laſt place; viz. that pope Zachary abſolved the Frenchmen from their oath of allegiance to their king. For Francis Hottoman, who was both a Frenchman, and a lawyer, and a very learned man, in the 13th chapter of his Francogallia, denies that either Chilperic was depoſed, or the kingdom tranſlated to Pepin by the pope's authority; and he proves out of very ancient chronicles of that nation, that the whole affair was tranſacted in the great council of the kingdom, according to the original conſtitution of that government. Which being once done, the French hiſtories, and pope Zachary himſelf, deny that there was any neceſſity of abſolving his ſubjects from their allegiance. For not only Hottoman, but Guiccard, a very eminent hiſtorian of that nation, informs us, that the ancient records of the kingdom of France teſtify, that the ſubjects of that nation upon the firſt inſtitution of kingſhip amongſt them, reſerved a power to themſelves, both of chooſing their princes, and of depoſing them again, if they thought fit: and that the oath of allegiance, which they took, was upon this expreſs condition; to wit, that the king ſhould likewiſe perform what at his coronation he ſwore to do. So that

if

if kings, by miſgoverning the people committed to their charge, firſt broke their own oath to their ſubjects, there needs no pope to diſpenſe with the people's oaths; the kings themſelves by their own perfidiouſneſs having abſolved their ſubjects. And finally, pope Zachary himſelf, in a letter of his to the French, which you yourſelf quote, renounces, and aſcribes to the people that authority, which you ſay he aſſumes to himſelf: for, if a prince be accountable to the people, being beholden to them for his royalty; if the people, ſince they make kings, have the ſame right to depoſe them, as the very words of that pope are; it is not likely that the Frenchmen would by any oath depart in the leaſt from that ancient right, or ever tie up their own hands, ſo as not to have the ſame right that their anceſtors always had, to depoſe bad princes, as well as to honour and obey good ones; nor is it likely that they thought themſelves obliged to yield that obedience to tyrants, which they ſwore to yield only to good princes. A people obliged to obedience by ſuch an oath is diſcharged of that obligation, when a lawful prince becomes a tyrant, or gives himſelf over to ſloth and voluptuouſneſs; the rule of juſtice, the very law of nature diſpenſes with ſuch a people's allegiance. So that even by the pope's own opinion, the people were under no obligation to yield obedience to Chilperic, and conſequently had no need of a diſpenſation.

CHAP. V.

THOUGH I am of opinion, Salmaſius, and always was, that the law of God does exactly agree with the law of nature; ſo that having ſhown what the law of God is, with reſpect to princes, and what the practice has been of the people of God, both Jews and Chriſtians, I have at the ſame time, and by the ſame diſcourſe, made appear what is moſt agreeable to the law of nature: yet becauſe you pretend "to confute us moſt powerfully by the law of nature," I will be content to admit that to be neceſſary, which before I had thought would be ſu-

perfluous; that in this chapter I may demonſtrate, that nothing is more ſuitable to the law of nature, than that puniſhment be inflicted upon tyrants. Which if I do not evince, I will then agree with you, that likewiſe by the law of God they are exempt. I do not purpoſe to frame a long diſcourſe of nature in general, and the original of civil ſocieties; that argument has been largely handled by many learned men, both Greek and Latin. But I ſhall endeavour to be as ſhort as may be; and my deſign is not ſo much to confute you (who would willingly have ſpared this pains) as to ſhow that you confute yourſelf, and deſtroy your own poſitions. I will begin with that firſt poſition, which you lay down as a fundamental, and that ſhall be the groundwork of my enſuing diſcourſe. "The law of nature," ſay you, "is a principle imprinted on all men's minds, to regard the good of all mankind, conſidering men as united together in ſocieties. But this innate principle cannot procure that common good, unleſs, as there are people that muſt be governed, ſo that very principle aſcertain who ſhall govern them." To wit, leſt the ſtronger oppreſs the weaker, and thoſe perſons, who for their mutual ſafety and protection have united themſelves together, ſhould be diſunited and divided by injury and violence, and reduced to a beſtial ſavage life again. This I ſuppoſe is what you mean. "Out of the number of thoſe that united into one body," you ſay, "there muſt needs have been ſome choſen, who excelled the reſt in wiſdom and valour; that they either by force, or by perſuaſion, might reſtrain thoſe that were refractory, and keep them within due bounds. Sometimes it would ſo fall out, that one ſingle perſon, whoſe conduct and valour was extraordinary, might be able to do this, and ſometimes more aſſiſted one another with their advice and counſel. But ſince it is impoſſible, that any one man ſhould order all things himſelf, there was a neceſſity of his conſulting with others, and taking ſome into part of the government with himſelf; ſo that whether a ſingle perſon reign, or whether the ſupreme power reſide in the body of the people, ſince it is impoſſible, that all ſhould adminiſter the affairs of the commonwealth, or that one

man ſhould do all, the government does always lie upon the ſhoulders of many. And afterwards you ſay, "both forms of government, whether by many or a few, or by a ſingle perſon, are equally according to the law of nature, viz. That it is impoſſible for any ſingle perſon ſo to govern alone, as not to admit others into a ſhare of the government with himſelf." Though I might have taken all this out of the third book of Ariſtotle's Politics, I choſe rather to tranſcribe it out of your own book; for you ſtole it from him, as Prometheus did fire from Jupiter, to the ruin of monarchy, and overthrow of yourſelf, and your own opinion. For inquire as diligently as you can for your life into the law of nature, as you have deſcribed it, you will not find the leaſt foot-ſtep in it of kingly power, as you explain it. "The law of nature," ſay you, "in ordering who ſhould govern others, reſpected the univerſal good of all mankind." It did not then regard the private good of any particular perſon, not of a prince; ſo that the king is for the people, and conſequently the people ſuperiour to him: which being allowed, it is impoſſible that princes ſhould have any right to oppreſs or enſlave the people; that the inferiour ſhould have right to tyrannize over the ſuperiour. So that ſince kings cannot pretend to any right to do miſchief, the right of the people muſt be acknowledged, according to the law of nature, to be ſuperiour to that of princes; and therefore, by the ſame right, that before kingſhip was known, men united their ſtrength and counſels for their mutual ſafety and defence; by the ſame right, that for the preſervation of all men's liberty, peace, and ſafety, they appointed one or more to govern the reſt; by the ſame right they may depoſe thoſe very perſons whom for their valour or wiſdom they advanced to the government, or any others that rule diſorderly, if they find them by reaſon of their ſlothfulneſs, folly, or impiety, unfit for government: ſince nature does not regard the good of one, or of a few, but of all in general. For what ſort of perſons were they whom you ſuppoſe to have been choſen? You ſay, "they were ſuch as excelled in courage and conduct," to wit, ſuch as by nature ſeemed fitteſt for go-

vernment; who by reaſon of their excellent wiſdom and valour, were enabled to undertake ſo great a charge. The conſequence of this I take to be, that right of ſucceſſion is not by the law of nature; that no man by the law of nature has right to be king, unleſs he excel all others in wiſdom and courage; that all ſuch as reign, and want theſe qualifications, are advanced to the government by force or faction; have no right by the law of nature to be what they are, but ought rather to be ſlaves than princes. For nature appoints, that wiſe men ſhould govern fools, not that wicked men ſhould rule over good men, fools over wiſe men: and conſequently they that take the government out of ſuch men's hands, act according to the law of nature. To what end nature directs wiſe men ſhould bear the rule, you ſhall hear in your own words; viz. "That by force or by perſuaſion, they may keep ſuch as are unruly within due bounds." But how ſhould he keep others within the bounds of their duty, that neglects, or is ignorant of, or wilfully acts contrary to his own? Allege now, if you can, any dictate of nature, by which we are enjoined to neglect the wiſe inſtitutions of the law of nature, and have no regard to them in civil and public concerns, when we ſee what great and admirable things nature herſelf effects in things that are inanimate and void of ſenſe, rather than loſe her end. Produce any rule of nature, or natural juſtice, by which inferiour criminals ought to be puniſhed, but kings and princes to go unpuniſhed; and not only ſo, but though guilty of the greateſt crimes imaginable, be had in reverence and almoſt adored. You agree, That "all forms of government, whether by many, or few, or by a ſingle perſon, are equally agreeable to the law of nature." So that the perſon of a king is not by the law of nature more ſacred than a ſenate of nobles, or magiſtrates, choſen from amongſt the common people, who you grant may be puniſhed, and ought to be if they offend; and conſequently, kings ought to be ſo too, who are appointed to rule for the very ſame end and purpoſe that other magiſtrates are. "For," ſay you, "nature does not allow any ſingle perſon to rule ſo entirely, as not to have partners

ners in the government." It does not therefore allow of a monarch; it does not allow one ſingle perſon to rule ſo, as that all others ſhould be in a ſlaviſh ſubjection to his commands only. You that give princes ſuch partners in the government, " as in whom," to uſe your own words, " the government always reſides," do at the ſame time make others colleagues with them, and equal to them; nay, and conſequently you ſettle a power in thoſe colleagues of puniſhing, and of depoſing them. So that while you yourſelf go about, not to extol a kingly government, but to eſtabliſh it by the law of nature, you deſtroy it; no greater misfortune could befall ſovereign princes, than to have ſuch an advocate as you are. Poor unhappy wretch! what blindneſs of mind has ſeized you, that you ſhould unwittingly take ſo much pains to diſcover your knavery and folly, and make it viſible to the world, (which before you concealed in ſome meaſure, and diſguiſed) that you ſhould be ſo induſtrious to heap diſgrace and ignominy upon yourſelf? What offence does Heaven puniſh you for, in making you appear in public, and undertake the defence of a deſperate cauſe, with ſo much impudence and childiſhneſs, and inſtead of defending it, to betray it by your ignorance? What enemy of yours would deſire to ſee you in a more forlorn, deſpicable condition than you are, who have no refuge left from the depth of miſery, but in your own imprudence and want of ſenſe, ſince by your unſkilful and ſilly defence, you have rendered tyrants the more odious and deteſtable, by aſcribing to them an unbounded liberty of doing miſchief with impunity; and conſequently have created them more enemies than they had before? But I return to your contradictions. When you had reſolved with yourſelf to be ſo wicked, as to endeavour to find out a foundation for tyranny in the law of nature, you ſaw a neceſſity of extolling monarchy above other ſorts of government; which you cannot go about to do, without doing as you uſe to do, that is, contradicting yourſelf. For having ſaid but a little before, " That all forms of government, whether by more or fewer, or by a ſingle perſon, are equally according to the law of nature,"

now you tell us, "that of all theſe ſorts of government, that of a ſingle perſon is moſt natural:" nay, though you had ſaid in expreſs terms but lately, "that the law of nature does not allow, that any government ſhould reſide intirely in one man." Now upbraid whom you will with the putting of tyrants to death; ſince you yourſelf, by your own folly, have cut the throats of all monarchs, nay even of monarchy itſelf. But it is not to the purpoſe for us here to diſpute which form of government is beſt, by one ſingle perſon, or by many. I confeſs many eminent and famous men have extolled monarchy; but it has always been upon this ſuppoſition, that the prince was a very excellent perſon, and one that of all others deſerved beſt to reign; without which ſuppoſition, no form of government can be ſo prone to tyranny as monarchy is. And whereas you reſemble a monarchy to the government of the world, by one divine Being, I pray anſwer me, whether you think that any other can deſerve to be inveſted with a power here on earth, that ſhall reſemble his power that governs the world, except ſuch a perſon as does infinitely excel all other men, and both for wiſdom and goodneſs in ſome meaſure reſemble the Deity? and ſuch a perſon, in my opinion, none can be but the Son of God himſelf.—And whereas you make a kingdom to be a kind of family, and make a compariſon betwixt a prince and the maſter of a family; obſerve how lame the parallel is. For a maſter of a family begot part of his houſehold, at leaſt he feeds all thoſe that are of his houſe, and upon that account deſerves to have the government; but the reaſon holds not in the caſe of a prince; nay, it is quite contrary. In the next place, you propoſe to us for our imitation the example of inferiour creatures, eſpecially of birds, and amongſt them of bees, which according to your ſkill in natural philoſophy, are a ſort of birds too; "The bees have a king over them." The bees of Trent you mean; do not you remember? all other bees, you yourſelf confeſs to be commonwealths. But leave off playing the fool with bees; they belong to the Muſes, and hate, and (you ſee) confute ſuch a beetle as you are. "The quails are under a captain." Lay

ſuch

ſuch ſnares for your own bitterns; you are not fowler good enough to catch us. Now you begin to be perſonally concerned. Gallus Gallinaceus, a cock, ſay you, "has both cocks and hens under him." How can that be, ſince you yourſelf that are Gallus, and but too much Gallinaceus, by report cannot govern your own ſingle hen, but let her govern you? So that if a Gallinaceus be a king over many hens, you that are a ſlave to one, muſt own yourſelf not to be ſo good as a Gallinaceus, but ſome Stercorarius Gallus, ſome dunghill-cock or other. For matter of books, there is no body publiſhes huger dunghills than you, and you diſturb all people with your ſhitten cock-crow; that is the only property in which you reſemble a true cock. I will throw you a great many barley-corns, if in ranſacking this dunghill-book of yours, you can ſhow me but one jewel. But why ſhould I promiſe you barley, that never pecked at corn, as that honeſt plain cock that we read of in Æſop, but at gold, as that roguey cock in Plautus, though with a different event; for you found a hundred Jacobuſſes, and he was ſtruck dead with Euclio's club, which you deſerve more than he did. But let us go on: "That ſame natural reaſon that deſigns the good and ſafety of all mankind, requires, that whoever be once promoted to the ſovereignty, be preſerved in the poſſeſſion of it." Whoever queſtioned this, as long as his preſervation is conſiſtent with the ſafety of all the reſt? But is it not obvious to all men, that nothing can be more contrary to natural reaſon, than that any one man ſhould be preſerved and defended, to the utter ruin and deſtruction of all others? But yet (you ſay) "it is better to keep and defend a bad prince, nay one of the worſt that ever was, than to change him for another; becauſe his ill government cannot do the commonwealth ſo much harm as the diſturbances will occaſion, which muſt of neceſſity be raiſed before the people can get rid of him." But what is this to the right of kings by the law of nature? If nature teaches me rather to ſuffer myſelf to be robbed by highwaymen, or if I ſhould be taken captive by ſuch, to purchaſe my liberty with all my eſtate, than to fight with them for my life, can you infer from thence, that

they have a natural right to rob and ſpoil me? Nature teaches men to give way ſometimes to the violence and outrages of tyrants, the neceſſity of affairs ſometimes enforces a toleration with their enormities; what foundation can you find in this forced patience of a nation, in this compulſory ſubmiſſion, to build a right upon, for princes to tyrannize by the law of nature? That right which nature has given the people for their own preſervation, can you affirm that ſhe has inveſted tyrants with for the people's ruin and deſtruction? Nature teaches us, of two evils to chooſe the leaſt; and to bear with oppreſſion, as long as there is a neceſſity of ſo doing; and will you infer from hence, that tyrants have ſome right by the law of nature to oppreſs their ſubjects, and go unpuniſhed, becauſe, as circumſtances may fall out, it may ſometimes be a leſs miſchief to bear with them than to remove them? Remember what yourſelf once wrote concerning biſhops againſt a jeſuit; you were then of another opinion than you are now: I have quoted your words formerly; you there affirm "that ſeditious civil diſſenſions and diſcords of the nobles and common people againſt and amongſt one another are much more tolerable, and leſs miſchievous, than certain miſery and deſtruction under the government of a ſingle perſon, that plays the tyrant." And you ſaid very true. For you had not then run mad; you had not then been bribed with Charles his Jacobuſſes. You had not got the Kingsevil. I ſhould tell you perhaps, if I did not know you, that you might be aſhamed thus to prevaricate. But you can ſooner burſt than bluſh, who have caſt off all ſhame for a little profit. Did you not remember, that the commonwealth of the people of Rome flouriſhed and became glorious when they had baniſhed their kings? Could you poſſibly forget that of the Low Countries? which, after it had ſhook off the yoke of the king of Spain, after long and tedious wars, but crowned with ſucceſs, obtained its liberty, and feeds ſuch a pitiful grammarian as yourſelf with a penſion: but not with a deſign that their youth might be ſo infatuated by your ſophiſtry, as to chooſe rather to return to their former ſlavery, than inherit the glorious liberty which

their

their anceſtors purchaſed for them. May thoſe pernicious principles of yours be baniſhed with yourſelf into the moſt remote and barbarous corners of the world. And laſt of all, the commonwealth of England might have afforded you an example, in which Charles, who had been their king, after he had been taken captive in war, and was found incurable, was put to death. But "they have defaced and impoveriſhed the iſland with civil broils and diſcords, which under its kings was happy, and ſwam in luxury." Yea, when it was almoſt buried in luxury and voluptuouſneſs, and the more inured thereto, that it might be enthralled the more eaſily; when its laws were aboliſhed, and its religion agreed to be ſold, they delivered it from ſlavery. You are like him that publiſhed Simplicius and Epictetus in the ſame volume; a very grave ſtoic, "who call an iſland happy, becauſe it ſwims in luxury." I am ſure no ſuch doctrine ever came out of Zeno's ſchool. But why ſhould not you, who would give kings a power of doing what they liſt, have liberty yourſelf to broach what new philoſophy you pleaſe? Now begin again to act your part. "There never was in any king's reign ſo much blood ſpilt, ſo many families ruined." All this is to be imputed to Charles, not to us, who firſt raiſed an army of Iriſhmen againſt us; who by his own warrant authorized the Iriſh nation to conſpire againſt the Engliſh; who by their means ſlew two hundred thouſand of his Engliſh ſubjects in the province of Ulſter, beſides what numbers were ſlain in other parts of that kingdom; who ſolicited two armies towards the deſtruction of the parliament of England, and the city of London; and did many other actions of hoſtility before the parliament and people had liſted one ſoldier for the preſervation and defence of the government. What principles, what law, what religion ever taught men rather to conſult their eaſe, to ſave their money, their blood, nay their lives themſelves, than to oppoſe an enemy with force? for I make no difference between a foreign enemy and another, ſince both are equally dangerous and deſtructive to the good of the whole nation. The people of Iſrael ſaw very well, that they could not poſſibly puniſh the Benjamites for murdering

dering the Levite's wife, without the loſs of many men's lives: and did that induce them to ſit ſtill? Was that accounted a ſufficient argument why they ſhould abſtain from war, from a very bloody civil war? Did they therefore ſuffer the death of one poor woman to be unrevenged? Certainly if nature teaches us rather to endure the government of a king, though he be never ſo bad, than to endanger the lives of a great many men in the recovery of our liberty; it muſt teach us likewiſe not only to endure a kingly government, which is the only one that you argue ought to be ſubmitted to, but even an ariſtocracy and a democracy: nay, and ſometimes it will perſuade us, to ſubmit to a multitude of highwaymen, and to ſlaves that mutiny. Fulvius and Rupilius, if your principles had been received in their days, muſt not have engaged in the ſervile war (as their writers call it) after the Prætorian armies were ſlain: Craſſus muſt not have marched againſt Spartacus, after the rebels had deſtroyed one Roman army, and ſpoiled their tents: nor muſt Pompey have undertaken the Piratic war. But the ſtate of Rome muſt have purſued the dictates of nature, and muſt have ſubmitted to their own ſlaves, or to the pirates, rather than run the hazard of loſing ſome men's lives. You do not prove at all, that nature has imprinted any ſuch notion as this of yours on the minds of men: and yet you cannot forbear boding us ill luck, and denouncing the wrath of God againſt us (which may Heaven divert, and inflict it upon yourſelf, and all ſuch prognoſticators as you) who have puniſhed, as he deſerved, one that had the name of our king, but was in fact our implacable enemy; and we have made atonement for the death of ſo many of our countrymen, as our civil wars have occaſioned, by ſhedding his blood, that was the author and cauſe of them. Then you tell us, that a kingly government appears to be more according to the laws of nature, becauſe more nations, both in our days, and of old, have ſubmitted to that form of government than ever did to any other." I anſwer, if that be ſo, it was neither the effect of any dictate of the law of nature, nor was it in obedience to any command from God. God would not ſuffer his

own

own people to be under a king; he conſented at laſt, but unwillingly; what nature and right reaſon dictates, we are not to gather from the practice of moſt nations, but of the wiſeſt and moſt prudent. The Grecians, the Romans, the Italians, and Carthaginians, with many other, have of their own accord, out of choice, preferred a commonwealth to a kingly government; and theſe nations that I have named, are better inſtances than all the reſt. Hence Sulpitius Severus ſays, "That the very name of a king was always very odious among a free-born people." But theſe things concern not our preſent purpoſe, nor many other impertinences that follow over and over again. I will make haſte to prove that by examples, which I have proved already by reaſon; viz. that it is very agreeable to the law of nature, that tyrants ſhould be puniſhed; and that all nations, by the inſtinct of nature, have puniſhed them; which will expoſe your impudence, and make it evident, that you take a liberty to publiſh palpable downright lies. You begin with the Egyptians; and indeed, who does not ſee, that you play the gipſy yourſelf throughout? "Amongſt them," ſay you, "there is no mention extant of any king, that was ever ſlain by the people in a popular inſurrection, no war made upon any of their kings by their ſubjects, no attempt made to depoſe any of them." What think you then of Oſiris, who perhaps was the firſt king that the Egyptians ever had? Was not he ſlain by his brother Typhon, and five and twenty other conſpirators? And did not a great part of the body of the people ſide with them, and fight a battle with Iſis and Orus, the late king's wife and ſon? I paſs by Seſoſtris, whom his brother had well nigh put to death, and Chemmis and Cephrenes, againſt whom the people were deſervedly enraged; and becauſe they could not do it while they were alive, they threatened to tear them in pieces after they were dead. Do you think that a people that durſt lay violent hands upon good kings, had any reſtraint upon them, either by the light of nature or religion, from putting bad ones to death? Could they that threatened to pull the dead bodies of their princes out of their graves, when they ceaſed to do miſchief, (though by the cuſtom of

of their own country the corpſe of the meaneſt perſon was ſacred and inviolable) abſtain from inflicting puniſhment upon them in their lifetime, when they were acting all their villanies, if they had been able, and that upon ſome maxim of the law of nature? I know you would not ſtick to anſwer me in the affirmative, how abſurd ſoever it be; but that you may not offer at it, I will pull out your tongue. Know then, that ſome ages before Cephrenes's time, one Ammoſis was king of Egypt, and was as great a tyrant, as who has been the greateſt; him the people bore with. This you are glad to hear; this is what you would be at. But hear what follows, my honeſt Telltruth. I ſhall ſpeak out of Diodorus, "They bore with him for ſome while, becauſe he was too ſtrong for them." But when Actiſanes king of Ethiopia made war upon him, they took that opportunity to revolt, ſo that being deſerted, he was eaſily ſubdued, and Egypt became an acceſſion to the kingdom of Ethiopia. You ſee the Egyptians, as ſoon as they could, took up arms againſt a tyrant; they joined forces with a foreign prince, to depoſe their own king, and diſinherit his poſterity; they choſe to live under a moderate and good prince, as Actiſanes was, though a foreigner, rather than under a tyrant of their own. The ſame people with a very unanimous conſent took up arms againſt Apries, another tyrant, who relied upon foreign aids that he had hired to aſſiſt him. Under the conduct of Amaſis their general they conquered, and afterwards ſtrangled him, and placed Amaſis in the throne. And obſerve this circumſtance in the hiſtory; Amaſis kept the captive king a good while in the palace, and treated him well: at laſt, when the people complained that he nouriſhed his own and their enemy; he delivered him into their hands, who put him to death in the manner I have mentioned. Theſe things are related by Herodotus and Diodorus. Where are you now? do you think that any tyrant would not chooſe a hatchet rather than a halter? "Afterwards," ſay you, "when the Egyptians were brought into ſubjection by the Perſians, they continued faithful to them;" which is moſt falſe; they never were faithful to them: for in the fourth year after Cambyſes had ſubdued them,

they

they rebelled. Afterwards, when Xerxes had tamed them, within a ſhort time they revolted from his ſon Artaxerxes, and ſet up one Inarus to be their king. After his death they rebelled again, and created one Tachus king, and made war upon Artaxerxes Mnemon. Neither were they better ſubjects to their own princes, for they depoſed Tachus, and conferred the government upon his ſon Nectanebus, till at laſt Artaxerxes Ochus brought them the ſecond time under ſubjection to the Perſian empire. When they were under the Macedonian empire, they declared by their actions, that tyrants ought to be under ſome reſtraint: they threw down the ſtatues and images of Ptolemæus Phyſco, and would have killed him, but that the mercenary army, that he commanded, was too ſtrong for them. His ſon Alexander was forced to leave his country by the mere violence of the people, who were incenſed againſt him for killing his mother: and the people of Alexandria dragged his ſon Alexander out of the palace, whoſe inſolent behaviour gave juſt offence, and killed him in the theatre: and the ſame people depoſed Ptolemæus Auletes for his many crimes. Now ſince it is impoſſible, that any learned man ſhould be ignorant of theſe things that are ſo generally known; and ſince it is an inexcuſable fault in Salmaſius to be ignorant of them, whoſe profeſſion it is to teach them others, and whoſe very aſſerting things of this nature ought to carry in itſelf an argument of credibility; it is certainly a very ſcandalous thing (I ſay) either that ſo ignorant, illiterate a blockhead, ſhould, to the ſcandal of all learning, profeſs himſelf, and be accounted a learned man, and obtain ſalaries from princes and ſtates; or that ſo impudent and notorious a liar ſhould not be branded with ſome particular mark of infamy, and for ever baniſhed from the ſociety of learned and honeſt men. Having ſearched among the Egyptians for examples, let us now conſider the Ethiopians their neighbours. They adore their kings, whom they ſuppoſe God to have appointed over them, even as if they were a ſort of Gods: and yet whenever the prieſts condemn any of them, they kill themſelves: and on that manner, ſays Diodorus, they puniſh all their criminals; they put them

them not to death, but ſend a miniſter of juſtice to command them to deſtroy their own perſons. In the next place, you mention the Aſſyrians, the Medes, and the Perſians, who of all others were moſt obſervant of their princes: and you affirm, contrary to all hiſtorians that have wrote any thing concerning thoſe nations, that "the regal power there, had an unbounded liberty annexed to it, of doing what the king liſted." In the firſt place, the prophet Daniel tells us, how the Babylonians expelled Nebuchadnezzar out of human ſociety, and made him graze with the beaſts, when his pride grew to be inſufferable. The laws of thoſe countries were not entitled the laws of their kings, but the laws of the Medes and Perſians; which laws were irrevocable, and the kings themſelves were bound by them: inſomuch that Darius the Mede, though he earneſtly deſired to have delivered Daniel from the hands of the princes, yet could not effect it. "Thoſe nations," ſay you, "thought it no ſufficient pretence to reject a prince, becauſe he abuſed the right that was inherent in him as he was ſovereign." But in the very writing of theſe words you are ſo ſtupid, as that with the ſame breath that you commend the obedience and ſubmiſſiveneſs of thoſe nations, of your own accord you make mention of Sardanapalus's being deprived of his crown by Arbaces. Neither was it he alone that accompliſhed that enterprize; for he had the aſſiſtance of the prieſts (who of all others were beſt verſed in the law) and of the people; and it was wholly upon this account that he depoſed him, becauſe he abuſed his authority and power, not by giving himſelf over to cruelty, but to luxury and effeminacy. Run over the hiſtories of Herodotus Cteſias, Diodorus, and you will find things quite contrary to what you aſſert here; you will find that thoſe kingdoms were deſtroyed for the moſt part by ſubjects, and not by foreigners; that the Aſſyrians were brought down by the Medes, who then were their ſubjects, and the Medes by the Perſians, who at that time were likewiſe ſubject to them. You yourſelf confeſs, that "Cyrus rebelled, and that at the ſame time in divers parts of the empire little upſtart governments were formed by thoſe that ſhook off the Medes." But does this

his agree with what you ſaid before? Does this prove he obedience of the Medes and Perſians to their princes, nd that Jus Regium which you had aſſerted to have een univerſally received amongſt thoſe nations? What otion can cure this brainſick frenzy of yours? You ay, "it appears by Herodotus how abſolute the Perſian ings were." Cambyſes being deſirous to marry his iſters, conſulted with the judges, who were the intrepreers of the laws, to whoſe deciſion all difficult matters vere to be referred. What anſwer had he from them? They told him, they knew no law which permitted a rother to marry his ſiſter; but another law they knew, hat the kings of Perſia might do what they liſted. Now o this I anſwer, if the kings of Perſia were really ſo abſoute, what need was there of any other to interpret he laws, beſides the king himſelf? Thoſe ſuperfluous nneceſſary judges would have had their abode and reſilence in any other place rather than in the palace, where hey were altogether uſeleſs. Again, if thoſe kings night do whatever they would, it is not credible, that o ambitious a prince as Cambyſes was, ſhould be ſo gnorant of that grand prerogative, as to conſult with the judges whether what he deſired were according to law. What was the matter then? either they deſigned to humour the king, as you ſay they did, or they were afraid o croſs his inclination, which is the account that Herodotus gives of it; and ſo told him of ſuch a law, as they knew would pleaſe him, and in plain terms made a fool of him, which is no new thing with judges and lawyers nowadays. "But," ſay you, "Artabanus a Perſian told Themiſtocles, that there was no better law in Perſia, than that by which it was enacted, that kings were to be honoured and adored." An excellent law that was without doubt, which commanded ſubjects to adore their princes! but the primitive fathers have long ago damned it; and Artabanus was a proper perſon to recommend ſuch a law, who was the very man that a little while after ſlew Xerxes with his own hand. You quote regicides to aſſert royalty. I am afraid you have ſome deſign upon kings. In the next place, you quote the poet Claudian, to prove how obedient the Perſians were.

But

But I appeal to their hiſtories and annals, which are full of the revolts of the Perſians, the Medes, the Bactrians, and Babylonians, and give us frequent inſtances of the murders of their princes. The next perſon whoſe authority you cite, is Otanes the Perſian, who likewiſe killed Smerdis then king of Perſia, to whom, out of the hatred which he bore to a kingly government, he reckons up the impieties and injurious actions of kings, their violation of all laws, their putting men to death without any legal conviction, their rapes and adulteries; and all this you will have called the right of kings, and ſlander Samuel again as a teacher of ſuch doctrines. You quote Homer, who ſays that kings derive their authority from Jupiter; to which I have already given an anſwer. For king Philip of Macedon, whoſe aſſerting the right of kings you make uſe of; I will believe that Charles his deſcription of it, as ſoon as his. Then you quote ſome ſentences out of a fragment of Diogenes a Pythagorean; but you do not tell us what ſort of a king he ſpeaks of. Obſerve therefore how he begins that diſcourſe; for whatever follows muſt be underſtood to have relation to it. "Let him be king," ſays he, "that of all others is moſt juſt, and ſo he is that acts moſt according to law; for no man can be king that is not juſt; and without laws there can be no juſtice." This is directly oppoſite to that regal right of yours. And Ecphantas, whom you likewiſe quote, is of the ſame opinion: "Whoſoever takes upon him to be a king, ought to be naturally moſt pure and clear from all imputation." And a little after, "Him," ſays he, "we call a king, that governs well, and he only is properly ſo." So that ſuch a king as you ſpeak of, according to the philoſophy of the Pythagoreans, is no king at all. Hear now what Plato ſays in his Eighth Epiſtle: "Let kings," ſay he, "be liable to be called to account for what they do: Let the laws control not only the people but kings themſelves, if they do any thing not warranted by law." I will mention what Ariſtotle ſays in the Third Book of his Politics; "It is neither for the public good, nor is it juſt," ſays he, "ſeeing all men are by nature alike and equal, that any one ſhould be lord and maſter over all the reſt, where there

there are no laws; nor is it for the public good, or juſt, that one man ſhould be a law to the reſt, where there are laws; nor that any one, though a good man, ſhould be lord over other good men, nor a bad man, over bad men." And in the Fifth Book, ſays he, "That king whom the people refuſe to be governed by, is no longer a king, but a tyrant." Hear what Xenophon ſays in Hiero: "People are ſo far from revenging the deaths of tyrants, that they confer great honour upon him that kills one, and erect ſtatues in their temples to the honour of tyrannicides." Of this I can produce an eye-witneſs, Marcus Tullius, in his oration pro Milone; "The Grecians," ſay he, "aſcribe divine worſhip to ſuch as kill tyrants: what things of this nature have I myſelf ſeen at Athens, and in the other cities of Greece? how many religious obſervances have been inſtituted in honour of ſuch men? how many hymns? They are conſecrated to immortality and adoration, and their memory endeavoured to be perpetuated." And laſtly, Polybius, a hiſtorian of great authority and gravity, in the Sixth Book of his Hiſtory, ſays thus: "When princes began to indulge their own luſts and ſenſual appetites, then kingdoms were turned into ſo many tyrannies, and the ſubjects began to conſpire the death of their governors; neither was it the profligate ſort that were the authors of thoſe deſigns, but the moſt generous and magnanimous." I could quote many ſuch like paſſages, but I ſhall inſtance in no more. From the philoſophers you appeal to the poets; and I am very willing to follow you thither. Æſchylus is enough to inform us, that the power of the kings of Greece was ſuch, as not to be liable to the cenſure of any laws, or to be queſtioned before any human judicature; for he in that tragedy that is called, The Suppliants, calls the king of the Argives, "a governor not obnoxious to the judgment of any tribunal." But you muſt know (for the more you ſay, the more you diſcover your raſhneſs and want of judgment) you muſt know, I ſay, that one is not to regard what the poet ſays, but what perſon in the play ſpeaks, and what that perſon ſays; for different perſons are introduced, ſometimes good,

ſometimes bad; ſometimes wiſe men, ſometimes fools; and ſuch words are put into their mouths, as it is moſt proper for them to ſpeak; not ſuch as the poet would ſpeak, if he were to ſpeak in his own perſon. The fifty daughters of Danaus, being baniſhed out of Egypt, became ſuppliants to the king of the Argives; they begged of him, that he would protect them from the Egyptians, who purſued them with a fleet of ſhips. The king told them he could not undertake their protection, till he had imparted the matter to the people; "For," ſays he, "if I ſhould make a promiſe to you, I ſhould not be able to perform it, unleſs I conſult with them firſt." The women being ſtrangers and ſuppliants, and fearing the uncertain ſuffrages of the people, tell him, "That the power of all the people reſides in him alone; that he judges all others, but is not judged himſelf by any." He anſwers: "I have told you already, That I cannot do this thing that you deſire of me, without the people's conſent; nay, and though I could, I would not." At laſt he refers the matter to the people; "I will aſſemble the people," ſays he, "and perſuade them to protect you." The people met, and reſolved to engage in their quarrel; inſomuch that Danaus their father bids his daughters "be of good cheer, for the people of the country, in a popular convention, had voted their ſafeguard and defence." If I had not related the whole thing, how raſhly would this impertinent Ignoramus have determined concerning the right of kings among the Grecians, out of the mouths of a few women that were ſtrangers and ſuppliants, though the king himſelf, and the hiſtory be quite contrary? The ſame thing appears by the ſtory of Oreſtes in Euripides, who after his father's death was himſelf king of the Argives, and yet was called in queſtion by the people for the death of his mother, and made to plead for his life, and by the major ſuffrage was condemned to die. The ſame poet, in his play called "The Suppliants," declares, That at Athens the kingly power was ſubject to the laws; where Theſeus then king of that city is made to ſay theſe words: "This is a free city, it is not governed by one man; the people reigns here." And his ſon Demophoon,

phoon, who was king after him, in another tragedy of the ſame poet, called Heraclidæ; "I do not exerciſe a tyrannical power over them, as if they were Barbarians: I am upon other terms with them; but if I do them juſtice, they will do me the like." Sophocles in his Œdipus ſhows, That anciently in Thebes the kings were not abſolute neither: hence ſays Tireſias to Œdipus, "I am not your ſlave." And Creon to the ſame king, "I have ſome right in this city," ſays he, "as well as you." And in another tragedy of the ſame poet, called Antigone, Æmon tells the king, "That the city of Thebes is not governed by a ſingle perſon." All men know, that the kings of Lacedæmon have been arraigned, and ſometimes put to death judicially. Theſe inſtances are ſufficient to evince what power the kings in Greece had. Let us conſider now the Romans: You betake yourſelf to that paſſage of C. Memmius in Salluſt, of kings having a liberty to do what they liſt, and go unpuniſhed; to which I have given an anſwer already. Salluſt himſelf ſays in expreſs words, "That the ancient government of Rome was by their laws, though the name and form of it was regal: which form of government, when it grew into a tyranny, you know they put down and changed." Cicero, in his oration againſt Piſo, "Shall I," ſays he, "account him a conſul, who would not allow the ſenate to have any authority in the commonwealth? Shall I take notice of any man as conſul, if at the ſame time there be no ſuch thing as a ſenate; when of old the city of Rome acknowledged not their kings, if they acted without, or in oppoſition to the ſenate? Do you hear; the very kings themſelves at Rome ſignified nothing without the ſenate. "But," ſay you, "Romulus governed as he liſted;" and for that you quote Tacitus. No wonder: the government was not then eſtabliſhed by law; they were a confuſed multitude of ſtrangers, more likely than a regulated ſtate; and all mankind lived without laws, before governments were ſettled. But when Romulus was dead, though all the people were deſirous of a king, not having yet experienced the ſweetneſs of liberty, yet, as Livy informs us, "The ſovereign power reſided in the people; ſo that they parted not with more right

than they retained." The ſame author tells us, "That the ſame power was afterwards extorted from them by their emperors." Servius Tullius at firſt reigned by fraud, and as it were a deputy to Tarquinius Priſcus; but afterward he referred it to the people, Whether they would have him reign or no? At laſt, ſays Tacitus, he became the author of ſuch laws as the kings were obliged to obey. Do you think he would have done ſuch an injury to himſelf and his poſterity, if he had been of opinion, that the right of kings had been above all laws? Their laſt king, Tarquinius Superbus, was the firſt that put an end to that cuſtom of conſulting the ſenate concerning all public affairs: for which very thing, and other enormities of his, the people depoſed him, and baniſhed him and his family. Theſe things I have out of Livy and Cicero, than whom you will hardly produce any better expoſitors of the right of kings among the Romans. As for the dictatorſhip, that was but temporary, and was never made uſe of, but in great extremities, and was not to continue longer than ſix months. But that which you call the right of the Roman emperors, was no right, but a plain downright force; and was gained by war only. "But Tacitus," ſay you, "that lived under the government of a ſingle perſon, writes thus; the Gods have committed the ſovereign power in human affairs to princes only, and have left to ſubjects the honour of being obedient." But you tell us not where Tacitus has theſe words, for you were conſcious to yourſelf, that you impoſed upon your readers in quoting them; which I preſently ſmelt out, though I could not find the place of a ſudden: for that expreſſion is not Tacitus's own, who is an approved writer, and of all others the greateſt enemy to tyrants; but Tacitus relates that of M. Terentius, a gentleman of Rome, being accuſed for a capital crime, amongſt other things that he ſaid to ſave his life, flattered Tiberius on this manner. It is in the Sixth Book of his Annals. "The gods have entruſted you with the ultimate judgment in all things; they have left us the honour of obedience." And you cite this paſſage as if Tacitus had ſaid it himſelf; you ſcrape together whatever ſeems to make for your

your opinion, either out of oſtentation, or out of weakneſs; you would leave out nothing that you could find in a baker's or a barber's ſhop; nay, you would be glad of any thing that looked like an argument, from the very hangman. If you had read Tacitus himſelf, and not tranſcribed ſome looſe quotations out of him by other authors, he would have taught you whence that imperial right had its original. "After the conqueſt of Aſia," ſays he, "the whole ſtate of our affairs was turned upſide down; nothing of the ancient integrity of our forefathers was left amongſt us; all men ſhook off that former equality which had been obſerved, and began to have reverence for the mandates of princes." This you might have learned out of the Third Book of his Annals, whence you have all your regal right. "When that ancient equality was laid aſide, and inſtead thereof ambition and violence took place, tyrannical forms of government ſtarted up, and fixed themſelves in many countries." The ſame thing you might have learned out of Dio, if your natural levity and unſettledneſs of judgment would have ſuffered you to apprehend any thing that is ſolid. He tells us in the Fifty-third Book of his Hiſtory, out of which book you have made ſome quotation already, That Octavius Cæſar, partly by force, and partly by fraud, brought things to that paſs, that the emperors of Rome became no longer fettered by laws. For he, though he promiſed to the people in public that he would lay down the government, and obey the laws, and become ſubject to others; yet, under pretence of making war in ſeveral provinces of the empire, ſtill retained the legions, and ſo by degrees invaded the government, which he pretended he would refuſe. This was not regularly getting from under the law, but breaking forcibly through all laws, as Spartacus the gladiator might have done; and then aſſuming to himſelf the ſtyle of prince or emperor, as if God or the law of nature had put all men and all laws into ſubjection under him. Would you inquire a little further into the original of the right of the Roman emperors? Marcus Antonius, whom Cæſar (when by taking up arms againſt the commonwealth he had got all the power into his hands) had made conſul,

when a ſolemnity called the Lupercalia was celebrated at Rome, as had been contrived beforehand, that he ſhould ſet a crown upon Cæſar's head, though the people ſighed and lamented at the ſight, cauſed it to be entered upon record, that Marcus Antonius, at the Lupercalia, made Cæſar king at the inſtance of the people. Of which action Cicero in his ſecond Philippic ſays, "was Lucius Tarquinius therefore expelled, Spurius Caſſius, Sp. Melius, and Marcus Manilius put to death, that after many ages Marcus Antonius ſhould make a king in Rome, contrary to law?" But you deſerve to be tortured, and loaded with everlaſting diſgrace, much more than Mark Antony; though I would not have you proud becauſe he and yourſelf are put together; for I do not think ſo deſpicable a wretch as you fit to be compared with him in any thing but his impiety; you that in thoſe horrible Lupercalia of yours ſet not a crown upon one tyrant's head, but upon all, and ſuch a crown as you would have limited by no laws, nor liable to any. Indeed if we muſt believe the oracles of the emperors themſelves, (for ſo ſome chriſtian emperors, as Theodoſius and Valens, have called their edicts, Cod. lib. 1. tit. 14.) the authority of the emperors depends upon that of the law. So that the majeſty of the perſon that reigns, even by the judgment, or call it the oracle of the emperors themſelves, muſt ſubmit to the laws, on whoſe authority it depends. Hence Pliny tells Trajan in his Panegyric, when the power of the emperors was grown to its height, "A principality, and an abſolute ſovereignty are quite different things. Trajan puts down whatever looks like a kingdom; he rules likes a prince, that there may be no room for a magiſterial power." And afterwards, "whatever I have ſaid of other princes, I ſaid that I might ſhow how our prince reforms and corrects the manners of princes, which by long cuſtom have been corrupted and depraved." Are you not aſhamed to call that the right of kings, that Pliny calls the corrupt and depraved cuſtoms of princes? But let this ſuffice to have been ſaid in ſhort of the right of kings, as it was taken at Rome. How they dealt with their tyrants, whether kings or emperors, is generally known. They expelled Tarquin.

"But,"

"But," ſay you, "how did they expel him? Did they proceed againſt him judicially? No ſuch matter: when he would have come into the city, they ſhut the gates againſt him." Ridiculous fool! what could they do but ſhut the gates, when he was haſtening to them with part of the army? And what great difference will there be, whether they baniſhed him or put him to death, ſo they puniſhed him one way or other? The beſt men of that age killed Cæſar the tyrant in the very ſenate. Which action of theirs, Marcus Tullius, who was himſelf a very excellent man, and publicly called the father of his country, both elſewhere and particularly in his ſecond Philippic, extols wonderfully. I will repeat ſome of his words: "All good men killed Cæſar as far as in them lay. Some men could not adviſe in it, others wanted courage to act in it, others an opportunity, all had a good will to it." And afterwards, "what greater and more glorious action (ye holy Gods!) ever was performed, not in this city only, but in any other country? what action more worthy to be recommended to everlaſting memory? I am not unwilling to be included within the number of thoſe that adviſed it, as within the Trojan horſe." The paſſage of Seneca may relate both to the Romans, and the Grecians: "there cannot be a greater, nor more acceptable ſacrifice offered up to Jupiter, than a wicked prince." For if you conſider Hercules, whoſe words theſe are, they ſhow what the opinion was of the principal men amongſt the Grecians in that age. If the poet, who flouriſhed under Nero, (and the moſt worthy perſons in plays generally expreſs the poet's own ſenſe) then this paſſage ſhows us what Seneca himſelf and all good men, even in Nero's time, thought was fit to be done to a tyrant; and how virtuous an action, how acceptable to God, they thought it to kill one. So every good man of Rome, as far as in him lay, killed Domitian. Pliny the ſecond owns it openly in his Panegyric to Trajan the emperor, "we took pleaſure in daſhing thoſe proud looks againſt the ground, in piercing him with our ſwords, in mangling him with axes, as if he had bled and felt pain at every ſtroke: no man could ſo command his paſſion of joy, but that he counted it a piece of revenge to behold his

mangled limbs, his members torn aſunder, and after all, his ſtern and horrid ſtatues thrown down and burnt." And afterwards, "they cannot love good princes enough, that cannot hate bad ones as they deſerve." Then amongſt other enormities of Domitian, he reckons this for one, that he put to death Epaphroditus, that had killed Nero: "Had we forgotten the avenging Nero's death? Was it likely that he would ſuffer his life and actions to be ill ſpoken of, whoſe death he revenged?" He ſeems to have thought it almoſt a crime not to kill Nero, that counts it ſo great a one to puniſh him that did it. By what has been ſaid, it is evident, that the beſt of the Romans did not only kill tyrants, as oft as they could, and howſoever they could; but that they thought it a commendable, and a praiſeworthy action ſo to do, as the Grecians had done before them. For when they could not proceed judicially againſt a tyrant in his lifetime, being inferiour to him in ſtrength and power, yet after his death they did it, and condemned him by the Valerian law. For Valerius Publicola, Junius Brutus his colleague, when he ſaw that tyrants, being guarded with ſoldiers, could not be brought to a legal trial, he deviſed a law to make it lawful to kill them any way, though uncondemned; and that they that did it, ſhould afterwards give an account of their ſo doing. Hence, when Caſſius had actually run Caligula through with a ſword, though every body elſe had done it in their hearts, Valerius Aſiaticus, one that had been conſul, being preſent at that time, cried out to the ſoldiers, that began to mutiny becauſe of his death, "I wiſh I myſelf had killed him." And the ſenate at the ſame time was ſo far from being diſpleaſed with Caſſius for what he had done, that they reſolved to extirpate the memory of the emperors, and to raze the temples that had been erected in honour of them. When Claudius was preſently ſaluted emperor by the ſoldiers, they forbad him by the tribune of the people to take the government upon him; but the power of the ſoldiers prevailed. The ſenate declared Nero an enemy, and made inquiry after him, to have puniſhed him according to the law of their anceſtors; which required, that he ſhould be ſtripped naked, and hung by the neck upon a forked

forked ſtake, and whipped to death. Conſider now, how much more mildly and moderately the Engliſh dealt with their tyrant, though many are of opinion, that he cauſed the ſpilling of more blood than ever Nero himſelf did. So the Senate condemned Domitian after his death; they commanded his ſtatues to be pulled down and daſhed in pieces, which was all they could do. When Commodus was ſlain by his own officers, neither the ſenate nor the people puniſhed the fact, but declared him an enemy, and inquired for his dead corpſe, to have made it an example. An act of the ſenate made upon that occaſion is extant in Lampridius: "Let the enemy of his country be deprived of all his titles; let the parricide be drawn, let him be torn in pieces in the Spoliary, let the enemy of the Gods, the executioner of the ſenate be dragged with a hook," &c. The ſame perſons in a very full ſenate condemned Didus Julianus to death, and ſent a tribune to ſlay him in the palace. The ſame ſenate depoſed Maximinus, and declared him an enemy. Let us hear the words of the decree of the ſenate concerning him, as Capitolinus relates it: "The conſul put the queſtion, 'conſcript fathers, what is your pleaſure concerning the Maximines?' They anſwered, 'They are enemies, they are enemies, whoever kills them ſhall be rewarded." Would you know now, whether the people of Rome, and the provinces of the empire obeyed the ſenate, or Maximine the emperor? Hear what the ſame author ſays, the ſenate wrote letters into all the provinces, requiring them to take care of their common ſafety and liberty; the letters were publicly read. And the friends, the deputies, the generals, the tribunes, the ſoldiers of Maximine, were ſlain in all places; very few cities were found, that kept their faith with the public enemy. Herodian relates the ſame thing. But what need we give any more inſtances out of the Roman hiſtories? Let us now ſee what manner of thing the right of kings was in thoſe days, in the nations that bordered upon the empire. Ambiorix, a king of the Gauls, confeſſes "the nature of his dominion to be ſuch, that the people have as great power over him, as he over them." And conſequently, as well as he judged them, he might be judged by

by them. Vercingetorix, another king in Gaul, was accuſed of treaſon by his own people. Theſe things Cæſar relates in his hiſtory of the Gallic wars. "Neither is the regal power among the Germans abſolute and uncontrollable; leſſer matters are ordered and diſpoſed by the princes; greater affairs by all the people. The king or prince is more conſiderable by the authority of his perſuaſions, than by any power that he has of commanding. If his opinion be not approved of, they declare their diſlike of it by a general murmuring noiſe." This is out of Tacitus. Nay, and you yourſelf now confeſs, that what but of late you exclaimed againſt as an unheard of thing, has been often doné, to wit, that "no leſs than fifty Scottiſh kings have been either baniſhed, or impriſoned, or put to death, nay, and ſome of them publicly executed." Which having come to paſs in our very iſland; why do you, as if it were your office to conceal the violent deaths of tyrants, by burying them in the dark, exclaim againſt it as an abominable and unheard of thing? You proceed to commend the Jews and Chriſtians for their religious obedience even to tyrants, and to heap one lie upon another; in all which I have already confuted you. Lately you made large encomiums on the obedience of the Aſſyrians and Perſians, and now you reckon up their rebellions; and though but of late you ſaid they never had rebelled at all, now you give us a great many reaſons why they rebelled ſo often. Then you reſume the narrative of the manner of our king's death, which you had broken off ſo long ſince; that if you had not taken care ſufficiently to appear ridiculous, and a fool then, you may do it now. You ſaid, "he was led through the members of his own court." What you mean by the members of the court, I would gladly know. You enumerate the calamities, that the Romans underwent by changing their kingdom into a commonwealth. In which I have already ſhown how groſsly you give yourſelf the lie. What was it you ſaid, when you wrote againſt the Jeſuit? You demonſtrated, that "in an ariſtocracy, or a popular ſtate, there could but be ſeditions and tumults, whereas under a tyrant nothing was to be looked for, but certain ruin and deſtruction:"

and

and dare you now ſay, you vain corrupt mortal, that "thoſe ſeditions were puniſhments inflicted upon them for baniſhing their kings?" Forſooth, becauſe king Charles gave you a hundred Jacobuſſes, therefore the Romans ſhall be puniſhed for baniſhing their kings. But "they that killed Julius Cæſar, did not proſper afterwards." I confeſs, if I would have had any tyrant ſpared, it ſhould have been him, For although he introduced a monarchical government into a free ſtate by force of arms, yet perhaps himſelf deſerved a kingdom beſt; and yet I conceive that none of thoſe that killed him can be ſaid to have been puniſhed for ſo doing, any more than Caius Antonius, Cicero's colleague, for deſtroying Catiline, who when he was afterward condemned for other crimes, ſays Cicero in his oration pro Flacco, "Catiline's ſepulchre was adorned with flowers." For they that favoured Catiline, they rejoiced; they gave out then, that what Catiline did was juſt, to increaſe the people's hatred againſt thoſe that had cut him off. Theſe are artifices, which wicked men make uſe of, to deter the beſt of men from puniſhing tyrants, and flagitious perſons. I might as eaſily ſay the quite contrary, and inſtance in them that have killed tyrants, and proſpered afterwards; if any certain inference might be drawn in ſuch caſes from the events of things. You object further, "that the Engliſh did not put their hereditary king to death in like manner, as tyrants uſe to be ſlain, but as robbers and traitors are executed." In the firſt place I do not, nor can any wiſe man underſtand what a crown's being hereditary ſhould contribute to a king's crimes being unpuniſhable. What you aſcribe to the barbarous cruelty of the Engliſh, proceeded rather from their clemency and moderation, and as ſuch, deſerves commendation; who, though the being a tyrant is a crime that comprehends all ſorts of enormities, ſuch as robberies, treaſons, and rebellions againſt the whole nation, yet were contented to inflict no greater puniſhment upon him for being ſo, than they uſed of courſe to do upon any common highwayman, or ordinary traitor. You hope "ſome ſuch men as Harmodius and Thraſibulus will riſe up againſt us, and make expiation for the king's death, by ſhedding

their blood that were the authors of it." But you will run mad with deſpair, and be deteſted by all good men, and put an end to that wretched life of yours, by hanging yourſelf, before you ſee men like Harmodius avenging the blood of a tyrant upon ſuch as have done no other than what they did themſelves. That you will come to ſuch an end is moſt probable, nor can any other be expected of ſo great a rogue; but the other thing is an utter impoſſibility. You mention thirty tyrants that rebelled in Gallienus's time. And what if it fall out, that one tyrant happens to oppoſe another, muſt therefore all they that reſiſt tyrants be accounted ſuch themſelves? You cannot perſuade men into ſuch a belief, you ſlave of a knight; nor your author Trebellius Pollio, the moſt inconſiderable of all hiſtorians that have writ. "If any of the emperors were declared enemies by the ſenate," you ſay, "it was done by faction, but could not have been by law." You put us in mind what it was that made emperors at firſt: it was faction and violence, and to ſpeak plainer, it was the madneſs of Antony, that made generals at firſt rebel againſt the ſenate, and the people of Rome; there was no law, no right for their ſo doing. "Galba," you ſay, "was puniſhed for his inſurrection againſt Nero." Tell us likewiſe how Veſpaſian was puniſhed for taking up arms againſt Vitellius. "There was as much difference," you ſay, "betwixt Charles and Nero, as betwixt thoſe Engliſh butchers, and the Roman ſenators of that age." Deſpicable villain! by whom it is ſcandalous to be commended, and a praiſe to be evil ſpoken of: but a few periods before, diſcourſing of this very thing, you ſaid, "that the Roman ſenate under the emperors was in effect but an aſſembly of ſlaves in robes:" and here you ſay, "that very ſenate was an aſſembly of kings;" which if it be allowed, then are kings, according to your own opinion, but ſlaves with robes on. Kings are bleſſed, that have ſuch a fellow as you to write in their praiſe, than whom no man is more a raſcal, no beaſt more void of ſenſe, unleſs this one may be ſaid to be peculiar to you, that none ever brayed ſo learnedly. You make the parliament of England more like to Nero, than to the Roman ſenate. This itch

of

of yours of making ſilly ſimilitudes enforces me to rectify you, whether I will or no: and I will let you ſee how like king Charles was to Nero; Nero, you ſay, "commanded his own mother to be run through with a ſword." But Charles murdered both his prince, and his father, and that by poiſon. For to omit other evidences; he that would not ſuffer a duke that was accuſed for it, to come to his trial, muſt needs have been guilty of it himſelf. Nero ſlew many thouſands of chriſtians; but Charles ſlew many more. There were thoſe, ſays Suetonius, that praiſed Nero after he was dead, that longed to have had him again, "that hung garlands of flowers upon his ſepulchre," and gave out that they would never proſper, that had been his enemies. And ſome there are tranſported with the like phrenſy, that wiſh for king Charles again, and extol him to the higheſt degree imaginable, of whom you, a knight of the halter, are a ringleader. "The Engliſh ſoldiers, more ſavage than their own maſtiffs, erected a new and unheard of court of juſtice." Obſerve this ingenious ſymbol, or adage of Salmaſius, which he has now repeated ſix times over, "more ſavage than their own maſtiffs." Take notice, orators and ſchoolmaſters; pluck, if you are wiſe, this elegant flower, which Salmaſius is ſo very fond of: commit this flouriſh of a man, that is ſo much a maſter of words, to your deſks for ſafe cuſtody, leſt it be loſt. Has your rage made you forget words to tha degree, that like a cuckoo, you muſt needs ſay the ſame thing over and over again? What ſtrange thing has befallen you? The poet tells us, that ſpleen and rage turned Hecuba into a dog; and it has turned you, the lord of St. Lupus, into a cuckoo. Now you come out with freſh contradictions. You had ſaid before, pag. 113, that "princes were not bound by any laws, neither coercive, nor directory; that they were bound by no law at all." Now, you ſay, that "you will diſcourſe by and by of the difference betwixt ſome kings and others, in point of power; ſome having had more, ſome leſs." You ſay, "you will prove that kings cannot be judged, nor condemned by their own ſubjects, by a moſt ſolid argu-

argument;" but you do it by a very ſilly one, and it is this: You ſay, "There was no other difference than that betwixt the judges, and the kings of the Jews; and yet the reaſon why the Jews required to have kings over them, was becauſe they were weary of their judges, and hated their government." Do you think, that, becauſe they might judge and condemn their judges, if they miſbehaved themſelves in the government, they therefore hated and were weary of them, and would be under kings, whom they ſhould have no power to reſtrain and keep within bounds, though they ſhould break through all laws? Who but you ever argued ſo childiſhly? So that they deſired a king for ſome other reaſon, than that they might have a maſter over them, whoſe power ſhould be ſuperiour to that of the law; which reaſon, what it was, it is not to our preſent purpoſe to make a conjecture. Whatever it was, both God and his prophets tell us, it was no piece of prudence in the people to deſire a king. And now you fall foul upon your rabbins, and are very angry with them for ſaying, that a king might be judged and condemned to undergo ſtripes; out of whoſe writings you ſaid before you had proved, that the kings of the Jews could not be judged. Wherein you confeſs, that you told a lie when you ſaid you had proved any ſuch thing out of their writings. Nay, you come at laſt to forget the ſubject you were upon, of writing in the king's defence, and raiſe little impertinent controverſies about Solomon's ſtables, and how many ſtalls he had for his horſes. Then of a jockey you become a ballad-ſinger again, or rather, as I ſaid before, a raving diſtracted cuckoo. You complain, that in theſe latter ages, diſcipline has been more remiſs, and the rule leſs obſerved and kept up to; viz. becauſe one tyrant is not permitted, without a check from the law, to let looſe the reins of all diſcipline, and corrupt all men's manners. This doctrine, you ſay, the Browniſts introduced amongſt thoſe of the reformed religion; ſo that Luther, Calvin, Zuinglius, Bucer, and all the moſt celebrated orthodox divines, are Browniſts in your opinion. The Engliſh have the leſs reaſon to take your reproaches ill, becauſe they hear you belching out the

the ſame ſlanders againſt the moſt eminent doctors of the Church, and in effect againſt the whole reformed Church itſelf.

CHAP. VI.

AFTER having diſcourſed upon the law of God and of nature, and handled both ſo untowardly, that you have got nothing by the bargain but a deſerved reproach of ignorance and knavery; I cannot apprehend what you can have farther to allege in defence of your royal cauſe, but mere trifles. I for my part hope I have given ſatisfaction already to all good and learned men, and done this noble cauſe right, ſhould I break off here; yet leſt I ſhould ſeem to any to decline your variety of arguing and ingenuity, rather than your immoderate impertinence, and tittle-tattle, I will follow you wherever you have a mind to go; but with ſuch brevity as ſhall make it appear, that after having performed whatever the neceſſary defence of the cauſe required, if not what the dignity of it merited, I now do but comply with ſome men's expectation, if not their curioſity. "Now," ſay you, "I ſhall allege other and greater arguments." What! greater arguments than what the law of God and nature afforded? Help Lucina! the mountain Salmaſius is in labour! It is not for nothing that he has got a ſhe-huſband. Mortals expect ſome extraordinary birth. "If he that is, and is called a king, might be accuſed before any other power, that power muſt of neceſſity be greater than that of the king; and if ſo, then muſt that power be indeed the kingly power, and ought to have the name of it: for a kingly power is thus defined; to wit, the ſupreme power in the ſtate reſiding in a ſingle perſon, and which has no ſuperiour." O ridiculous birth! a mouſe crept out of the mountain! help grammarians! one of your number is in danger of periſhing! the law of God and of nature are ſafe; but Salmaſius's dictionary is undone. What if I ſhould anſwer you thus? That words ought to give place to things; that we having taken away kingly government itſelf, do not think ourſelves concerned about its name and definition; let others

others look to that, who are in love with kings: we are contented with the enjoyment of our liberty; ſuch an anſwer would be good enough for you. But to let you ſee that I deal fairly with you throughout, I will anſwer you, not only from my own, but from the opinion of very wiſe and good men, who have thought, that the name and power of a king are very conſiſtent with a power in the people and the law ſuperiour to that of the king himſelf. In the firſt place, Lycurgus, a man very eminent for wiſdom, deſigning, as Plato ſays, to ſecure a kingly government as well as it was poſſible, could find no better expedient to preſerve it, than by making the power of the ſenate, and of the Ephori, that is, the power of the people, ſuperiour to it. Theſeus, in Euripides, king of Athens, was of the ſame opinion; for he to his great honour reſtored the people to their liberty, and advanced the power of the people above that of the king, and yet left the regal power in that city to his poſterity. Whence Euripides in his play called the "Suppliants," introduces him ſpeaking on this manner: "I have advanced the people themſelves into the throne, having freed the city from ſlavery, and admitted the people to a ſhare in the government, by giving them an equal right of ſuffrage." And in another place to the herald of Thebes, "in the firſt place," ſays he, "you begin your ſpeech, friend, with a thing that is not true, in ſtyling me a monarch: for this city is not governed by a ſingle perſon, but is a free ſtate; the people reigns here." Theſe were his words, when at the ſame time he was both called, and really was king there. The divine Plato likewiſe, in his eighth epiſtle, "Lycurgus," ſays he, "introduced the power of the ſenate and of the Ephori, a thing very preſervative of kingly government, which by this means has honourably flouriſhed for ſo many ages, becauſe the law in effect was made king. Now the law cannot be king, unleſs there be ſome, who, if there ſhould be occaſion, may put the law in execution againſt the king. A kingly government ſo bounded and limited, he himſelf commends to the Sicilians: "Let the people enjoy their liberty under a kingly government; let the king himſelf

himſelf be accountable; let the law take place even againſt kings themſelves, if they act contrary to law." Ariſtotle likewiſe, in the third book of his Politics, "of all kingdoms," ſays he, "that are governed by laws, that of the Lacedemonians ſeems to be moſt truly and properly ſo." And he ſays, all forms of kingly governments are according to ſettled and eſtabliſhed laws, but one, which he calls παμβασιλεία, or Abſolute Monarchy, which he does not mention ever to have obtained in any nation. So that Ariſtotle thought ſuch a kingdom, as that of the Lacedemonians was, to be and deſerve the name of a kingdom more properly than any other; and conſequently that a king, though ſubordinate to his own people, was nevertheleſs actually a king, and properly ſo called. Now ſince ſo many and ſo great authors aſſert, that a kingly government both in name and thing may very well ſubſiſt even where the people, though they do not ordinarily exerciſe the ſupreme power, yet have it actually reſiding in them, and exerciſe it upon occaſion; be not you of ſo mean a ſoul as to fear the downfall of grammar, and the confuſion of the ſignification of words to that degree, as to betray the liberty of mankind, and the ſtate, rather than your gloſſary ſhould not hold water. And know for the future, that words muſt be conformable to things, not things to words. By this means you will have more wit, and not run on in infinitum, which now you are afraid of. "It was to no purpoſe then for Seneca," you ſay, "to deſcribe thoſe three forms of government, as he has done." Let Seneca do a thing to no purpoſe, ſo we enjoy our liberty. And if I miſtake us not, we are other ſort of men, than to be enſlaved by Seneca's flowers. And yet Seneca, though he ſays, that the ſovereign power in a kingly government reſides in a ſingle perſon, ſays withal, that "the power is the people's," and by them committed to the king for the welfare of the whole, not for their ruin and deſtruction; and that the people has not given him a propriety in it, but the uſe of it. "Kings at this rate," you ſay, "do not reign by God but by the people." As if God did not ſo overrule the people, that they ſet up ſuch kings, as

it pleaſes God. Since Juſtinian himſelf openly acknowledges, that the Roman emperors derived their authority from that "royal law, whereby the people granted to them and veſted in them all their own power and authority." But how oft ſhall we repeat theſe things over and over again? Then you take upon you to intermeddle with the conſtitution of our government, in which you are no way concerned, who are both a ſtranger and a foreigner; but it ſhows your ſaucineſs, and want of good manners. Come then, let us hear your ſoleciſms, like a buſy coxcomb as you are. You tell us, but it is in falſe Latin, "that what thoſe deſperadoes ſay, is only to deceive the people." You raſcal! was it not for this that you, a renegado grammarian, were ſo forward to intermeddle with the affairs of our government, that you might introduce your ſoleciſms and barbariſms amongſt us? But ſay, how have we deceived the people? "The form of government, which they have ſet up, is not popular, but military." This is what that herd of fugitives and vagabonds hired you to write. So that I ſhall not trouble myſelf to anſwer you, who bleat what you know nothing of, but I will anſwer them that hired you. "Who excluded the lords from parliament, was it the people?" Ay, it was the people; and in ſo doing they threw an intolerable yoke of ſlavery from off their necks. Thoſe very ſoldiers, who you ſay did it, were not foreigners, but our own countrymen, and a great part of the people; and they did it with the conſent, and at the deſire of almoſt all the reſt of the people, and not without the authority of the parliament neither. "Was it the people that cut off part of the houſe of commons, forcing ſome away?" &c. Yes, I ſay, it was the people. For whatever the better and ſounder part of the ſenate did, in which the true power of the people reſided, why may not the people be ſaid to have done it? What if the greater part of the ſenate ſhould chooſe to be ſlaves, or to expoſe the government to ſale, ought not the leſſer number to interpoſe, and endeavour to retain their liberty, if it be in their power? "But the officers of the army and their ſoldiers did it." And we are beholden to thoſe officers

for not being wanting to the ſtate, but repelling the tumultuary violence of the citizens and mechanics of London, who, like that rabble that appeared for Clodius, had but a little before beſet the very parliament houſe? Do you therefore call the right of the parliament, to whom it properly and originally belongs, to take care of the liberty of the people both in peace and war, a military power? But it is no wonder that thoſe traitors that have dictated theſe paſſages to you, ſhould talk at that rate; ſo that profligate faction of Antony and his adherents uſed to call the ſenate of Rome, when they armed themſelves againſt the enemies of their country, The camp of Pompey. And now I am glad to underſtand, that they of your party envy Cromwell, that moſt valiant general of our army, for undertaking that expedition in Ireland, (ſo acceptable to Almighty God) ſurrounded with a joyful crowd of his friends, and proſecuted with the well-wiſhes of the people, and the prayers of all good men: for I queſtion not but at the news of his many victories there, they are by this time burſt with ſpleen. I paſs by many of your impertinencies concerning the Roman ſoldiers. What follows is moſt notoriouſly falſe: "The power of the people," ſay you, "ceaſes where there is a king." By what law or right is that? Since it is known that almoſt all kings, of what nations ſoever, received their authority from the people upon certain conditions; which if the king do not perform, I wiſh you would inform us, why that power, which was but a truſt, ſhould not return to the people, as well from a king, as from a conſul, or any other magiſtrate. For when you tell us, that it is neceſſary for the public ſafety, you do but trifle with us; for the ſafety of the public is equally concerned, whether it be from a King, or from a Senate, or from a Triumvirate, that the power wherewith they were entruſted reverts to the people, upon their abuſe of it; and yet you yourſelf grant, that it may ſo revert from all ſorts of magiſtrates, a king only excepted. Certainly, if no people in their right wits ever committed the government either to a king, or other magiſtrates, for any other purpoſe than for the common good of them all,

there can be no reaſon why, to prevent the utter ruin of them all, they may not as well take it back again from a king, as from other governors; nay, and it may with far greater eaſe be taken from one, than from many. And to inveſt any mortal creature with a power over themſelves, on any other terms than upon truſt, were extreme madneſs; nor is it credible that any people ſince the creation of the world, who had freedom of will, were ever ſo miſerably ſilly, as either to part with the power for ever, and to all purpoſes, or to revoke it from thoſe whom they had entruſted with it, but upon moſt urgent and weighty reaſons. If diſſenſions, if civil wars, are occaſioned thereby, there cannot any right accrue from thence to the king, to retain that power by force of arms, which the people challenge from him as their own. Whence it follows, that what you ſay, and we do not deny, that "governors are not likely to be changed," is true with reſpect to the people's prudence, not the king's right; but that therefore they ought never to be changed, upon no occaſion whatſoever, that does not follow by no means; nor have you hitherto alleged any thing, or made appear any right of kings to the contrary, but that all the people concurring, they may lawfully be depoſed, when unfit for government; provided it may be done, as it has been often done in your own country of France, without any tumults or civil wars. Since therefore the ſafety of the people, and not that of a tyrant, is the ſupreme law; and conſequently ought to be alleged on the people's behalf againſt a tyrant, and not for him againſt them: you that go about to pervert ſo ſacred and ſo glorious a law, with your fallacies and jugglings; you who would have this ſupreme law, and which of all others is moſt beneficial to mankind, to ſerve only for the impunity of tyrants; let me tell you (ſince you call us Engliſhmen ſo often inſpired, and enthuſiaſts, and prophets) let me, I ſay, be ſo far a prophet, as to tell you, that the vengeance of God and man hangs over your head for ſo horrid a crime; although your ſubjecting all mankind to tyranny, as far as in you lies, which in effect is no better than condemning them to be devoured by wild beaſts,

beaſts, is in itſelf part of its own vengeance; and whitherſoever you fly, and whereſoever you wander, will firſt or laſt purſue you with its furies, and overtake you, and cauſe you to rave worſe than you do at preſent. I come now to your ſecond argument, which is not unlike the firſt: If the people may reſume their liberty, "there would be no difference," ſay you, "betwixt a popular ſtate and a kingdom; but that in a kingdom one man rules, and in a popular ſtate many." And what if that were true; would the ſtate have any prejudice by it? But you yourſelf tell us of other differences that would be notwithſtanding; to wit, of "Time and Succeſſion; for in popular ſtates, the magiſtrates are generally choſen yearly;" whereas kings, if they behave themſelves well, are perpetual; and in moſt kingdoms there is a ſucceſſion in the ſame family. But let them differ from one another, or not differ, I regard not thoſe petty things: in this they agree, that when the public good requires it, the people may, without doing injury to any, reſume that power for the public ſafety, which they committed to another for that end and purpoſe. "But according to the royal law, by the Romans ſo called, which is mentioned in the inſtitutes, the people of Rome granted all their power and authority to the prince." They did ſo by compulſion; the emperor being willing to ratify their tyranny by the authority of a law. But of this we have ſpoken before; and their own lawyers, commenting upon this place in the inſtitutes, confeſs as much. So that we make no queſtion but the people may revoke what they were forced to grant, and granted againſt their wills. But moſt rational it is to ſuppoſe, that the people of Rome transferred no other power to the prince, than they had before granted to their own magiſtrates; and that was a power to govern according to law, and a revocable, not an abſurd, tyrannical power. Hence it was, that the emperors aſſumed the conſular dignity, and that of the tribunes of the people; but after Julius Cæſar, not one of them pretended to the dictatorſhip: in the Circus Maximus they uſed to adore the people, as I have ſaid already out of Tacitus and Claudian. But "as heretofore many pri-

vate perſons have ſold themſelves into ſlavery, ſo a whole nation may." Thou jailbird of a knight, thou day-ſpirit, thou everlaſting ſcandal to thy native country! The moſt deſpicable ſlaves in the world ought to abhor and ſpit upon ſuch a factor for ſlavery, ſuch a public pander as thou art. Certainly if people had ſo enſlaved themſelves to kings, then might kings turn them over to other maſters, or ſell them for money, and yet we know that kings cannot ſo much as alienate the demeſnes of the crown: and ſhall he, that has but the crown, and the revenues that belong to it, as an uſufructuary, and thoſe given him by the people, can he be ſaid to have, as it were, purchaſed the people, and made them his propriety? Though you were bored through both ears, and went barefoot, you would not be ſo vile and deſpicable, ſo much more contemptible than all ſlaves, as the broaching ſuch a ſcandalous doctrine as this makes you. But go on, and puniſh yourſelf for your roguries as now you do, though againſt your will. You frame a long diſcourſe of the law of war; which is nothing to the purpoſe in this place: for neither did Charles conquer us; and for his anceſtors, if it were never ſo much granted that they did, yet have they often renounced their title as conquerors. And certain it is, That we were never ſo conquered, but that as we ſwore allegiance to them, ſo they ſwore to maintain our laws, and govern by them: which laws, when Charles had notoriouſly violated, taken in what capacity you will, as one who had formerly been a conqueror or was now a perjured king, we ſubdued him by force, he himſelf having begun with us firſt. And according to your own opinion, "Whatever is acquired by war, becomes his property that acquired it." So that how full ſoever you are of words, how impertinent ſoever a babbler, whatever you prate, how great a noiſe ſoever you make, what quotations ſoever out of the rabbins, though you make yourſelf never ſo hoarſe, to the end of this chapter, aſſure yourſelf, That nothing of it makes for the king, he being now conquered, but all for us, who by God's aſſiſtance are conquerors.

CHAP. VII.

TO avoid two very great inconveniencies, and, conſidering your own weight, very weighty ones indeed, you denied in the foregoing chapter, that the people's power was ſuperiour to that of the king; for if that ſhould be granted, kings muſt provide themſelves of ſome other name, becauſe the people would indeed be king, and ſome diviſions in your ſyſtem of politics would be confounded: the firſt of which inconveniencies would thwart with your dictionary, and the latter overthrow your politics. To theſe I have given ſuch an anſwer as ſhows, that though our own ſafety and liberty were the principal things I aimed the preſervation of, yet withal, I had ſome conſideration of ſalving your dictionary, and your politics. "Now," ſay you, "I will prove by other arguments, That a king cannot be judged by his own ſubjects; of which arguments this ſhall be the greateſt and moſt convincing, that a king has no peer in his kingdom." What? Can a king have no peer in his kingdom? What then is the meaning of thoſe twelve ancient peers of the kings of France? Are they fables and trifles? Are they called ſo in vain, and in mock only? Have a care how you affront thoſe principal men of that kingdom; who if they are not the king's peers, as they are called, I am afraid your dictionary, which is the only thing you are concerned for, will be found more faulty in France than in England. But go to, let us hear your demonſtration, that a king has no peer in his own kingdom. "Becauſe," ſay you, "the people of Rome, when they had baniſhed their king, appointed not one, but two conſuls: and the reaſon was, That if one of them ſhould tranſgreſs the laws, his colleague might be a check to him." There could hardly have been deviſed any thing more ſilly: how came it to paſs then, that but one of the conſuls had the bundles of rods carried before him, and not both, if two were appointed, that each might have a power over the other? And what if both had conſpired againſt the common-

wealth? Would not the caſe then be the very ſame that it would have been, if one conſul only had been appointed without a colleague? But we know very well, that both conſuls, and all other magiſtrates were bound to obey the ſenate, whenever the ſenate and the people ſaw, that the intereſt of the commonwealth ſo required. We have a famous inſtance of that in the decemvirs, who though they were inveſted with the power of conſuls, and were the chief magiſtrates, yet the authority of the ſenate reduced them all, though they ſtruggled to retain their government. Nay, we read that ſome conſuls, before they were out of office, had been declared enemies, and arms have been taken up againſt them; for in thoſe days no man looked upon him as a conſul, who acted as an enemy. So war was waged againſt Antony, though a conſul, by authority of the ſenate; in which being worſted, he would have been put to death, but that Octavius, affecting the empire, ſided with him to ſubvert the commonwealth. Now whereas you ſay, "that it is a property peculiar to kingly majeſty, that the power reſides in a ſingle perſon;" that is but a looſe expreſſion, like the reſt of what you ſay, and is contradicted by yourſelf a little after: "for the Hebrew judges," you ſay, "ruled as long as they lived, and there was but one of them at a time: the ſcripture alſo calls them kings; and yet they were accountable to the great council." Thus we ſee, that an itch of vain glory, in being thought to have ſaid all that can be ſaid, makes you hardly ſay any thing but contradictions. Then I aſk, what kind of government that was in the Roman empire, when ſometimes two, ſometimes three emperors, reigned all at once? Do you reckon them to have been emperors, that is, kings, or was it an ariſtocracy, or a triumvirate? Or will you deny, that the Roman empire under Antoninus and Verus, under Dioclefian and Maximian, under Conſtantine and Licinius, was ſtill but one entire empire? If theſe princes were not kings, your three forms of government will hardly hold; if they were, then it is not an eſſential property of a kingly government, to reſide in a ſingle perſon. "If one of theſe offend," ſay you, "then may the other

other refer the matter to the ſenate, or the people, where he may be accuſed and condemned." And does not the ſenate and the people then judge, when the matter is ſo referred to them? So that if you will give any credit to yourſelf, there needs not one colleague to judge another. Such a miſerable advocate as you, if you were not ſo wretched a fellow as you are, would deſerve compaſſion; you lie every way ſo open to blows, that if one were minded for ſport's ſake to make a paſs at any part of you, he could hardly miſs, let him aim where he would. "It is ridiculous," ſay you, "to imagine, that a king will ever appoint judges to condemn himſelf." But I can tell you of an emperor, that was no ridiculous perſon, but an excellent prince, and that was Trajan, who when he delivered a dagger to a certain Roman magiſtrate, as the cuſtom was, that being the badge of his office, frequently thus admoniſhed him, "Take this ſword, and uſe it for me, if I do as I ought; if otherwiſe, againſt me: for miſcarriages in the ſupreme magiſtrate are leſs excuſable." This Dion and Aurelius Victor ſay of him. You ſee here, that a worthy emperor appointed one to judge himſelf, though he did not make him equal. Tiberius perhaps might have ſaid as much out of vanity and hypocrity; but it is almoſt a crime to imagine, that ſo good and virtuous a prince as Trajan, did not really ſpeak as he thought, and according to what he apprehended right and juſt. How much more reaſonable was it, that though he were ſuperiour to the ſenate in power, and might, if he would, have refuſed to yield them any obedience, yet he actually did obey them, as by virtue of his office he ought to do, and acknowledged their right in the government to be ſuperiour to his own? For ſo Pliny tells us in his Panegyric, "The ſenate both deſired and commanded you to be conſul a fourth time; you may know by the obedience you pay them, that this is no word of flattery, but of power." And a little after, "This is the deſign you aim at, to reſtore our loſt liberty." And Trajan was not of that mind alone; the ſenate thought ſo too, and were of opinion, that their authority was indeed ſupreme: for they that could command their emperor, might

might judge him. So the emperor Marcus Aurelius, when Caſſius governor of Syria endeavoured to get the empire from him, referred himſelf either to the ſenate, or the people of Rome, and declared himſelf ready to lay down the government, if they would have it ſo. Now how ſhould a man determine of the right of kings better, and more truly, than out of the very mouths of the beſt of kings? Indeed every good king accounts either the ſenate, or the people, not only equal, but ſuperiour to himſelf by the law of nature. But a tyrant being by nature inferiour to all men, every one that is ſtronger than he, ought to be accounted not only his equal, but ſuperiour: for as heretofore nature taught men from force and violence to betake themſelves to laws; ſo wherever the laws are ſet at naught, the ſame dictate of nature muſt neceſſarily prompt us to betake ourſelves to force again. "To be of this opinion," ſays Cicero pro Seſtio, "is a ſign of wiſdom; to put it in practice, argues courage and reſolution; and to do both, is the effect of virtue in its perfection." Let this ſtand then as a ſettled maxim of the law of nature, never to be ſhaken by any artifices of flatterers, that the ſenate, or the people, are ſuperiour to kings, be they good or bad: which is but what you yourſelf do in effect confeſs, when you tell us, that the authority of kings was derived from the people. For that power, which they transferred to princes, doth yet naturally, or, as I may ſay, virtually reſide in themſelves notwithſtanding: for ſo natural cauſes, that produce any effect by a certain eminency of operation, do always retain more of their own virtue and energy than they impart; nor do they, by communicating to others, exhauſt themſelves. You ſee, the cloſer we keep to nature, the more evidently does the people's power appear to be above that of the prince. And this is likewiſe certain, that the people do not freely, and of choice, ſettle the government in the king abſolutely, ſo as to give him a propriety in it, nor by nature can do ſo; but only for the public ſafety and liberty, which, when the king ceaſes to take care of, then the people in effect have given him nothing at all: for nature ſays, the people

gave

gave it him to a particular end and purpoſe; which end, if neither nature, nor the people can attain, the people's gift becomes no more valid, than any other void covenant or agreement. Theſe reaſons prove very fully, that the people are ſuperiour to the king; and ſo your "greateſt and moſt convincing argument, that a king cannot be judged by his people, becauſe he has no peer in his kingdom," nor any ſuperiour, falls to the ground. For you take that for granted, which we by no means allow. "In a popular ſtate," ſay you, "the magiſtrates being appointed by the people, may likewiſe be puniſhed for their crimes by the people: in an ariſtocracy the ſenators may be puniſhed by their colleagues: but it is a prodigious thing to proceed criminally againſt a king in his own kingdom, and make him plead for his life." What can you conclude from hence, but that they who ſet up kings over them, are the moſt miſerable and moſt ſilly people in the world? But, I pray, what is the reaſon why the people may not puniſh a king that becomes a malefactor, as well as they may popular magiſtrates and ſenators in an ariſtocracy? Do you think that all they who live under a kingly government, were ſo ſtrangely in love with ſlavery, as when they might be free, to chooſe vaſſalage, and to put themſelves all and intirely under the dominion of one man, who often happens to be an ill man, and often a fool, ſo as whatever cauſe might be, to leave themſelves no refuge in, no relief from the laws nor the dictates of nature, againſt the tyranny of a moſt outrageous maſter, when ſuch a one happens? Why do they then tender conditions to their kings, when they firſt enter upon their government, and preſcribe laws for them to govern by? Do they do this to be trampled upon the more, and be the more laughed to ſcorn? Can it be imagined, that a whole people would ever ſo vilify themſelves, depart from their own intereſt to that degree, be ſo wanting to themſelves, as to place all their hopes in one man, and he very often the moſt vain perſon of them all? To what end do they require an oath of their kings, not to act any thing contrary to law? We muſt ſuppoſe them to do this, that (poor creatures!) they may learn to their ſorrow,

ſorrow, that kings only may commit perjury with impunity. This is what your own wicked concluſions hold forth. "If a king, that is elected, promiſe any thing to his people upon oath, which, if he would not have ſworn to, perhaps they would not have choſe him, yet if he refuſe to perform that promiſe, he falls not under the people's cenſure. Nay, though he ſwear to his ſubjects at his election, that he will adminiſter juſtice to them according to the laws of the kingdom; and that if he do not, they ſhall be diſcharged of their allegiance, and himſelf ipſo facto ceaſe to be their king; yet if he break this oath, it is God and not man that muſt require it of him." I have tranſcribed theſe lines, not for their elegance, for they are barbarouſly expreſſed; nor becauſe I think there needs any anſwer to them, for they anſwer themſelves, they explode and damn themſelves by their notorious falſehood and loathſomeneſs: but I did it to recommend you to kings for your great merits; that among ſo many places as there are at court, they may put you into ſome preferment or office that may be fit for you. Some are princes ſecretaries, ſome their cupbearers, ſome maſters of the revels: I think you had beſt be maſter of the perjuries to ſome of them. You ſhall not be maſter of the ceremonies, you are too much a clown for that; but their treachery and perfidiouſneſs ſhall be under your care. But that men may ſee that you are both a fool and a knave to the higheſt degree, let us conſider theſe laſt aſſertions of yours a little more narrowly; "A king," ſay you, "though he ſwear to his ſubjects at his election, that he will govern according to law, and that if he do not, they ſhall be diſcharged of their allegiance, and he himſelf ipſo facto ceaſe to be their king: yet can he not be depoſed or puniſhed by them." Why not a king, I pray, as well as popular magiſtrates? becauſe in a popular ſtate, the people do not transfer all their power to the magiſtrates. And do they, in the caſe that you have put, veſt it all in the king, when they place him in the government upon thoſe terms expreſsly, to hold it no longer than he uſes it well? Therefore it is evident, that a king ſworn to obſerve the laws, if he tranſgreſs them, may be puniſhed and

and depoſed, as well as popular magiſtrates. So that you can make no more uſe of that invincible argument of the people's transferring all their right and power to the prince; you yourſelf have battered it down with your own engines. Hear now another moſt powerful and invincible argument of his, why ſubjects cannot judge their kings, "becauſe he is bound by no law, being himſelf the ſole lawgiver." Which having been proved already to be moſt falſe, this great reaſon comes to nothing, as well as the former. But the reaſon why princes have but ſeldom been proceeded againſt for perſonal and private crimes, as whoredom, and adultery, and the like, is not becauſe they could not juſtly be puniſhed even for ſuch, but leſt the people ſhould receive more prejudice through diſturbances that might be occaſioned by the king's death, and the change of affairs, than they would be profited by the puniſhment of one man or two. But when they begin to be univerſally injurious and inſufferable, it has always been the opinion of all nations, that then, being tyrants, it is lawful to put them to death any how, condemned or uncondemned. Hence Cicero, in his Second Philippic, ſays thus of thoſe that killed Cæſar, "they were the firſt that ran through with their ſwords, not a man who affected to be king, but who was actually ſettled in the government; which, as it was a worthy and godlike action, ſo it is ſet before us for our imitation." How unlike are you to him! "Murder, adultery, injuries, are not regal and public, but private and perſonal crimes." Well ſaid, paraſite! you have obliged all pimps and profligates in courts by this expreſſion. How ingeniouſly do you act both the paraſite and the pimp with the ſame breath! "A king that is an adulterer, or a murderer, may yet govern well, and conſequently ought not to be put to death, becauſe, together with his life, he muſt loſe his kingdom; and it was never yet allowed by God's laws, or man's, that for one and the ſame crime, a man was to be puniſhed twice." Infamous foulmouth wretch! By the ſame reaſon the magiſtrates in a popular ſtate, or in an ariſtocracy, ought never to be put to death, for fear of double puniſhment; no judge, no ſenator muſt die,

for

for they muſt loſe their magiſtracy too, as well as their lives. As you have endeavoured to take all power out of the people's hands, and veſt it in the king, ſo you would all majeſty too: a delegated tranſlatitious majeſty we allow, but that majeſty does chiefly and primarily reſide in him, you can no more prove, than you can, that power and authority does. "A king," you ſay, "cannot commit treaſon againſt his people, but a people may againſt their king." And yet a king is what he is for the people only, not the people for him. Hence I infer, that the whole body of the people, or the greater part of them, muſt needs have greater power than the king. This you deny, and begin to caſt up accounts. "He is of greater power than any one, than any two, than any three, than any ten, than any hundred, than any thouſand, than any ten thouſand:" be it ſo, "he is of more power than half the people." I will not deny that neither; "add now half of the other half, will he not have more power than all thoſe?" Not at all. Go on, why do you take away the board? Do you not underſtand progreſſion in arithmetic? He begins to reckon after another manner. "Has not the king, and the nobility together, more power?" No, Mr. Changeling, I deny that too. If by the nobility, whom you ſtyle optimates, you mean the peers only: for it may happen that amongſt the whole number of them, there may not be one man deſerving that appellation: for it often falls out, that there are better and wiſer men than they amongſt the commons, whom in conjunction with the greater, or the better part of the people, I ſhould not ſcruple to call by the name of, and take them for all the people. "But if the king is not ſuperiour in power to all the people together, he is then a king but of ſingle perſons, he is not the king of the whole body of the people." You ſay well, no more he is, unleſs they are content he ſhould be ſo. Now, balance your accounts, and you will find that by miſcaſting, you have loſt your principal. "The Engliſh ſay, that the right of majeſty originally and principally reſides in the people; which principle would introduce a confuſion of all ſtates." What, of an ariſtocracy and democracy? But let that paſs.

paſs. What if it ſhould overthrow a gynæocracy too? (i. e. a government of one or more women) under which ſtate, or form of government, they ſay, you are in danger of being beaten at home; would not the Engliſh do you a kindneſs in that, you ſhcepiſh fellow, you? But there is no hope of that. For it is moſt juſtly ſo ordered, ſince you would ſubject all mankind to tyranny abroad, that you yourſelf ſhould live in a ſcandalous moſt unmanlike ſlavery at home. "We muſt tell you," you ſay, "what we mean by the word People." There are a great many other things, which you ſtand more in need of being told: for of things that more immediately concern you, you ſeem altogether ignorant, and never to have learnt any thing but words and letters, not to be capable of any thing elſe. But this you think you know, that by the word people we mean the common people only, excluſive of the nobility, becauſe we have put down the Houſe of Lords. And yet that very thing ſhows, that under the word people we comprehend all our natives, of what order and degree ſoever; in that we have ſettled one ſupreme ſenate only, in which the nobility alſo, as a part of the people (not in their own right, as they did before; but repreſenting thoſe boroughs or counties, for which they may be choſe) may give their votes. Then you inveigh againſt the common people, as being "blind and brutiſh, ignorant of the art of governing;" you ſay there is "nothing more empty, more vain, more inconſtant, more uncertain than they." All which is very true of yourſelf, and it is true likewiſe of the rabble, but not of the middle ſort, amongſt whom the moſt prudent men, and moſt ſkilful in affairs, are generally found; others are moſt commonly diverted either by luxury and plenty, or by want and poverty, from virtue, and the ſtudy of laws and government. "There are many ways," you ſay, "by which kings come to the crown, ſo as not to be beholden to the people at all for it;" and eſpecially, "thoſe that inherit a kingdom." But thoſe nations muſt certainly be ſlaves, and born to ſlavery, that acknowledge any one to be their lord and maſter ſo abſolutely, as that they are his inheritance, and come to him

him by deſcent, without any conſent of their own; they deſerve not the appellation of ſubjects, nor of freemen, nor can they juſtly be reputed ſuch; nor are they to be accounted as a civil ſociety, but muſt be looked on as the poſſeſſions and eſtate of their lord, and his family: for I ſee no difference as to the right of ownerſhip betwixt them, and ſlaves, or beaſts. Secondly, "they that come to the crown by conqueſt, cannot acknowledge themſelves to have received from the people the power to uſurp." We are not now diſcourſing of a conqueror, but of a conquered king; what a conqueror may lawfully do, we will diſcourſe elſewhere; do you keep to your ſubject. But whereas you aſcribe to kings that ancient right, that maſters of families have over their houſeholds, and take an example from thence of their abſolute power; I have ſhown already over and over, that there is no likeneſs at all betwixt them. And Ariſtotle (whom you name ſo often) if you had read him, would have taught you as much in the beginning of his Politics, where he ſays they judge amiſs, that think there is but little difference betwixt a king, and a maſter of a family: "For that there is not a numerical, but a ſpecifical difference betwixt a kingdom and a family." For when villages grew to be towns and cities, that regal domeſtic right vaniſhed by degrees, and was no more owned. Hence Diodorus, in his firſt book, ſays, that anciently kingdoms were tranſmitted not to the former kings ſons, but to thoſe that had beſt deſerved of the people. And Juſtin, "originally," ſays he, "the government of nations, and of countries, was by kings, who were exalted to that height of majeſty, not by popular ambition, but for their moderation, which commended them to good men." Whence it is manifeſt, that, in the very beginning of nations, that fatherly and hereditary government gave way to virtue, and the people's right: which is the moſt natural reaſon and cauſe, and was the true riſe of kingly government. For at firſt men entered into ſocieties, not that any one might inſult over all the reſt, but that in caſe any ſhould injure another, there might be laws and judges to protect them from wrong, or at leaſt to puniſh the wrong doers.

doers. When men were at firſt diſperſed and ſcattered aſunder, ſome wiſe and eloquent man perſuaded them to enter into civil ſocieties; "that he himſelf," ſay you, "might exerciſe dominion over them, when ſo united." Perhaps you meant this of Nimrod, who is ſaid to have been the firſt tyrant. Or elſe it proceeds from your own malice only, and certainly it cannot have been true of thoſe great and generous ſpirited men, but is a fiction of your own, not warranted by any authority that I ever heard of. For all ancient writers tell us, that thoſe firſt inſtituters of communities of men had a regard to the good and ſafety of mankind only, and not to any private advantages of their own, or to make themſelves great or powerful. One thing I cannot paſs by, which I ſuppoſe you intended for an emblem, to ſet off the reſt of this chapter: "If a conſul," ſay you, "had been to be accuſed before his magiſtracy expired, there muſt have been a dictator created for that purpoſe;" though you had ſaid before, "that for that very reaſon there were two of them." Juſt ſo your poſitions always agree with one another, and almoſt every page declares how weak and frivolous whatever you ſay or write upon any ſubject, is. "Under the ancient Saxon kings," you ſay, "the people were never called to parliaments." If any of our own countrymen had aſſerted ſuch a thing, I could eaſily have convinced him that he was in an errour. But I am not ſo much concerned at your miſtaking our affairs, becauſe you are a foreigner. This in effect is all you ſay of the right of kings in general. Many other things I omit, for you uſe many digreſſions, and put things down that either have no ground at all, or are nothing to the purpoſe, and my deſign is not to vie with you in impertinence.

CHAP. VIII.

IF you had publiſhed your own opinion, Salmaſius, concerning the right of kings in general, without affronting any perſons in particular, notwithſtanding this alteration of affairs in England, as long as you did but uſe your own liberty in writing what yourſelf thought fit,

no Engliſhman could have had any cauſe to have been diſpleaſed with you, nor would you have made good the opinion you maintain ever a whit the leſs. For if it be a poſitive command both of Moſes and of Chriſt himſelf, "That all men whatſoever, whether Spaniards, French, Italians, Germans, Engliſh, or Scots, ſhould be ſubject to their princes, be they good or bad," which you aſſerted, p. 127, to what purpoſe was it for you, who are a foreigner, and unknown to us, to be tampering with our laws, and to read us lectures out of them as out of your own papers and miſcellanies, which, be they how they will, you have taught us already in a great many words, that they ought to give way to the laws of God? But now it is apparent, that you have undertaken the defence of this royal cauſe, not ſo much out of your own inclination, as partly becauſe you were hired, and that at a good round price too, conſidering how things are with him that ſet you on work; and partly, it is like, out of expectation of ſome greater reward hereafter; to publiſh a ſcandalous libel againſt the Engliſh, who are injurious to none of their neighbours, and meddle with their own matters only. If there were no ſuch thing as that in the caſe, is it credible, that any man ſhould be ſo impudent or ſo mad, as though he be a ſtranger, and at a great diſtance from us, yet of his own accord to intermeddle with our affairs, and ſide with a party? What the devil is it to you, what the Engliſh do amongſt themſelves? What would you have, pragmatical puppy? What would you be at? Have you no concerns of your own at home? I wiſh you had the ſame concerns that that famous Olus, your fellow buſybody in the Epigram, had; and perhaps ſo you have; you deſerve them, I am ſure. Or did that hotſpur your wife, who encouraged you to write what you have done for outlawed Charles's ſake, promiſe you ſome profitable profeſſor's place in England, and God knows what gratifications at Charles's return? But aſſure yourſelves, my miſtreſs and my maſter, that England admits neither of wolves, nor owners of wolves: ſo that it is no wonder you ſpit ſo much venom at our Engliſh maſtiffs. It were better for you to return to thoſe illuſtrious titles of yours in France; firſt to that hungerſtarved lordſhip of yours

at

at * St. Lou; and in the next place to the ſacred conſiſtory of the moſt chriſtian king. Being a counſellor to the prince, you are at too great a diſtance from your own country. But I ſee full well that ſhe neither deſires you, nor your counſel; nor did it appear ſhe did, when you were there a few years ago, and began to lick a cardinal's trencher; ſhe is in the right, by my troth, and can very willingly ſuffer ſuch a little fellow as you, that are but one half of a man, to run up and down with your miſtreſs of a wife, and your deſks full of trifles and fooleries, till you light ſomewhere or other upon a ſtipend, large enough for a knight of the grammar, or an illuſtrious critic on horſeback; if any prince or ſtate has a mind to hire a vagabond doctor, that is to be ſold at a good round price. But here is one that will bid for you; whether you are a merchantable commodity or not, and what you are worth, we ſhall ſee by and by. You ſay, "the parricides aſſert, that the government of England is not merely kingly, but that it is a mixed government." Sir Thomas Smith, a countryman of ours in Edward the ſixth's days, a good lawyer, and a ſtateſman, one whom you yourſelf will not call a parricide, in the beginning of a book which he wrote "of the commonwealth of England," aſſerts the ſame thing, and not of our government only, but of almoſt all others in the world, and that out of Ariſtotle; and he ſays it is not poſſible, that any government ſhould otherwiſe ſubſiſt. But as if you thought it a crime to ſay any thing, and not unſay it again, you repeat your former threadbare contradictions. You ſay, "there neither is nor ever was any nation, that did not underſtand by the very name of a king, a perſon whoſe authority is inferiour to God alone, and who is accountable to no other." And yet a little after you confeſs, "that the name of a king was formerly given to ſuch powers and magiſtrates, as had not a full and abſolute right of themſelves, but had a dependance upon the people, as the ſuffetes among the Carthaginians, the

* St. Lou, in Latin, Sanctus Lupus, Saint Wolf, is the name of a place in France, where Salmaſius had ſome ſmall eſtate, and was called ſo from St. Lupus a German Biſhop, who with St. German came over into England, Anno Dom. 429.

Hebrew judges, the kings of the Lacedemonians, and of Arragon." Are you not very conſiſtent with yourſelf? Then you reckon up five ſeveral ſorts of monarchies out of Ariſtotle; in one of which only that right obtained, which you ſay is common to all kings. Concerning which I have ſaid already more than once, that neither doth Ariſtotle give an inſtance of any ſuch monarchy, nor was there ever any ſuch in being; the other four he clearly demonſtrates that they were bounded by eſtabliſhed laws, and the king's power ſubject to thoſe laws. The firſt of which four was that of the Lacedemonians, which in his opinion did of all others beſt deſerve the name of a kingdom. The ſecond was ſuch as obtained among barbarians, which was laſting, becauſe regulated by laws, and becauſe the people willingly ſubmitted to it; whereas by the ſame author's opinion in his third book, what king ſoever retains the ſovereignty againſt the people's will, is no longer to be accounted a king, but a downright tyrant; all which is true likewiſe of his third ſort of kings, which he calls Æſymnetes, who were choſen by the people, and moſt commonly for a certain time only, and for ſome particular purpoſes, ſuch as the Roman dictators were. The fourth ſort he makes of ſuch as reigned in the heroical days, upon whom for their extraordinary merits the people of their own accord conferred the government, but yet bounded by laws; nor could theſe retain the ſovereignty againſt the will of the people; nor do theſe four ſorts of kingly governments differ, he ſays, from tyranny in any thing elſe, but only in that theſe governments are with the good liking of the people, and that againſt their will. The fifth ſort of kingly government, which he calls παμβασίλεια, or abſolute monarchy, in which the ſupreme power reſides in the king's perſon, which you pretend to be the right of all kings, is utterly condemned by the philoſopher, as neither for the good of mankind, nor conſonant to juſtice or nature, unleſs ſome people ſhould be content to live under ſuch a government, and withal confer it upon ſuch as excel all others in virtue. Theſe things any man may read in the third book of his Politics. But you, I believe, that once in your life you might appear witty and florid,

florid, pleaſed yourſelf with making a compariſon "betwixt theſe five ſorts of kingly government, and the five zones of the world; betwixt the two extremes of kingly power, there are three more temperate ſpecies interpoſed, as there lie three zones betwixt the torrid and the frigid." Pretty rogue! what ingenious compariſons he always makes us! may you forever be baniſhed, whither you yourſelf condemn an abſolute kingdom to be, that is, to the frigid zone, which when you are there, will be doubly cold to what it was before. In the mean while we ſhall expect that newfaſhioned ſphere which you deſcribe, from you our modern Archimedes, in which there ſhall be two extreme zones, one torrid, and the other frigid, and three temperate ones lying betwixt. "The kings of the Lacedemonians, you ſay, might lawfully be impriſoned, but it was not lawful to put them to death." Why not? Becauſe the miniſters of juſtice, and ſome foreign ſoldiers, being ſurpriſed at the novelty of the thing, thought it not lawful to lead Agis to his execution, though condemned to die? And the people of Lacedemon were diſpleaſed at his death, not becauſe condemned to die, though a king, but becauſe he was a good man and popular, and had been circumvented by a faction of the great ones. Says Plutarch, "Agis was the firſt king, that was put to death by the ephori;" in which words he does not pretend to tell us what lawfully might be done, but what actually was done. For to imagine that ſuch as may lawfully accuſe a king, and impriſon him, may not alſo lawfully put him to death, is a childiſh conceit. At laſt you betake yourſelf to give an account of the right of Engliſh kings. "There never was," you ſay, "but one king in England." This you ſay, becauſe you had ſaid before, that "unleſs a king be ſole in the government, he cannot be a king." Which if it be true, ſome of them, who I had thought had been kings of England, were not really ſo; for to omit many of our Saxon kings, who had either their ſons, or their brothers partners with them in the government, it is known that king Henry II, of the Norman race, reigned together with his ſon. "Let them ſhow," ſay you, "a precedent of any kingdom under the government of a

ſingle perſon, who has not an abſolute power: though in ſome kingdoms more remiſs, in others more intenſe." Do you ſhow any power that is abſolute, and yet remiſs, you aſs; is not that power that is abſolute, the ſupreme power of all? How can it then be both ſupreme and remiſs? Whatſoever kings you ſhall acknowledge to be inveſted with a remiſs (or a leſs) power, thoſe I will eaſily make appear to have no abſolute power; and conſequently to be inferiour to a people, free by nature, who is both its own lawgiver, and can make the regal power more or leſs intenſe or remiſs; that is, greater or leſs. Whether the whole iſland of Britain was anciently governed by kings, or no, is uncertain. It is moſt likely, that the form of their government changed according to the exigencies of the times. Whence Tacitus ſays, "the Britains anciently were under kings; now the great men amongſt them divide them into parties and factions." When the Romans left them, they were about forty years without kings; they were not always therefore under a kingly government, as you ſay they were. But when they were ſo, that the kingdom was hereditary, I poſitively deny; which that it was not, is evident both from the ſeries of their kings, and their way of creating them; for the conſent of the people is aſked in expreſs words. When the king has taken the accuſtomed oath, the archbiſhop ſtepping to every ſide of the ſtage erected for that purpoſe, aſks the people four ſeveral times in theſe words, "Do you conſent to have this man to be your king?" Juſt as if he ſpoke to them in the Roman ſtyle, Vultis, Jubetis hunc Regnare? "Is it your pleaſure, do you appoint this man to reign?" Which would be needleſs, if the kingdom were by the law hereditary. But with kings, uſurpation paſſes very frequently for law and right. You go about to ground Charles's right to the crown, who was ſo often conquered himſelf, upon the right of conqueſt. William, ſurnamed the Conqueror, forſooth, ſubdued us. But they who are not ſtrangers to our hiſtory, know full well, that the ſtrength of the Engliſh nation was not ſo broken in that one fight at Haſtings, but that they might eaſily have renewed the war. But they choſe rather to accept of a king, than

to

to be under a conqueror and a tyrant: they ſwear therefore to William, to be his liegemen, and he ſwears to them at the altar, to carry himſelf towards them as a good king ought do in all reſpects. When he broke his word, and the Engliſh betook themſelves again to their arms, being diffident of his ſtrength, he renewed his oath upon the Holy Evangeliſts, to obſerve the ancient laws of England. And therefore, if after that he miſerably oppreſſed the Engliſh, (as you ſay he did) he did it not by right of conqueſt, but by right of perjury. Beſides, it is certain, that many ages ago, the conquerors and conquered coaleſced into one and the ſame people: ſo that that right of conqueſt, if any ſuch ever were, muſt needs have been antiquated long ago. His own words at his death, which I give you out of a French manuſcript written at Caen, put all out of doubt, "I appoint no man (ſays he) to inherit the kingdom of England." By which words, both his pretended right of conqueſt, and the hereditary right, were diſclaimed at his death, and buried together with him. I ſee now that you have gotten a place at court, as I foretold you would; you are made the king's chief treaſurer and ſteward of his court craft: and what follows, you ſeem to write ex officio, as by virtue of your office, magnificent Sir. "If any preceding kings, being thereunto compelled by factions of great men, or ſeditions amongſt the common people, have receded in ſome meaſure from their right, that cannot prejudice the ſucceſſor; but that he is at liberty to reſume it." You ſay well; if therefore at any time our anceſtors have through neglect loſt any thing that was their right, why ſhould that prejudice us their poſterity? If they would promiſe for themſelves to become ſlaves, they could make no ſuch promiſe for us; who ſhall always retain the ſame right of delivering ourſelves out of ſlavery, that they had of enſlaving themſelves to any whomſoever. You wonder how it comes to paſs that a king of Great-Britain muſt nowadays be looked upon as one of the magiſtrates of the kingdom only; whereas in all other kingly governments in Chriſtendom, kings are inveſted with a free and abſolute authority. For the Scots, I remit you to Buchanan: for

France, your own native country, to which you ſeem to be a ſtranger, to Hottoman's Franco-Gallia, and Girardus a French hiſtorian: for the reſt, to other authors, of whom none that I know of were Independents: out of whom you might have learned a quite other leſſon concerning the right of kings, than what you teach. Not being able to prove, that a tyrannical power belongs to the kings of England by right of conqueſt, you try now to do it by right of perjury. Kings profeſs themſelves to reign "by the Grace of God:" what if they had profeſſed themſelves to be Gods? I believe if they had, you might eaſily have been brought to become one of their prieſts. So the archbiſhops of Canterbury pretended to archbiſhop it by "Divine Providence." Are you ſuch a fool, as to deny the pope's being a king in the Church, that you may make the king greater than a pope in the ſtate? But in the ſtatutes of the realm the king is called our Lord. You are become of a ſudden a wonderful Nomenclator of our ſtatutes: but you know not that many are called lords and maſters, who are not really ſo: you know not how unreaſonable a thing it is to judge of truth and right by titles of honour, not to ſay of flattery. Make the ſame inference, if you will, from the parliament's being called the king's parliament; for it is called the king's bridle too, or a bridle to the king: and therefore the king is no more lord or maſter of his parliament, than a horſe is of his bridle. But why not the king's parliament, ſince the king "ſummons them?" I will tell you why; becauſe the conſuls uſed to indict a meeting of the ſenate, yet were they not lords over that council. When the king therefore ſummons or calls together a parliament, he does it by virtue and in diſcharge of that office, which he has received from the people, that he may adviſe with them about the weighty affairs of the kingdom, not his own particular affairs. Or when at any time the parliament deboted of the king's own affairs, if any could properly be called his own, they were always the laſt things they did; and it was in their choice when to debate of them, and whether at all or no, and depended not upon the king's pleaſure. And they whom it concerns to know this, know very

very well, that parliaments anciently, whether ſummoned or not, might by law meet twice a year: but the laws are called too, "the king's laws." Theſe are flattering aſcriptions; a king of England can of himſelf make no law: for he was not conſtituted to make laws, but to ſee thoſe laws kept, which the people made. And you yourſelf here confeſs, that "parliaments meet to make laws;" wherefore the law is alſo called the law of the land, and the people's law. Whence king Ethelſtane in the preface to his laws, ſpeaking to all the people, "I have granted you every thing," ſays he, "by your own law." And in the form of the oath, which the kings of England uſed to take before they were made kings, the people ſtipulate with them thus; "Will you grant thoſe juſt laws, which the people ſhall chooſe?" The king anſwers, "I will." And you are infinitely miſtaken in ſaying, that "when there is no parliament ſitting, the king governs the whole ſtate of the kingdom, to all intents and purpoſes, by a regal power." For he can determine nothing of any moment, with reſpect to either peace or war: nor can he put any ſtop to the proceedings of the courts of juſtice. And the judges therefore ſwear, that they will do nothing judicially, but according to law, though the king by word, or mandate, or letters under his own ſeal, ſhould command the contrary. Hence it is that the king is often ſaid in our law to be an infant; and to poſſeſs his rights and dignities, as a child or a ward does his: ſee the Mirror, Cap. 4. Sect. 22. And hence is that common ſaying amongſt us, that "the king can do no wrong:" Which you, like a raſcal, interpret thus, "Whatever the king does, is no injury, becauſe he is not liable to be puniſhed for it." By this very comment, if there were nothing elſe, the wonderful impudence and villany of this fellow diſcovers itſelf ſufficiently. "It belongs to the head," you ſay, "to command, and not to the members: the king is the head of the parliament." You would not trifle thus, if you had any guts in your brains. You are miſtaken again (but there is no end of your miſtakes) in not diſtinguiſhing the king's counſellors from the ſtates of the realm: for neither ought he to make choice of all of them, nor of any of

of them, which the reſt do not approve of; but for electing any member of the houſe of commons, he never ſo much as pretended to it. Whom the people appointed to that ſervice, they were ſeverally choſen by the votes of all the people in their reſpective cities, towns, and counties. I ſpeak now of things univerſally known, and therefore I am the ſhorter. But you ſay, "it is falſe that the parliament was inſtituted by the people, as the worſhippers of ſaint Independency aſſert." Now I ſee why you took ſo much pains in endeavouring to ſubvert the papacy; you carry another pope in your belly, as we ſay. For what elſe ſhould you be in labour of, the wife of a woman, a he-wolf, impregnated by a ſhe-wolf, but either a monſter, or ſome new ſort of papacy? You now make he-ſaints and ſhe-ſaints, at your pleaſure, as if you were a true genuine pope. You abſolve kings of all their ſins, and as if you had utterly vanquiſhed and ſubdued your antagoniſt the pope, you adorn yourſelf with his ſpoils. But becauſe you have not yet profligated the pope quite, till the ſecond and third, and perhaps the fourth and fifth part of your book of his ſupremacy come out, which book will nauſeate a great many readers to death, ſooner than you will get the better of the pope by it; let it ſuffice you in the mean time, I beſeech you, to become ſome antipope or other. There is another ſhe-ſaint, beſides that Independency that you deride, which you have canonized in good earneſt; and that is, the tyranny of kings: you ſhall therefore by my conſent be the high prieſt of tyranny; and that you may have all the pope's titles, you ſhall be a "ſervant of the ſervants," not of God, but of the court. For that curſe pronounced upon Canaan ſeems to ſtick as cloſe to you, as your ſhirt. You call the people "a beaſt." What are you then yourſelf? For neither can that ſacred conſiſtory, nor your lordſhip of St. Lou, exempt you its maſter from being one of the people, nay, of the common people; nor can make you other than what you really are, a moſt loathſome beaſt. Indeed, the writings of the prophets ſhadow out to us the monarchy and dominion of great kings by the name, and under the reſemblance of a great beaſt. You ſay, that "there is no mention of parliaments

parliaments held under our kings, that reigned before William the conqueror." It is not worth while to jangle about a French word: the thing was always in being; and you yourſelf allow that in the Saxon times, Concilia ſapientum, Wittena-gemots, are mentioned. And there are wiſe men among the body of the people, as well as amongſt the nobility. But "in the ſtatute of Merton made in the twentieth year of king Henry the third, the earls and barons are only named." Thus you are always impoſed upon by words, who yet have ſpent your whole life in nothing elſe but words; for we know very well that in that age, not only the guardians of the cinque-ports, and magiſtrates of cities, but even tradeſmen are ſometimes called barons; and without doubt, they might much more reaſonably call every member of parliament, though never ſo much a commoner, by the name of baron. For that in the fifty-ſecond year of the ſame king's reign, the commoners as well as the lords were ſummoned, the ſtatute of Marlbridge, and moſt other ſtatutes, declare in expreſs words; which commoners king Edward the third, in the preface to the ſtatute-ſtaple, calls, "Magnates Comitatum, the great men of the counties," as you very learnedly quote it for me; thoſe to wit, that came out of the ſeveral counties, and ſerved for them;" which number of men conſtituted the houſe of commons, and neither were lords, nor could be. Beſides, a book more ancient than thoſe ſtatutes, called, "Modus tenendi Parliamenta, i. e. the manner of holding parliaments," tells us, that the king and the commons may hold a parliament, and enact laws, though the lords, the biſhops are abſent; but that with the lords, and the biſhops, in the abſence of the commons, no parliament can be held. And there is a reaſon given for it, viz. becauſe kings held parliaments and councils with their people before any lords or biſhops were made; beſides, the lords ſerve for themſelves only, the commons each for the county, city, or borough that ſent them. And that therefore the commons in parliament repreſent the whole body of the nation; in which reſpect they are more worthy, and every way preferable to the houſe of peers. "But the power of Judicature," you ſay, "never was inveſted in the

the houſe of commons." Nor was the king every poſſeſſed of it: remember though, that originally all power proceeded, and yet does proceed from the people. Which Marcus Tullius excellently well ſhows in his oration, "De lege Agraria, of the Agrarian law:" "As all powers, authorities, and public adminiſtrations ought to be derived from the whole body of the people; ſo thoſe of them ought in an eſpecial manner ſo to be derived, which are ordained and appointed for the common benefit and intereſt of all, to which employments every particular perſon may both give his vote for the chooſing ſuch perſons, as he thinks will take moſt care of the public, and withal by voting and making intereſt for them, lay ſuch obligations upon them, as may entitle them to their friendſhip, and good offices in time to come." Here you ſee the true riſe and original of parliaments, and that it was much ancienter than the Saxon chronicles. Whilſt we may dwell in ſuch a light of truth and wiſdom, as Cicero's age afforded, you labour in vain to blind us with the darkneſs of obſcurer times. By the ſaying whereof I would not be underſtood to derogate in the leaſt from the authority and prudence of our anceſtors, who moſt certainly went further in the enacting of good laws, than either the ages they lived in, or their own learning or education ſeem to have been capable of; and though ſometimes they made laws that were none of the beſt, yet as being conſcious to themſelves of the ignorance and infirmity of human nature, they have conveyed this doctrine down to poſterity, as the foundation of all laws, which likewiſe all our lawyers admit, that if any law, or cuſtom, be contrary to the law of God, of nature, or of reaſon, it ought to be looked upon as null and void. Whence it follows, that though it were poſſible for you to diſcover any ſtatute, or other public ſanction, which aſcribed to the king a tyrannical power, ſince that would be repugnant to the will of God, to nature, and to right reaſon, you may learn from that general and primary law of ours, which I have juſt now quoted, that it will be null and void. But you will never be able to find, that any ſuch right of kings has the leaſt foundation in our law. Since it is plain therefore, that the power

of

udicature was originally in the people themſelves, and t the people never did by any royal law part with it to king, (for the kings of England neither uſed to judge y man, nor can by the law do it, otherwiſe than ording to laws ſettled and agreed to: Fleta, Book 1, p. 17.) it follows, that this power remains yet whole d entire in the people themſelves. For that it was her never committed to the houſe of peers, or if it re, that it may lawfully be taken from them again, a yourſelf will not deny. But, "It is in the king's wer," you ſay, "to make a village into a borough, d that into a city; and conſequently, the king does effect create thoſe that conſtitute the Commons Houſe Parliament." But, I ſay, that even towns and boughs are more ancient than kings; and that the people the people, though they ſhould live in the open fields. nd now we are extremely well pleaſed with your ngliciſms, COUNTY COURT, THE TURNE, UNDREDA: You have quickly learnt to count your ndred Jacobuſſes in Engliſh.

Quis expedivit Salmaſio ſuam HUNDREDAM?
Picamque docuit verba noſtra conari?
Magiſter artis venter, & Jacobæi
Centum, exulantis viſcera marſupii Regis.
Quod ſi doloſi ſpes refulſerit nummi,
Ipſe Antichriſti modò qui Primatum Papæ
Minatus uno eſt diſſipare ſufflatu,
Cantabit ultrò Cardinalitium melos.

Who taught Salmaſius, that French chatt'ring pie,
To aim at Engliſh, and HUNDREDA cry?
The ſtarving raſcal, fluſh'd with juſt a Hundred
Engliſh Jacobuſſes, HUNDREDA blunder'd.
An outlaw'd King's laſt ſtock.—A hundred more,
Would make him pimp for th' Antichriſtian whore;
And in Rome's praiſe employ his poiſon'd breath,
Who threat'ned once to ſtink the Pope to death.

The next thing you do is to trouble us with a long diſcourſe of the earls and the barons, to ſhow that the king

king made them all; which we readily grant, and for that reaſon they were moſt commonly at the king's beck; and therefore we have done well to take care, that for the future they ſhall not be judges of a free people. You affirm, that "the power of calling parliaments as often as he pleaſes, and of diſſolving them when he pleaſes, has belonged to the king time out of mind." Whether ſuch a vile, mercenary foreigner as you, who tranſcribe what ſome fugitives dictate to you, or the expreſs letter of our own laws are more to be credited in this matter, we ſhall inquire hereafter. But ſay you, "there is another argument, and an invincible one, to prove the power of the kings of England ſuperiour to that of the parliament; the king's power is perpetual and of courſe, whereby he adminiſters the government ſingly without the parliament; that of the parliament is extraordinary, or out of courſe, and limited to particulars only, nor can they enact any thing ſo as to be binding in law, without the king." Where does the great force of this argument lie? In the words "of courſe and perpetual?" Why, many inferiour magiſtrates have an ordinary and perpetual power, thoſe whom we call juſtices of the peace. Have they therefore the ſupreme power? And I have ſaid already, that the king's power is committed to him, to take care, by interpoſing his authority, that nothing be done contrary to law, and that he may ſee to the due obſervation of our laws, not to top his own upon us: and conſequently that the king has no power out of his courts; nay, all the ordinary power is rather the people's, who determine all controverſies themſelves by juries of twelve men. And hence it is, that when a malefactor is aſked at his arraignment, "How will you be tried?" he anſwers always, according to law and cuſtom, "by God and my country;" not by God and the king, or the king's deputy. But the authority of the parliament, which indeed and in truth is the ſupreme power of the people committed to that ſenate, if it may be called extraordinary, it muſt be by reaſon of its eminence and ſuperiority; elſe it is known they are called ordines, and therefore cannot properly be ſaid to be extra ordinem, out of order; and if not actually, as they

ey ſay, yet virtually they have a perpetual power and thority over all courts and ordinary magiſtrates, and it without the king. And now it ſeems our barba- us terms grate upon your critical ears, forſooth! where- , if I had leiſure, or that it were worth my while, I uld reckon up ſo many barbariſms of yours in this e book, as if you were to be chaſtized for them as you ſerve, all the ſchoolboys ferulas in Chriſtendom would broken upon you; nor would you receive ſo many ces of gold as that wretched poet did of old, but a eat many more boxes on the ear. You ſay, "It is a odigy more monſtrous than all the moſt abſurd opinions the world put together, that the Bedlams ſhould make liſtinction betwixt the king's power and his perſon." will not quote what every author has ſaid upon this bject; but if by the words Perſonam Regis, you mean at we call in Engliſh, the perſon of the king; Chry- tom, who was no Bedlam, might have taught you, it it is no abſurd thing to make a diſtinction betwixt it and his power; for that farther explains the apoſtle's mmand of being ſubject to the higher powers, to be ant of the thing, the power itſelf, and not of the per- ns of the magiſtrates. And why may not I ſay that a ng, who acts any thing contrary to law, acts ſo far th as a private perſon, or a tyrant, and not in the ca- city of a king inveſted with a legal authority? If you not know, that there may be in one and the ſame n more perſons or capacities than one, and that thoſe pacities may in thought and conception be ſevered from man himſelf, you are altogether ignorant both of tin and common ſenſe. But this you ſay to abſolve gs from all ſin and guilt; and that you may make us lieve, that you are gotten into the chair yourſelf, which have pulled the pope out of. "The king," you , "is ſuppoſed not capable of committing any crime, cauſe no puniſhment is conſequential upon any crime his." Whoever therefore is not puniſhed, offends not; s not the theft, but the puniſhment that makes the ef. Salmaſius the Grammarian commits no ſoleciſms w, becauſe he is from under the ferula; when you re overthrown the pope, let theſe, for God's ſake, be the

the canons of your pontificate, or at leaſt your indulgencies, whether you ſhall chooſe to be called the high prieſt St. Tyranny, or St. Slavery. I paſs by the reproachful language, which towards the latter end of the chapter you give the ſtate of the commonwealth, and the church of England; it is common to ſuch as you are, you contemptible varlet, to rail at thoſe things moſt, that are moſt praiſeworthy. But that I may not ſeem to have aſſerted any thing raſhly concerning the right of the kings of England, or rather concerning the people's right with reſpect to their princes; I will now allege out of our ancient hiſtories a few things indeed of many, but ſuch as will make it evident, that the Engliſh lately tried their king according to the ſettled laws of the realm, and the cuſtoms of their anceſtors. After the Romans quitted this iſland, the Britains for about forty years were ſui juris, and without any kings at all. Of whom thoſe they firſt ſet up, ſome they put to death. And for that, Gildas reprehends them, not as you do, for killing their kings, but for killing them uncondemned, and (to uſe his own words,) "non pro veri examinatione," without inquiring into the matter of fact. Vortigern was for his inceſtuous marriage with his own daughter condemned (as Nennius informs us, the moſt ancient of all our hiſtorians next to Gildas) by St. German, "and a general council of the Britains," and his ſon Vortimer ſet up in his ſtead. This came to paſs not long after St. Auguſtine's death, which is enough to diſcover how futilous you are, to ſay, as you have done, that it was a Pope, and Zachary by name, who firſt held the lawfulneſs of judging kings. About the year of our Lord 600, Morcantius, who then reigned in Wales, was by Gudeceus, biſhop of Llandaff, condemned to exile, for the murder of his uncle, though he got the ſentence off by beſtowing ſome lands upon the church. Come we now to the Saxons, whoſe laws we have, and therefore I ſhall quote none of their precedents. Remember, that the Saxons were of a German extract, who never inveſted their kings with any abſolute, unlimited power, but conſulted in a body of the more weighty affairs of government; whence we may perceive, that in the time

of our Saxon anceſtors parliaments (the name itſelf only excepted) had the ſupreme authority. The name they gave them, was "councils of wiſe men;" and this in the reign of Ethelbert, of whom Bede ſays, "that he made laws in imitation of the Roman laws, cum concilio ſapientum; by the advice, or in a council of his wiſe men." So Edwin king of Northumberland, and Ina king of the weſt Saxons, "having conſulted with their wiſe men, and the elders of the people," made new laws. Other laws king Alfred made, "by the advice" in like manner of "his wiſe men;" and he ſays himſelf, "that it was by the conſent of them all, that they were commanded to be obſerved." From theſe and many other like places, it is as clear as the ſun, that choſen men even from amongſt the common people, were members of the ſupreme councils, unleſs we muſt believe, that no men are wiſe but the nobility. We have likewiſe a very ancient book, called the "Mirror of Juſtice," in which we are told, that the Saxons, when they firſt ſubdued the Britains, and choſe themſelves kings, required an oath of them, to ſubmit to the judgment of the law, as much as any of their ſubjects, Cap. 1, Sect. 2. In the ſame place it is ſaid, that it is but juſt that the king have his peers in parliament, to take cognizance of wrongs done by the king, or the queen; and that there was a law made in king Alfred's time, that parliaments ſhould be holden twice a year at London, or oftener, if need were: which law, when through neglect it grew into diſuſe, was revived by two ſtatutes in king Edward the third's time. And in another ancient manuſcript, called "Modus tenendi Parlamenta," we read thus, "If the king was ſummoned, he is guilty of perjury; and ſhall be reputed to have broken his coronation oath." For how can he be ſaid to grant thoſe good laws, which the people chooſe, as he is ſworn to do, if he hinders the people from chooſing them, either by ſummoning parliaments ſeldomer, or by diſſolving them ſooner than the public affairs require, or admit? And that oath, which the kings of England take at their coronation, has always been looked upon by our lawyers as a moſt ſacred law. And what remedy can be

found to obviate the great dangers of the whole ſtate (which is the very end of ſummoning parliaments) if that great and auguſt aſſembly may be diſſolved at the pleaſure many time of a ſilly, headſtrong king? To abſent himſelf from them, is certainly leſs than to diſſolve them; and yet by our laws, as that Modus lays them down, the king neither can, nor ought to abſent himſelf from his parliament, unleſs he be really indiſpoſed in health; nor then neither, till twelve of the peers have been with him to inſpect his body, and give the parliament an account of his indiſpoſition. Is this like the carriage of ſervants to a maſter? On the other hand, the houſe of commons, without whom there can be no parliament held, though ſummoned by the king, may withdraw, and having made a ſeceſſion, expoſtulate with the king concerning maleadminiſtration, as the ſame book has it. But, which is the greateſt thing of all, amongſt the laws of king Edward, commonly called the Confeſſor, there is one very excellent, relating to the kingly office; which office, if the king do not diſcharge as he ought, then, ſays the law, "he ſhall not retain ſo much as the name of a king." And leſt theſe words ſhould not be ſufficiently underſtood, the example of Chilperic king of France is ſubjoined, whom the people for that cauſe depoſed. And that by this law a wicked king is liable to puniſhment, that ſword of king Edward, called Curtana, denotes to us, which the earl of Cheſter uſed to carry in the ſolemn proceſſion at a coronation; "a token, ſays Matthew Paris, that he has authority by law to puniſh the king, if he will not do his duty:" and the ſword is hardly ever made uſe of but in capital puniſhments. This ſame law, together with other laws of that good king Edward, did William the Conqueror ratify in the fourth year of his reign, and in a very full council held at Verulam, confirmed it with a moſt ſolemn oath: and by ſo doing, he not only extinguiſhed his right of conqueſt, if he ever had any over us, but ſubjected himſelf to be judged according to the tenour of this very law. And his ſon Henry ſwore to the obſervance of king Edward's laws, and of this amongſt the reſt; and upon thoſe only terms it was, that

that he was choſen king, while his elder brother Robert was alive. The ſame oath was taken by all ſucceeding kings, before they were crowned. Hence our ancient and famous lawyer Bracton, in his firſt book, Chap. viii, "There is no king in the caſe," ſays he, "where will rules the roaſt, and law does not take place." And in his third book, Chap. ix, "A king is a king ſo long as he rules well; he becomes a tyrant when he oppreſſes the people committed to his charge." And in the ſame chapter, "The king ought to uſe the power of law and right as God's miniſter and vicegerent; the power of wrong is the Devil's, and not God's; when the king turns aſide to do injuſtice, he is the miniſter of the Devil." The very ſame words almoſt another ancient lawyer has, who was the author of the book called "Fleta;" both of them remembered that truly royal law of king Edward, that fundamental maxim in our law, which I have formerly mentioned, by which nothing is to be accounted a law, that is contrary to the laws of God, or of reaſon; no more than a tyrant can be ſaid to be a king, or a miniſter of the Devil a miniſter of God. Since therefore the law is chiefly right reaſon, if we are bound to obey a king, and a miniſter of God; by the very ſame reaſon, and the very ſame law, we ought to reſiſt a tyrant, and a miniſter of the Devil. And becauſe controverſies ariſe oftener about names than things, the ſame authors tell us, that a king of England, though he have not loſt the name of a king, yet is as liable to be judged, and ought ſo to be, as any of the common people. Bracton, Book I, Chap. viii; Fleta, Book I, Chap. xvii; "No man ought to be greater than the king in the adminiſtration of juſtice; but he himſelf ought to be as little as the leaſt in receiving juſtice, ſi peccat, if he offend." Others read it, ſi petat. Since our kings therefore are liable to be judged, whether by the name of tyrants, or of kings, it muſt not be difficult to aſſign their legal judges. Nor will it be amiſs to conſult the ſame authors upon that point. Bracton, Book I, Chap. xvi; Fleta, Book I, Chap. 17; "The king has his ſuperiours in the government; the law, by which he is made king; and his court, to wit, the earls, and the barons:

comites (earls) are as much as to ſay, companions; and he that has a companion, has a maſter; and therefore, if the king will be without a bridle, that is, not govern by law, they ought to bridle him." That the commons are comprehended in the word barons, has been ſhown already; nay, and in the books of our ancient laws they are frequently ſaid to have been called peers of parliament: and eſpecially in the Modus tenendi, &c. "There ſhall be choſen," ſays that book, "out of all the peers of the realm, five and twenty perſons, of whom five ſhall be knights, five citizens, and five burgeſſes; and two knights of a county, have a greater vote in granting and rejecting than the greateſt earl in England." And it is but reaſonable they ſhould, for they vote for a whole county, &c. the earls for themſelves only. And who can but perceive, that thoſe patent earls, whom you call earls made by writ, (ſince we have now none that hold their earldoms by tenure) are very unfit perſons to try the king, who conferred their honours upon them? Since therefore by our law, as appears by that old book, called "the Mirror," the king has his peers, who in parliament have cognizance of wrongs done by the king to any of his people; and ſince it is notoriouſly known, that the meaneſt man in the kingdom may even in inferiour courts have the benefit of the law againſt the king himſelf, in caſe of any injury, or wrong ſuſtained; how much more conſonant to juſtice, how much more neceſſary is it, that in caſe the king oppreſs all his people, there ſhould be ſuch as have authority not only to reſtrain him, and keep him within bounds, but to judge and puniſh him? for that government muſt needs be very ill, and moſt ridiculouſly conſtituted, in which remedy is provided in caſe of little injuries, done by the prince to private perſons, and no remedy, no redreſs for greater, no care taken for the ſafety of the whole; no proviſion made to the contrary, but that the king may, without any law, ruin all his ſubjects, when at the ſame time he cannot by law ſo much as hurt any one of them. And ſince I have ſhown, that it is neither good manners, nor expedient, that the lords ſhould be the king's judges; it follows, that the power of judica-

ture

ture in that caſe does wholly, and by very good right, belong to the commons, who are both peers of the realm, and barons, and have the power and authority of all the people committed to them. For ſince (as we find it expreſsly in our written law, which I have already cited) the commons together with the king made a good parliament without either lords or biſhops, becauſe before either lords or biſhops had a being, kings held parliaments with their commons only; by the very ſame reaſon the commons apart muſt have the ſovereign power without the king, and a power of judging the king himſelf; becauſe before there ever was a king, they in the name of the whole body of the nation held counſels and parliaments, had the power of judicature, made laws, and made the kings themſelves, not to lord it over the people, but to adminiſter their public affairs. Whom if the king, inſtead of ſo doing, ſhall endeavour to injure and oppreſs, our law pronounces him from time forward not ſo much as to retain the name of a king, to be no ſuch thing as a king: and if he be no king, what need we trouble ourſelves to find out peers for him? For being then by all good men adjudged to be a tyrant, there are none but who are peers good enough for him, and proper enough to pronounce ſentence of death upon him judicially. Theſe things being ſo, I think I have ſufficiently proved what I undertook, by many authorities, and written laws; to wit, that ſince the commons have authority by very good right to try the king, and ſince they have actually tried him, and put him to death, for the miſchief he had done both in church and ſtate, and without all hope of amendment, they have done nothing therein but what was juſt and regular, for the intereſt of the ſtate, in diſcharging of their truſt, becoming their dignity, and according to the laws of the land. And I cannot upon this occaſion, but congratulate myſelf with the honour of having had ſuch anceſtors, who founded this government with no leſs prudence, and in as much liberty as the moſt worthy of the ancient Romans or Grecians ever founded any of theirs: and they muſt needs, if they have any knowledge of our affairs, rejoice over their

poſterity, who when they were almoſt reduced to ſlavery, yet with ſo much wiſdom and courage vindicated and aſſerted the ſtate, which they ſo wiſely founded upon ſo much liberty, from the unruly government of a king.

CHAP. IX.

I THINK by this time it is ſufficiently evident, that kings of England may be judged even by the laws of England; and that they have their proper judges, which was the thing to be proved. What do you do farther? (for whereas you repeat many things that you have ſaid before, I do not intend to repeat the anſwers that I have given them) "It is an eaſy thing to demonſtrate, even from the nature of the things for which parliaments are ſummoned, that the king is above the parliament. The parliament, (you ſay,) is wont to be aſſembled upon weighty affairs, ſuch as wherein the ſafety of the kingdom and of the people is concerned." If therefore the king call parliaments together, not for his own concerns, but thoſe of the nation, nor to ſettle thoſe neither, but by their own conſent, at their own diſcretion, what is he more than a miniſter, and as it were an agent for the people? ſince without their ſuffrages that are choſen by the people, he cannot exact the leaſt thing whatſoever, either with relation to himſelf, or any body elſe? Which proves likewiſe, that it is the king's duty to call parliaments whenever the people deſire it; ſince the people's, and not the king's concerns, are to be treated of by that aſſembly, and to be ordered as they ſee cauſe. For although the king's aſſent be required for faſhion ſake, which in leſſer matters, that concerned the welfare of private perſons only, he might refuſe, and uſe that form, "the king will adviſe;" yet in thoſe greater affairs, that concerned the public ſafety, and liberty of the people in general, he had no negative voice: for it would have been againſt his coronation oath to deny his aſſent in ſuch caſes, which was as binding to him as any law could be, and againſt the chief article of Magna Charta, cap. 29, "We will not deny to any man, nor will we delay to render to every man right and juſtice."

Shall

Shall it not be in the king's power to deny juſtice, and ſhall it be in his power to deny the enacting of juſt laws? Could he not deny juſtice to any particular perſon, and could he to all his people? Could he not do it in inferiour courts, and could he in the ſupreme court of all? Or, can any king be ſo arrogant as to pretend to know what is juſt and profitable better than the whole body of the people? Eſpecially, ſince "he is created and choſen for this very end and purpoſe, to do juſtice to all," as Bracton ſays, lib. iii. c. 9. that is, to do juſtice according to ſuch laws as the people agree upon. Hence is what we find in our records, 7 H. IV, Rott. Parl. num. 59, the king has no prerogative, that derogates from juſtice and equity. And formerly when kings have refuſed to confirm acts of parliament, to wit, Magna Charta, and ſome others, our anceſtors have brought them to it by force of arms. And yet our lawyers never were of opinion, that thoſe laws were leſs valid, or leſs binding, ſince the king was forced to aſſent to no more than what he ought in juſtice to have aſſented to voluntarily, and without conſtraint. Whilſt you go about to prove that kings of other nations have been as much under the power of their ſenates or councils, as our kings were, you do not argue us into ſlavery, but them into liberty. In which you do but that over again, that you have from the very beginning of your diſcourſe, and which ſome ſilly Leguleians now and then do, to argue unawares, againſt their own clients. But you ſay, "We confeſs that the king, wherever he be, yet is ſuppoſed ſtill to be preſent in his parliament by virtue of his power; inſomuch, that whatever is tranſacted there, is ſuppoſed to be done by the king himſelf:" and then as if you had got ſome petty bribe or ſmall morſel, and tickled with the remembrance of your purſe of gold, "we take," ſay you, "what they give us;" and take a halter then, for I am ſure you deſerve it. But we do not give it for granted, which is the thing you thought would follow from thence, "that therefore that court acts only by virtue of a delegated power from the king." For when we ſay, that the regal power, be it what it will, cannot be abſent from the parliament, do we thereby acknowledge that power to

be ſupreme? Does not the king's authority ſeem rather to be transferred to the parliament, and, as being the leſſer of the two, to be compriſed in the greater? Certainly, if the parliament may reſcind the king's acts whether he will or no, and revoke privileges granted by him, to whomſoever they be granted: if they may ſet bounds to his prerogative, as they ſee cauſe, if they may regulate his yearly revenue, and the expenſes of his court, his retinue, and generally all the concerns of his houſehold; if they may remove his moſt intimate friends and counſellors, and, as it were, pluck them out of his boſom, and bring them to condign puniſhment; finally, if any ſubject may by law appeal from the king to the parliament (all which things, that they may lawfully be done, and have been frequently practiſed, both our hiſtories and records, and the moſt eminent of our lawyers aſſure us) I ſuppoſe no man in his right wits will deny the authority of the parliament to be ſuperiour to that of the king. For even in an interregnum the authority of the parliament is in being, and (than which nothing is more common in our hiſtories) they have often made a free choice of a ſucceſſor, without any regard to an hereditary deſcent. In ſhort, the parliament is the ſupreme council of the nation, conſtituted and appointed by a moſt free people, and armed with ample power and authority, for this end and purpoſe; viz. to conſult together upon the moſt weighty affairs of the kingdom; the king was created to put their laws in execution. Which thing after the parliament themſelves had declared in a public edict, (for ſuch is the juſtice of their proceedings, that of their own accord they have been willing to give an account of their actions to other nations,) is it not prodigious, that ſuch a pitiful fellow as you are, a man of no authority, of no credit, of no figure in the world, a mere Burgundian ſlave, ſhould have the impudence to accuſe the parliament of England, aſſerting by a public inſtrument their own and their country's right, "of a deteſtable and horrid impoſture?" Your country may be aſhamed, you raſcal, to have brought forth a little inconſiderable fellow of ſuch profligate impudence. But perhaps you have ſomewhat to

tell

tell us, that may be for our good: go on, we will hear you. "What laws," ſay you, "can a parliament enact, in which the biſhops are not preſent?" Did you then, you madman, expel the order of biſhops out of the church, to introduce them into the ſtate? O wicked wretch! who ought to be delivered over to Satan, whom the church ought to forbid her communion, as being a hypocrite, and an atheiſt, and no civil ſociety of men to acknowledge as a member, being a public enemy, and a plague-ſore to the common liberty of mankind; who, where the goſpel fails you, endeavour to prove out of Ariſtotle, Halicarnaſſæus, and then from ſome popiſh authorities of the moſt corrupt ages, that the king of England is the head of the church of England, to the end that you may, as far as in you lies, bring in the biſhops again, his intimates and table-companions, grown ſo of late, to rob and tyrannize in the church of God, whom God himſelf has depoſed and degraded, whoſe very order you had heretofore aſſerted in print that it ought to be rooted out of the world, as deſtructive of and pernicious to the chriſtian religion. What apoſtate did ever ſo thamefully and wickedly deſert as this man has done, I do not ſay his own, which indeed never was any, but the chriſtian doctrine which he had formerly aſſerted? "The biſhops being put down, who under the king, and by his permiſſion held plea of eccleſiaſtical cauſes, upon whom," ſay you, "will that juriſdiction devolve?" O villain! have ſome regard at leaſt to your own conſcience; remember before it be too late, if at leaſt this admonition of mine come not too late, remember that this mocking the holy ſpirit of God is an inexpiable crime, and will not be left unpuniſhed. Stop at laſt, and ſet bounds to your fury, leſt the wrath of God lay hold upon you ſuddenly, for endeavouring to deliver the flock of God, his anointed ones that are not to be touched, to enemies and cruel tyrants, to be cruſhed and trampled on again, from whom himſelf by a high and ſtretched out arm had ſo lately delivered them; and from whom you yourſelf maintained, that they ought to be delivered, I know not whether for any good of theirs, or in order to the hardening of your own heart,

and

and to further your own damnation. If the biſhops have no right to lord it over the church, certainly much leſs have kings, whatever the laws of men may be to the contrary. For they that know any thing of the goſpel know thus much, that the government of the church is altogether divine and ſpiritual, and no civil conſtitution. Whereas you ſay, that "in ſecular affairs, the kings of England have always had the ſovereign power;" our laws do abundantly declare that to be falſe. Our courts of juſtice are erected and ſuppreſſed, not by the king's authority, but that of the parliament; and yet in any of them, the meaneſt ſubject might go to law with the king; nor is it a rare thing for the judges to give judgment againſt him, which if the king ſhould endeavour to obſtruct by any prohibition, mandate, or letters, the judges were bound by law, and by their oaths not to obey him, but to reject ſuch inhibitions as null and void in law. The king could not impriſon any man, or ſeize his eſtate as forfeited; he could not puniſh any man, not ſummoned to appear in court, where not the king, but the ordinary judges give ſentence; which they frequently did, as I have ſaid, againſt the king. Hence our Bracton, lib. 3. cap. 9. "The regal power," ſays he, "is according to law; he has no power to do any wrong, nor can the king do any thing but what the law warrants." Thoſe lawyers that you have conſulted, men that have lately fled their country, may tell you another tale, and acquaint you with ſome ſtatutes, not very ancient neither, but made in king Edward IV, king Henry VI, and king Edward VIth's days; but they did not conſider, that what power ſoever thoſe ſtatutes gave the king, was conferred upon him by authority of parliament, ſo that he was beholden to them for it; and the ſame power that conferred it, might at pleaſure refume it. How comes it to paſs, that ſo acute a diſputant as you, ſhould ſuffer yourſelf to be impoſed upon to that degree, as to make uſe of that very argument to prove the king's power to be abſolute and ſupreme, than which nothing proves more clearly, that it is ſubordinate to that of the parliament? Our records of the greateſt authority with us declare, that our kings owe all

all their power, not to any right of inheritance, of conqueſt, or ſucceſſion, but to the people. So in the parliament rolls of king Henry IV, numb. 108, we read, that the kingly office and power was granted by the commons to king Henry IV, and before him, to his predeceſſor king Richard II, juſt as kings uſe to grant commiſſioners places, and lieutenantſhips to their deputies, by edicts and patents. Thus the houſe of commons ordered expreſsly to be entered upon record, "that they had granted to king Richard to uſe the ſame good liberty, that the kings of England before him had uſed:" which becauſe that king abuſed to the ſubverſion of the laws, and "contrary to his oath at his coronation," the ſame perſons, that granted him that power, took it back again, and depoſed him. The ſame men, as appears by the ſame record, declared in open parliament, "that having confidence in the prudence and moderation of king Henry the IVth, they will and enact, that he enjoy the ſame royal authority that his anceſtors enjoyed." Which if it had been any other than in the nature of a truſt, as this was, either thoſe houſes of parliament were fooliſh and vain, to give what was none of their own, or thoſe kings that were willing to receive as from them, what was already theirs, were too injurious both to themſelves and their poſterity; neither of which is likely. "A third part of the regal power," ſay you, "is converſant about the militia; this the kings of England have uſed to order and govern, without fellow or competitor." This is as falſe as all the reſt, that you have taken upon the credit of fugitives: for in the firſt place, both our own hiſtories, and thoſe of foreigners, that have been any whit exact in the relation of our affairs, declare, that the making of peace and war always did belong to the parliament. And the laws of St. Edward, which our kings were bound to ſwear that they would maintain, make this appear beyond all exception, in the chapter "De Heretochiis," viz. "That there were certain officers appointed in every province and county throughout the kingdom, that were called Heretochs, in Latin duces, commanders of armies, that were to command the forces of the ſeveral counties," not for the honour

honour of the crown only, " but for the good of the realm. And they were choſen by the general council, and in the ſeveral counties at public aſſemblies of the inhabitants, as ſheriffs ought to be choſen." Whence it is evident, that the forces of the kingdom, and the commanders of thoſe forces, were anciently, and ought to be ſtill, not at the king's command, but at the people's; and that this moſt reaſonable and juſt law obtained in this kingdom of ours, no leſs than heretofore it did in the commonwealth of the Romans. Concerning which, it will not be amiſs to hear what Cicero ſays, Philip. 1. " All the legions, all the forces of the commonwealth, whereſoever they are, are the people of Rome's; nor are thoſe legions, that deſerted the conſul Antonius, ſaid to have been Antony's, but the commonwealth's legions." This very law of St. Edward, together with the reſt, did William the Conqueror, at the deſire and inſtance of the people, confirm by oath, and added over and above, cap. 56, " That all cities, boroughs, caſtles, ſhould be ſo watched every night, as the ſheriffs, the aldermen, and other magiſtrates, ſhould think meet for the ſafety of the kingdom." And in the 6th law, " Caſtles, boroughs, and cities, were firſt built for the defence of the people, and therefore ought to be maintained free and entire, by all ways and means." What then? Shall towns and places of ſtrength in times of peace be guarded againſt thieves and robbers by common councils of the ſeveral places; and ſhall they not be defended in dangerous times of war, againſt both domeſtic and foreign hoſtility, by the common council of the whole nation? If this be not granted, there can be no freedom, no integrity, no reaſon in the guarding of them: nor ſhall we obtain any of thoſe ends, for which the law itſelf tells us, that towns and fortreſſes were at firſt founded. Indeed our anceſtors were willing to put any thing into the king's power, rather than their arms, and the garriſons of their towns; conceiving that to be neither better nor worſe, than betraying their liberty to the fury and exorbitancy of their princes. Of which there are ſo very many inſtances in our hiſtories, and thoſe ſo generally known, that it would be ſuperfluous to mention any of them here. But " the king owes protection

to

to his ſubjects; and how can he protect them, unleſs he have men and arms at command?" But, ſay I, he had all this for the good of the kingdom, as has been ſaid, not for the deſtruction of his people, and the ruin of the kingdom: which in King Henry the IIId's time, one Leonard, a learned man in thoſe days, in an aſſembly of biſhops, told Ruſtandus, the pope's nuncio and the king's procurator, in theſe words; "All churches are the pope's, as all temporal things are ſaid to be the king's, for defence and protection, not his in propriety and ownerſhip, as we ſay; they are his to defend, not to deſtroy." The aforementioned law of St. Edward is to the ſame purpoſe; and what does this import more than a truſt? Does this look like abſolute power? Such a kind of power a commander of an army always has, that is, a delegated power; and yet both at home and abroad he is never the leſs able to defend the people that chooſe him. Our parliaments would anciently have contended with our kings about their liberty and the laws of St. Edward, to very little purpoſe; and it would have been an unequal match betwixt the kings and them, if they had been of opinion, that the power of the ſword belonged to them alone: for how unjuſt laws ſoever their kings would have impoſed upon them, their Charter, though never ſo great, would have been a weak defence againſt force. But ſay you, "What would the parliament be the better for the militia, ſince without the king's aſſent they cannot raiſe the leaſt farthing from the people towards the maintaining it?" Take you no thought for that: for in the firſt place you go upon a falſe ſuppoſition, "that parliaments cannot impoſe taxes without the king's aſſent," upon the people that ſend them, and whoſe concerns they undertake. In the next place, you, that are ſo officious an inquirer into other men's matters, cannot but have heard, that the people of their own accord, by bringing in their plate to be melted down, raiſed a great ſum of money towards the carrying on of this war againſt the king. Then you mention the largeneſs of our king's revenue: you mention over and over again five hundred and forty thouſands: that "thoſe of our kings that have been eminent for their bounty and liberality have uſed

to

to give large boons out of their own patrimony." This you were glad to hear; it was by this charm, that thoſe traitors to their country allured you, as Balaam the prophet was enticed of old, to curſe the people of God, and exclaim againſt the judicial diſpenſations of his providence. You fool! what was that unjuſt and violent king the better for ſuch abundance of wealth? What are you the better for it? Who have been no partaker of any part of it, that I can hear of (how great hopes ſoever you may have conceived of being vaſtly enriched by it) but only of a hundred pieces of gold, in a purſe wrought with beads. Take that reward of thine iniquity, Balaam, which thou haſt loved, and enjoy it. You go on to play the fool; "the ſetting up of a ſtandard is a prerogative that belongs to the king only." How ſo? Why becauſe Virgil tells us in his Æneis, "that Turnus ſet up a ſtandard on the top of the tower at Laurentum, for an enſign of war." And do not you know, Grammarian, that every general of an army does the ſame thing? But, ſays Ariſtotle, "The king muſt always be provided of a military power, that he may be able to defend the laws; and therefore the king muſt be ſtronger than the whole body of the people." This man makes conſequences juſt as Ocnus does ropes in Hell; which are of no uſe but to be eaten by aſſes. For a number of ſoldiers given to the king by the people, is one thing; and the ſole power of the militia is quite another thing; the latter, Ariſtotle does not allow that kings ought to be maſters of, and that in this very place which you have quoted: "He ought," ſays he, "to have ſo many armed men about him, as to make him ſtronger than any one man, than many men got together; but he muſt not be ſtronger than all the people." Polit. lib. 3. cap. 4. Elſe inſtead of protecting them, it would be in his power to ſubject both people and laws to himſelf. For this is the difference betwixt a king and a tyrant: a king, by conſent of the ſenate and people, has about him ſo many armed men, as to enable him to reſiſt enemies, and ſuppreſs ſeditions. A tyrant, againſt the will both of ſenate and people, gets as great a number as he can, either of enemies, or profligate ſubjects, to ſide with him againſt the ſenate and the

people. The parliament therefore allowed the king, as they did whatever he had beſides, the ſetting up of a ſtandard; not to wage war againſt his own people, but to defend them againſt ſuch as the parliament ſhould declare enemies to the ſtate: if he acted otherwiſe, himſelf was to be accounted an enemy; ſince according to the very law of St. Edward, or according to a more ſacred law than that, the law of nature itſelf, he loſt the name of a king, and was no longer ſuch. Whence Cicero in his Philip. "He forfeits his command in the army, and intereſt in his government, that employs them againſt the ſtate." Neither could the king compel thoſe that held of him by knight-ſervice, to ſerve him in any other war, than ſuch as was made by conſent of parliament; which is evident by many ſtatutes. So for cuſtoms and other ſubſidies for the maintenance of the navy, the king could not exact them without an act of parliament; as was reſolved about twelve years ago, by the ableſt of our lawyers, when the king's authority was at the height. And long before them, Forteſcue, an eminent lawyer, and chancellor to king Henry the Sixth, "The king of England," ſays he, "can neither alter the laws, nor exact ſubſidies without the people's conſent." Nor can any teſtimonies be brought from antiquity, to prove the kingdom of England to have been merely regal. "The king," ſays Bracton, "has a juriſdiction over all his ſubjects;" that is, in his courts of juſtice, where juſtice is adminiſtered in the king's name indeed, but according to our own laws. "All are ſubject to the king;" that is, every particular man is; and ſo Bracton explains himſelf in the places that I have cited. What follows is but turning the ſame ſtone over and over again; (at which ſport I believe you are able to tire Siſiphus himſelf) and is ſufficiently anſwered by what has been ſaid already. For the reſt, if our parliaments have ſometimes complimented good kings with ſubmiſſive expreſſions, though neither ſavouring of flattery nor ſlavery, thoſe are not to be accounted due to tyrants, nor ought to prejudice the people's right: good manners and civility do not infringe liberty. Whereas you cite out of Sir Edward Coke and others, "that the kingdom of England is an abſolute kingdom;"

dom;" that is ſaid with reſpect to any foreign prince, or the emperor: becauſe as Camden ſays, "It is not under the patronage of the emperor:" but both of them affirm, that the government of England reſides not in king alone, but in a body politic. Whence Forteſcue, in his book de Laud. Leg. Ang. cap. 9, "The king of England," ſays he, "governs his people, not by a merely regal, but a political power; for the Engliſh are governed by laws of their own making." Foreign authors were not ignorant of this: hence Philip de Comines, a grave author, in the Fifth Book of his Commentaries, "Of all the kingdoms of the earth," ſays he, "that I have any knowledge of, there is none in my opinion, where the government is more moderate, where the king has leſs power of hurting his people, than in England." Finally, "It is ridiculous," ſay you, "for them to affirm that kingdoms were ancienter than kings; which is as much as if they ſhould ſay, that there was light before the ſun was created." But with your good leave, Sir, we do not ſay that kingdoms, but that the people were before kings. In the mean time, who can be more ridiculous than you, who deny there was light before the ſun had a being? You pretend to a curioſity in other men's matters, and have forgot the very firſt things that were taught you. "You wonder how they that have ſeen the king ſit upon his throne, at a ſeſſion of parliament (ſub aureo & ſerico Cœlo, under a golden and ſilken Heaven) under a canopy of ſtate, ſhould ſo much as make a queſtion, whether the majeſty reſided in him, or in the parliament?" They are certainly hard of belief, whom ſo lucid an argument, coming down from Heaven, cannot convince. Which golden Heaven, you, like a ſtoic, have ſo devoutly and ſerioufly gazed upon, that you ſeem to have forgot what kind of Heaven Moſes and Ariſtotle deſcribe to us; for you deny, that there was any light in Moſes's Heaven before the ſun: and in Ariſtotle's you make three temperate zones. How many zones you obſerved in that golden and ſilken Heaven of the king's, I know not; but I know you got one zone (a purſe) well tempered with a hundred golden ſtars by your aſtronomy.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

SINCE this whole controverſy, whether concerning the right of kings in general, or that of the king of England in particular, is rendered difficult and intricate, rather by the obſtinacy of parties, than by the nature of the thing itſelf; I hope they that prefer truth before the intereſt of a faction, will be ſatisfied with what I have alleged out of the law of God, the laws of nations, and the municipal laws of my own country, that a king of England may be brought to trial, and put to death. As for thoſe whoſe minds are either blinded with ſuperſtition, or ſo dazzled with the ſplendour and grandeur of a court, that magnanimity and true liberty do not appear ſo glorious to them, as they are in themſelves, it will be in vain to contend with them, either by reaſon and arguments, or examples. But you, Salmaſius, ſeem very abſurd, as in every other part of your book, ſo particularly in this, who though you rail perpetually at the Independents, and revile them with all the terms of reproach imaginable, yet aſſert to the higheſt degree that can be the Independency of a king, whom you defend; and will not allow him to "owe his ſovereignty to the people, but to his deſcent." And whereas in the beginning of your book you complained, that he was "put to plead for his life," here you complain "that he periſhed without being heard to ſpeak for himſelf." But if you have a mind to look into the hiſtory of his trial, which is very faithfully publiſhed in French, it may be you will be of another opinion. Whereas he had liberty given him for ſome days together, to ſay what he could for himſelf, he made uſe of it not to clear himſelf of the crimes laid to his charge, but to diſprove the authority of his judges, and the judicature that he was called before. And whenever a criminal is either mute, or ſays nothing to the purpoſe, there is no injuſtice in condemning him without hearing him, if his crimes are notorious, and publicly known. If you ſay, that Charles died as he lived, I agree with you: if you ſay, that he died pioufly, holily, and at eaſe, you may remember that his

grandmother Mary, queen of Scots, an infamous woman, died on a ſcaffold with as much outward appearance of piety, ſanctity, and conſtancy, as he did. And leſt you ſhould aſcribe too much to that preſence of mind, which ſome common malefactors have ſo great a meaſure of at their death; many times deſpair, and a hardened heart puts on as it were a vizor of courage; and ſtupidity, a ſhow of quiet and tranquillity of mind: ſometimes the worſt of men deſire to appear good, undaunted, innocent, and now and then religious, not only in their life, but at their death; and in ſuffering death for their villanies, uſe to act the laſt part of their hypocriſy and cheats, with all the ſhow imaginable; and like bad poets or ſtageplayers, are very ambitious at being clapped at the end of the play. "Now," you ſay, "you are come to inquire who they chiefly were, that gave ſentence againſt the king." Whereas it ought firſt to be inquired into, how you, a foreigner, and a French vagabond, came to have any thing to do to raiſe a queſtion about our affairs, to which you are ſo much a ſtranger? And what reward induced you to it? But we know enough of that, and who ſatisfied your curioſity in theſe matters of ours; even thoſe fugitives, and traitors to their country, that could eaſily hire ſuch a vain fellow as you, to ſpeak ill of us. Then an account in writing of the ſtate of our affairs was put into your hands by ſome hairbrained, half proteſtant, half papiſt chaplain or other, or by ſome ſneaking courtier, and you were put to tranſlate it into Latin; out of that you took theſe narratives, which, if you pleaſe, we will examine a little: "Not the hundred thouſandth part of the people conſented to this ſentence of condemnation." What were the reſt of the people then, that ſuffered ſo great a thing to be tranſacted againſt their will? Were they ſtocks and ſtones, were they mere trunks of men only, or ſuch images of Britains, as Virgil deſcribes to have been wrought in tapeſtry?

Purpurea intexti tollant aulæa Britanni.

And Britains interwove held up the purple hangings.

For

For you deſcribe no true Britains, but painted ones, or rather needle-wrought men inſtead of them. Since therefore it is a thing ſo incredible, that a warlike nation ſhould be ſubdued by ſo few, and thoſe of the dregs of the people (which is the firſt thing that occurs in your narrative), that appears in the very nature of the thing itſelf to be moſt falſe. "The biſhops were turned out of the houſe of lords by the parliament itſelf." The more deplorable is your madneſs (for are not you yet ſenſible that you rave) to complain of their being turned out of the parliament, whom you yourſelf in a large book endeavour to prove ought to be turned out of the Church. "One of the ſtates of parliament, to wit, the houſe of lords, conſiſting of dukes, earls, and viſcounts, was removed." And deſervedly were they removed; for they were not deputed to ſit there by any town or county, but repreſented themſelves only; they had no right over the people, but (as if they had been ordained for that very purpoſe) uſed frequently to oppoſe their rights and liberties. They were created by the king, they were his companions, his ſervants, and as it were, ſhadows of him. He being removed, it was neceſſary they ſhould be reduced to the ſame level with the body of the people, from amongſt whom they took their riſe: "One part of the parliament, and that the worſt of all, ought not to have aſſumed that power of judging and condemning the king." But I have told you already, that the houſe of commons was not only the chief part of our parliament, while we had kings, but was a perfect and entire parliament of itſelf, without the temporal lords, much more without the biſhops. But, "the whole houſe of commons themſelves were not admitted to have to do with the trial of the king." To wit, that part of them was not admitted, that openly revolted to him in their minds and counſels; whom, though they ſtyled him their king, yet they had ſo often acted againſt as an enemy. The parliament of England, and the deputies ſent from the parliament of Scotland, on the 13th of January, 1645, wrote to the king, in anſwer to a letter of his, by which he deſired a deceitful truce, and that he might treat with them at London; that they could

not admit him into that city, till he had made ſatisfaction to the ſtate for the civil war that he had raiſed in the three kingdoms, and for the deaths of ſo many of his ſubjects ſlain by his order; and till he had agreed to a true and firm peace upon ſuch terms as the parliaments of both kingdoms had offered him ſo often already, and ſhould offer him again. He on the other hand either refuſed to hear, or by ambiguous anſwers eluded their juſt and equal propoſals, though moſt humbly preſented to him ſeven times over. The parliament at laſt, after ſo many years patience, leſt the king ſhould overturn the ſtate by his wiles and delays, when in priſon, which he could not ſubdue in the field, and leſt the vanquiſhed enemy, pleaſed with our diviſions, ſhould recover himſelf, and triumph unexpectedly over his conquerors, vote that for the future they would have no regard to him, that they would ſend him no more propoſals, nor receive any from him: after which vote, there were found even ſome members of parliament, who out of the hatred they bore that invincible army, whoſe glory they envied, and which they would have had diſbanded, and ſent home with diſgrace, after they had deſerved ſo well of their nation, and out of a ſervile compliance with ſome ſeditious miniſters, finding their opportunity, when many, whom they knew to be otherwiſe minded than themſelves, having been ſent by the houſe itſelf to ſuppreſs the Preſbyterians, who began already to be turbulent, were abſent in the ſeveral counties, with a ſtrange levity, not to ſay perfidiouſneſs, vote that that inveterate enemy of the ſtate, who had nothing of a king but the name, without giving any ſatisfaction or ſecurity, ſhould be brought back to London, and reſtored to his dignity and government, as if he had deſerved well of the nation by what he had done. So that they preferred the king before their religion, their liberty, and that very celebrated covenant of theirs. What did they do in the mean time, who were found themſelves, and ſaw ſuch pernicious councils on foot? Ought they therefore to have been wanting to the nation, and not provide for its ſafety, becauſe the infection had ſpread itſelf even in their own houſe? But, who ſecluded thoſe ill-affected members? "The Engliſh army," you ſay:

: ſo that it was not an army of foreigners, but of moſt iant, and faithful, honeſt natives, whoſe officers for moſt part were members of Parliament; and whom ſe good ſecluded members would have ſecluded their ntry, and baniſhed into Ireland; while in the mean ie the Scots, whoſe alliance began to be doubtful, l very conſiderable forces in four of our northern nties, and kept garriſons in the beſt towns of thoſe ts, and had the king himſelf in cuſtody; whilſt they ewiſe encouraged the tumultuating of thoſe of their n faction, who did more than threaten the parliament, h in city and country, and through whoſe means not y a civil, but a war with Scotland too ſhortly after ke out. If it has been always counted praiſe-worthy private men to aſſiſt the ſtate, and promote the public d, whether by advice or action; our army ſure was no fault, who being ordered by the parliament to come town, obeyed and came, and when they were come, lled with eaſe the faction and uproar of the king's ty, who ſometimes threatened the houſe itſelf. For gs were brought to that paſs, that of neceſſity either muſt be run down by them, or they by us. They l on their ſide moſt of the ſhopkeepers and handi-ftsmen of London, and generally thoſe of the mini-s, that were moſt factious. On our ſide was the army, oſe fidelity, moderation, and courage were ſufficiently wn. It being in our power by their means to retain liberty, our ſtate, our common ſafety, do you think had not been fools to have loſt all by our negligence l folly? They who had had places of command in the g's army, after their party were ſubdued, had laid n their arms indeed againſt their wills, but continued mies to us in their hearts; and they flocked to town, l were here watching all opportunities of renewing the . With theſe men, though they were the greateſt mies they had in the world, and thirſted after their d, did the Preſbyterians, becauſe they were not per-ted to exerciſe a civil, as well as an eccleſiaſtical juriſ-ion over all others, hold ſecret correſpondence, and k meaſures very unworthy of what they had formerly h ſaid and done; and they came to that ſpleen at laſt,

that they would rather enthral themſelves to the king again, than admit their own brethren to ſhare in their liberty, which they likewiſe had purchaſed at the price of their own blood; they choſe rather to be lorded over once more by a tyrant, polluted with the blood of ſo many of his own ſubjects, and who was enraged, and breathed out nothing but revenge againſt thoſe of them that were left, than endure their brethren and friends to be upon the ſquare with them. The Independents, as they are called, were the only men, that from firſt to laſt kept to their point, and knew what uſe to make of their victory. They refuſed (and wiſely, in my opinion) to make him king again, being then an enemy; who when he was their king, had made himſelf their enemy: nor were they ever the leſs averſe to a peace, but they very prudently dreaded a new war, or a perpetual ſlavery under the name of a peace. To load our army with the more reproaches, you begin a ſilly confuſed narrative of our affairs; in which, though I find many things falſe, many things frivolous, many things laid to our charge, for which we rather merit; yet I think it will be to no purpoſe for me to write a true relation, in anſwer to your falſe one. For you and I are arguing, not writing hiſtories, and both ſides will believe our reaſons, but not our narrative; and indeed the nature of the things themſelves is ſuch, that they cannot be related as they ought to be, but in a ſet hiſtory; ſo that I think it better, as Salluſt ſaid of Carthage, rather to ſay nothing at all, than to ſay but a little of things of this weight and importance. Nay, and I ſcorn ſo much as to mention the praiſes of great men, and of Almighty God himſelf (who in ſo wonderful a courſe of affairs ought to be frequently acknowledged) amongſt your ſlanders and reproaches. I will therefore only pick out ſuch things as ſeem to have any colour of argument. You ſay, "the Engliſh and Scots promiſed by a ſolemn covenant, to preſerve the majeſty of the king." But you omit upon what terms they promiſed it; to wit, if it might conſiſt with the ſafety of their religion and their liberty. To both which, religion and liberty, that king was ſo averſe to his laſt breath, and watched all opportunities of gaining advan-

tages upon them, that it was evident that his life was dangerous to their religion, and the certain ruin of their liberty. But then you fall upon the king's judges again: "If we conſider the thing aright, the concluſion of this abominable action muſt be imputed to the Independents, yet ſo as the Preſbyterians may juſtly challenge the glory of its beginning and progreſs." Hark, ye Preſbyterians, what good has it done you? How is your innocence and loyalty the more cleared by your ſeeming ſo much to abhor the putting the king to death? You yourſelves, in the opinion of this everlaſting talkative advocate of the king, your accuſer, "went more than half-way towards it; you were ſeen acting the fourth act and more, in this tragedy; you may juſtly be charged with the king's death, ſince you ſhowed the way to it; it was you and only you that laid his head upon the block." Wo be to you in the firſt place, if ever Charles his poſterity recover the crown of England; aſſure yourſelves, you are like to be put in the black liſt. But pay your vows to God, and love your brethren who have delivered you, who have prevented that calamity from falling upon you, who have ſaved you from inevitable ruin, though againſt your wills. You are accuſed likewiſe for that "ſome years ago you endeavoured by ſundry petitions to leſſen the king's authority, that you publiſhed ſome ſcandalous expreſſions of the king himſelf in the papers you preſented him with in the name of the parliament; to wit, in that declaration of the lords and commons of the 26th of May 1642, you declared openly in ſome mad poſitions that breathed nothing but rebellion, what your thoughts were of the king's authority: Hotham by order of parliament ſhut the gates of Hull againſt the king; you had a mind to make a trial by this firſt act of rebellion how much the king would bear." What could this man ſay more, if it were his deſign to reconcile the minds of all Engliſhmen to one another, and alienate them wholly from the king? for he gives them here to underſtand, that if ever the king be brought back, they muſt not only expect to be puniſhed for his father's death, but for the petitions they made long ago, and ſome acts that paſt in full parliament, concerning the putting down the com-

mon-prayer and biſhops, and that of the triennial parliament, and ſeveral other things that were enacted with the greateſt conſent and applauſe of all the people that could be; all which will be looked upon as the ſeditions and mad poſitions of the Preſbyterians. But this vain fellow changes his mind all of a ſudden; and what but of late, "when he conſidered it aright," he thought was to be imputed wholly to the Preſbyterians, now that "he conſiders the ſame thing from firſt to laſt," he thinks the Independents were the ſole actors of it. But even now he told us, "the Preſbyterians took up arms againſt the king, that by them he was beaten, taken captive, and put in priſon:" now he ſays, "this whole doctrine of rebellion is the Independents principle." O! the faithfulneſs of this man's narrative! how conſiſtent he is with himſelf! what need is there of a counter-narrative to this of his, that cuts its own throat? But if any man ſhould queſtion whether you are an honeſt man or a knave, let him read theſe following lines of yours: "It is time to explain whence and at what time this ſect of enemies to kingſhip firſt began. Why truly theſe rare puritans began in queen Elizabeth's time to crawl out of Hell, and diſturb not only the church, but the ſtate likewiſe; for they are no leſs plagues to the latter than to the former." Now your very ſpeech bewrays you to be a right Balaam; for where you deſigned to ſpit out the moſt bitter poiſon you could, there unwittingly and againſt your will you have pronounced a bleſſing. For it is notoriouſly known all over England, that if any endeavoured to follow the example of thoſe churches, whether in France or Germany, which they accounted beſt reformed, and to exerciſe the public worſhip of God in a more pure manner, which our biſhops had almoſt univerſally corrupted with their ceremonies and ſuperſtitions; or if any ſeemed either in point of religion or morality to be better than others, ſuch perſons were by the favour of epiſcopacy termed Puritans. Theſe are they whoſe principles you ſay are ſo oppoſite to kingſhip. Nor are they the only perſons, "moſt of the reformed religion, that have not ſucked in the reſt of their principles, yet ſeem to have approved of thoſe that

that ſtrike at kingly government." So that while you inveigh bitterly againſt the Independents, and endeavour to ſeparate them from Chriſt's flock, with the ſame breath you praiſe them; and thoſe principles which almoſt every where you affirm to be peculiar to the Independents, here you confeſs have been approved of by moſt of the reformed religion. Nay, you are arrived to that degree of impudence, impiety, and apoſtacy, that though formerly you maintained biſhops ought to be extirpated out of the church root and branch, as ſo many peſts and limbs of antichriſt, here you ſay the king ought to protect them, for the ſaving of his coronation oath. You cannot ſhow yourſelf a more infamous villain than you have done already, but by abjuring the proteſtant reformed religion, to which you are a ſcandal. Whereas you tax us with giving a "toleration of all ſects and hereſies," you ought not to find fault with us for that; ſince the church bears with ſuch a profligate wretch as you yourſelf, ſuch a vain fellow, ſuch a liar, ſuch a mercenary ſlanderer, ſuch an apoſtate, one who has the impudence to affirm, that the beſt and moſt pious of chriſtians, and even moſt of thoſe who profeſs the reformed religion, are crept out of Hell, becauſe they differ in opinion from you. I had beſt paſs by the calumnies that fill up the reſt of this chapter, and thoſe prodigious tenets that you aſcribe to the Independents, to render them odious; for neither do they at all concern the cauſe you have in hand, and they are ſuch for the moſt part as deſerve to be laughed at and deſpiſed, rather than receive a ſerious anſwer.

CHAP. XI.

YOU ſeem to begin this eleventh chapter, Salmaſius, though with no modeſty, yet with ſome ſenſe of your weakneſs and trifling in this diſcourſe. For whereas you propoſed to yourſelf to inquire in this place, by what authority ſentence was given againſt the king; you add immediately, which nobody expected from you, that "it is in vain to make any ſuch inquiry; to wit, becauſe

cauſe the quality of the perſons that did it leaves hardly any room for ſuch a queſtion." And therefore as you have been found guilty of a great deal of impudence and faucineſs in the undertaking of this cauſe, ſo ſince you ſeem here conſcious of your own impertinence, I ſhall give you the ſhorter anſwer. To your queſtion then; by what authority the houſe of commons either condemned the king themſelves, or delegated that power to others; I anſwer, they did it by virtue of the ſupreme authority on earth. How they come to have the ſupreme power, you may learn by what I have ſaid already, when I have refuted your impertinencies upon that ſubject. If you believed yourſelf, that you could ever ſay enough upon any ſubject, you would not be ſo tedious in repeating the ſame things ſo many times over. And the houſe of commons might delegate their judicial power by the ſame reaſon, by which you ſay the king may delegate his, who received all he had from the people. Hence in that ſolemn league and covenant that you object to us, the parliaments of England and Scotland ſolemnly proteſt and engage to each other, to puniſh the traitors in ſuch manner as "the ſupreme, judicial authority in both nations, or ſuch as ſhould have a delegated power from them," ſhould think fit. Now you hear the parliaments of both nations proteſt with one voice, that they may delegate their judicial power, which they call the ſupreme; ſo that you move a vain and frivolous controverſy about delegating this power. "But," ſay you, "there were added to thoſe judges, that were made choice of out of the houſe of commons, ſome officers of the army, and it never was known, that ſoldiers had any right to try a ſubject for his life." I will ſilence you in a very few words: you may remember, that we are not now diſcourſing of a ſubject, but of an enemy; whom if a general of an army, after he has taken him priſoner, reſolves to diſpatch, would he be thought to proceed otherwiſe than according to cuſtom and martial law, if he himſelf with ſome of his officers ſhould ſit upon him, and try and condemn him? An enemy to a ſtate, made a priſoner of war, cannot be looked upon to be ſo much as a member, much leſs a king in that ſtate.

This

This is declared by that ſacred law of St. Edward, which denies that a bad king is a king at all, or ought to be called ſo. Whereas you ſay, it was "not the whole, but a part of the houſe of commons, that tried and condemned the king," I give you this anſwer: the number of them, who gave their votes for putting the king to death, was far greater than is neceſſary, according to the cuſtom of our parliaments, to tranſact the greateſt affairs of the kingdom, in the abſence of the reſt; who ſince they were abſent through their own fault (for to revolt to the common enemy in their hearts, is the worſt ſort of abſence) their abſence ought not to hinder the reſt who continued faithful to the cauſe, from preſerving the ſtate; which when it was in a tottering condition, and almoſt quite reduced to ſlavery and utter ruin, the whole body of the people had at firſt committed to their fidelity, prudence, and courage. And they acted their parts like men; they ſet themſelves in oppoſition to the unruly wilfulneſs, the rage, the ſecret deſigns of an inveterate and exaſperated king; they preferred the common liberty and ſafety before their own; they outdid all former parliaments, they outdid all their anceſtors in conduct, magnanimity and ſteadineſs to their cauſe. Yet theſe very men did a great part of the people ungratefully deſert in the midſt of their undertaking, though they had promiſed them all fidelity, all the help and aſſiſtance they could afford them. Theſe were for ſlavery and peace, with ſloth and luxury, upon any terms: others demanded their liberty, nor would accept of a peace, that was not ſure and honourable. What ſhould the parliament do in this caſe? Ought they to have defended this part of the people, that was ſound, and continued faithful to them and their country, or to have ſided with thoſe that deſerted both? I know what you will ſay they ought to have done. You are not Eurylochus, but Elpenor, a miſerable enchanted beaſt, a filthy ſwine, accuſtomed to a ſordid ſlavery even under a woman; ſo that you have not the leaſt reliſh of true magnanimity, nor conſequently of liberty, which is the effect of it: you would have all other men ſlaves, becauſe you find in yourſelf no generous, ingenuous inclinations;

tions; you ſay nothing, you breathe nothing but what is mean and ſervile. You raiſe another ſcruple, to wit, "that he was the king of Scotland too, whom we condemned;" as if he might therefore do what he would in England. But that you may conclude this chapter, which of all others is the moſt weak and inſipid, at leaſt with ſome witty quirk, "there are two little words," ſay you, "that are made up of the ſame number of letters, and differ only in the placing of them, but whoſe ſignifications are wide aſunder, to wit, Vis and Jus, (might and right.)" It is no great wonder, that ſuch a three-lettered man as you, (fur, a thief) ſhould make ſuch a witticiſm upon three letters: it is the greater wonder (which yet you aſſert throughout your book) that two things ſo directly oppoſite to one another as thoſe two are, ſhould yet meet and become one and the ſame thing in kings. For what violence was ever acted by kings, which you do not affirm to be their right? Theſe are all the paſſages, that I could pick out of nine long pages, that I thought deſerved an anſwer. The reſt conſiſts either of repetitions of things that have been anſwered more than once, or ſuch as have no relation to the matter in hand. So that my being more brief in this chapter than in the reſt is not to be imputed to want of diligence in me, which, how irkſome ſoever you are to me, I have not ſlackened, but to your tedious impertinence, ſo void of matter and ſenſe.

CHAP. XII.

I WISH, Salmaſius, that you had left out this part of your diſcourſe concerning the king's crime, which it had been more adviſable for yourſelf and your party to have done; for I am afraid leſt in giving you an anſwer to it, I ſhould appear too ſharp and ſevere upon him, now he is dead, and hath received his puniſhment. But ſince you chooſe rather to diſcourſe confidently and at large upon that ſubject, I will make you ſenſible, that you could not have done a more inconſiderate thing, than to reſerve the worſt part of your cauſe to the laſt,

to

to wit, that of ripping up and inquiring into the king's crimes; which when I ſhall have proved them to have been true and moſt exorbitant, they will render his memory unpleaſant and odious to all good men, and imprint now in the cloſe of the controverſy a juſt hatred of you, who undertake his defence, on the readers minds. Say you, "his accuſation may be divided into two parts, one is converſant about his morals, the other taxeth him with ſuch faults as he might commit in his public capacity." I will be content to paſs by in ſilence that part of his life that he ſpent in banquetting, at plays, and in the converſation of women; for what can there be in luxury and exceſs worth relating? And what would thoſe things have been to us, if he had been a private perſon? But ſince he would be a king, as he could not live a private life, ſo neither could his vices be like thoſe of a private perſon. For in the firſt place, he did a great deal of miſchief by his example: in the ſecond place, all that time that he ſpent upon his luſt, and his ſports, which was a great part of his time, he ſtole from the ſtate, the government of which he had undertaken: thirdly and laſtly, he ſquandered away vaſt ſums of money, which were not his own, but the public revenue of the nation, in his domeſtic luxury and extravagance. So that in his private life at home he firſt began to be an ill king. But let us rather paſs over to thoſe crimes, "that he is charged with on the account of miſgovernment." Here you lament his being condemned as a tyrant, a traitor, and a murderer. That he had no wrong done him, ſhall now be made appear. But firſt let us define a tyrant, not according to vulgar conceits, but the judgment of Ariſtotle, and of all learned men. He is a tyrant who regards his own welfare and profit only, and not that of the people. So Ariſtotle defines one in the tenth book of his Ethics, and elſewhere, and ſo do very many others. Whether Charles regarded his own or the people's good, theſe few things of many, that I ſhall but touch upon, will evince. When his rents and other public revenues of the crown would not defray the expenſes of the court, he laid moſt heavy taxes upon the people; and when they were ſquandered away,

away, he invented new ones; not for the benefit, honour, or defence of the ſtate, but that he might hoard up, or laviſh out in one houſe, the riches and wealth, not of one, but of three nations. When at this rate he broke looſe, and acted without any colour of law to warrant his proceedings, knowing that the parliament was the only thing that could give him check, he endeavoured either wholly to lay aſide the very calling of parliaments, or calling them juſt as often, and no oftener, than to ſerve his own turn, to make them entirely at his devotion. Which bridle when he had caſt off himſelf, he put another bridle upon the people; he put garriſons of German horſe and Iriſh foot in many towns and cities, and that in time of peace. Do you think he does not begin to look like a tyrant? In which very thing, as in many other particulars, which you have formerly given me occaſion to inſtance, though you ſcorn to have Charles compared with ſo cruel a tyrant as Nero, he reſembled him extremely much. For Nero likewiſe often threatened to take away the ſenate. Beſides, he bore extreme hard upon the conſciences of good men, and compelled them to the uſe of ceremonies and ſuperſtitious worſhip, borrowed from popery, and by him reintroduced into the church. They that would not conform, were impriſoned or baniſhed. He made war upon the Scots twice for no other cauſe than that. By all theſe actions he has ſurely deſerved the name of a tyrant once over at leaſt. Now I will tell you why the word traitor was put into his indictment: when he aſſured his parliament by promiſes, by proclamations, by imprecations, that he had no deſign againſt the ſtate, at that very time did he liſt Papiſts in Ireland, he ſent a private embaſſy to the king of Denmark to beg aſſiſtance from him of arms, horſes and men, expreſsly againſt the parliament; and was endeavouring to raiſe an army firſt in England, and then in Scotland. To the Engliſh he promiſed the plunder of the city of London; to the Scots, that the four northern counties ſhould be added to Scotland, if they would but help him to get rid of the parliament, by what means ſoever. Theſe projects not ſucceeding, he ſent over one Dillon, a traitor, into Ireland

Ireland with private inſtructions to the natives, to fall ſuddenly upon all the Engliſh that inhabited there.— Theſe are the moſt remarkable inſtances of his treaſons, not taken up upon hearſay and idle reports, but diſcovered by letters under his own hand and ſeal. And finally I ſuppoſe no man will deny that he was a murderer, by whoſe order the Iriſh took arms, and put to death with moſt exquiſite torments above a hundred thouſand Engliſh, who lived peaceably by them, and without any apprehenſion of danger; and who raiſed ſo great a civil war in the other two kingdoms. Add to all this, that at the treaty in the Iſle of Wight the king openly took upon himſelf the guilt of the war, and cleared the parliament in the confeſſion he made there, which is publicly known. Thus you have in ſhort why king Charles was adjudged a tyrant, a traitor, and a murderer. "But," ſay you, "why was he not declared ſo before, neither in that ſolemn league and covenant, nor afterwards when he was delivered to them, either by the Preſbyterians or the Independents, but on the other hand was received as a king ought to be, with all reverence?" This very thing is ſufficient to perſuade any rational man, that the parliament entered not into any councils of quite depoſing the king, but as their laſt refuge, after they had ſuffered and undergone all that poſſibly they could, and had attempted all other ways and means. You alone endeavour maliciouſly to lay that to their charge, which to all good men cannot but evidence their great patience, moderation, and perhaps a too long forbearing with the king's pride and arrogance. But "in the month of Auguſt, before the king ſuffered, the houſe of commons, which then bore the only ſway, and was governed by the Independents, wrote letters to the Scots, in which they acquainted them, that they never intended to alter the form of government that had obtained ſo long in England under king, lords, and commons." You may ſee from hence, how little reaſon there is, to aſcribe the depoſing of the king to the principles of the Independents. They, that never uſed to diſſemble and conceal their tenets, even then, when they had the ſole management of affairs, profeſs,

profeſs, "That they never intended to alter the govern-ment." But if afterwards a thing came into their minds, which at firſt they intended not, why might they not take ſuch a courſe, though before not intended, as ap-peared moſt adviſable, and moſt for the nation's intereſt? Eſpecially when they found, that the king could not poſſibly be intreated or induced to aſſent to thoſe juſt demands, that they had made from time to time, and which were always the ſame from firſt to laſt. He per-ſiſted in thoſe perverſe ſentiments with reſpect to religion and his own right, which he had all along eſpouſed, and which were ſo deſtructive to us; not in the leaſt altered from the man that he was, when in peace and war he did us all ſo much miſchief. If he aſſented to any thing, he gave no obſcure hints, that he did it againſt his will, and that whenever he ſhould come into power again, he would look upon ſuch his aſſent as null and void. The ſame thing his ſon declared by writing under his hand, when in thoſe days he run away with part of the fleet, and ſo did the king himſelf by letters to ſome of his own party in London. In the mean time, againſt the avowed ſenſe of the parliament, he ſtruck up a private peace with the Iriſh, the moſt barbarous enemies imaginable to England, upon baſe diſhonourable terms; but when-ever he invited the Engliſh to treaties of peace, at thoſe very times with all the power he had, and intereſt he could make, he was preparing for war. In this caſe, what ſhould they do, who were entruſted with the care of the government? Ought they to have betrayed the ſafety of us all to our moſt bitter adverſary? Or would you have had them left us to undergo the calamities of another ſeven years war, not to ſay worſe? God put a better mind into them, of preferring, purſuant to that very ſolemn league and covenant, their religion, and liberties, before thoſe thoughts they once had, of not rejecting the king; for they had not gone ſo far as to vote it; all which they ſaw at laſt (though indeed later than they might have done) could not poſſibly ſubſiſt, as long as the king continued king. The parliament ought and muſt of neceſſity be entirely free, and at liberty to provide for the good of the nation, as occa-ſion

ion requires; nor ought they ſo to be wedded to their irſt ſentiments, as to ſcruple the altering their minds, or their own, or the nation's good, if God put an opportunity into their hands of procuring it. But " the Scots were of another opinion; for they, in a letter to Charles, the king's ſon, call his father a moſt ſacred prince, and the putting him to death a moſt execrable villany." Do not you talk of the Scots, whom you know not; we know them well enough, and know the time, when they called that ſame king a moſt execrable perſon, a murderer, and a traitor; and the putting a tyrant to death a moſt ſacred action. Then you pick holes in the king's charge, as not being properly penned; and you aſk " why we needed to call him a traitor and a murderer, after we had ſtyled him a tyrant; ſince the word tyrant includes all the crimes that may be:" and then you explain to us grammatically and critically, what a tyrant is. Away with thoſe trifles, you pedagogue, which that one definition of Ariſtotle's, that has lately been cited, will utterly confound; and teach ſuch a doctor as you, that the word tyrant (for all your concern is barely to have ſome underſtanding of words) may be applied to one, who is neither a traitor nor a murderer. But " the laws of England do not make it reaſon in the king, to ſtir up ſedition againſt himſelf or the people." Nor do they ſay, that the parliament can be guilty of treaſon by depoſing a bad king, nor that any parliament ever was ſo, though they have often done it; but our laws plainly and clearly declare, that a king may violate, diminiſh, nay, and wholly loſe his royalty. For that expreſſion in the law of St. Edward, of " loſing the name of a king," ſignifies neither more nor leſs, than being deprived of the kingly office and dignity; which befel Chilperic king of France, whoſe example for illuſtration ſake is taken notice of in the law itſelf. There is not a lawyer amongſt us, that can deny, but that the higheſt treaſon may be committed againſt the kingdom as well as againſt the king. I appeal to Glanvile himſelf, whom you cite, " If any man attempt to put the king to death, or raiſe ſedition in the realm, it is high reaſon." So that attempt of ſome papiſts to blow up

the parliament-houſe, and the lords and commons there with gunpowder, was by king James himſelf, and both houſes of parliament, declared to be high treaſon, not againſt the king only, but againſt the parliament and the whole kingdom. It would be to no purpoſe to quote more of our ſtatutes, to prove ſo clear a truth; which yet I could eaſily do. For the thing itſelf is ridiculous, and abſurd to imagine, that high treaſon may be committed againſt the king, and not againſt the people, for whoſe good, nay, and by whoſe leave, as I may ſay, the king is what he is: ſo that you babble over ſo many ſtatutes of ours to no purpoſe; you toil and wallow in our ancient law-books to no purpoſe; for the laws themſelves ſtand or fall by authority of parliament, who always had power to confirm or repeal them; and the parliament is the ſole judge of what is rebellion, what high treaſon (læſa majeſtas) and what not. Majeſty never was veſted to that degree in the perſon of the king, as not to be more conſpicuous, and more auguſt in parliament, as I have often ſhown: but who can endure to hear ſuch a ſenſeleſs fellow, ſuch a French mountebank as you, declare what our laws are? And, you Engliſh fugitives! ſo many biſhops, doctors, lawyers, who pretend that all learning and ingenuous literature is fled out of England with yourſelves, was there not one of you that could defend the king's cauſe and your own, and that in good Latin alſo, to be ſubmitted to the judgment of other nations, but that this brainſick, beggarly Frenchman muſt be hired to undertake the defence of a poor indigent king, ſurrounded with ſo many infant-prieſts and doctors? This very thing, I aſſure you, will be a great imputation to you amongſt foreigners; and you will be thought deſervedly to have loſt that cauſe, you were ſo far from being able to defend by force of arms, as that you cannot ſo much as write in behalf of it. But now I come to you again, good man Gooſecap, who ſcribble ſo finely; if at leaſt you are come to yourſelf again: for I find you here towards the latter end of your book in a deep ſleep, and dreaming of ſome voluntary death or other, that is nothing to the purpoſe. Then you "deny, that it is poſſible

poſſible for a king in his right wits to embroil his people in ſeditions, to betray his own forces to be ſlaughtered by enemies, and raiſe factions againſt himſelf." All which things having been done by many kings, and particularly by Charles the late king of England, you will no longer doubt, I hope, eſpecially being addicted to Stoicism, but that all tyrants, as well as profligate villains, are downright mad. Hear what Horace ſays, "Whoever through a ſenſeleſs ſtupidity, or any other cauſe whatſoever, hath his underſtanding ſo blinded, as not to diſcern truth, the Stoics account of him as of a madman: and ſuch are whole nations, ſuch are kings and princes, ſuch are all mankind; except thoſe very few that are wiſe." So that if you would clear king Charles from the imputation of acting like a madman, you muſt firſt vindicate his integrity, and ſhow that he never acted like an ill man. "But a king," you ſay, "cannot commit treaſon againſt his own ſubjects and vaſſals." In the firſt place, ſince we are as free as any people under Heaven, we will not be impoſed upon by any barbarous cuſtom of any other nation whatſoever. In the ſecond place, ſuppoſe we had been the king's vaſſals; that relation would not have obliged us to endure a tyrant to reign and lord it over us. All ſubjection to magiſtrates, as our own laws declare, is circumſcribed, and confined within the bounds of honeſty, and the public good. Read Leg. Hen. I. Cap. 55. The obligation betwixt a lord and his tenants is mutual, and remains ſo long as the lord protects his tenant; (this all our lawyers tell us) but if the lord be too ſevere and cruel to his tenant, and do him ſome heinous injury, "The whole relation betwixt them, and whatever obligation the tenant is under by having done homage to his lord, is utterly diſſolved and extinguiſhed." Theſe are the very words of Bracton and Fleta. So that in ſome caſe, the law itſelf warrants even a ſlave, or a vaſſal, to oppoſe his lord, and allows the ſlave to kill him, if he vanquiſh him in battle. If a city, or a whole nation may not lawfully take this courſe with a tyrant, the condition of freemen will be worſe than that of ſlaves. Then you go about to excuſe king Charles's

ſhedding of innocent blood, partly by murders committed by other kings, and partly by ſome inſtances of men put to death by them lawfully. For the matter of the Iriſh maſſacre, you refer the reader to Εικων Βασιλικη; and I refer you to Eiconoclaſtes. The town of Rochel being taken, and the townſmen betrayed, aſſiſtance ſhown, but not afforded them, you will not have laid at Charles's door; nor have I any thing to ſay, whether he was faulty in that buſineſs or not; he did miſchief enough at home; we need not inquire into what miſdemeanors he was guilty of abroad. But you in the mean time would make all the proteſtant churches, that have at any time defended themſelves by force of arms againſt princes, who were profeſſed enemies of their religion, to have been guilty of rebellion. Let them conſider how much it concerns them for the maintaining their eccleſiaſtical diſcipline, and aſſerting their own integrity, not to paſs by ſo great an indignity offered them by a perſon bred up by and amongſt themſelves. That which troubles us moſt is, that the Engliſh likewiſe were betrayed in that expedition. He, who had deſigned long ago to convert the government of England into a tyranny, thought he could not bring it to paſs, till the flower and ſtrength of the military power of the nation were cut off. Another of his crimes was, the cauſing ſome words to be ſtruck out of the uſual coronation oath, before he himſelf would take it. Unworthy and abominable action! The act was wicked in itſelf; what ſhall be ſaid of him that undertakes to juſtify it? For by the eternal God, what greater breach of faith, and violation of all laws, can poſſibly be imagined? What ought to be more ſacred to him, next to the holy ſacraments themſelves, than that oath? Which of the two do you think the more flagitious perſon, him that offends againſt the law, or him that endeavours to make the law equally guilty with himſelf? Or rather him who ſubverts the law itſelf, that he may not ſeem to offend againſt it? For thus that king violated that oath, which he ought moſt religiouſly to have ſworn to; but that he might not ſeem openly and publicly to violate it, he craftily adulterated and corrupted it; and leſt he himſelf

ſhould

uld be accounted perjured, he turned the very oath
› a perjury. What other could be expected, than
t his reign would be full of injuſtice, craft, and mis-
tune, who began it with ſo deteſtable an injury to
people? And who durſt pervert and adulterate that
, which he thought the only obſtacle that ſtood in
way, and hindered him from perverting all the reſt
the laws: But "that oath" (thus you juſtify him)
ays no other obligation upon kings, than the laws
mſelves do; and kings pretend, that they will be
ınd and limited by laws, though indeed they are
›gether from under the power of laws." Is it not
digious, that a man ſhould dare to expreſs himſelf ſo
ilegiouſly, and ſo ſenſeleſly, as to aſſert, that an oath
redly ſworn upon the Holy Evangeliſts may be diſ-
ıſed with, and ſet aſide as a little inſignificant thing,
hout any cauſe whatſoever! Charles himſelf refutes
ı, you prodigy of impiety! who, thinking that oath
light matter, choſe rather by a ſubterfuge to avoid
force of it, or by a fallacy to elude it, than openly
iolate it; and would rather falſify and corrupt the
h, than manifeſtly forſwear himſelf after he had
en it. But, "The king indeed ſwears to his people,
the people do to him; but the people ſwear fidelity
he king, not the king to them." Pretty invention!
es not he that promiſes, and binds himſelf by an oath
do any thing to, or for another, oblige his fidelity to
n that require the oath of him? Of a truth, every
g ſwears Fidelity, and Service, and Obedience to the
›ple, with reſpect to the performance of whatſoever
promiſes upon oath to do. Then you run back to
lliam the Conqueror, who was forced more than
:e to ſwear to perform, not what he himſelf would,
what the people, and the great men of the realm
uired of him. If many kings "are crowned with-
the uſual ſolemnity," and reign without taking any
h, the ſame thing may be ſaid of the people; a great
ny of whom never took the oath of allegiance. If
king by not taking an oath be at liberty, the people
ſo too. And that part of the people that has ſworn,
›re not to the king only, but to the realm, and the

laws, by which the king came to his crown; and no otherwiſe to the king, than whilſt he ſhould act according to thoſe laws, that "the common People," that is, the houſe of Commons, ſhould chooſe; (quas vulgus elegerit.) For it were folly to alter the phraſe of our law, and turn it into more genuine Latin. This clauſe (quas vulgus elegerit) which the commons ſhall chooſe, Charles before he was crowned procured to be razed out. "But," ſay you, "without the king's aſſent the people can chooſe no laws;" and for this you cite two ſtatutes, viz. Anno 37 H. VI, Cap. 15, and 13 Edw. IV, Cap. 8: but theſe two ſtatutes are ſo far from appearing in our ſtatute-books, that in the years you mention neither of thoſe kings enacted any laws at all. Go now and complain, that thoſe fugitives, who pretended to furniſh you with matter out of our ſtatutes, impoſed upon you in it; and let other people in the mean time ſtand aſtoniſhed at your impudence and vanity, who are not aſhamed to pretend to be thoroughly verſed in ſuch books, as it is ſo evident you have never looked into, nor ſo much as ſeen. And that clauſe in the coronation oath, which ſuch a brazen faced brawler as you call fictitious, "The king's friends," you ſay yourſelf, "acknowledge, that it may poſſibly be extant in ſome ancient copies, but that it grew into diſuſe, becauſe it had no convenient ſignification." But for that very reaſon did our anceſtors inſert it in the oath, that the oath might have ſuch a ſignification as would not be for a tyrant's conveniency. If it had really grown into diſuſe, which yet is moſt falſe, there was the greater need of reviving it; but even that would have been to no purpoſe, according to your doctrine: "For that cuſtom of taking an oath, as kings now a days generally uſe it, is no more," you ſay, "than a bare ceremony." And yet the king, when the biſhops were to be put down, pretended that he could not do it by reaſon of that oath. And conſequently that reverend and ſacred oath, as it ſerves for the king's turn, or not, muſt be ſolemn and binding, or an empty ceremony: which I earneſtly entreat my countrymen to take notice of, and to conſider what manner of a king they are like to have,

if

if he ever come back. For it would never have entered into the thoughts of this raſcally foreign grammarian, to write a diſcourſe of the rights of the crown of England, unleſs both Charles Stuart now in baniſhment, and tainted with his father's principles, and thoſe profligate tutors that he has along with him, had induſtriouſly ſuggeſted to him what they would have writ. They dictated to him, "That the whole parliament were liable to be proceeded againſt as traitors, becauſe they declared without the king's aſſent all them to be traitors, who had taken up arms againſt the parliament of England;' and that parliaments were but the king's vaſſals: that the oath, which our kings take at their coronation, is but a ceremony:" And why not that a vaſſal too? So that no reverence of laws, no ſacredneſs of an oath, will be ſufficient to protect your lives and fortunes, either from the exorbitance of a furious, or the revenge of an exaſperated prince, who has been ſo inſtructed from his cradle, as to think laws, religion, nay, and oaths themſelves, ought to be ſubject to his will and pleaſure. How much better is it, and more becoming yourſelves, if you deſire riches, liberty, peace, and empire, to obtain them aſſuredly by your own virtue, induſtry, prudence, and valour, than to long after, and hope for them in vain under the rule of a king? They, who are of opinion that theſe things cannot be compaſſed but under a king, and a lord, it cannot well be expreſſed how mean, how baſe, I do not ſay, how unworthy thoughts they have of themſelves; for in effect, what do they other than confeſs, that they themſelves are lazy, weak, ſenſeleſs, ſilly perſons, and framed for ſlavery both in body and mind? And indeed all manner of ſlavery is ſcandalous and diſgraceful to a freeborn ingenuous perſon; but for you, after you have recovered your loſt liberty, by God's aſſiſtance, and your own arms; after the performance of ſo many valiant exploits, and the making ſo remarkable an example of a moſt potent king, to deſire to return again into a condition of bondage and ſlavery, will not only be ſcandalous and diſgraceful, but an impious and wicked thing; and equal to that of the Iſraelites, who for deſiring to return to the Egyptian ſlavery

were ſo ſeverely puniſhed for that ſordid, ſlaviſh temper of mind, and ſo many of them deſtroyed by that God who had been their deliverer. But what ſay you now, who would perſuade us to become ſlaves? "The king," ſay you, "had a power of pardoning ſuch as were guilty of treaſon, and other crimes; which evinces ſufficiently, that the king himſelf was under no law." The king might indeed pardon treaſon, not againſt the kingdom, but againſt himſelf; and ſo may any body elſe pardon wrongs done to themſelves; and he might, perhaps, pardon ſome other offences, though not always. But does it follow, becauſe in ſome caſes he had the right of ſaving a malefactor's life, that therefore he muſt have a right to deſtroy all good men? If the king be impleaded in an inferiour court, he is not obliged to anſwer, but by his attorney: does it therefore follow, that when he is ſummoned by all his ſubjects to appear in parliament, he may chooſe whether he will appear or no, and refuſe to anſwer in perſon? You ſay, "That we endeavour to juſtify what we have done by the Hollanders example;" and upon this occaſion, fearing the loſs of that ſtipend with which the Hollanders feed ſuch a murrain and peſt as you are, if by reviling the Engliſh you ſhould conſequently reflect upon them that maintain you, you endeavour to demonſtrate "how unlike their actions and ours are." The compariſon that you make betwixt them I reſolve to omit (though many things in it are moſt falſe, and other things flattery all over, which yet you thought yourſelf obliged to put down, to deſerve your penſion.) For the Engliſh think they need not allege the examples of foreigners for their juſtification. They have municipal laws of their own, by which they have acted; laws with relation to the matter in hand the beſt in the world: they have the examples of their anceſtors, great and gallant men, for their imitation, who never gave way to the exorbitant power of princes, and who have put many of them to death, when their government became inſupportable. They were born free, they ſtand in need of no other nation, they can make what laws they pleaſe for their own good government. One law in particular they have a great veneration for,

and a very ancient one it is, enacted by nature itſelf, That all human laws, all civil right and government muſt have a reſpect to the ſafety and welfare of good men, and not be ſubject to the luſts of princes. From hence to the end of your book I find nothing but rubbiſh and trifles, picked out of the former chapters; of which you have here raiſed ſo great a heap, that I cannot imagine what other deſign you could have in it, than to preſage the ruin of your whole fabric. At laſt, after an infinite deal of tittle-tattle you make an end, calling "God to witneſs, that you undertook the defence of this cauſe, not only becauſe you were deſired ſo to do, but becauſe your own conſcience told you, that you could not poſſibly undertake the defence of a better." Is it fit for you to intermeddle with our matters, with which you have nothing to do, becauſe you were deſired, when we ourſelves did not deſire you? to reproach with contumelious and opprobrious language, and in a printed book, the ſupreme magiſtracy of the Engliſh nation, when according to the authority and power that they are intruſted with, they do but their duty within their own juriſdiction, and all this without the leaſt injury or provocation from them? (for they did not ſo much as know that there was ſuch a man in the world as you.) And I pray by whom were you deſired? By your wife, I ſuppoſe, who, they ſay, exerciſes a kingly right and juriſdiction over you; and whenever ſhe has a mind to it (as Fulvia is made to ſpeak in that obſcene epigram, that you collected ſome centoes out of, Pag. 320) cries, "Either write, or let us fight;" that made you write perhaps, leſt the ſignal ſhould be given. Or were you aſked by Charles the younger, and that profligate gang of vagabond courtiers, and like a ſecond Balaam called upon by another Balak to reſtore a deſperate cauſe by ill writing, that was loſt by ill fighting? That may be; but there is this difference, for he was a wiſe underſtanding man, and rid upon an aſs that could ſpeak, to curſe the people of God: thou art a very talkative aſs thyſelf, and rid by a woman, and being ſurrounded with the healed heads of the biſhops, that heretofore thou hadſt wounded, thou ſeemeſt to repreſent that beaſt in the Revelation.

velation. But they ſay, that a little after you had written this book you repented of what you had done. It is well, if it be ſo; and to make your repentance public, I think the beſt courſe that you can take will be, for this long book that you have writ, to take a halter, and make one long letter of yourſelf. So Judas Iſcariot repented, to whom you are like; and that young Charles knew, which made him ſend you the purſe, Judas his badge; for he had heard before, and found afterward by experience, that you were an apoſtate and a devil. Judas betrayed Chriſt himſelf, and you betray his church; you have taught heretofore, that biſhops were Antichriſtian, and you are now revolted to their party. You now undertake the defence of their cauſe, whom formerly you damned to the pit of Hell. Chriſt delivered all men from bondage, and you endeavour to enſlave all mankind. Never queſtion, ſince you have been ſuch a villain to God himſelf, his church, and all mankind in general, but that the ſame fate attends you that befel your equal, out of deſpair rather than repentance, to be weary of your life, and hang yourſelf, and burſt aſunder as he did; and to ſend before-hand that faithleſs and treacherous conſcience of yours, that railing conſcience at good and holy men, to that place of torment that is prepared for you. And now I think, through God's aſſiſtance, I have finiſhed the work I undertook, to wit, the defence of the noble actions of my countrymen at home and abroad, againſt the raging and envious madneſs of this diſtracted ſophiſter; and the aſſerting of the common rights of the people againſt the unjuſt domination of kings, not out of any hatred to kings, but tyrants: nor have I purpoſely left unanſwered any one argument alleged by my adverſary, nor any one example or authority quoted by him, that ſeemed to have any force in it, or the leaſt colour of an argument. Perhaps I have been guilty rather of the other extreme, of replying to ſome of his fooleries and trifles, as if they were ſolid arguments, and thereby may ſeem to have attributed more to them than they deſerved. One thing yet remains to be done, which perhaps is of the greateſt concern of all, and that is, That you, my countrymen,

refute this adverſary of yours yourſelves, which I do not ſee any other means of your affecting, than by a conſtant endeavour to outdo all men's bad words by your own good deeds. When you laboured under more ſorts of oppreſſion than one, you betook yourſelves to God for refuge, and he was graciouſly pleaſed to hear your moſt earneſt prayer and deſires. He has glorioufly delivered you, the firſt of nations, from the two greateſt miſchiefs of this life, and moſt pernicious to virtue, tyranny and ſuperſtition; he has endued you with greatneſs of mind to be the firſt of mankind, who after having conquered their own king, and having had him delivered into their hands, have not ſcrupled to condemn him judicially, and purſuant to that ſentence of condemnation, to put him to death. After the performing ſo glorious an action as this, you ought to do nothing that is mean and little, not ſo much as to think of, much leſs to do any thing but what is great and ſublime. Which to attain to, this is your only way; as you have ſubdued your enemies in the field, ſo to make appear, that unarmed, and in the higheſt outward peace and tranquillity, you of all mankind are beſt able to ſubdue ambition, avarice, the love of riches, and can beſt avoid the corruptions that proſperity is apt to introduce, (which generally ſubdue and triumph over other nations,) to ſhow as great juſtice, temperance, and moderation in the maintaining your liberty, as you have ſhown courage in freeing yourſelves from ſlavery. Theſe are the only arguments, by which you will be able to evince, that you are not ſuch perſons as this fellow repreſents you, Traitors, Robbers, Murderers, Parricides, Madmen; that you did not put your king to death out of any ambitious deſign, or a deſire of invading the rights of others, not out of any ſeditious principles or ſiniſter ends; that it was not an act of fury or madneſs; but that it was wholly out of love to your liberty, your religion, to juſtice, virtue, and your country, that you puniſhed a tyrant. But if it ſhould fall out otherwiſe (which God forbid) if as you have been valiant in war, you ſhould grow debauched in peace, you that have had ſuch viſible demonſtrations of the goodneſs of God to yourſelves,

yourſelves, and his wrath againſt your enemies; and that you ſhould not have learned by ſo eminent, ſo remarkable an example before your eyes, to fear God, and work righteouſneſs; for my part, I ſhall eaſily grant and confeſs (for I cannot deny it) whatever ill men may ſpeak or think of you, to be very true. And you will find in a little time, that God's diſpleaſure againſt you will be greater than it has been againſt your adverſaries, greater than his grace and favour has been to yourſelves, which you have had larger experience of, than any other nation under Heaven.

A

TREATISE

OF

vil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes;

SHOWING,

*at it is not lawful for any Power on Earth to compel in Matters of Religion.**

he Parliament of the Commonwealth of ENGLAND, with the Dominions thereof.

lave prepared, Supreme Council! againſt the much-xpected time of your ſitting, this treatiſe; which, gh to all chriſtian magiſtrates equally belonging, therefore to have been written in the common lan-e of Chriſtendom, natural duty and affection hath ined, and dedicated firſt to my own nation; and ſeaſon wherein the timely reading thereof, to the r accompliſhment of your great work, may ſave you h labour and interruption: of two parts uſually pro-l, civil and eccleſiaſtical, recommending civil only our proper care, eccleſiaſtical to them only from m it takes both that name and nature. Yet not this cauſe only do I require or truſt to find accep-e, but in a twofold reſpect beſides: firſt, as bringing evidence of ſcripture and proteſtant maxims to parliament of England, who in all their late acts, occaſion, have profeſſed to aſſert only the true eſtant chriſtian religion, as it is contained in the ſcriptures: next, in regard that your power being for a time, and having in yourſelves a chriſtian ty of your own, which at one time or other may be eſſed, thereof truly ſenſible, it will concern you

* Firſt printed 1659.

while

while you are in power, ſo to regard other men's conſciences, as you would your own ſhould be regarded in the power of others; and to conſider that any law againſt conſcience is alike in force againſt any conſcience, and ſo may one way or other juſtly redound upon yourſelves. One advantage I make no doubt of, that I ſhall write to many eminent perſons of your number, already perfect and reſolved in this important article of chriſtianity. Some of whom I remember to have heard often for ſeveral years, at a council next in authority to your own, ſo well joining religion with civil prudence, and yet ſo well diſtinguiſhing the different power of either; and this not only voting, but frequently reaſoning why it ſhould be ſo, that if any there preſent had been before of an opinion contrary, he might doubtleſs have departed thence a convert in that point, and have confeſſed, that then both commonwealth and religion will at length, if ever, flouriſh in Chriſtendom, when either they who govern diſcern between civil and religious, or they only who ſo diſcern ſhall be admitted to govern. Till then, nothing but troubles, perſecutions, commotions can be expected; the inward decay of true religion among ourſelves, and the utter overthrow at laſt by a common enemy. Of civil liberty I have written heretofore by the appointment, and not without the approbation of civil power: of chriſtian liberty I write now, which others long ſince having done with all freedom under heathen emperors, I ſhould do wrong to ſuſpect, that I now ſhall with leſs under chriſtian governors, and ſuch eſpecially as profeſs openly their defence of chriſtian liberty; although I write this, not otherwiſe appointed or induced, than by an inward perſuaſion of the chriſtian duty, which I may uſefully diſcharge herein to the common lord and maſter of us all, and the certain hope of his approbation, firſt and chiefeſt to be ſought: in the hand of whoſe providence I remain, praying all ſucceſs and good event on your public councils, to the defence of true religion and our civil rights.

JOHN MILTON.

A TREATISE OF CIVIL POWER

IN ECCLESIASTICAL CAUSES.

TWO things there be, which have been ever found working much miſchief to the Church of God, and the advancement of truth; force on one ſide reſtraining, and hire on the other ſide corrupting the teachers thereof. Few ages have been ſince the aſcenſion of our Saviour, wherein the one of theſe two, or both together, have not prevailed. It can be at no time, therefore, unſeaſonable to ſpeak of theſe things; ſince by them the church is either in continual detriment and oppreſſion, or in continual danger. The former ſhall be at this time my argument; the latter as I ſhall find God diſpoſing me, and opportunity inviting. What I argue, ſhall be drawn from the Scripture only; and therein from true fundamental principles of the goſpel, to all knowing chriſtians undeniable. And if the governors of this commonwealth, ſince the rooting out of prelates, have made leaſt uſe of force in religion, and moſt have favoured chriſtian liberty of any in this iſland before them ſince the firſt preaching of the goſpel, for which we are not to forget our thanks to God, and their due praiſe; they may, I doubt not, in this treatiſe, find that which not only will confirm them to defend ſtill the chriſtian liberty which we enjoy, but will incite them alſo to enlarge it, if in aught they yet ſtraiten it. To them who perhaps hereafter, leſs experienced in religion, may come to govern or give us laws, this or other ſuch, if they pleaſe, may be a timely inſtruction: however, to the truth it will be at all times no unneedful teſtimony, at leaſt ſome diſcharge of that general duty, which no chriſtian, but according to what he hath received, knows is required of him, if he have aught more conducing to the advancement of religion, than what is uſually endeavoured, freely to impart it.

It will require no great labour of expoſition, to unfold what is here meant by matters of religion; being

as

as ſoon apprehended as defined, ſuch things as belong chiefly to the knowledge and ſervice of God; and are either above the reach and light of nature without revelation from above, and therefore liable to be variouſly underſtood by human reaſon, or ſuch things as are enjoined or forbidden by divine precept, which elſe by the light of reaſon would ſeem indifferent to be done or not done; and ſo likewiſe muſt needs appear to every man as the precept is underſtood. Whence I here mean by conſcience or religion that full perſuaſion, whereby we are aſſured, that our belief and practice, as far as we are able to apprehend and probably make appear, is according to the will of God and his holy ſpirit within us, which we ought to follow much rather than any law of man, as not only his word every where bids us, but the very dictate of reaſon tells us. Acts iv. 19. "Whether it be right in the ſight of God, to hearken to you more than to God, judge ye." That for belief or practice in religion, according to this conſcientious perſuaſion, no man ought to be puniſhed or moleſted by any outward force on earth whatſoever, I diſtruſt not, through God's implored aſſiſtance, to make plain by theſe following arguments.

Firſt, it cannot be denied, being the main foundation of our proteſtant religion, that we of theſe ages, having no other divine rule or authority from without us, warrantable to one another as a common ground, but the Holy Scripture, and no other within us but the illumination of the holy ſpirit ſo interpreting that ſcripture as warrantable only to ourſelves, and to ſuch whoſe conſciences we can ſo perſuade, can have no other ground in matters of religion but only from the Scriptures. And theſe being not poſſible to be underſtood without this divine illumination, which no man can know at all times to be in himſelf, much leſs to be at any time for certain in any other, it follows clearly, that no man or body of men in theſe times can be the infallible judges or determiners in matters of religion to any other men's conſciences but their own. And therefore thoſe Bereans are commended, Acts xvii. 11. who after the preaching even of St. Paul, ſearched the Scriptures

Scriptures daily, whether thoſe things were ſo." Nor did they more than what God himſelf in many places commands us by the ſame Apoſtle, to ſearch, to try, to judge of theſe things ourſelves: and gives us reaſon alſo, Gal. vi, 4, 5. "Let every man prove his own work, and then ſhall he have rejoicing in himſelf alone, and not in another: for every man ſhall bear his own burden." If then we count it ſo ignorant and irreligious in the papiſt, to think himſelf diſcharged in God's account, believing only as the Church believes, how much greater condemnation will it be to the proteſtant his condemner, to think himſelf juſtified, believing only as the ſtate believes? With good cauſe, therefore, it is the general conſent of all ſound proteſtant writers, that neither traditions, councils, nor canons of any viſible church, much leſs edicts of any magiſtrate or civil ſeſſion, but the ſcripture only, can be the final judge or rule in matters of religion, and that only in the conſcience of every chriſtian to himſelf. Which proteſtation made by the firſt public reformers of our religion againſt the imperial edicts of Charles the fifth, impoſing church-traditions without ſcripture, gave firſt beginning to the name of Proteſtant; and with that name hath ever been received this doctrine, which prefers the ſcripture before the church, and acknowledges none but the ſcripture ſole interpreter of itſelf to the conſcience. For if the church be not ſufficient to be implicitly believed, as we hold it is not, what can there elſe be named of more authority than the church but the conſcience, than which God only is greater, 1 John iii, 20? But if any man ſhall pretend that the ſcripture judges to his conſcience for other men, he makes himſelf greater not only than the church, but alſo than the ſcripture, than the conſciences of other men: a preſumption too high for any mortal, ſince every true chriſtian, able to give a reaſon of his faith, hath the word of God before him, the promiſed holy ſpirit, and the mind of Chriſt within him, 1 Cor. ii, 16; a much better and ſafer guide of conſcience, which as far as concerns himſelf he may far more certainly know than any outward rule impoſed upon him by others, whom

he inwardly neither knows nor can know; at leaſt knows nothing of them more ſure than this one thing, that they cannot be his judges in religion. 1 Cor. ii, 15, "The ſpiritual man judgeth all things, but he himſelf is judged of no man." Chiefly for this cauſe do all true proteſtants account the pope Antichriſt, for that he aſſumes to himſelf this infallibility over both the conſcience and the ſcripture; "ſitting in the temple of God," as it were oppoſite to God, "and exalting himſelf above all that is called God, or is worſhipped," 2 Theſſ. ii, 4. That is to ſay, not only above all judges and magiſtrates, who though they be called Gods, are far beneath infallible; but alſo above God himſelf, by giving law both to the ſcripture, to the conſcience, and to the ſpirit itſelf of God within us. Whenas we find, James iv, 12, "There is one lawgiver, who is able to ſave and to deſtroy: Who art thou that judgeſt another?" That Chriſt is the only lawgiver of his church, and that it is here meant in religious matters, no well-grounded chriſtian will deny. Thus alſo St. Paul, Rom. xiv, 4, "Who art thou that judgeſt the ſervant of another? to his own lord he ſtandeth or falleth: but he ſhall ſtand; for God is able to make him ſtand." As therefore of one beyond expreſſion bold and preſumptuous, both theſe Apoſtles demand, "Who art thou," that preſumeſt to impoſe other law or judgment in religion than the only lawgiver and judge Chriſt, who only can ſave and deſtroy, gives to the conſcience? And the forecited place to the Theſſalonians, by compared effects, reſolves us, that be he or they who or wherever they be or can be, they are of far leſs authority than the church, whom in theſe things as proteſtants they receive not, and yet no leſs Antichriſt in this main point of Antichriſtianiſm, no leſs a pope or popedom than he at Rome, if not much more, by ſetting up ſupreme interpreters of ſcripture either thoſe doctors whom they follow, or, which is far worſe, themſelves as a civil papacy aſſuming unaccountable ſupremacy to themſelves, not in civil only, but in eccleſiaſtical cauſes. Seeing then that in matters of religion, as hath been proved, none can judge or determine here on

n earth, no not Church-governors themſelves againſt
ie conſciences of other believers, my inference is, or
ither not mine but our Saviour's own, that in thoſe
natters they neither can command nor uſe conſtraint,
ſt they run raſhly on a pernicious conſequence, fore-
armed in that parable, Matt. xiii, from the 29th to
ie 31ſt verſe: "Leſt while ye gather up the tares, ye
oot up alſo the wheat with them. Let both grow
ogether until the harveſt: and in the time of harveſt
will ſay to the reapers, gather ye together firſt the
ares," &c. Whereby he declares, that this work nei-
ier his own miniſters nor any elſe can diſcerningly
hough or judgingly perform without his own imme-
iate direction, in his own fit ſeaſon, and that they
ught till then not to attempt it. Which is further con-
rmed 2 Cor. i, 24, "Not that we have dominion over
our faith, but are helpers of your joy." If apoſtles
ad no dominion or conſtraining power over faith or
onſcience, much leſs have ordinary miniſters, 1 Pet. v,
, 3, "Feed the flock of God, &c. not by conſtraint,
either as being lords over God's heritage." But ſome
ill object, that this overthrows all church-diſcipline,
ll cenſure of errours, if no man can determine. My
nſwer is, that what they hear is plain ſcripture, which
orbids not church-ſentence or determining, but as it
nds in violence upon the conſcience unconvinced. Let
hoſo will interpret or determine, ſo it be according to
ue church-diſcipline, which is exerciſed on them only
ho have willingly joined themſelves in that covenant
f union, and proceeds only to a ſeparation from the
eſt, proceeds never to any corporal inforcement or for-
eiture of money, which in all ſpiritual things are the
wo arms of Antichriſt, not of the true church; the
ne being an inquiſition, the other no better than a
emporal indulgence of ſin for money, whether by the
hurch exacted or by the magiſtrate; both the one and
ie other a temporal ſatisfaction for what Chriſt hath
tisfied eternally; a popiſh commuting of penalty,
orporal for ſpiritual: a ſatisfaction to man, eſpecially
o the magiſtrate, for what and to whom we owe none:
ieſe and more are the injuſtices of force and fining in

religion, beſides what I moſt inſiſt on, the violation of God's expreſs commandment in the goſpel, as hath been ſhewn. Thus then, if church-governors cannot uſe force in religion, though but for this reaſon, becauſe they cannot infallibly determine to the conſcience without convincement, much leſs have civil magiſtrates authority to uſe force where they can much leſs judge; unleſs they mean only to be the civil executioners of them who have no civil power to give them ſuch commiſſion, no nor yet eccleſiaſtical, to any force or violence in religion. To ſum up all in brief, if we muſt believe as the magiſtrate appoints, why not rather as the church? If not as either without convincement, how can force be lawful? But ſome are ready to cry out, what ſhall then be done to blaſphemy? Them I would firſt exhort not thus to terrify and poſe the people with a Greek word; but to teach them better what it is, being a moſt uſual and common word in that language to ſignify any ſlander, any malicious or evil ſpeaking, whether againſt God or man, or any thing to good belonging: Blaſphemy or evil ſpeaking againſt God maliciouſly, is far from conſcience in religion, according to that of Mar. ix, 39, "There is none who doth a powerful work in my name, and can likely ſpeak evil of me." If this ſuffice not, I refer them to that prudent and well-deliberated act, Auguſt 9, 1650, where the parliament defines blaſphemy againſt God, as far as it is a crime belonging to civil judicature, plenius ac melius Chryſippo & Crantore; in plain Engliſh, more warily, more judiciouſly, more orthodoxally than twice their number of divines have done in many a prolix volume: although in all likelihood they whoſe whole ſtudy and profeſſion theſe things are, ſhould be moſt intelligent and authentic therein, as they are for the moſt part, yet neither they nor theſe unerring always, or infallible. But we ſhall not carry it thus; another Greek apparition ſtands in our way, Hereſy and Heretic: in like manner alſo railed at to the people as in a tongue unknown. They ſhould firſt interpret to them, that Hereſy, by what it ſignifies in that language, is no word of evil note, meaning only the choice

or

or following of any opinion good or bad in religion, or any other learning: and thus not only in heathen authors, but in the New Teſtament itſelf, without cenure or blame; Acts xv, 5, "Certain of the hereſy of he Phariſees which believed;" and xxvi, 5, "After he exacteſt hereſy of our religion I lived a Phariſee." n which ſenſe preſbyterian or independent may without eproach be called a hereſy. Where it is mentioned ith blame, it ſeems to differ little from ſchiſm; 1 Cor. i, 18, 19, "I hear that there be ſchiſms among you, c. for there muſt alſo hereſies be among you," &c. hough ſome, who write of hereſy after their own eads, would make it far worſe than ſchiſm; whenas n the contrary, ſchiſm ſignifies diviſion, and in the orſt ſenſe; hereſy, choice only of one opinion before nother, which may be without diſcord. In apoſtolic mes, therefore, ere the ſcripture was written, hereſy as a doctrine maintained againſt the doctrine by them elivered; which in theſe times can be no otherwiſe efined than a doctrine maintained againſt the light, hich we now only have, of the ſcripture. Seeing herefore that no man, no ſynod, no aſſion of men, ough called the Church, can judge definitively the enſe of ſcripture to another man's conſcience, which well known to be a general maxim of the proteſtant eligion; it follows plainly, that he who holds in religion that belief, or thoſe opinions, which to his conience and utmoſt underſtanding appear with moſt vidence or probability in the ſcripture, though to thers he ſeem erroneous, can no more be juſtly cenured for a heretic than his cenſurers; who do but the me thing themſelves, while they cenſure him for ſo oing. For aſk them, or any proteſtant, which hath oſt authority, the Church or the Scripture? They ill anſwer, doubtleſs, that the ſcripture: and what ath moſt authority, that no doubt but they will conſs is to be followed. He then, who to his beſt appreenſion follows the ſcripture, though againſt any point f doctrine by the whole church received, is not the eretic; but he who follows the church againſt his conience and perſuaſion grounded on the ſcripture. To

make this yet more undeniable, I ſhall only borrow a plain ſimile, the ſame which our own writers, when they would demonſtrate plaineſt, that we rightly prefer the ſcripture before the church, uſe frequently againſt the papiſt in this manner. As the Samaritans believed Chriſt, firſt for the woman's word, but next and much rather for his own, ſo we the ſcripture: firſt on the church's word, but afterwards and much more for its own, as the word of God; yea, the church itſelf we believe then for the ſcripture. The inference of itſelf follows: if by the proteſtant doctrine we believe the ſcripture, not for the Church's ſaying, but for its own as the word of God, then ought we to believe what in our conſcience we apprehend the ſcripture to ſay, though the viſible church, with all her doctors, gainſay: and being taught to believe them only for the ſcripture, they who ſo do are not heretics, but the beſt proteſtants: and by their opinions, whatever they be, can hurt no proteſtant, whoſe rule is not to receive them but from the ſcripture: which to interpret convincingly to his own conſcience, none is able but himſelf guided by the holy ſpirit; and not ſo guided, none than he to himſelf can be a worſe deceiver. To proteſtants, therefore, whoſe common rule and touchſtone is the ſcripture, nothing can with more conſcience, more equity, nothing more proteſtantly can be permitted, than a free and lawful debate at all times by writing, conference, or diſputation of what opinion ſoever, diſputable by ſcripture: concluding, that no man in religion is properly a heretic at this day, but he who maintains traditions or opinions not probable by ſcripture, who, for aught I know, is the papiſt only; he the only heretic, who counts all heretics but himſelf. Such as theſe, indeed, were capitally puniſhed by the law of Moſes, as the only true heretics, idolaters, plain and open deſerters of God and his known law: but in the goſpel ſuch are puniſhed by excommunion only. Tit. iii, 10, "An heretic, after the firſt and ſecond admonition, reject." But they who think not this heavy enough, and underſtand not that dreadful awe and ſpiritual efficacy, which the Apoſtle hath expreſſed ſo highly

to

to be in church-diſcipline, 2 Cor. x, of which anon, and think weakly that the church of God cannot long ſubſiſt but in a bodily fear, for want of other proof will needs wreſt that place of St. Paul, Rom. xiii, to ſet up civil inquiſition, and give power to the magiſtrate both of civil judgment, and puniſhment in cauſes eccleſiaſtical. But let us ſee with what ſtrength of argument; "let every ſoul be ſubject to the higher powers." Firſt, how prove they that the Apoſtle means other powers, than ſuch as they to whom he writes were then under; who meddled not at all in eccleſiaſtical cauſes, unleſs as tyrants and perſecuters? And from them, I hope, they will not derive either the right of magiſtrates to judge in ſpiritual things, or the duty of ſuch our obedience. How prove they next, that he entitles them here to ſpiritual cauſes, from whom he withheld, as much as in him lay, the judging of civil? 1 Cor. vi, 1, &c. If he himſelf appealed to Cæſar, it was to judge his innocence, not his religion. "For rulers are not a terrour to good works, but to the evil:" then are they not a terrour to conſcience, which is the rule or judge of good works grounded on the ſcripture. But hereſy, they ſay, is reckoned among evil works, Gal. v, 20, as if all evil works were to be puniſhed by the magiſtrate; whereof this place, their own citation, reckons up beſides hereſy a ſufficient number to confute them; "uncleanneſs, wantonneſs, enmity, ſtrife, emulations, animoſities, contentions, envyings;" all which are far more manifeſt to be judged by him than hereſy, as they define it; and yet I ſuppoſe they will not ſubject theſe evil works, nor many more ſuchlike, to his cognizance and puniſhment. "Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou ſhalt have praiſe of the ſame." This ſhows that religious matters are not here meant; wherein from the power here ſpoken of, they could have no praiſe: "For he is the miniſter of God to thee for good:" True; but in that office, and to that end, and by thoſe means which in this place muſt be clearly found, if from this place they intend to argue. And how, for thy good by forcing, oppreſſing,

and enſnaring thy conſcience? Many are the miniſters of God, and their offices no leſs different than many: none more different than ſtate and church-government. Who ſeeks to govern both, muſt needs be worſe than any lord prelate, or church-pluraliſt: for he in his own faculty and profeſſion, the other not in his own, and for the moſt part not thoroughly underſtood, makes himſelf ſupreme lord or pope of the church, as far as his civil juriſdiction ſtretches; and all the miniſters of God therein, his miniſters, or his curates rather in the function only, not in the government; while he himſelf aſſumes to rule by civil power things to be ruled only by ſpiritual: whenas this very chapter, verſe 6, appointing him his peculiar office, which requires utmoſt attendance, forbids him this worſe than church-plurality from that full and weighty charge, wherein alone he is "the miniſter of God, attending continually on this very thing." To little purpoſe will they here inſtance Moſes, who did all by immediate divine direction; no nor yet Aſa, Jehoſaphat, or Joſiah, who both might, when they pleaſed, receive anſwer from God, and had a commonwealth by him delivered them, incorporated with a national church, exerciſed more in bodily than in ſpiritual worſhip: ſo as that the church might be called a commonwealth, and the whole commonwealth a church: nothing of which can be ſaid of chriſtianity, delivered without the help of magiſtrates, yea, in the midſt of their oppoſition; how little then with any reference to them, or mention of them, ſave only of our obedience to their civil laws, as they countenance good, and deter evil? which is the proper work of the magiſtrate, following in the ſame verſe, and ſhows diſtinctly wherein he is the miniſter of God, "a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil." But we muſt firſt know who it is that doth evil: the heretic they ſay among the firſt. Let it be known then certainly who is a heretic; and that he who holds opinions in religion profeſſedly from tradition, or his own inventions, and not from ſcripture, but rather againſt it, is the only heretic: and yet though ſuch, not always puniſhable by the magiſtrate, unleſs he do evil againſt a

civil law, properly ſo called, hath been already proved, without need of repetition. "But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid." To do by ſcripture and the goſpel, according to conſcience, is not to do evil; if we thereof ought not to be afraid, he ought not by his judging to give cauſe: cauſes therefore of religion are not here meant. "For he beareth not the ſword in vain." Yes, altogether in vain, if it ſmite he knows not what; if that for hereſy, which not the church itſelf, much leſs he can determine abſolutely to be ſo; if truth for errour, being himſelf ſo often fallible, he bears the ſword not in vain only, but unjuſtly and to evil. "Be ſubject not only for wrath, but for conſcience ſake:" How for conſcience ſake, againſt conſcience? By all theſe reaſons it appears plainly, that the Apoſtle in this place gives no judgment or coercive power to magiſtrates, neither to thoſe then, nor theſe now, in matters of religion; and exhorts us no otherwiſe than he exhorted thoſe Romans. It hath now twice befallen me to aſſert, through God's aſſiſtance, this moſt wreſted and vexed place of ſcripture; heretofore againſt Salmaſius, and regal tyranny over the ſtate; now againſt Eraſtus, and ſtate-tyranny over the church. If from ſuch uncertain, or rather ſuch improbable grounds as theſe, they endue magiſtracy with ſpiritual judgment, they may as well inveſt him in the ſame ſpiritual kind with power of utmoſt puniſhment, excommunication; and then turn ſpiritual into corporal, as no worſe authors did than Chryſoſtom, Jerome, and Auſtin, whom Eraſmus and others in their notes on the New Teſtament have cited, to interpret that cutting off which St. Paul wiſhed to them who had brought back the Galatians to circumciſion, no leſs than the amercement of their whole virility: and Grotius adds, that this conciſing puniſhment of circumciſers became a penal law thereupon among the Viſigoths: a dangerous example of beginning in the ſpirit to end ſo in the fleſh; whereas that cutting off much likelier ſeems meant a cutting off from the church, not unuſually ſo termed in ſcripture, and a zealous imprecation, not a command. But I have mentioned this paſſage to ſhow how

how abſurd they often prove, who have not learned to diſtinguiſh rightly between civil power and eccleſiaſtical. How many perſecutions then, impriſonments, baniſhments, penalties, and ſtripes; how much bloodſhed have the forcers of conſcience to anſwer for, and proteſtants rather than papiſts! For the papiſt, judging by his principles, puniſhes them who believe not as the church believes, though againſt the ſcripture; but the proteſtant, teaching every one to believe the ſcripture, though againſt the church, counts heretical, and perſecutes againſt his own principles, them who in any particular ſo believe as he in general teaches them; them who moſt honour and believe divine ſcripture, but not againſt it any human interpretation though univerſal; them who interpret ſcripture only to themſelves, which by his own poſition, none but they to themſelves can interpret: them who uſe the ſcripture no otherwiſe by his own doctrine to their edification, than he himſelf uſes it to their puniſhing; and ſo whom his doctrine acknowledges a true believer, his diſcipline perſecutes as a heretic. The papiſt exacts our belief as to the church due above ſcripture; and by the church, which is the whole people of God, underſtands the pope, the general councils, prelatical only, and the ſurnamed fathers: but the forcing proteſtant, though he deny ſuch belief to any church whatſoever, yet takes it to himſelf and his teachers, of far leſs authority than to be called the church, and above ſcripture believed: which renders his practice both contrary to his belief, and far worſe than that belief, which he condemns in the papiſt. By all which, well conſidered, the more he profeſſes to be a true proteſtant, the more he hath to anſwer for his perſecuting than a papiſt. No proteſtant therefore, of what ſect ſoever, following ſcripture only, which is the common ſect wherein they all agree, and the granted rule of every man's conſcience to himſelf, ought by the common doctrine of proteſtants, to be forced or moleſted for religion. But as for popery and idolatry, why they alſo may not hence plead to be tolerated, I have much leſs to ſay. Their religion the more conſidered, the leſs can be acknowledged a religion;

gion; but a Roman principality rather, endeavouring to keep up her old univerſal dominion under a new name, and mere ſhadow of a catholic religion; being indeed more rightly named a catholic herety againſt the ſcripture, ſupported mainly by a civil, and except in Rome, by a foreign power: juſtly therefore to be ſuſpected, not tolerated by the magiſtrate of another country. Beſides, of an implicit faith which they profeſs, the conſcience alſo becomes implicit, and ſo by voluntary ſervitude to man's law, forfeits her chriſtian liberty. Who then can plead for ſuch a conſcience, as being implicitly enthralled to man inſtead of God, almoſt becomes no conſcience, as the will not free, becomes no will? Nevertheleſs, if they ought not to be tolerated, it is for juſt reaſon of ſtate, more than of religion; which they who force, though profeſſing to be proteſtants, deſerve as little to be tolerated themſelves, being no leſs guilty of popery, in the moſt popiſh point. Laſtly, for idolatry, who knows it not to be evidently againſt all ſcripture, both of the Old and New Teſtament, and therefore a true herety, or rather an impiety, wherein a right conſcience can have nought to do; and the works thereof ſo manifeſt, that a magiſtrate can hardly err in prohibiting and quite removing at leaſt the public and ſcandalous uſe thereof?

From the riddance of theſe objections, I proceed yet to another reaſon why it is unlawful for the civil magiſtrate to uſe force in matters of religion; which is, becauſe to judge in thoſe things, though we ſhould grant him able, which is proved he is not, yet as a civil magiſtrate he hath no right. Chriſt hath a government of his own, ſufficient of itſelf to all his ends and purpoſes in governing his church, but much different from that of the civil magiſtrate; and the difference in this very thing principally conſiſts, that it governs not by outward force; and that for two reaſons. Firſt, Becauſe it deals only with the inward man and his actions, which are all ſpiritual, and to outward force not liable. 2dly, To ſhow us the divine excellence of his ſpiritual kingdom, able, without worldly force, to ſubdue all the powers and kingdoms of this world, which

which are upheld by outward force only. That the inward man is nothing elſe but the inward part of man, his underſtanding and his will; and that his actions thence proceeding, yet not ſimply thence, but from the work of divine grace upon them, are the whole matter of religion under the goſpel, will appear plainly by conſidering what that religion is; whence we ſhall perceive yet more plainly that it cannot be forced. What evangelic religion is, is told in two words, Faith and Charity, or Belief and Practice. That both theſe flow, either, the one from the underſtanding, the other from the will, or both jointly from both; once indeed naturally free, but now only as they are regenerate and wrought on by divine grace, is in part evident to common ſenſe and principles unqueſtioned, the reſt by ſcripture: Concerning our belief, Mat. xvi, 17, "Fleſh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in Heaven." Concerning our practice, as it is religious, and not merely civil, Gal. v, 22, 23, and other places, declare it to be the fruit of the ſpirit only. Nay, our whole practical duty in religion is contained in charity, or the love of God and our neighbour, no way to be forced, yet the fulfilling of the whole law; that is to ſay, our whole practice in religion. If then both our belief and practice, which comprehend our whole religion, flow from faculties of the inward man, free and unconſtrainable of themſelves by nature, and our practice not only from faculties endued with freedom, but from love and charity beſides, incapable of force, and all theſe things by tranſgreſſion loſt, but renewed and regenerated in us by the power and gift of God alone; how can ſuch religion as this admit of force from man, or force be any way applied to ſuch religion, eſpecially under the free offer of grace in the goſpel, but it muſt forthwith fruſtrate and make of no effect, both the religion and the goſpel? And that to compel outward profeſſion, which they will ſay perhaps ought to be compelled, though inward religion cannot, is to compel hypocriſy, not to advance religion, ſhall yet, though of itſelf clear enough, be ere the concluſion further manifeſt. The other reaſon

ſon why Chriſt rejects outward force in the government of his church, is, as I ſaid before, to ſhow us the divine excellence of his ſpiritual kingdom, able without worldly force to ſubdue all the powers and kingdoms of this world, which are upheld by outward force only: by which to uphold religion otherwiſe than to defend the religious from outward violence, is no ſervice to Chriſt or his kingdom, but rather a diſparagement, and degrades it from a divine and ſpiritual kingdom, to a kingdom of this world: which he denies it to be, becauſe it needs not force to confirm it: John xviii, 36, "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my ſervants fight, that I ſhould not be delivered to the Jews." This proves the kingdom of Chriſt not governed by outward force, as being none of this world, whoſe kingdoms are maintained all by force only: and yet diſproves not that a chriſtian commonwealth may defend itſelf againſt outward force, in the cauſe of religion as well as in any other; though Chriſt himſelf coming purpoſely to die for us, would not be ſo defended. 1 Cor. i, 27, "God hath choſen the weak things of the world, to confound the things which are mighty." Then ſurely he hath not choſen the force of this world to ſubdue conſcience, and conſcientious men, who in this world are counted weakeſt; but rather conſcience, as being weakeſt, to ſubdue and regulate force, his adverſary, not his aid or inſtrument in governing the church: 2 Cor. x, 3, 4, 5, 6, "For though we walk in the fleſh, we do not war after the fleſh: for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of ſtrong holds, caſting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalts itſelf againſt the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Chriſt: and having in a readineſs to avenge all diſobedience." It is evident by the firſt and ſecond verſes of this chapter, and the apoſtle here ſpeaks of that ſpiritual power by which Chriſt governs his church, how all-ſufficient it is, how powerful to reach the conſcience, and the inward man with whom it chiefly deals, and whom no power elſe can deal with. In compariſon of which,

which, as it is here thus magnificently deſcribed, how uneffectual and weak is outward force with all her boiſterous tools, to the ſhame of thoſe chriſtians, and eſpecially thoſe churchmen, who to the exerciſing of church-diſcipline, never ceaſe calling on the civil magiſtrate to interpoſe his fleſhly force? An argument that all true miniſterial and ſpiritual power is dead within them; who think the goſpel, which both began and ſpread over the whole world for above three hundred years, under heathen and perſecuting emperors, cannot ſtand or continue, ſupported by the ſame divine preſence and protection, to the world's end, much eaſier under the defenſive favour only of a chriſtian magiſtrate, unleſs it be enacted and ſettled, as they call it, by the ſtate, a ſtatute or a ſtate religion; and underſtand not that the church itſelf cannot, much leſs the ſtate, ſettle or impoſe one title of religion upon our obedience implicit, but can only recommend or propound it to our free and conſcientious examination: unleſs they mean to ſet the ſtate higher than the church in religion, and with a groſs contradiction give to the ſtate in their ſettling petition that command of our implicit belief, which they deny in their ſettled confeſſion both to the ſtate and to the church. Let them ceaſe then to importune and interrupt the magiſtrate from attending to his own charge in civil and moral things, the ſettling of things juſt, things honeſt, the defence of things religious, ſettled by the churches within themſelves; and the repreſſing of their contraries, determinable by the common light of nature; which is not to conſtrain or to repreſs religion probable by ſcripture, but the violaters and perſecutors thereof: of all which things he hath enough and more than enough to do, left yet undone; for which the land groans, and juſtice goes to wrack the while. Let him alſo forbear force where he hath no right to judge, for the conſcience is not his province, leſt a worſt wo arrive him, for worſe offending than was denounced by our Saviour, Matth. xxiii, 23, againſt the Phariſees: Ye have forced the conſcience, which was not to be forced; but judgment and mercy ye have not executed;

this

his ye ſhould have done, and the other let alone. And nce it is the counſel and ſet purpoſe of God in the oſpel, by ſpiritual means which are counted weak, to vercome all power which reſiſts him; let them not go bout to do that by worldly ſtrength, which he hath ecreed to do by thoſe means which the world counts reakneſs, leſt they be again obnoxious to that ſaying, vhich in another place is alſo written of the Phariſees, uke vii, 30, "That they fruſtrated the counſel of od." The main plea is, and urged with much vehenence to their imitation, that the kings of Judah, as I ouched before, and eſpecially Joſiah, both judged and ſed force in religion: 2 Chron. xxxiv, 33, "He made ll that were preſent in Iſrael to ſerve the Lord their od:" an argument, if it be well weighed, worſe than hat uſed by the falſe prophet Shemaia to the high rieſt, that in imitation of Jehoiada, he ought to put eremiah in the ſtocks, Jer. xxix, 24, 26, &c. for which e received his due denouncement from God. But to his beſides I return a threefold anſwer: Firſt, That the tate of religion under the goſpel is far differing from vhat it was under the law; then was the ſtate of rigour, hildhood, bondage, and works, to all which force was ot unbefitting; now is the ſtate of grace, manhood, reedom, and faith, to all which belongs willingneſs nd reaſon, not force: the law was then written on ables of ſtone, and to be performed according to the etter, willingly or unwillingly; the goſpel, our new ovenant, upon the heart of every believer, to be inerpreted only by the ſenſe of charity and inward perıaſion: the law had no diſtinct government or goverors of church and commonwealth, but the Prieſts and evites judged in all cauſes, not eccleſiaſtical only, but ivil, Deut. xvii, 8, &c. which under the goſpel is foridden to all church miniſters, as a thing which Chriſt heir maſter in his miniſtry diſclaimed, Luke xii, 14, as thing beneath them, 1 Cor. vi, 4, and by many other tatutes, as to them who have a peculiar and far differing overnment of their own. If not, why different the overnors? Why not church-miniſters in ſtate-affairs, s well as ſtate-miniſters in church-affairs? If church and

ſtate

ſtate ſhall be made one fleſh again as under the law, let it be withal conſidered, that God, who then joined them, hath now ſevered them; that which, he ſo ordaining, was then a lawful conjunction, to ſuch on either ſide as join again what he hath ſevered would be nothing now but their own preſumptuous fornication. Secondly, the kings of Judah, and thoſe magiſtrates under the law might have recourſe, as I ſaid before, to divine inſpiration; which our magiſtrates under the goſpel have not, more than to the ſame ſpirit, which thoſe whom they force have ofttimes in greater meaſure than themſelves: and ſo, inſtead of forcing the chriſtian, they force the Holy Ghoſt; and, againſt that wiſe forewarning of Gamaliel, fight againſt God. Thirdly, thoſe kings and magiſtrates uſed force in ſuch things only as were undoubtedly known and forbidden in the law of Moſes, idolatry and direct apoſtacy from that national and ſtrict enjoined worſhip of God; whereof the corporal puniſhment was by himſelf expreſsly ſet down: but magiſtrates under the goſpel, our free, elective and rational worſhip, are moſt commonly buſieſt to force thoſe things which in the goſpel are either left free, nay, ſometimes aboliſhed when by them compelled, or elſe controverted equally by writers on both ſides, and ſometimes with odds on that ſide which is againſt them. By which means they either puniſh that which they ought to favour and protect, or that with corporal puniſhment, and of their own inventing, which not they, but the church had received command to chaſtiſe with a ſpiritual rod only. Yet ſome are ſo eager in their zeal of forcing, that they refuſe not to deſcend at length to the utmoſt ſhift of that parabolical proof, Luke xiv, 16, &c. "Compel them to come in:" therefore magiſtrates may compel in religion. As if a parable were to be ſtrained through every word or phraſe, and not expounded by the general ſcope thereof; which is no other here than the earneſt expreſſion of God's diſpleaſure on thoſe recuſant Jews, and his purpoſe to prefer the Gentiles on any terms before them; expreſſed here by the word compel. But how compels he? Doubtleſs no other way than he draws, without which no man can come to him, John vi, 44, and that is by the inward perſuaſive

ſuaſive motions of his ſpirit, and by his miniſters; not by the outward compulſions of a magiſtrate or his officers. The true people of Chriſt, as is foretold, Pſal. cx, 3, "are a willing people in the day of his power;" then much more now when he rules all things by outward weakneſs, that both his inward power and their ſincerity may the more appear. "God loveth a cheerful Giver:" then certainly is not pleaſed with an uncheerful worſhipper; as the very words declare of his evangelical invitations, Eſa, lv, 1, "Ho, every one that thirſteth, come." John vii, 37, "If any man thirſteth." Rev. iii, 18, "I counſel thee." And xxii, 17, "Whoſoever will, let him take the water of life freely." And in that grand commiſſion of preaching, to invite all nations, Mark xvi, 16, as the reward of them who come, ſo the penalty of them who come not, is only ſpiritual. But they bring now ſome reaſon with their force, which muſt not paſs unanſwered, that the church of Thyatira was blamed, Rev. ii, 20, for ſuffering the falſe "Propheteſs to teach and to ſeduce." I anſwer, That ſeducement is to be hindered by fit and proper means ordained in Church-diſcipline, by inſtant and powerful demonſtration to the contrary; by oppoſing truth to errour, no unequal match; truth the ſtrong, to errour the weak, though ſly and ſhifting. Force is no honeſt confutation, but uneffectual, and for the moſt part unſucceſsful, oftimes fatal to them who uſe it: ſound doctrine, diligently and duly taught, is of herſelf both ſufficient, and of herſelf (if ſome ſecret judgment of God hinder not) always prevalent againſt ſeducers. This the Thyatirians had neglected, ſuffering, againſt Church-diſcipline, that woman to teach and ſeduce among them: Civil Force they had not then in their power, being the Chriſtian part only of that city, and then eſpecially under one of thoſe ten great perſecutions, whereof this the ſecond was raiſed by Domitian: force therefore in theſe matters could not be required of them who were under force themſelves.

I have ſhown, that the civil power hath neither right, nor can do right, by forcing religious things: I will now ſhow the wrong it doth, by violating the fundamental privilege of the goſpel, the new birthright of every true

believer, chriſtian liberty: 2 Cor, iii, 17, "Where the ſpirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Gal. iv, 26, "Jeruſalem, which is above, is free; which is the mother of us all." And v, 31, "We are not Children of the bondwoman, but of the free." It will be ſufficient in this place to ſay no more of chriſtian liberty, than that it ſets us free not only from the bondage of thoſe ceremonies, but alſo from the forcible impoſition of thoſe circumſtances, place and time, in the worſhip of God: which though by him commanded in the old law, yet in reſpect of that verity and freedom which is evangelical, St. Paul comprehends both kinds alike, that is to ſay, both ceremony and circumſtance, under one and the ſame contemptuous name of "weak and beggarly Rudiments," Gal. iv, 3, 9, 10; Col. ii, 8, with 16; conformable to what our Saviour himſelf taught, John iv, 21, 23, "Neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jeruſalem. In Spirit and in Truth; for the father ſeeketh ſuch to worſhip him:" that is to ſay, not only ſincere of heart, for ſuch he ſought ever; but alſo, as the words here chiefly import, not compelled to place, and by the ſame reaſon, not to any ſet time; as his apoſtle by the ſame ſpirit hath taught us, Rom. xiv, 6, &c., "One man eſteemeth one day above another; another, &c.; Gal. iv, 10, Ye obſerve days and months, &c.;" Col. ii, 16. Theſe and other ſuch places in ſcripture the beſt and learnedeſt reformed writers have thought evident enough to inſtruct us in our freedom, not only from ceremonies, but from thoſe circumſtances alſo, though impoſed with a confident perſuaſion of morality in them, which they hold impoſſible to be in place or time. By what warrant then our opinions and practices herein are of late turned quite againſt all other proteſtants, and that which is to them orthodoxal, to us becomes ſcandalous and puniſhable by ſtatute, I wiſh were once again conſidered; if we mean not to proclaim a ſchiſm in this point from the beſt and moſt reformed churches abroad. They who would ſeem more knowing, confeſs that theſe things are indifferent, but for that very cauſe by the magiſtrate may be commanded. As if God of his ſpecial grace in the goſpel had to this end freed us from his own commandments

in

in theſe things, that our freedom ſhould ſubject us to a more grievous yoke, the commandments of men. As well may the magiſtrate call that common or unclean which God hath cleanſed, forbidden to St. Peter, Acts x, 15; as well may he looſen that which God hath ſtraitened, or ſtraiten that which God hath looſened, as he may enjoin thoſe things in religion which God hath left free, and lay on that yoke which God hath taken off. For he hath not only given us this gift as a ſpecial privilege and excellence of the free goſpel above the ſervile law, but ſtrictly alſo hath commanded us to keep it and enjoy it. Gal. v, 13, "You are called to liberty." 1 Cor. vii, 23, "Be not made the ſervants of men." Gal. v, 14, "Stand faſt therefore in the liberty wherewith Chriſt hath made us free; and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." Neither is this a mere command, but for the moſt part in theſe forecited places, accompanied with the very weightieſt and inmoſt reaſons of Chriſtian religion: Rom. xiv, 9, 10, "For to this end Chriſt both died, and roſe, and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and living. But why doſt thou judge thy brother? &c." How preſumeſt thou to be his Lord, to be whoſe only Lord, at leaſt in theſe things, Chriſt both died, and roſe, and lived again? "We ſhall all ſtand before the judgment-ſeat of Chriſt." Why then doſt thou not only judge, but perſecute in theſe things for which we are to be accountable to the tribunal of Chriſt only, our Lord and lawgiver? 1 Cor. vii, 23, "Ye are bought with a price; be not made the ſervants of men." Some trivial price belike, and for ſome frivolous pretences paid in their opinion, if bought and by him redeemed, who is God, from what was once the ſervice of God, we ſhall be enthralled again, and forced by men to what now is but the ſervice of men. Gal. iv, 31, with v, 1, "We are not children of the bondwoman, &c. ſtand faſt therefore, &c." Col. ii, 8, "Beware leſt any man ſpoil you, &c. after the rudiments of the world, and not after Chriſt." Solid reaſons whereof are continued through the whole chapter. Ver. 10, "Ye are complete in him, which is the head of all principality and power:" not completed therefore or made the more

religious by thoſe ordinances of civil power; from which Chriſt their head hath diſcharged us; "blotting out the hand writing of ordinances that was againſt us, which was contrary to us; and took it out of the way, nailing it to his croſs," ver. 14. Blotting out ordinances written by God himſelf, much more thoſe ſo boldly written over again by men: ordinances which were againſt us, that is, againſt our frailty, much more thoſe which are againſt our conſcience. "Let no man therefore judge you in reſpect of, &c." v, 16; Gal. iv, 3, &c., "Even ſo we, when we were children, were in bondage under the rudiments of the world: But when the fulneſs of time was come, God ſent forth his ſon, &c. to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of ſons, &c. Wherefore thou art no more a ſervant, but a ſon, &c. But now, &c. how turn ye again to the weak and beggarly rudiments, whereunto ye deſire again to be in bondage? Ye obſerve days, &c." Hence it plainly appears, that if we be not free, we are not ſons, but ſtill ſervants unadopted; and if we turn again to thoſe weak and beggarly rudiments, we are not free; yea, though willingly, and with a miſguided conſcience, we deſire to be in bondage to them; how much more then if unwillingly and againſt our conſcience? Ill was our condition changed from legal to evangelical, and ſmall advantage gotten by the goſpel, if for the ſpirit of adoption to freedom promiſed us, we receive again the ſpirit of bondage to fear; if our fear, which was then ſervile towards God only, muſt be now ſervile in religon towards men: ſtrange alſo and prepoſterous fear, if when and wherein it hath attained by the redemption of our Saviour, to be filial only towards God, it muſt be now ſervile towards the magiſtrate: who, by ſubjecting us to his puniſhment in theſe things, brings back into religion that law of terrour and ſatisfaction belonging now only to civil crimes; and thereby in effect aboliſhes the goſpel, by eſtabliſhing again the law to a far worſe yoke of ſervitude upon us than before. It will therefore not miſbecome the meaneſt chriſtian to put in mind chriſtian magiſtrates, and ſo much the more freely by how much the more they deſire to be thought chriſtian, (for they will

will be thereby, as they ought to be in theſe things, the more our brethren and the leſs our Lords) that they meddle not raſhly with chriſtian liberty, the birthright and outward teſtimony of our adoption; leſt while they little think it, nay, think they do God ſervice, they themſelves, like the ſons of that bondwoman, be found perſecuting them who are freeborn of the ſpirit, and by a ſacrilege of not the leaſt aggravation, bereaving them of that ſacred liberty, which our ſaviour with his own blood purchaſed for them.

A fourth reaſon, why the magiſtrate ought not to uſe force in religion, I bring from the conſideration of all thoſe ends, which he can likely pretend to the interpoſing of his force therein: and thoſe hardly can be other than firſt the glory of God; next, either the ſpiritual good of them whom he forces, or the temporal puniſhment of their ſcandal to others. As for the promoting of God's glory, none, I think, will ſay that his glory ought to be promoted in religious things by unwarrantable means, much leſs by means contrary to what he hath commanded. That outward force is ſuch, and that God's glory in the whole adminiſtration of the goſpel according to his own will and counſel ought to be fulfilled by weakneſs, at leaſt ſo refuted, not by force; or if by force, inward and ſpiritual, not outward and corporeal, is already proved at large. That outward force cannot tend to the good of him who is forced in religion, is unqueſtionable. For in religion whatever we do under the goſpel, we ought to be thereof perſuaded without ſcruple; and are juſtified by the faith we have, not by the work we do: Rom. xiv, 5, "Let every man be fully perſuaded in his own mind." The other reaſon which follows neceſſarily, is obvious, Gal. ii, 16, and in many other places of St. Paul, as the groundwork and foundation of the whole goſpel, that we are "juſtified by the faith of Chriſt, and not by the works of the law." If not by the works of God's law, how then by the injunctions of man's law? Surely force cannot work perſuaſion, which is faith; cannot therefore juſtify nor pacify the conſcience; and that which juſtifies not in the goſpel, condemns; is not only not good, but ſinful to

do: Rom. xiv, 23, "Whatſoever is not of faith, is ſin." It concerns the magiſtrate then to take heed how he forces in religion conſcientious men: leſt by compelling them to do that whereof they cannot be perſuaded, that wherein they cannot find themſelves juſtified, but by their own conſciences condemned, inſtead of aiming at their ſpiritual good, he force them to do evil; and while he thinks himſelf Aſa, Joſiah, Nehemiah, he be found Jeroboam, who cauſed Iſrael to ſin; and thereby draw upon his own head all thoſe ſins and ſhipwrecks of implicit faith and conformity, which he hath forced, and all the wounds given to thoſe little ones, whom to offend he will find worſe one day than that violent drowning mentioned Mat. xviii, 6. Laſtly, as a preface to force, it is the uſual pretence, That although tender conſciences ſhall be tolerated, yet ſcandals thereby given ſhall not be unpuniſhed, prophane and licentious men ſhall not be encouraged, to neglect the performance of religious and holy duties by colour of any law giving liberty to tender conſciences. By which contrivance the way lies ready open to them hereafter, who may be ſo minded, to take away by little and little that liberty which Chriſt and his goſpel, not any magiſtrate, hath right to give: though this kind of his giving be but to give with one hand, and take away with the other, which is a deluding not a giving. As for ſcandals, if any man be offended at the conſcientious liberty of another, it is a taken ſcandal, not a given. To heal one conſcience, we muſt not wound another: and men muſt be exhorted to beware of ſcandals in chriſtian liberty, not forced by the magiſtrate; leſt while he goes about to take away the ſcandal, which is uncertain whether given or taken, he take away our liberty, which is the certain and the ſacred gift of God, neither to be touched by him, nor to be parted with by us. None more cautious of giving ſcandal than St. Paul. Yet while he made himſelf "Servant to all," that he "might gain the more," he made himſelf ſo of his own accord, was not made ſo by outward force, teſtifying at the ſame time that he "was free from all men," 1 Cor. ix, 19; and thereafter exhorts us alſo, Gal. v, 13, "Ye were called to liberty, &c. but by love ſerve one another:"

then

then not by force. As for that fear, leſt prophane and licentious men ſhould be encouraged to omit the performance of religious and holy duties, how can that care belong to the civil magiſtrate, eſpecially to his force? For if prophane and licentious perſons muſt not neglect the performance of religious and holy duties, it implies, that ſuch duties they can perform, which no proteſtant will affirm. They who mean the outward performance, may ſo explain it; and it will then appear yet more plainly, that ſuch performance of religious and holy duties, eſpecially by prophane and licentious perſons, is a diſhonouring rather than a worſhipping of God; and not only by him not required, but deteſted: Prov. xxi, 27, "The ſacrifice of the wicked is an abomination; how much more when he bringeth it with a wicked mind?" To compel therefore the prophane to things holy in his prophaneneſs, is all one under the goſpel, as to have compelled the unclean to ſacrifice in his uncleanneſs under the law. And I add withal, that to compel the licentious in his licentiouſneſs, and the conſcientious againſt his conſcience, comes all to one; tends not to the honour of God, but to the multiplying and the aggravating of ſin to them both. We read not that Chriſt ever exerciſed force but once; and that was to drive prophane ones out of his temple, not to force them in: and if their being there was an offence, we find by many other ſcriptures that their praying there was an abomination: and yet to the Jewiſh law that nation, as a ſervant, was obliged; but to the goſpel each perſon is left voluntary, called only, as a ſon, by the preaching of the word; not to be driven in by edicts and force of arms. For if by the apoſtle, Rom. xii, 1, we are "beſeeched as brethren by the mercies of God to preſent our bodies a living ſacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is our reaſonable ſervice" or worſhip, then is no man to be forced by the compulſive laws of men to preſent his body a dead ſacrifice; and ſo under the goſpel moſt unholy and unacceptable, becauſe it is his unreaſonable ſervice, that is to ſay, not only unwilling but unconſcionable. But if prophane and licentious perſons may not omit the performance of holy duties, why may they not partake of holy things? Why are they pro-

hibited the Lord's ſupper, ſince both the one and the other action may be outward; and outward performance of duty may attain at leaſt an outward participation of benefit? The church denying them that communion of grace and thankſgiving, as it juſtly doth, why doth the magiſtrate compel them to the union of performing that which they neither truly can, being themſelves unholy, and to do ſeemingly is both hateful to God, and perhaps no leſs dangerous to perform holy duties irreligiouſly, than to receive holy ſigns or ſacraments unworthily? All prophane and licentious men, ſo known, can be conſidered but either ſo without the church as never yet within it, or departed thence of their own accord, or excommunicate: if never yet within the church, whom the apoſtle, and ſo conſequently the church, have nought to do to judge, as he profeſſes, 1 Cor. v, 12, then by what authority doth the magiſtrate judge; or, which is worſe, compel in relation to the church? If departed of his own accord, like that loſt ſheep, Luke xv, 4, &c. the true church either with her own or any borrowed force worries him not in again, but rather in all charitable manner ſends after him; and if ſhe find him, lays him gently on her ſhoulders; bears him, yea bears his burdens, his errours, his infirmities any way tolerable, "ſo fulfilling the law of Chriſt," Gal. vi, 2. If excommunicate, whom the church hath bid go out, in whoſe name doth the magiſtrate compel to go in? The church indeed hinders none from hearing in her public congregation, for the doors are open to all: nor excommunicates to deſtruction; but, as much as in her lies, to a final ſaving. Her meaning therefore muſt needs be, that as her driving out brings on no outward penalty, ſo no outward force or penalty of an improper and only a deſtructive power ſhould drive in again her infectious ſheep; therefore ſent out becauſe infectious, and not driven in but with the danger not only of the whole and ſound, but alſo of his own utter periſhing. Since force neither inſtructs in religion, nor begets repentance or amendment of life, but on the contrary, hardneſs of heart, formality, hypocriſy, and, as I ſaid before, every way increaſe of ſin; more and more alienates the mind from a violent religion, expelling out and com-

pelling in, and reduces it to a condition like that which the Britons complain of in our ſtory, driven to and fro between the Picts and the ſea. If after excommunion he be found intractable, incurable, and will not hear the church, he becomes as one never yet within her pale, "a Heathen or a Publican," Mat. xviii, 17, not further to be judged, no not by the magiſtrate, unleſs for civil cauſes; but left to the final ſentence of that judge, whoſe coming ſhall be in flames of fire; that Maranathà, 1 Cor. xvi, 22, than which to him ſo left nothing can be more dreadful, and ofttimes to him particularly nothing more ſpeedy, that is to ſay, the Lord cometh: in the mean while delivered up to Satan, 1 Cor. v, 5, 1 Tim. i, 20, that is, from the fold of Chriſt and kingdom of grace to the world again, which is the kingdom of Satan; and as he was received "from darkneſs to light, and from the power of Satan to God," Acts xxvi, 18, ſo now delivered up again from light to darkneſs, and from God to the power of Satan; yet ſo as is in both places manifeſted, to the intent of ſaving him, brought ſooner to contrition by ſpiritual than by any corporal ſeverity. But grant it belonging any way to the magiſtrate, that prophane and licentious perſons omit not the performance of holy duties, which in them were odious to God even under the law, much more now under the goſpel; yet ought his care both as a magiſtrate and a chriſtian, to be much more that conſcience be not inwardly violated, than that licence in theſe things be made outwardly comformable: ſince his part is undoubtedly as a chriſtian, which puts him upon this office much more than as a magiſtrate, in all reſpects to have more care of the conſcientious than of the prophane; and not for their ſakes to take away (while they pretend to give) or to diminiſh the rightful liberty of religious conſciences.

On theſe four ſcriptural reaſons, as on a firm ſquare, this truth, the right of chriſtian and evangelic liberty, will ſtand immovable againſt all thoſe pretended conſequences of licence and confuſion, which for the moſt part men moſt licentious and confuſed themſelves, or ſuch as whoſe ſeverity would be wiſer than divine wiſdom, are ever apteſt to object againſt the ways of God: as if God without

without them, when he gave us this liberty, knew not of the worſt which theſe men in their arrogance pretend will follow: yet knowing all their worſt, he gave us this liberty as by him judged beſt. As to thoſe magiſtrates who think it their work to ſettle religion, and thoſe miniſters or others, who ſo oft call upon them to do ſo, I truſt, that having well conſidered what hath been here argued, neither they will continue in that intention, nor theſe in that expectation from them: when they ſhall find that the ſettlement of religion belongs only to each particular church by perſuaſive and ſpiritual means within itſelf, and that the defence only of the church belongs to the magiſtrate. Had he once learnt not further to concern himſelf with church-affairs, half his labour might be ſpared, and the commonwealth better tended. To which end, that which I premiſed in the beginning, and in due place treated of more at large, I deſire now concluding, that they would conſider ſeriouſly what religion is: and they will find it to be, in ſum, both our belief and our practice depending upon God only. That there can be no place then left for the magiſtrate or his force in the ſettlement of religion, by appointing either what we ſhall believe in divine things, or practiſe in religious, (neither of which things are in the power of man either to perform himſelf, or to enable others) I perſuade me in the chriſtian ingenuity of all religious men, the more they examine ſeriouſly, the more they will find clearly to be true: and find how falſe and deviſeable that common ſaying is, which is ſo much relied upon, that the chriſtian magiſtrate is "Cuſtos, utriuſque Tabulæ," Keeper of both Tables, unleſs is meant by keeper the defender only: neither can that maxim be maintained by any proof or argument, which hath not in this diſcourſe firſt or laſt been refuted. For the two tables, or ten commandments, teach our duty to God and our neighbour from the love of both; give magiſtrates no authority to force either: they ſeek that from the judicial law, though on falſe grounds, eſpecially in the firſt table, as I have ſhown; and both in firſt and ſecond execute that authority for the moſt part, not according to God's judicial laws but their own. As for civil crimes, and of the outward man, which

which all are not, no not of thoſe againſt the ſecond table, as that of coveting; in them what power they have, they had from the beginning, long before Moſes or the two tables were in being. And whether they be not now as little in being to be kept by any chriſtian as they are two legal tables, remains yet as undecided, as it is ſure they never were yet delivered to the keeping of any chriſtian magiſtrate. But of theſe things perhaps more ſome other time; what may ſerve the preſent hath been above diſcourſed ſufficiently out of the ſcriptures: and to thoſe produced, might be added teſtimonies, examples, experiences of all ſucceeding ages to theſe times, aſſerting this doctrine: but having herein the ſcripture ſo copious and ſo plain, we have all that can be properly called true ſtrength and nerve; the reſt would be but pomp and encumbrance. Pomp and oſtentation of reading is admired among the vulgar: but doubtleſs in matters of religion he is learnedeſt who is plaineſt. The brevity I uſe, not exceeding a ſmall manual, will not therefore, I ſuppoſe, be thought the leſs conſiderable, unleſs with them perhaps who think that great books only can determine great matters. I rather chooſe the common rule, not to make much ado, where leſs may ſerve. Which in controverſies, and thoſe eſpecially of religion, would make them leſs tedious, and by conſequence read oftener by many more, and with more benefit.

CONSIDERATIONS

Touching the likelieſt Means to remove

HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH.

Wherein is alſo diſcourſed

Of Tithes, Church-Fees, and Church-Revenues;

AND

Whether any Maintenance of Miniſters can be ſettled by Law.*

To the Parliament of the Commonwealth of ENGLAND, with the Dominions thereof.

OWING to your protection, ſupreme ſenate! this liberty of writing, which I have uſed theſe eighteen years on all occaſions to aſſert the juſt rights and freedoms both of church and ſtate, and ſo far approved, as to have been truſted with the repreſentment and defence of your actions to all Chriſtendom againſt an adverſary of no mean repute; to whom ſhould I addreſs what I ſtill publiſh on the ſame argument, but to you, whoſe magnanimous councils firſt opened and unbound the age from a double bondage under prelatical and regal tyranny: above our own hopes heartening us to look up at laſt like men and chriſtians from the ſlaviſh dejection, wherein from father to ſon we were bred up and taught; and thereby deſerving of theſe nations, if they be not barbarouſly ingrateful, to be acknowledged, next under God, the authors and beſt patrons of religious and civil liberty, that ever theſe iſlands brought forth? The care and tuition of whoſe peace and ſafety, after a ſhort, but ſcandalous night of interruption, is now again, by a new

* Firſt publiſhed 1659.

dawning

dawning of God's miraculous Providence among us, revolved upon your ſhoulders. And to whom more appertain theſe conſiderations, which I propound, than to yourſelves, and the debate before you, though I truſt of no difficulty, yet at preſent of great expectation, not whether ye will gratify, were it no more than ſo, but whether ye will hearken to the juſt petition of many thouſands beſt affected both to religion and to this your return, or whether ye will ſatisfy, which you never can, the covetous pretences and demands of inſatiable hirelings, whoſe diſaffection ye well know both to yourſelves and your reſolutions? That I, though among many others in this common concernment, interpoſe to your deliberations what my thoughts alſo are; your own judgment and the ſucceſs thereof hath given me the confidence: which requeſts but this, that if I have proſperouſly, God ſo favouring me, defended the public cauſe of this commonwealth to foreigners, ye would not think the reaſon and ability, whereon ye truſted once (and repent not,) your whole reputation to the world, either grown leſs by more maturity and longer ſtudy, or leſs available in Engliſh than in another tongue: but that if it ſufficed ſome years paſt to convince and ſatisfy the unengaged of other nations in the juſtice of your doings, though then held paradoxal, it may as well ſuffice now againſt weaker oppoſition in matters, except here in England with a ſpirituality of men devoted to their temporal gain, of no controverſy elſe among proteſtants. Neither do I doubt, ſeeing daily the acceptance which they find who in their petitions venture to bring advice alſo, and new models of a commonwealth, but that you will interpret it much more the duty of a chriſtian to offer what his conſcience perſuades him may be of moment to the freedom and better conſtituting of the church: ſince it is a deed of higheſt charity to help undeceive the people, and a work worthieſt your authority, in all things elſe authors, aſſertors and now recoverers of our liberty, to deliver us, the only people of all proteſtants left ſtill undelivered, from the oppreſſions of a ſimonious decimating clergy, who ſhame not, againſt the judgment and practice of all other churches reformed, to maintain, though very weakly, their popiſh

and

and oft refuted poſitions; not in a point of conſcience, wherein they might be blameleſs, but in a point of covetouſneſs and unjuſt claim to other men's goods; a contention foul and odious in any man, but moſt of all in miniſters of the goſpel, in whom contention, though for their own right, ſcarce is allowable. Till which grievances be removed, and religion ſet free from the monopoly of hirelings, I dare affirm, that no model whatſoever of a commonwealth will prove ſucceſsful or undiſturbed; and ſo perſuaded, implore divine aſſiſtance on your pious counſels and proceedings to unanimity in this and all other truth.

JOHN MILTON.

CONSIDERATIONS

Touching the likelieſt Means to remove

HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH.

THE former treatiſe, which leads in this, began with two things ever found working much miſchief to the one ſide reſtraining, and hire on the other ſide corrupting the teachers thereof. The latter of theſe is by much the more dangerous: for under force, though no thank to the forcers, true religion oftimes beſt thrives and flouriſhes; but the corruption of teachers, moſt commonly the effect of hire, is the very bane of truth in them who are ſo corrupted. Of force not to be uſed in matters of religion, I have already ſpoken; and ſo ſtated matters of conſcience and religion in faith and divine worſhip, and ſo ſevered them from blaſphemy and hereſy, the one being ſuch properly as is deſpiteful, the other ſuch as ſtands not to the rule of ſcripture, and ſo both of them not matters of religion, but rather againſt it, that to them who will yet uſe force, this only choice can be left, whether they will force them to believe, to whom it is not given from above, being not forced thereto by any principle of the goſpel, which is now the only diſpenſation of God to all men; or whether being proteſtants, they will puniſh in thoſe things wherein the proteſtant religion denies them to be judges, either in themſelves infallible, or to the conſciences of other men; or whether, laſtly, they think fit to puniſh errour, ſuppoſing they can be infallible that it is ſo, being not wilful, but conſcientious, and, according to the beſt light of him who errs, grounded on ſcripture: which kind of errour all men religious, or but only reaſonable, have thought worthier of pardon, and the growth thereof to be prevented by ſpiritual means and church-diſcipline, not by civil laws and outward force, ſince it is God only who gives as well to believe aright, as to believe at all; and by thoſe means, which he ordained ſufficiently in his church to the full execution of his divine purpoſe in the goſpel.

goſpel. It remains now to ſpeak of hire, the other evil ſo miſchievous in religion: whereof I promiſed then to ſpeak further, when I ſhould find God diſpoſing me, and opportunity inviting. Opportunity I find now inviting; and apprehend therein the concurrence of God diſpoſing; ſince the maintenance of Church-miniſters, a thing not properly belonging to the magiſtrate, and yet with ſuch importunity called for, and expected from him, is at preſent under public debate. Wherein leſt any thing may happen to be determined and eſtabliſhed prejudicial to the right and freedom of the church, or advantageous to ſuch as may be found hirelings therein, it will be now moſt ſeaſonable, and in theſe matters, wherein every chriſtian hath his free ſuffrage, no way miſbecoming chriſtian meekneſs to offer freely, without diſparagement to the wiſeſt, ſuch advice as God ſhall incline him and enable him to propound: ſince heretofore in commonwealths of moſt fame for government, civil laws were not eſtabliſhed till they had been firſt for certain days publiſhed to the view of all men, that whoſo pleaſed might ſpeak freely his opinion thereof, and give in his exceptions, ere the law could paſs to a full eſtabliſhment. And where ought this equity to have more place, than in the liberty which is inſeparable from chriſtian religion? This, I am not ignorant, will be a work unpleaſing to ſome: but what truth is not hateful to ſome or other, as this, in likelihood, will be to none but hirelings. And if there be among them who hold it their duty to ſpeak impartial truth, as the work of their miniſtry, though not performed without money, let them not envy others who think the ſame no leſs their duty by the general office of chriſtianity, to ſpeak truth, as in all reaſon may be thought, more impartially and unſuſpectedly without money.

Hire of itſelf is neither a thing unlawful, nor a word of any evil note, ſignifying no more than a due recompenſe or reward; as when our Saviour ſaith, "the labourer is worthy of his hire." That which makes it ſo dangerous in the church, and properly makes the Hireling, a word always of evil ſignification, is either the exceſs thereof, or the undue manner of giving and taking

ing it. What harm the exceſs thereof brought to the church, perhaps was not found by experience till the days of Conſtantine; who out of his zeal thinking he could be never too liberally a nurſing father of the church, might be not unfitly ſaid to have either overlaid it or choked it in the nurſing. Which was foretold, as is recorded in eccleſiaſtical traditions, by a voice heard from Heaven, on the very day that thoſe great donations and church-revenues were given, crying aloud, "This day is poiſon poured into the church." Which the event ſoon after verified, as appears by another no leſs ancient obſervation, "That religion brought forth wealth, and the daughter devoured the mother." But long ere wealth came into the church, ſo ſoon as any gain appeared in religion, hirelings were apparent; drawn in long before by the very ſcent thereof. Judas therefore, the firſt hireling, for want of preſent hire anſwerable to his coveting, from the ſmall number or the meanneſs of ſuch as then were the religious, ſold the religion itſelf with the founder thereof, his maſter. Simon Magus the next, in hope only that preaching and the gifts of the Holy Ghoſt would prove gainful, offered beforehand a ſum of money to obtain them. Not long after, as the apoſtle foretold, hirelings like wolves came in by herds; Acts xx, 29, "For I know this, that after my departing ſhall grievous wolves enter in among you, not ſparing the flock." Tit. 1, 11, "Teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre's ſake." 2 Pet. ii, 3, "And through covetouſneſs ſhall they with feigned words make merchandiſe of you. Yet they taught not falſe doctrine only, but ſeeming piety; 1 Tim. vi, 5, "Suppoſing that gain is godlineſs." Neither came they in of themſelves only, but invited ofttimes by a corrupt audience: 2 Tim. iv, 3, "For the time will come, when they will not endure ſound doctrine, but after their own luſts they will heap to themſelves teachers, having itching ears:" and they on the other ſide, as faſt heaping to themſelves diſciples, Acts xx, 30, doubtleſs had as itching palms: 2 Pet. ii, 15, Following the way of Balaam, the ſon of Boſor, who loved the wages of unrighteouſneſs." Jude 11, "They ran greedily after the errour

of Balaam for reward." Thus we ſee, that not only the exceſs of hire in wealthieſt times, but alſo the undue and vicious taking or giving it, though but ſmall or mean, as in the primitive times, gave to hirelings occaſion, though not intended, yet ſufficient to creep at firſt into the church. Which argues alſo the difficulty, or rather the impoſſibility, to remove them quite, unleſs every miniſter were, as St. Paul, contented to teach gratis; but few ſuch are to be found. As therefore we cannot juſtly take away all hire in the church, becauſe we cannot otherwiſe quite remove all hirelings, ſo are we not for the impoſſibility of removing them all, to uſe therefore no endeavour that feweſt may come in; but rather, in regard the evil, do what we can, will always be incumbent and unavoidable, to uſe our utmoſt diligence how it may be leaſt dangerous: which will be likelieſt effected, if we conſider, firſt, what recompenſe God hath ordained ſhould be given to miniſters of the church; (for that a recompenſe ought to be given them, and may by them juſtly be received, our Saviour himſelf from the very light of reaſon and of equity hath declared, Luke x, 7, "The labourer is worthy of his hire;") next, by whom; and laſtly, in what manner.

What recompenſe ought to be given to church-miniſters, God hath anſwerably ordained according to that difference, which he hath manifeſtly put between thoſe his two great diſpenſations, the law and the goſpel. Under the law he gave them tithes; under the goſpel, having left all things in his church to charity and chriſtian freedom, he hath given them only what is juſtly given them. That, as well under the goſpel, as under the law, ſay our Engliſh divines, and they only of all proteſtants, is tithes; and they ſay true, if any man be ſo minded to give them of his own the tenth or twentieth; but that the law therefore of tithes is in force under the goſpel, all other proteſtant divines, though equally concerned, yet conſtantly deny. For although hire to the labourer be of moral and perpetual right, yet that ſpecial kind of hire, the tenth, can be of no right or neceſſity, but to that ſpecial labour for which God ordained it. That ſpecial labour was the levitical and ceremonial

ceremonial ſervice of the tabernacle, Numb. xviii, 21, 31, which is now aboliſhed: the right therefore of that ſpecial hire muſt needs be withal aboliſhed, as being alſo ceremonial. That tithes were ceremonial, is plain, not being given to the Levites till they had been firſt offered a heave offering to the Lord, ver. 24, 28. He then who by that law brings tithes into the goſpel, of neceſſity brings in withal a ſacrifice, and an altar; without which tithes by that law were unſanctified and polluted, ver. 32, and therefore never thought on in the firſt chriſtian times, till ceremonies, altars, and oblations, by an ancienter corruption were brought back long before. And yet the Jews, ever ſince their temple was deſtroyed, though they have rabbies and teachers of their law, yet pay no tithes, as having no Levites to whom, no temple where to pay them, no altar whereon to hallow them: which argues that the Jews themſelves never thought tithes moral, but ceremonial only. That chriſtians therefore ſhould take them up, when Jews have laid them down, muſt needs be very abſurd and prepoſterous. Next, it is as clear in the ſame chapter, that the prieſts and Levites had not tithes for their labour only in the tabernacle, but in regard they were to have no other part nor inheritance in the land, ver. 20, 24, and by that means for a tenth, loſt a twelfth. But our Levites undergoing no ſuch law of deprivement, can have no right to any ſuch compenſation: nay, if by this law they will have tithes, can have no inheritance of land, but forfeit what they have. Beſides this, tithes were of two ſorts, thoſe of every year, and thoſe of every third year: of the former, every one that brought his tithes, was to eat his ſhare: Deut. xiv, 23, "Thou ſhalt eat before the Lord thy God, in the place which he ſhall chooſe to place his name there, the tithe of thy corn, of thy wine, and of thine oil, &c." Nay, though he could not bring his tithe in kind, by reaſon of his diſtant dwelling from the tabernacle or temple, but was thereby forced to turn it into money, he was to beſtow that money on whatſoever pleaſed him, oxen, ſheep, wine, or ſtrong drink; and to eat and drink thereof there before the Lord, both he and his houſhold, ver. 24, 25, 26. As for the tithes of

every third year, they were not given only to the Levite, but to the ſtranger, the fatherleſs, and the widow, ver. 28, 29, and Chap. xxvi, 12, 13. So that ours, if they will have tithes, muſt admit of theſe ſharers with them. Nay, theſe tithes were not paid in at all to the Levite, but the Levite himſelf was to come with thoſe his fellow-gueſts, and eat his ſhare of them only at his houſe who provided them; and this not in regard of his miniſterial office, but becauſe he had no part nor inheritance in the land. Laſtly, the Prieſts and Levites, a tribe, were of a far different conſtitution from this of our miniſters under the goſpel: in them were orders and degrees both by family, dignity and office, mainly diſtinguiſhed; the high prieſt, his brethren and his ſons, to whom the Levites themſelves paid tithes, and of the beſt, were eminently ſuperiour, Numb. xviii, 28, 29. No proteſtant, I ſuppoſe, will liken one of our miniſters to a high prieſt, but rather to a common Levite. Unleſs then, to keep their tithes, they mean to bring back again biſhops, archbiſhops, and the whole gang of prelatry, to whom will they themſelves pay tithes, as by that law it was a ſin to them if they did not? ver. 32. Certainly this muſt needs put them to a deep demur, while the deſire of holding faſt their tithes without ſin may tempt them to bring back again biſhops, as the likeneſs of that hierarchy that ſhould receive tithes from them; and the deſire to pay none, may adviſe them to keep out of the church all orders above them. But if we have to do at preſent, as I ſuppoſe we have, with true reformed proteſtants, not with papiſts or prelates, it will not be denied that in the goſpel there be but two miniſterial degrees, preſbyters and deacons: which if they contend to have any ſucceſſion, reference or conformity with thoſe two degrees under the law, prieſts and Levites, it muſt needs be ſuch whereby our preſbyters or miniſters may be anſwerable to prieſts, and our deacons to Levites; by which rule of proportion it will follow that we muſt pay our tithes to the deacons only, and they only to the miniſters. But if it be truer yet, that the prieſthood of Aaron typified a better reality, 1 Pet. ii, 5, ſignifying the chriſtian true and "holy prieſthood to offer up ſpiritual

ritual ſacrifice;" it follows hence, that we are now juſtly exempt from paying tithes to any who claim from Aaron, ſince that prieſthood is in us now real, which in him was but a ſhadow. Seeing then by all this which has been ſhown, that the law of tithes is partly ceremonial, as the work was for which they were given, partly judicial, not of common, but of particular right to the tribe of Levi, nor to them alone, but to the owner alſo and his houſhold, at the time of their offering, and every three years to the ſtranger, the fatherleſs, and the widow, their appointed ſharers, and that they were a tribe of prieſts and deacons improperly compared to the conſtitution of our miniſtry; and the tithes given by that people to thoſe deacons only; it follows that our miniſters at this day, being neither prieſts nor Levites, nor fitly anſwering to either of them, can have no juſt title or pretence to tithes, by any conſequence drawn from the law of Moſes. But they think they have yet a better plea in the example of Melchiſedec, who took tithes of Abraham ere the law was given; whence they would infer tithes to be of moral right. But they ought to know, or to remember, that not examples, but expreſs commands oblige our obedience to God or man: next, that whatſoever was done in religion before the law written, is not preſently to be counted moral, when as ſo many things were then done both ceremonial and judaically judicial, that we need not doubt to conclude all times before Chriſt more or leſs under the ceremonial law. To what end ſerved elſe thoſe altars and ſacrifices, that diſtinction of clean and unclean entering into the ark, circumciſion, and the raiſing up of ſeed to the elder brother? Gen. xxxviii, 8. If theſe things be not moral, though before the law, how are tithes, though in the example of Abraham and Melchiſedec? But this inſtance is ſo far from being the juſt ground of a law, that after all circumſtances duly weighed both from Gen. xiv, and Heb. vii, it will not be allowed them ſo much as an example. Melchiſedec, beſides his prieſtly benediction, brought with him bread and wine ſufficient to refreſh Abraham and his whole army; incited to do ſo, firſt, by the ſecret providence of God, intending him for a

type of Chriſt and his prieſthood; next, by his due thankfulneſs and honour to Abraham, who had freed his borders of Salem from a potent enemy: Abraham on the other ſide honours him with the tenth of all, that is to ſay (for he took not ſure his whole eſtate with him to that war) of the ſpoils, Heb. vii, 4. Incited he alſo by the ſame ſecret providence, to ſignify as grandfather of Levi, that the levitical prieſthood was excelled by the prieſthood of Chriſt. For the giving of a tenth declared, it ſeems, in thoſe countries and times, him the greater who received it. That which next incited him, was partly his gratitude to requite the preſent, partly his reverence to the perſon and his benediction: to his perſon, as a king and prieſt, greater therefore than Abraham, who was a prieſt alſo, but not a king. And who unhired will be ſo hardy as to ſay, that Abraham at any other time ever paid him tithes, either before or after; or had then, but for this accidental meeting and obligement; or that elſe Melchiſedec had demanded or exacted them, or took them otherwiſe than as the voluntary gift of Abraham? But our miniſters, though neither prieſts nor kings more than any other chriſtian, greater in their own eſteem than Abraham and all his ſeed, for the verbal labour of a ſeventh day's preachment, not bringing, like Melchiſedec, bread or wine at their own coſt, would not take only at the willing hand of liberality or gratitude, but require and exact as due, the tenth, not of ſpoils, but of our whole eſtates and labours; nor once, but yearly. We then it ſeems, by the example of Abraham, muſt pay tithes to theſe Melchiſedecs: but what if the perſon of Abraham can neither no way repreſent us, or will oblige the miniſters to pay tithes no leſs than other men? Abraham had not only a prieſt in his loins, but was himſelf a prieſt, and gave tithes to Melchiſedec either as grandfather of Levi, or as father of the faithful. If as grandfather (though he underſtood it not) of Levi, he obliged not us, but Levi only, the inferiour prieſt, by that homage (as the apoſtle to the Hebrews clearly enough explains) to acknowledge the greater. And they who by Melchiſedec claim from Abraham as Levi's grandfather, have none to ſeek their tithes

tithes of but the Levites, where they can find them. If Abraham, as father of the faithful, paid tithes to Melchiſedec, then certainly the miniſters alſo, if they be of that number, paid in him equally with the reſt. Which may induce us to believe, that as both Abraham and Melchiſedec, ſo tithes alſo in that action typical and ceremonial, ſignified nothing elſe but that ſubjection which all the faithful, both miniſters and people, owe to Chriſt, our high prieſt and king.

In any literal ſenſe, from this example, they never will be able to extort that the people in thoſe days paid tithes to prieſts, but this only, that one prieſt once in his life, of ſpoils only, and in requital partly of a liberal preſent, partly of a benediction, gave voluntary tithes, not to a greater prieſt than himſelf, as far as Abraham could then underſtand, but rather to a prieſt and king joined in one perſon. They will reply, perhaps, that if one prieſt paid tithes to another, it muſt needs be underſtood that the people did no leſs to the prieſt. But I ſhall eaſily remove that neceſſity, by remembering them that in thoſe days was no prieſt, but the father, or the firſt-born of each family; and by conſequence no people to pay him tithes, but his own children and ſervants, who had not wherewithal to pay him, but of his own. Yet grant that the people then paid tithes, there will not yet be the like reaſon to enjoin us; they being then under ceremonies, a mere laity, we now under Chriſt, a royal prieſthood, 1 Pet. ii, 9, as we are coheirs, kings and prieſts with him, a prieſt for ever after the order or manner of Melchiſedec. As therefore Abraham paid tithes to Melchiſedec becauſe Levi was in him, ſo we ought to pay none becauſe the true Melchiſedec is in us, and we in him who can pay to none greater, and hath freed us, by our union with himſelf, from all compulſive tributes and taxes in his church. Neither doth the collateral place, Heb. vii, make other uſe of this ſtory, than to prove Chriſt, perſonated by Melchiſedec, a greater prieſt than Aaron: verſ. 4, "Now conſider how great this man was, &c."; and proves not in the leaſt manner that tithes be of any right to miniſters, but the contrary; firſt, the Levites had "a commandment to take tithes of

the people according to the law, that is, of their brethren, though they come out of the loins of Abraham, ver. 5. The commandment then was, it ſeems, to take tithes of the Jews only, and according to the law. That law changing of neceſſity with the prieſthood, no other ſort of miniſters, as they muſt needs be another ſort under another prieſthood, can receive that tribute of tithes which fell with that law, unleſs renewed by another expreſs command, and according to another law; no ſuch law is extant. Next, Melchiſedec not as a miniſter, but as Chriſt himſelf in perſon, bleſſed Abraham, who "had the promiſes," ver. 6, and in him bleſſed all both miniſters and people, both of the law and goſpel: that bleſſing declared him greater and better than whom he bleſſed, ver. 7, receiving tithes from them all, not as a maintenance, which Melchiſedec needed not, but as a ſign of homage and ſubjection to their king and prieſt: whereas miniſters bear not the perſon of Chriſt in his prieſthood or kingſhip, bleſs not as he bleſſes, are not by their bleſſing greater than Abraham, and all the faithful with themſelves included in him; cannot both give and take tithes in Abraham, cannot claim to themſelves that ſign of our allegiance due only to our eternal king and prieſt, cannot therefore derive tithes from Melchiſedec. Laſtly, the eighth verſe hath thus; "Here men that die receive tithes: there he received them, of whom it is witneſſed that he liveth." Which words intimate, that as he offered himſelf once for us, ſo he received once of us in Abraham, and in that place the typical acknowledgment of our redemption: which had it been a perpetual annuity to Chriſt, by him claimed as his due, Levi muſt have paid it yearly, as well as then, ver. 9, and our miniſters ought ſtill, to ſome Melchiſedec or other, as well now as they did in Abraham. But that Chriſt never claimed any ſuch tenth as his annual due, much leſs reſigned it to the miniſters, his ſo officious receivers, without expreſs commiſſion or aſſignment, will be yet clearer as we proceed. Thus much may at length aſſure us, that this example of Abraham and Melchiſedec, though I ſee of late they build moſt upon it, can ſo little be the ground of any law to us, that it will not ſo much avail

them

them as to the authority of an example. Of like impertinence is that example of Jacob, Gen. xxviii, 22, who of his free choice, not enjoined by any law, vowed the tenth of all that God ſhould give him: which, for aught appears to the contrary, he vowed as a thing no leſs indifferent before his vow, than the foregoing part thereof: that the ſtone, which he had ſet there for a pillar, ſhould be God's houſe. And to whom vowed he this tenth, but to God? Not to any prieſt, for we read of none to him greater than himſelf: and to God, no doubt, but he paid what he vowed, both in the building of that Bethel, with other altars elſewhere, and the expenſe of his continual ſacrifices, which none but he had a right to offer. However therefore he paid his tenth, it could in no likelihood, unleſs by ſuch an occaſion as befel his grandfather, be to any prieſt. But, ſay they, "All the tithe of the land, whether of the ſeed of the land, or of the fruit of the tree, is the Lord's, holy unto the Lord, Lev. xxvii, 30." And this before it was given to the Levites; therefore ſince they ceaſed. No queſtion; For the whole earth is the Lord's, and the fulneſs thereof, Pſal. xxiv, 1, and the light of nature ſhows us no leſs: but that the tenth is his more than the reſt, how know I, but as he ſo declares it? He declares it ſo here of the land of Canaan only, as by all circumſtance appears, and paſſes, by deed of gift, this tenth to the Levite; yet ſo as offered to him firſt a heave offering, and conſecrated on his altar, Numb. xviii, all which I had as little known, but by that evidence. The Levites are ceaſed, the gift returns to the giver. How then can we know that he hath given it to any other? Or how can theſe men preſume to take it unoffered firſt to God, unconſecrated, without another clear and expreſs donation, whereof they ſhow no evidence or writing? Beſides, he hath now alienated that holy land; who can warrantably affirm, that he hath ſince hallowed the tenth of this land, which none but God hath power to do or can warrant? Their laſt proof they cite out of the goſpel, which makes as little for them, Mat. xxiii, 23, where our Saviour denouncing woe to the ſcribes and Phariſees, who paid tithe ſo exactly, and omitted weigh-

tier

tier matters, tells them, that theſe they ought to have done, that is, to have paid tithes. For our Saviour ſpake then to thoſe who obſerved the law of Moſes, which was yet not fully abrogated, till the deſtruction of the temple. And by the way here we may obſerve, out of their own proof, that the ſcribes and Phariſees, though then chief teachers of the people, ſuch at leaſt as were not Levites, did not take tithes, but paid them: ſo much leſs covetous were the ſcribes and Phariſees in thoſe worſt times than ours at this day. This is ſo apparent to the reformed divines of other countries, that when any one of ours hath attempted in Latin to maintain this argument of tithes, though a man would think they might ſuffer him without oppoſition, in a point equally tending to the advantage of all miniſters, yet they forbear not to oppoſe him, as in a doctrine not fit to paſs unoppoſed under the goſpel. Which ſhows the modeſty, the contentedneſs of thoſe foreign paſtors, with the maintenance given them, their ſincerity alſo in the truth, though leſs gainful, and the avarice of ours; who through the love of their old papiſtical tithes, conſider not the weak arguments, or rather conjectures and ſurmiſes, which they bring to defend them. On the other ſide, although it be ſufficient to have proved in general the aboliſhing of tithes, as part of the judaical or ceremonial law, which is aboliſhed all, as well that before, as that after Moſes; yet I ſhall further prove them abrogated by an expreſs ordinance of the goſpel, founded not on any type, or that municipal law of Moſes, but on moral and general equity, given us in ſtead: 1 Cor. ix, 13, 14, "Know ye not, that they who miniſter about holy things, live of the things of the temple; and they which wait at the altar, are partakers with the altar? So alſo the Lord hath ordained, that they who preach the goſpel, ſhould live of the goſpel." He ſaith not, ſhould live on things which were of the temple, or of the altar, of which were tithes, for that had given them a clear title: but abrogating that former law of Moſes, which determined what and how much, by a later ordinance of Chriſt, which leaves the what and how much indefinite and free, ſo it be ſufficient to live on: he ſaith,

"The

"The Lord hath ſo ordained, that they who preach the goſpel, ſhould live of the goſpel;" which hath neither temple, altar, nor ſacrifice: Heb. vii, 13, "For he of whom theſe things are ſpoken, pertaineth to another tribe, of which no man gave attendance at the altar:" his miniſters therefore cannot thence have tithes. And where the Lord hath ſo ordained, we may find eaſily in more than one evangeliſt: Luke x, 7, 8, "In the ſame houſe remain, eating and drinking ſuch things as they give: for the labourer is worthy of his hire, &c. And into whatſoever city you enter, and they receive you, eat ſuch things as are ſet before you." To which ordinance of Chriſt it may ſeem likelieſt, that the apoſtle refers us both here, and 1 Tim. v, 18, where he cites this as the ſaying of our Saviour, "That the labourer is worthy of his hire." And both by this place of Luke, and that of Mat. x, 9, 10, 11, it evidently appears, that our Saviour ordained no certain maintenance for his apoſtles or miniſters, publicly or privately, in houſe or city received; but that, whatever it were, which might ſuffice to live on: and this not commanded or proportioned by Abraham or by Moſes, whom he might eaſily have here cited, as his manner was, but declared only by a rule of common equity, which proportions the hire as well to the ability of him who gives, as to the labour of him who receives, and recommends him only as worthy, not inveſts him with a legal right. And mark whereon he grounds this his ordinance; not on a perpetual right of tithes from Melchiſedec, as hirelings pretend, which he never claimed, either for himſelf, or for his miniſters, but on the plain and common equity of rewarding the labourer; worthy ſometimes of ſingle, ſometimes of double honour, not proportionable by tithes. And the apoſtle in this forecited chapter to the Corinthians, ver. 11, affirms it to be no great recompenſe, if carnal things be reaped for ſpiritual ſown; but to mention tithes, neglects here the fitteſt occaſion that could be offered him, and leaves the reſt free and undetermined. Certainly if Chriſt or his apoſtles had approved of tithes, they would have, either by writing or tradition, recommended them to the church; and that

ſoon

ſoon would have appeared in the practice of thoſe primitive and the next ages. But for the firſt three hundred years and more, in all the eccleſiaſtical ſtory, I find no ſuch doctrine or example: though errour by that time had brought back again prieſts, altars, and oblations; and in many other points of religion had miſerably judaized the church. So that the defenders of tithes, after a long pomp, and tedious preparation out of heathen authors, telling us that tithes were paid to Hercules and Apollo, which perhaps was imitated from the Jews, and as it were beſpeaking our expectation, that they will abound much more with authorities out of chriſtian ſtory, have nothing of general approbation to begin with from the firſt three or four ages, but that which abundantly ſerves to the confutation of their tithes; while they confeſs that churchmen in thoſe ages lived merely upon freewill offerings. Neither can they ſay, that tithes were not then paid for want of a civil magiſtrate to ordain them, for chriſtians had then alſo lands, and might give out of them what they pleaſed; and yet of tithes then given we find no mention. And the firſt chriſtian emperors, who did all things as biſhops adviſed them, ſupplied what was wanting to the clergy not out of tithes, which were never motioned, but out of their own imperial revenues; as is manifeſt in Euſebius, Theodoret, and Sozomen, from Conſtantine to Arcadius. Hence thoſe ancienteſt reformed churches of the Waldenſes, if they rather continued not pure ſince the apoſtles, denied that tithes were to be given, or that they were ever given in the primitive church, as appears by an ancient tractate in the Bohemian hiſtory. Thus far hath the church been always, whether in her prime or in her ancienteſt reformation, from the approving of tithes: nor without reaſon; for they might eaſily perceive that tithes were fitted to the Jews only, a national church of many incomplete ſynagogues, uniting the accompliſhment of divine worſhip in one temple; and the Levites there had their tithes paid where they did their bodily work; to which a particular tribe was ſet apart by divine appointment, not by the people's election: but the Chriſtian church is univerſal; not tied to nation,

nation, dioceſs, or pariſh, but conſiſting of many particular churches complete in themſelves, gathered not by compulſion, or the accident of dwelling nigh together, but by free conſent, chuſing both their particular church and their church-officers. Whereas if tithes be ſet up, all theſe chriſtian privileges will be diſturbed and ſoon loſt, and with them chriſtian liberty.

The firſt authority which our adverſaries bring, after thoſe fabulous apoſtolic canons, which they dare not inſiſt upon, is a provincial council held at Cullen, where they voted tithes to be God's Rent, in the year 356; at the ſame time perhaps when the three kings reigned there, and of like authority. For to what purpoſe do they bring theſe trivial teſtimonies, by which they might as well prove altars, candles at noon, and the greateſt part of thoſe ſuperſtitions fetched from Paganiſm or Jewiſin, which the papiſt, inveigled by this fond argument of antiquity, retains to this day? To what purpoſe thoſe decrees of I know not what biſhops, to a parliament and people who have thrown out both biſhops and altars, and promiſed all reformation by the word of God? And that altars brought tithes hither, as one corruption begot another, is evident by one of thoſe queſtions, which the monk Auſtin propounded to the pope, "concerning thoſe things, which by Offerings of the faithful came to the Altar;" as Beda writes, l. 1. c. 27. If then by theſe teſtimonies we muſt have tithes continued, we muſt again have altars. Of Fathers, by cuſtom ſo called, they quote Ambroſe, Auguſtin, and ſome other ceremonial doctors of the ſame leaven: whoſe aſſertion, without pertinent ſcripture, no reformed church can admit; and what they vouch is founded on the law of Moſes, with which, every where pitifully miſtaken, they again incorporate the goſpel; as did the reſt alſo of thoſe titular Fathers, perhaps an age or two before them, by many rites and ceremonies, both Jewiſh and Heatheniſh, introduced; whereby thinking to gain all, they loſt all: and inſtead of winning Jews and Pagans to be Chriſtians, by too much condeſcending they turned Chriſtians into Jews and Pagans. To heap ſuch unconvincing citations as theſe in religion, whereof the ſcripture only is our rule,

argues

argues not much learning nor judgment, but the loſt labour of much unprofitable reading. And yet a late hot Queriſt* for tithes, whom ye may know by his wits lying ever beſide him in the margin, to be ever beſide his wits in the text, a fierce reformer once, now rankled with a contrary heat, would ſend us back, very reformedly indeed, to learn reformation from Tyndarus and Rebuffus, two canonical promoters. They produce next the ancient conſtitutions of this land, Saxon laws, edicts of kings, and their councils, from Athelſtan, in the year 928, that tithes by ſtatute were paid: and might produce from Ina, above 200 years before, that Romeſcot or Peter's penny was by as good ſtatute law paid to the pope; from 725, and almoſt as long continued. And who knows not that this law of tithes was enacted by thoſe kings and barons upon the opinion they had of their divine right? as the very words import of Edward the Confeſſor, in the cloſe of that law: "For ſo bleſſed Auſtin preached and taught;" meaning the monk, who firſt brought the Romiſh religion into England from Gregory the pope. And by the way I add, that by theſe laws, imitating the law of Moſes, the third part of tithes only was the prieſt's due; the other two were appointed for the poor, and to adorn or repair churches; as the canons of Ecbert and Elfric witneſs: Concil. Brit. If then theſe laws were founded upon the opinion of divine authority, and that authority be found miſtaken and erroneous, as hath been fully manifeſted, it follows, that theſe laws fall of themſelves with their falſe foundation. But with what face or conſcience can they allege Moſes or theſe laws for tithes, as they now enjoy or exact them; whereof Moſes ordains the owner, as we heard before, the ſtranger, the fatherleſs, and the widow, partakers of the Levite; and theſe Fathers which they cite, and theſe though Romiſh rather than Engliſh laws, allotted both to prieſt and biſhop the third part only? But theſe our proteſtant, theſe our new reformed Engliſh preſbyterian divines, againſt their own cited authors, and to the ſhame of their pretended reformation, would engroſs to themſelves all

* Prynne.

tithes

tithes by ſtatute; and ſupported more by their wilful obſtinacy and deſire of filthy lucre, than by theſe both inſufficient, and impertinent authorities, would perſuade a chriſtian magiſtracy and parliament, whom we truſt God hath reſtored for a happier reformation, to impoſe upon us a judaical ceremonial law, and yet from that law to be more irregular and unwarrantable, more complying with a covetous clergy, than any of thoſe Popiſh kings and parliaments alleged. Another ſhift they have to plead, that tithes may be moral as well as the ſabbath, a tenth of fruits as well as a ſeventh of days: I anſwer, that the prelates who urge this argument have leaſt reaſon to uſe it, denying morality in the ſabbath, and therein better agreeing with reformed churches abroad than the reſt of our divines. As therefore the ſeventh day is not moral, but a convenient recourſe of worſhip in fit ſeaſon, whether ſeventh or other number; ſo neither is the tenth of our goods, but only a convenient ſubſiſtence morally due to miniſters. The laſt and loweſt ſort of their arguments, that men purchaſed not their tithe with their land, and ſuch like pettifoggery, I omit; as refuted ſufficiently by others: I omit alſo their violent and irreligious exactions, related no leſs credibly; their ſeizing of pots and pans from the poor, who have as good right to tithes as they; from ſome, the very beds; their ſuing and impriſoning, worſe than when the canon law was in force; worſe than when thoſe wicked ſons of Eli were prieſts, whoſe manner was thus to ſeize their pretended prieſtly due by force; 1 Sam. ii, 12, &c., "Whereby men abhorred the offering of the Lord." And it may be feared, that many will as much abhor the goſpel, if ſuch violence as this be ſuffered in her miniſters, and in that which they alſo pretend to be the offering of the Lord. For thoſe ſons of Belial within ſome limits made ſeizure of what they knew was their own by an undoubted law; but theſe, from whom there is no ſanctuary, ſeize out of men's grounds, out of men's houſes, their other goods of double, ſometimes of treble value, for that which, did not covetouſneſs and rapine blind them, they know to be not their own by the goſpel which they preach. Of ſome more tolerable than theſe, thus

ſeverely

ſeverely God hath ſpoken; Iſa. xlvi, 10, &c., "They are greedy dogs; they all look to their own way, every one for his gain, from his quarter." With what anger then will he judge them who ſtand not looking, but under colour of a divine right, fetch by force that which is not their own, taking his name not in vain, but in violence? Nor content, as Gehazi was, to make a cunning, but a conſtrained advantage of what their maſter bids them give freely, how can they but return ſmitten, worſe than that ſharking miniſter, with a ſpiritual leproſy? And yet they cry out ſacrilege, that men will not be gulled and baffled the tenth of their eſtates, by giving credit to frivolous pretences of divine right. Where did God ever clearly declare to all nations, or in all lands, (and none but fools part with their eſtates, without cleareſt evidence, on bare ſuppoſals and preſumptions of them who are the gainers thereby) that he required the tenth as due to him or his ſon perpetually and in all places? Where did he demand it, that we might certainly know, as in all claims of temporal right is juſt and reaſonable? or if demanded, where did he aſſign it, or by what evident conveyance to miniſters? Unleſs they can demonſtrate this by more than conjectures, their title can be no better to tithes than the title of Gehazi was to thoſe things which by abuſing his maſter's name he rooked from Naaman. Much leſs where did he command that tithes ſhould be fetched by force, where left not under the Goſpel, whatever his right was, to the freewill-offerings of men? Which is the greater ſacrilege, to bely divine authority, to make the name of Chriſt acceſſory to violence, and robbing him of the very honour which he aimed at in beſtowing freely the goſpel, to commit ſimony and rapine, both ſecular and eccleſiaſtical; or on the other ſide, not to give up the tenth of civil right and propriety to the tricks and impoſtures of clergymen, contrived with all the art and argument that their bellies can invent or ſuggeſt; yet ſo ridiculous and preſuming on the people's dulneſs and ſuperſtition, as to think they prove the divine right of their maintenance by Abraham paying tithes to Melchiſedec, whenas Melchiſedec in that paſſage rather gave maintenance to Abraham;

in

in whom all, both prieſts and miniſters as well as laymen, paid tithes, not received them. And becauſe I affirmed above, beginning this firſt part of my diſcourſe, that God hath given to miniſters of the goſpel that maintenance only which is juſtly given them, let us ſee a little what hath been thought of that other maintenance beſides tithes, which of all proteſtants our Engliſh divines either only or moſt apparently both require and take. Thoſe are fees for chriſtenings, marriages, and burials: which, though whoſo will may give freely, yet being not of right, but of free gift, if they be exacted or eſtabliſhed, they become unjuſt to them who are otherwiſe maintained; and of ſuch evil note, that even the council of Trent, l. ii, p. 240, makes them liable to the laws againſt simony, who take or demand fees for the adminiſtring of any ſacrament: "Che la ſinodo volendo levare gli abuſi introdotti, &c." And in the next page, with like severity, condemns the giving or taking for a benefice, and the celebrating of marriages, chriſtenings, and burials, for fees exacted or demanded: nor counts it leſs simony to ſell the ground or place of burial. And in a late assembly at Orleans, 1561, it was decreed, "Che non ſi poteſſe eſſiger coſa alcuna, &c., p. 429, That nothing ſhould be exacted for the adminiſtring of ſacraments, burials, or any other ſpiritual function." Thus much that council, of all others the moſt Popiſh, and this aſſembly of Papiſts, though, by their own principles, in bondage to the clergy, were induced, either by their own reaſon and ſhame, or by the light of reformation then shining in upon them, or rather by the known canons of many councils and ſynods long before, to condemn of ſimony ſpiritual fees demanded. For if the miniſter be maintained for his whole miniſtry, why ſhould he be twice paid for any part thereof? Why ſhould he, like a ſervant, ſeek vails over and above his wages? As for chriſtenings, either they themſelves call men to baptiſm, or men of themſelves come: if miniſters invite, how ill had it become John the baptiſt to demand fees for his baptizing, or Chriſt for his chriſtenings? Far leſs becomes it theſe now, with a greedineſs lower than that of tradeſmen calling paſſengers to their ſhop, and yet paid be-

forehand, to aſk again for doing that which thoſe their founders did freely. If men of themſelves come to be baptized, they are either brought by ſuch as already pay the miniſter, or come to be one of his diſciples and maintainers: of whom to aſk a fee as it were for entrance is a piece of paltry craft or caution, befitting none but beggarly artiſts. Burials and marriages are ſo little to be any part of their gain, that they who conſider well may find them to be no part of their function. At burials their attendance they allege on the corpſe; all the gueſts do as much unhired. But their prayers at the grave; ſuperſtitiouſly required: yet if required, their laſt performance to the deceaſed of their own flock. But the funeral ſermon; at their choice, or if not, an occaſion offered them to preach out of ſeaſon, which is one part of their office. But ſomething muſt be ſpoken in praiſe; if due, their duty; if undue, their corruption: a peculiar ſimony of our divines in England only. But the ground is broken, and eſpecially their unrighteous poſſeſſion, the chancel. To ſell that, will not only riſe up in judgment the council of Trent againſt them, but will loſe them the beſt champion of tithes, their zealous antiquary, ſir Henry Spelman; who in a book written to that purpoſe, by many cited canons, and ſome even of times corrupteſt in the church, proves that fees exacted or demanded for ſacraments, marriages, burials, and eſpecially for interring, are wicked, accurſed, ſimoniacal, and abominable: yet thus is the church, for all this noiſe of reformation, left ſtill unreformed, by the cenſure of their own ſynods, their own favourers, a den of thieves and robbers. As for marriages, that miniſters ſhould meddle with them, as not ſanctified or legitimate without their celebration, I find no ground in ſcripture either of precept or example. Likelieſt it is (which our Selden hath well obſerved, l. 2, c. 28, Ux. Eb.) that in imitation of heathen prieſts, who were wont at nuptials to uſe many rites and ceremonies, and eſpecially, judging it would be profitable, and the increaſe of their authority, not to be ſpectators only in buſineſs of ſuch concernment to the life of man, they inſinuated that marriage was not holy without their benediction, and for the better

tter colour, made it a ſacrament; being of itſelf a civil dinance, a houſehold contract, a thing indifferent and :e to the whole race of mankind, not as religious, but men: beſt, indeed, undertaken to religious ends, and the apoſtle ſaith, 1 Cor. vii, "in the Lord." Yet t therefore invalid or unholy without a miniſter and pretended neceſſary hallowing, more than any other t, enterpriſe, or contract of civil life, which ought all be done alſo in the Lord and to his glory: all which, leſs than marriage, were by the cunning of prieſts retofore, as material to their profit, tranſacted at the ar. Our divines deny it to be a ſacrament; yet re-ned the celebration, till prudently a late parliament :overed the civil liberty of marriage from their en-)achment, and transferred the ratifying and re-tering thereof from the canonical ſhop to the pro- cognizance of civil magiſtrates. Seeing then, it God hath given to miniſters under the goſpel it only which is juſtly given them, that is to ſay, a e and moderate livelihood, the hire of their labour, l that the heave offering of tithes is aboliſhed with altar; yea, though not aboliſhed, yet lawleſs, as they oy them; their Melchiſedechian right alſo trivial l groundleſs, and both tithes and fees, if exacted or abliſhed, unjuſt and ſcandalous; we may hope, with m removed, to remove hirelings in ſome good mea-e, whom theſe tempting baits, by law eſpecially to be overed, allure into the church.

The next thing to be conſidered in the maintenance miniſters, is by whom it ſhould be given. Wherein ugh the light of reaſon might ſufficiently inform us, vill be beſt to conſult the ſcripture: Gal. vi, 6, "Let 1 that is taught in the word, communicate to him t teacheth, in all good things;" that is to ſay, in all nner of gratitude, to his ability. 1 Cor. ix, 11, "If have ſown unto you ſpiritual things, is it a great tter if we reap your carnal things?" To whom refore hath not been ſown, from him wherefore uld be reaped? 1 Tim. v, 17, "Let the elders that e well, be counted worthy of double honour; eſpe-lly they who labour in word and doctrine." By ſe places we ſee, that recompenſe was given either by

every one in particular who had been inſtructed, or by them all in common, brought into the church-treaſury, and diſtributed to the miniſters according to their ſeveral labours: and that was judged either by ſome extraordinary perſon, as Timothy, who by the apoſtle was then left evangeliſt at Epheſus, 2 Tim. iv, 5, or by ſome to whom the church deputed that care. This is ſo agreeable to reaſon, and ſo clear, that any one may perceive what iniquity and violence hath prevailed ſince in the church, whereby it hath been ſo ordered, that they alſo ſhall be compelled to recompenſe the parochial miniſter, who neither choſe him for their teacher, nor have received inſtruction from him, as being either inſufficient, or not reſident, or inferiour to whom they follow; wherein to bar them their choice, is to violate chriſtian liberty. Our law books teſtify, that before the council of Lateran, in the year 1179, and the fifth of our Henry II, or rather before a decretal Epiſtle of pope Innocent the IIId, about 1200, and the firſt of king John, "any Man might have given his tithes to what ſpiritual perſon he would:" and as the lord Coke notes on that place, Inſtit. part 2, that "this decretal bound not the ſubjects of this realm, but as it ſeemed juſt and reaſonable." The pope took his reaſon rightly from the above-cited place, 1 Cor. ix, 11, but falſely ſuppoſed every one to be inſtructed by his pariſh prieſt. Whether this were then firſt ſo decreed, or rather long before, as may ſeem by the laws of Edgar and Canute, that tithes were to be paid, not to whom he would that paid them, but to the cathedral church or the pariſh prieſt, it imports not; ſince the reaſon which they themſelves bring, built on falſe ſuppoſition, becomes alike infirm and abſurd, that he ſhould reap from me, who ſow not to me; be the cauſe either his defect, or my free choice. But here it will be readily objected, What if they who are to be inſtructed be not able to maintain a miniſter, as in many villages? I anſwer, that the ſcripture ſhows in many places what ought to be done herein. Firſt I offer it to the reaſon of any man, whether he think the knowledge of Chriſtian religion harder than any other art or ſcience to attain. I ſuppoſe he will grant that it is far eaſier, both of itſelf, and in regard of God's aſſiſting

assisting spirit, not particularly promised us to the attainment of any other knowledge, but of this only: since it was preached as well to the shepherds of Bethlehem by angels, as to the eastern wisemen by that star: and our Saviour declares himself anointed to preach the gospel to the poor, Luke iv, 18; then surely to their capacity. They who after him first taught it, were otherwise unlearned men: they who before Hus and Luther first reformed it, were for the meanness of their condition called, "the poor men of Lions:" and in Flanders at this day, "le Gueus," which is to say, Beggars. Therefore are the scriptures translated into every vulgar tongue, as being held in main matters of belief and salvation, plain and easy to the poorest: and such no less than their teachers have the spirit to guide them in all truth, John xiv, 26, and xvi, 13. Hence we may conclude, if men be not all their lifetime under a teacher to learn logic, natural philosophy, ethics or mathematics, which are more difficult, that certainly it is not necessary to the attainment of christian knowledge, that men should sit all their life long at the feet of a pulpited divine; while he, a lollard indeed over his elbow cushion, in almost the seventh part of forty or fifty years teaches them scarce half the principles of religion; and his sheep ofttimes sit the while to as little purpose of benefitting, as the sheep in their pews at Smithfield; and for the most part by some simony or other bought and sold like them: or if this comparison be too low, like those women, 1 Tim. iii, 7, "Ever learning and never attaining;" yet not so much through their own fault, as through the unskilful and immethodical teaching of their pastor, teaching here and there at random out of this or that text, as his ease or fancy, and ofttimes as his stealth guides him. Seeing then that christian religion may be so easily attained, and by meanest capacities, it cannot be much difficult to find ways, both how the poor, yea all men may be soon taught what is to be known of Christianity, and they who teach them, recompensed. First, if ministers of their own accord, who pretend that they are called and sent to preach the gospel, those especially who have no

particular flock, would imitate our Saviour and his diſciples, who went preaching through the villages, not only through the cities, Matth. ix, 35, Mark vi, 6, Luke xiii, 22, Acts viii, 25, and there preached to the poor as well as to the rich, looking for no recompenſe but in Heaven: John iv, 35, 36, "Look on the fields, for they are white already to harveſt: and he that reapeth, receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal." This was their wages. But they will ſoon reply, we ourſelves have not wherewithal; who ſhall bear the charges of our journey? To whom it may as ſoon be anſwered, that in likelihood they are not poorer, than they who did thus; and if they have not the ſame faith, which thoſe diſciples had to truſt in God and the promiſe of Chriſt for their maintenance as they did, and yet intrude into the miniſtry without any livelihood of their own, they caſt themſelves into miſerable hazard or temptation, and ofttimes into a more miſerable neceſſity, either to ſtarve, or to pleaſe their paymaſters rather than God; and give men juſt cauſe to ſuſpect, that they came neither called nor ſent from above to preach the word, but from below, by the inſtinct of their own hunger, to feed upon the church. Yet grant it needful to allow them both the charges of their journey and the hire of their labour, it will belong next to the charity of richer congregations, where moſt commonly they abound with teachers, to ſend ſome of their number to the villages round, as the apoſtles from Jeruſalem ſent Peter and John to the city and villages of Samaria, Acts viii, 14, 25; or as the church at Jeruſalem ſent Barnabas to Antioch, chap. xi, 22, and other churches joining ſent Luke to travel with Paul, 2 Cor. viii, 19; though whether they had their charges borne by the church or no, it be not recorded. If it be objected, that this itinerary preaching will not ſerve to plant the goſpel in their places, unleſs they who are ſent abide there ſome competent time; I anſwer, that if they ſtay there a year or two, which was the longeſt time uſually ſtaid by the apoſtles in one place, it may ſuffice to teach them, who will attend and learn, all the points of religion neceſſary to ſalvation; then ſorting them into ſeveral congrega-

tions of a moderate number, out of the ableſt and zealouſeſt among them to create elders, who, exerciſing and requiring from themſelves what they have learned (for no learning is retained without conſtant exerciſe and methodical repetition) may teach and govern the reſt: and ſo exhorted to continue faithful and ſtedfaſt, they may ſecurely be committed to the providence of God and the guidance of his holy ſpirit, till God may offer ſome opportunity to viſit them again, and to confirm them: which when they have done, they have done as much as the apoſtles were wont to do in propagating the goſpel, Acts xiv, 23, "And when they had ordained them elders in every church, and had prayed with faſting, they commended them to the Lord, on whom they believed." And in the ſame chapter, ver. 21, 22, "When they had preached the goſpel to that city, and had taught many, they returned again to Lyſtra, and to Iconium and Antioch, confirming the ſouls of the diſciples, and exhorting them to continue in the faith." And chap. xv, 36, "Let us go again, and viſit our brethren." And ver. 41, "He went through Syria and Cilicia, confirming the churches." To theſe I might add other helps, which we enjoy now, to make more eaſy the attainment of chriſtian religion by the meaneſt: the entire ſcripture tranſlated into Engliſh with plenty of notes; and ſomewhere or other, I truſt, may be found ſome wholeſome body of divinity, as they call it, without ſchoolterms and metaphyſical notions, which have obſcured rather than explained our religion, and made it ſeem difficult without cauſe. Thus taught once for all, and thus now and then viſited and confirmed, in the moſt deſtitute and pooreſt places of the land, under the government of their own elders performing all miniſterial offices among them, they may be truſted to meet and edify one another whether in church or chapel, or, to ſave them the trudging of many miles thither, nearer home, though in a houſe or barn. For notwithſtanding the gaudy ſuperſtition of ſome devoted ſtill ignorantly to temples, we may be well aſſured, that he who diſdained not to be laid in a manger, diſdains not to be preached in a barn; and that by ſuch meet-

ings as theſe, being indeed moſt apoſtolical and primitive, they will in a ſhort time advance more in chriſtian knowledge and reformation of life, than by the many years preaching of ſuch an incumbent, I may ſay, ſuch an Incubus oftimes, as will be meanly hired to abide long in thoſe places. They have this left perhaps to object further; that to ſend thus, and to maintain, though but for a year or two, miniſters and teachers in ſeveral places, would prove chargeable to the churches, though in towns and cities round about. To whom again I anſwer, that it was not thought ſo by them who firſt thus propagated the goſpel, though but few in number to us, and much leſs able to ſuſtain the expenſe. Yet this expenſe would be much leſs than to hire incumbents, or rather incumbrances, for lifetime; and a great means (which is the ſubject of this diſcourſe) to diminiſh hirelings. But be the expenſe leſs or more, if it be found burdenſome to the churches, they have in this land an eaſy remedy in their recourſe to the civil magiſtrate; who hath in his hands the diſpoſal of no ſmall revenues, left perhaps anciently to ſuperſtitious, but meant undoubtedly to good and beſt uſes; and therefore, once made public, appliable by the preſent magiſtrate to ſuch uſes as the church, or ſolid reaſon from whomſoever, ſhall convince him to think beſt. And thoſe uſes may be, no doubt, much rather than as glebes and augmentations are now beſtowed, to grant ſuch requeſts as theſe of the churches; or to erect in greater number, all over the land, ſchools, and competent libraries to thoſe ſchools, where languages and arts may be taught free together, without the needleſs, unprofitable, and inconvenient removing to another place. So all the land would be ſoon better civilized, and they who are taught freely at the public coſt might have their education given them on this condition, that therewith content, they ſhould not gad for preferment out of their own country, but continue there thankful for what they received freely, beſtowing it as freely on their country, without ſoaring above the meanneſs wherein they were born. But how they ſhall live when they are thus bred and diſmiſſed, will be ſtill the ſluggiſh objection. To

which

which is anſwered, that thoſe public foundations may be ſo inſtituted, as the youth therein may be at once brought up to a competence of learning and to an honeſt trade; and the hours of teaching ſo ordered, as their ſtudy may be no hindrance to their labour or other calling. This was the breeding of St. Paul, though born of no mean parents, a free citizen of the Roman empire: ſo little did his trade debaſe him, that it rather enabled him to uſe that magnanimity of preaching the goſpel through Aſia and Europe at his own charges. Thus thoſe preachers among the poor Waldenſes, the ancient ſtock of our reformation, without theſe helps which I ſpeak of, bred up themſelves in trades, and eſpecially in phyſic and ſurgery, as well as in the ſtudy of ſcripture, (which is the only true theology) that they might be no burden to the church; and by the example of Chriſt, might cure both ſoul and body; through induſtry joining that to their miniſtry, which he joined to his by gift of the ſpirit. Thus relates Peter Gilles in his hiſtory of the Waldenſes in Piemont. But our miniſters think ſcorn to uſe a trade, and count it the reproach of this age, that tradeſmen preach the goſpel. It were to be wiſhed they were all tradeſmen; they would not then ſo many of them, for want of another trade, make a trade of their preaching: and yet they clamour that tradeſmen preach; and yet they preach, while they themſelves are the worſt tradeſmen of all. As for church-endowments and poſſeſſions, I meet with none conſiderable before Conſtantine, but the houſes and gardens where they met, and their places of burial; and I perſuade me, that from them the ancient Waldenſes, whom deſervedly I cite ſo often, held, "That to endow churches is an evil thing; and, that the church then fell off and turned whore, ſitting on that beaſt in the Revelation, when under pope Sylveſter ſhe received thoſe temporal donations. So the forecited tractate of their doctrine teſtifies. This alſo their own traditions of that heavenly voice witneſſed, and ſome of the ancient fathers then living foretaw and deplored. And indeed, how could theſe endowments thrive better with the church, being unjuſtly taken by thoſe emperors, without ſuffrage of the people, out of the tributes and public

public lands of each city, whereby the people became liable to be oppreſſed with other taxes. Being therefore given for the moſt part by kings and other public perſons, and ſo likelieſt out of the public, and if without the people's conſent, unjuſtly, however to public ends of much concernment, to the good or evil of a commonwealth, and in that regard made public though given by private perſons, or which is worſe, given, as the clergy then perſuaded men, for their ſouls health, a pious gift; but as the truth was, ofttimes a bribe to God, or to Chriſt for abſolution, as they were then taught, from murders, adulteries, and other heinous crimes; what ſhall be found heretofore given by kings or princes out of the public, may juſtly by the magiſtrate be recalled and reappropriated to the civil revenue: what by private or public perſons out of their own, the price of blood or luſt, or to ſome ſuch purgatorious and ſuperſtitious uſes, not only may, but ought to be taken off from Chriſt, as a foul diſhonour laid upon him, or not impiouſly given, nor in particular to any one, but in general to the church's good, may be converted to that uſe, which ſhall be judged tending more directly to that general end. Thus did the princes and cities of Germany in the firſt reformation; and defended their ſo doing by many reaſons, which are ſet down at large in Sleidan, Lib. 6, Anno 1526, and Lib. 11, Anno 1537, and Lib. 13, Anno 1540. But that the magiſtrate either out of that church-revenue which remains yet in his hand, or eſtabliſhing any other maintenance inſtead of tithe, ſhould take into his own power the ſtipendiary maintenance of church-miniſters, or compel it by law, can ſtand neither with the people's right, nor with chriſtian liberty, but would ſuſpend the church wholly upon the ſtate, and turn her miniſters into ſtate-penſioners. And for the magiſtrate in perſon of a nurſing father to make the church his mere ward, as always in minority, the church, to whom he ought as a magiſtrate, Iſa. xlix, 23, "to bow down with his face toward the earth, and lick up the duſt of he feet;" her to ſubject to his political drifts or conceived opinions, by maſtering her revenue; and ſo by his examinant committees to circumſcribe her free elec-

tion

tion of miniſters, is neither juſt nor pious; no honour done to the church, but a plain diſhonour: and upon her whoſe only head is in Heaven, yea upon him, who is only head, ſets another in effect, and which is moſt monſtrous, a human on a heavenly, a carnal on a ſpiritual, a political head on an eccleſiaſtical body; which at length by ſuch heterogeneal, ſuch inceſtuous conjunction, transforms her oftimes into a beaſt of many heads and many horns. For if the church be of all ſocieties the holieſt on earth, and ſo to be reverenced by the magiſtrate; not to truſt her with her own belief and integrity, and therefore not with the keeping, at leaſt with the diſpoſing of what revenue ſhall be found juſtly and lawfully her own, is to count the church not a holy congregation, but a pack of giddy or diſhoneſt perſons, to be ruled by civil power in ſacred affairs. But to proceed further in the truth yet more freely, ſeeing the chriſtian church is not national, but conſiſting of many particular congregations, ſubject to many changes, as well through civil accidents, as through ſchiſm and various opinions, not to be decided by any outward judge, being matters of conſcience, whereby theſe pretended church-revenues, as they have been ever, ſo are like to continue endleſs matter of diſſenſion both between the church and magiſtrate, and the churches among themſelves, there will be found no better remedy to theſe evils, otherwiſe incurable, than by the incorrupteſt council of thoſe Waldenſes, or firſt reformers, to remove them as a peſt, an apple of diſcord in the church, (for what elſe can be the effect of riches, and the ſnare of money in religion?) and to convert them to thoſe more profitable uſes above expreſſed, or other ſuch as ſhall be judged moſt neceſſary; conſidering that the church of Chriſt was founded in poverty rather than in revenues, ſtood pureſt and proſpered beſt without them, received them unlawfully from them who both erroneouſly and unjuſtly, ſometimes impiouſly, gave them, and ſo juſtly was enſnared and corrupted by them. And leſt it be thought, that, theſe revenues withdrawn and better employed, the magiſtrate ought inſtead to ſettle by ſtatute ſome maintenance of miniſters,

niſters, let this be conſidered firſt, that it concerns every man's conſcience to what religion he contributes; and that the civil magiſtrate is intruſted with civil rights only, not with conſcience, which can have no deputy or repreſenter of itſelf, but one of the ſame mind: next, that what each man gives to the miniſter, he gives either as to God, or as to his teacher; if as to God, no civil power can juſtly conſecrate to religious uſes any part either of civil revenue, which is the people's, and muſt ſave them from other taxes, or of any man's propriety, but God by ſpecial command, as he did by Moſes, or the owner himſelf by voluntary intention and the perſuaſion of his giving it to God. Forced conſecrations out of another man's eſtate are no better than forced vows, hateful to God, "who loves a cheerful giver;" but much more hateful, wrung out of men's purſes to maintain a diſapproved miniſtry againſt their conſcience; however unholy, infamous, and diſhonourable to his miniſters and the free goſpel, maintained in ſuch unworthy manner as by violence and extortion. If he give it as to his teacher, what juſtice or equity compels him to pay for learning that religion which leaves freely to his choice, whether he will learn it or no, whether of this teacher or another, and eſpecially to pay for what he never learned, or approves not; whereby, beſides the wound of his conſcience, he becomes the leſs able to recompenſe his true teacher? Thus far hath been inquired by whom church-miniſters ought to be maintained, and hath been proved moſt natural, moſt equal and agreeable with ſcripture, to be by them who receive their teaching; and by whom, if they be unable. Which ways well obſerved can diſcourage none but hirelings, and will much leſſen their number in the church.

It remains laſtly to conſider, in what manner God hath ordained that recompenſe be given to miniſters of the goſpel; and by all ſcripture it will appear, that he hath given it them not by civil law and freehold, as they claim, but by the benevolence and free gratitude of ſuch as receive them: Luke x, 7, 8, "Eating and drinking ſuch things as they gave you. If they receive

you,

you, eat ſuch things as are ſet before you." Matth. x, 7, 8, "As ye go, preach, ſaying, the kingdom of God is at hand, &c. Freely ye have received, freely give." If God have ordained miniſters to preach freely, whether they receive recompenſe or not, then certainly he hath forbid both them to compel it, and others to compel it for them. But freely given, he accounts it as given to himſelf: Phil. iv, 16, 17, 18, "Ye ſent once and again to my neceſſity: not becauſe I deſire a gift; but I deſire fruit, that may abound to your account. Having received of Epaphroditus the things which were ſent from you, an odour of ſweet ſmell, a ſacrifice acceptable, well-pleaſing to God:" which cannot be from force or unwillingneſs. The ſame is ſaid of alms, Heb. xiii, 16, "To do good and to communicate, forget not; for with ſuch ſacrifice God is well pleaſed." Whence the primitive church thought it no ſhame to receive all their maintenance as the alms of their auditors. Which they who defend tithes, as if it made for their cauſe, whenas it utterly confutes them, omit not to ſet down at large; proving to our hands out of Origen, Tertullian, Cyprian, and others, that the clergy lived at firſt upon the mere benevolence of their hearers; who gave what they gave, not to the clergy, but to the church; out of which the clergy had their portions given them in baſkets, and where thence called ſportularii, baſket-clerks: that their portion was a very mean allowance, only for a bare livelihood; according to thoſe precepts of our Saviour, Matth. x, 7, &c., the reſt was diſtributed to the poor. They cite alſo out of Proſper, the diſciple of St. Auſtin, that ſuch of the clergy, as had means of their own, might not without ſin partake of church maintenance; not receiving thereby food which they abound with, but feeding on the ſins of other men: that the Holy Ghoſt ſaith of ſuch clergymen, they eat the ſins of my people; and that a council at Antioch, in the year 340, ſuffered not either prieſt or biſhop to live on church-maintenance without neceſſity. Thus far tithers themſelves have contributed to their own confutation, by confeſſing that the church lived primitively on alms. And I add, that about the year 359, Conſtantius the emperor having ſummoned

ſummoned a general council of biſhops to Ariminum, in Italy, and provided for their ſubſiſtence there, the Britiſh and French biſhops judging it not decent to live on the public, choſe rather to be at their own charges. Three only out of Britain conſtrained through want, yet refuſing offered aſſiſtance from the reſt, accepted the emperor's proviſion; judging it more convenient to ſubſiſt by public than by private ſuſtenance. Whence we may conclude, that biſhops then in this iſland had their livelihood only from benevolence; in which regard this relater Sulpitius Severus, a good author of the ſame time, highly praiſes them. And the Waldenſes, our firſt reformers, both from the ſcripture and theſe primitive examples, maintained thoſe among them who bore the office of miniſters by alms only. Take their very words from the hiſtory written of them in French, Part. 3, Lib. 2, Chap. 2, "La nourriture & ce de quoy nous ſommes couverts, &c. Our food and clothing is ſufficiently adminiſtered and given to us by way of gratuity and alms, by the good people whom we teach." If then by alms and benevolence, not by legal force, not by tenure of freehold or copyhold: for alms, though juſt, cannot be compelled; and benevolence forced is malevolence rather, violent and inconſiſtent with the goſpel; and declares him no true miniſter thereof, but a rapacious hireling rather, who by force receiving it, eats the bread of violence and exaction, no holy or juſt livelihood, no not civilly counted honeſt; much leſs beſeeming ſuch a ſpiritual miniſtry. But, ſay they, our maintenance is our due, tithes the right of Chriſt, inſeparable from the prieſt, no where repealed; if then, not otherwiſe to be had, by law to be recovered: for though Paul were pleaſed to forego his due, and not to uſe his power, 1 Cor. ix, 12, yet he had a power, ver. 4, and bound not others. I anſwer firſt, becauſe I ſee them ſtill ſo loth to unlearn their decimal arithmetic, and ſtill graſp their tithes as inſeparable from a prieſt, that miniſters of the goſpel are not prieſts; and therefore ſeparated from tithes by their excluſion, being neither called prieſts in the New Teſtament, nor of any order known in ſcripture: not of Melchiſedec, proper to Chriſt only; not

not of Aaron, as they themſelves will confeſs; and the third prieſthood only remaining, is common to all the faithful. But they are miniſters of our high prieſt.—True, but not of his prieſthood, as the Levites were to Aaron; for he performs that whole office himſelf incommunicably. Yet tithes remain, ſay they, ſtill unreleaſed, the due of Chriſt; and to whom payable, but to his miniſters? I ſay again, that no man can ſo underſtand them, unleſs Chriſt in ſome place or other ſo claim them. That example of Abraham argues nothing but his voluntary act; honour once only done, but on what conſideration, whether to a prieſt or to a king, whether due the honour, arbitrary that kind of honour or not, will after all contending be left ſtill in mere conjecture: which muſt not be permitted in the claim of ſuch a needy and ſubtle ſpiritual corporation, pretending by divine right to the tenth of all other men's eſtates; nor can it be allowed by wiſe men or the verdict of common law. And the tenth part, though once declared holy, is declared now to be no holier than the other nine, by that command to Peter, Acts x, 15, 28, whereby all diſtinction of holy and unholy is removed from all things. Tithes therefore, though claimed, and holy under the law, yet are now releaſed and quitted both by that command to Peter, and by this to all miniſters, above-cited Luke x, "eating and drinking ſuch things as they give you:" made holy now by their free gift only. And therefore St. Paul, 1 Cor. ix, 4, aſſerts his power indeed; but of what? not of tithes, but, "to eat and drink ſuch things as are given" in reference to this command; which he calls not holy things, or things of the goſpel, as if the goſpel had any conſecrated things in anſwer to things of the temple, ver. 13, but he calls them "your carnal things," ver. 11, without changing their property. And what power had he? Not the power of force, but of conſcience only, whereby he might lawfully and without ſcruple live on the goſpel; receiving what was given him, as the recompenſe of his labour. For if Chriſt the maſter hath profeſſed his kingdom to be not of this world, it ſuits not with that profeſſion, either in him or his miniſters, to claim temporal

right from ſpiritual reſpects. He who refuſed to be the divider of an inheritance between two brethren, cannot approve his miniſters, by pretended right from him, to be dividers of tenths and freeholds out of other men's poſſeſſions, making thereby the goſpel but a cloak of carnal intereſt, and to the contradiction of their maſter, turning his heavenly kingdom into a kingdom of this world, a kingdom of force and rapine: to whom it will be one day thundered more terribly than to Gehazi, for thus diſhonouring a far greater maſter and his goſpel; "is this a time to receive money, and to receive garments, and oliveyards, and vineyards, and ſheep and oxen?" The leproſy of Naaman, linked with that apoſtolic curſe of periſhing imprecated on Simon Magus, may be feared will "cleave to ſuch and to their ſeed for ever." So that when all is done, and belly hath uſed in vain all her cunning ſhifts, I doubt not but all true miniſters, conſidering the demonſtration of what hath been here proved, will be wiſe, and think it much more tolerable to hear, that no maintenance of miniſters, whether tithes or any other, can be ſettled by ſtatute, but muſt be given by them who receive inſtruction; and freely given, as God hath ordained. And indeed what can be a more honourable maintenance to them than ſuch, whether alms or willing oblations, as theſe; which being accounted both alike as given to God, the only acceptable ſacrifices now remaining, muſt needs repreſent him who receives them much in the care of God, and nearly related to him, when not by worldly force and conſtraint, but with religious awe and reverence, what is given to God, is given to him; and what to him, accounted as given to God. This would be well enough, ſay they; but how many will ſo give? I anſwer, as many, doubtleſs, as ſhall be well taught, as many as God ſhall ſo move. Why are ye ſo diſtruſtful, both of your own doctrine and of God's promiſes, fulfilled in the experience of thoſe diſciples firſt ſent? Luke xxii, 35, "When I ſent you without purſe, and ſcrip, and ſhoes, lacked ye any thing? And they ſaid, Nothing." How then came ours, or who ſent them thus deſtitute, thus poor and empty both of

purſe

ırſe and faith? Who ſtyle themſelves embaſſadors of
ɛſus Chriſt, and ſeem to be his tithe-gatherers, though
ı office of their own ſetting up to his diſhonour, his
ıacters, his publicans rather, not truſting that he will
aintain them in their embaſſy, unleſs they bind him
ı his promiſe by a ſtatute-law, that we ſhall maintain
ıem. Lay down for ſhame that magnific title, while
ɛ ſeek maintenance from the people: it is not the man-
ɛr of embaſſadors to aſk maintenance of them to whom
ıey are ſent. But he who is Lord of all things, hath
ordained: truſt him then; he doubtleſs will com-
ıand the people to make good his promiſes of main-
nance more honourably unaſked, unraked for. This
ıey know, this they preach, yet believe not: but think
as impoſſible, without a ſtatute-law, to live of the
ɔſpel, as if by thoſe words they were bid go eat their
ibles, as Ezekiel and John did their books; and ſuch
ɔctrines as theſe are as bitter to their bellies; but will
rve ſo much the better to diſcover hirelings, who can
ave nothing, though but in appearance, juſt and ſolid
ı anſwer for themſelves againſt what hath been here
ɔoken, unleſs perhaps this one remaining pretence,
hich we ſhall quickly ſee to be either falſe or uninge-
uous.

They pretend that their education, either at ſchool or
niverſity, hath been very chargeable, and therefore
ught to be repaired in future by a plentiful mainte-
ance: whenas it is well known, that the better half of
ıem, (and ofttimes poor and pitiful boys, of no merit
r promiſing hopes that might entitle them to the pub-
c proviſion, but their poverty and the unjuſt favour
f friends,) have had the moſt of their breeding, both at
hool and univerſity, by ſcholarſhips, exhibitions, and
llowſhips at the public coſt, which might engage them
ıe rather to give freely, as they have freely received.
ɔr if they have miſſed of theſe helps at the latter place,
ıey have after two or three years left the courſe of
ıeir ſtudies there, if they ever well began them, and
ndertaken, though furniſhed with little elſe but igno-
ance, boldneſs, and ambition, if with no worſe vices,
chaplainſhip in ſome gentleman's houſe, to the fre-

quent embaſing of his ſons with illiterate and narrow principles. Or if they have lived there upon their own, who knows not that ſeven years charge of living there, to them who fly not from the government of their parents to the licence of a univerſity, but come ſeriouſly to ſtudy, is no more than may be well defrayed and reimburſed by one year's revenue of an ordinary good benefice? If they had then means of breeding from their parents, it is likely they have more now; and if they have, it needs muſt be mechanic and uningenuous in them, to bring a bill of charges for the learning of thoſe liberal arts and ſciences, which they have learned (if they have indeed learned them, as they ſeldom have) to their own benefit and accompliſhment. But they will ſay, we had betaken us to ſome other trade or profeſſion, had we not expected to find a better livelihood by the miniſtry. This is that which I looked for, to diſcover them openly neither true lovers of learning, and ſo very ſeldom guilty of it, nor true miniſters of the goſpel. So long ago out of date is that old true ſaying, 1 Tim. iii, 1, "If a man deſire a biſhopric, he deſires a good work:" for now commonly he who deſires to be a miniſter, looks not at the work, but at the wages; and by that lure or lowbell, may be tolled from pariſh to pariſh all the town over. But what can be plainer ſimony, than thus to be at charges beforehand, to no other end than to make their miniſtry doubly or trebly beneficial? To whom it might be ſaid, as juſtly as to that Simon, "Thy money periſh with thee, becauſe thou haſt thought, that the gift of God may be purchaſed with money; thou haſt neither part nor lot in this matter." Next, it is a fond errour, though too much believed among us, to think that the univerſity makes a miniſter of the goſpel; what it may conduce to other arts and ſciences, I diſpute not now: but that which makes fit a miniſter, the ſcripture can beſt informa us to be only from above, whence alſo we are bid to ſeek them; Mat. ix, 38, "Pray ye therefore to the Lord of the harveſt, that he will ſend forth labourers into his harveſt." Acts, xx, 28, "The flock, over which the Holy Ghoſt hath made you overſeers." Rom. x, 15

"How ſhall they preach, unleſs they be ſent?" By whom ſent? by the univerſity, or the magiſtrate, or their belly? No ſurely, but ſent from God only, and that God who is not their belly. And whether he be ſent from God, or from Simon Magus, the inward ſenſe of his calling and ſpiritual ability will ſufficiently tell him; and that ſtrong obligation felt within him, which was felt by the apoſtle, will often expreſs from him the ſame words: 1 Cor. ix, 16, "Neceſſity is laid upon me, yea, Woe is me if I preach not the goſpel." Not a beggarly neceſſity, and the Woe feared otherwiſe of perpetual want, but ſuch a neceſſity as made him willing to preach the goſpel gratis, and to embrace poverty, rather than as a woe to fear it. 1 Cor. xii, 28, "God hath ſet ſome in the church, firſt apoſtles, &c." Epheſ. iv, 11, &c., "He gave ſome apoſtles, &c. For the perfecting of the ſaints, for the work of the miniſtry, for the edifying of the body of Chriſt, till we all come to the unity of the faith." Whereby we may know, that as he made them at the firſt, ſo he makes them ſtill, and to the world's end. 2 Cor. iii, 6, "Who hath alſo made us fit or able miniſters of the New Teſtament." 1 Tim. iv, 14, "The gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, and the laying on of the hands of the preſbytery." Theſe are all the means, which we read of, required in ſcripture to the making of a miniſter. All this is granted, you will ſay; but yet that it is alſo requiſite he ſhould be trained in other learning; which can be no where better had than at univerſities. I anſwer, that what learning, either human or divine, can be neceſſary to a miniſter, may as eaſily and leſs chargeably be had in any private houſe. How deficient elſe, and to how little purpoſe are all thoſe piles of ſermons, notes, and comments on all parts of the Bible, bodies and marrows of divinity, beſides all other ſciences, in our Engliſh tongue; many of the ſame books which in Latin they read at the univerſity? And the ſmall neceſſity of going thither to learn divinity I prove firſt from the moſt part of themſelves, who ſeldom continue there till they have well got through logic, their firſt rudiments; though, to ſay truth, logic alſo may much better be wanting in

diſputes of divinity, that in the ſubtile debates of lawyers, and ſtateſmen, who yet ſeldom or never deal with ſyllogiſms. And thoſe theological diſputations there held by profeſſors and graduates are ſuch, as tend leaſt of all to the edification or capacity of the people, but rather perplex and leaven pure doctrine with ſcholaſtical traſh, than enable any miniſter to the better preaching of the goſpel. Whence we may alſo compute, ſince they come to reckonings, the charges of his needful library: which, though ſome ſhame not to value at 600l., may be competently furniſhed for 60l. If any man for his own curioſity or delight be in books further expenſive, that is not to be reckoned as neceſſary to his miniſterial, either breeding or function. But papiſts and other adverſaries cannot be confuted without fathers and councils, immenſe volumes, and of vaſt charges. I will ſhow them therefore a ſhorter and a better way of confutation: Tit. i, 9, "Holding faſt the faithful word, as he hath been taught, that he may be able by ſound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince gainſayers:" who are confuted as ſoon as heard, bringing that which is either not in ſcripture, or againſt it. To purſue them further through the obſcure and entangled wood of antiquity, fathers and councils fighting one againſt another, is needleſs, endleſs, not requiſite in a miniſter, and refuſed by the firſt reformers of our religion. And yet we may be confident, if theſe things be thought needful, let the ſtate but erect in public good ſtore of libraries, and there will not want men in the church, who of their own inclinations will become able in this kind againſt papiſt or any other adverſary. I have thus at large examined the uſual pretences of hirelings, coloured over moſt commonly with the cauſe of learning and univerſities; as if with divines learning ſtood and fell, wherein for the moſt part their pittance is ſo ſmall: and, to ſpeak freely, it were much better there were not one divine in the univerſities, no ſchool-divinity known, the idle ſophiſtry of monks, the canker of religion; and that they who intended to be miniſters, were trained up in the church only by the ſcripture, and in the original languages thereof at ſchool; without fetching the cou

pel

paſs of other arts and ſciences, more than what they can well learn at ſecondary leiſure, and at home.— Neither ſpeak I this in contempt of learning, or the miniſtry, but hating the common cheats of both; hating that they, who have preached out biſhops, prelates, and canoniſts, ſhould, in what ſerves their own ends, retain their falſe opinions, their Phariſaical leaven, their avarice, and cloſely their ambition, their pluralities, their nonreſidencies, their odious fees, and uſe their legal and popiſh arguments for tithes: that independents ſhould take that name, as they may juſtly from the true freedom of chriſtian doctrine and church-diſcipline ſubject to no ſuperiour judge but God only, and ſeek to be dependents on the magiſtrate for their maintenance; which two things, independence and ſtate-hire in religion, can never conſiſt long or certainly together. For magiſtrates at one time or other, not like theſe at preſent our patrons of chriſtian liberty, will pay none but ſuch whom by their committees of examination they find conformable to their intereſts and opinions: and hirelings will ſoon frame themſelves to that intereſt, and thoſe opinions which they ſee beſt pleaſing to their paymaſters; and to ſeem right themſelves, will force others as to the truth. But moſt of all they are to be reviled and ſhamed, who cry out with the diſtinct voice of notorious hirelings; that if ye ſettle not our maintenance by law, farewel the goſpel; than which nothing can be uttered more falſe, more ignominious, and I may ſay, more blaſphemous againſt our Saviour; who hath promiſed without this condition, both his holy ſpirit, and his own preſence with his church to the world's end: nothing more falſe (unleſs with their own mouths they condemn themſelves for the unworthieſt and moſt mercenary of all other miniſters) by the experience of 300 years after Chriſt, and the churches at this day in France, Auſtria, Polonia, and other places, witneſſing the contrary under an adverſe magiſtrate, not a favourable; nothing more ignominious, levelling, or rather undervaluing Chriſt beneath Mahomet. For if it muſt be thus, how can any chriſtian object it to a Turk, that his religion ſtands by force only; and not juſtly

fear from him this reply, yours both by force and money, in the judgment of your own preachers? This is that which makes atheiſts in the land, whom they ſo much complain of: not the want of maintenance, or preachers, as they allege, but the many hirelings and cheaters that have the goſpel in their hands; hands that ſtill crave, and are never ſatisfied. Likely miniſters indeed, to proclaim the faith, or to exhort our truſt in God, when they themſelves will not truſt him to provide for them in the meſſage whereon, they ſay, he ſent them; but threaten, for want of temporal means, to deſert it; calling that want of means, which is nothing elſe but the want of their own faith; and would force us to pay the hire of building our faith to their covetous incredulity. Doubtleſs, if God only be he who gives miniſters to his church till the world's end; and through the whole goſpel never ſent us for miniſters to the ſchools of philoſophy, but rather bids us beware of ſuch "vain deceit," Col. ii, 8, (which the primitive church, after two or three ages not remembering, brought herſelf quickly to confuſion) if all the faithful be now "a holy and a royal prieſthood," 1 Pet. ii, 5, 9, not excluded from the diſpenſation of things holieſt, after free election of the church, and impoſition of hands, there will not want miniſters elected out of all ſorts and orders of men, for the goſpel makes no difference from the magiſtrate himſelf to the meaneſt artificer, if God evidently favour him with ſpiritual gifts, as he can eaſily, and oft hath done, while thoſe bachelor divines and doctors of the tippet have been paſſed by. Heretofore in the firſt evangelic times, (and it were happy for Chriſtendom if it were ſo again) miniſters of the goſpel were by nothing elſe diſtinguiſhed from other chriſtians, but by their ſpiritual knowledge and ſanctity of life, for which the church elected them to be her teachers and overſeers, though not thereby to ſeparate them from whatever calling ſhe then found them following beſides; as the example of St. Paul declares, and the firſt times of chriſtianity. When once they affected to be called a clergy, and became, as it were, a peculiar tribe of Levites, a party, a diſtinct order in the commonwealth,

bred

bred up for divines in babbling ſchools, and fed at the public coſt, good for nothing elſe but what was good for nothing, they ſoon grew idle: that idleneſs, with fulneſs of bread, begat pride and perpetual contention with their feeders the deſpiſed laity, through all ages ever ſince; to the perverting of religion, and the diſturbance of all Chriſtendom. And we may confidently conclude, it never will be otherwiſe while they are thus upheld undepending on the church, on which alone they anciently depended, and are by the magiſtrate publicly maintained a numerous faction of indigent perſons, crept for the moſt part out of extreme want and bad nurture, claiming by divine right and freehold the tenth of our eſtates, to monopolize the miniſtry as their peculiar, which is free and open to all able chriſtians, elected by any church. Under this pretence exempt from all other employment, and enriching themſelves on the public, they laſt of all prove common incendiaries, and exalt their horns againſt the magiſtrate himſelf that maintains them, as the prieſt of Rome did ſoon after againſt his benefactor the emperor, and the preſbyters of late in Scotland. Of which hireling crew, together with all the miſchiefs, diſſenſions, troubles, wars merely of their kindling, Chriſtendom might ſoon rid herſelf and be happy, if chriſtians would but know their own dignity, their liberty, their adoption, and let it not be wondered if I ſay, their ſpiritual prieſthood, whereby they have all equally acceſs to any miniſterial function, whenever called by their own abilities, and the church, though they never came near commencement or univerſity. But while proteſtants, to avoid the due labour of underſtanding their own religion, are content to lodge it in the breaſt, or rather in the books of a clergyman, and to take it thence by ſcraps and mammocks, as he diſpenſes it in his Sunday's dole; they will be always learning and never knowing; always infants; always either his vaſſals, as lay papiſts are to their prieſts; or at odds with him, as reformed principles give them ſome light to be not wholly conformable; whence infinite diſturbances in the ſtate, as they do, muſt needs follow. Thus much I had to ſay; and, I ſuppoſe, what may be enough to them

who are not avariciouſly bent otherwiſe, touching the likelieſt means to remove hirelings out of the church; than which nothing can more conduce to truth, to peace and all happineſs both in church and ſtate. If I be not heard nor believed, the event will bear me witneſs to have ſpoken truth; and I, in the mean while, have borne my witneſs, not out of ſeaſon, to the church and to my country.

A

LETTER TO A FRIEND,

CONCERNING

The RUPTURES of the COMMONWEALTH.

Publiſhed from the Manuſcript.

SIR,

UPON the ſad and ſerious diſcourſe which we fell into laſt night, concerning theſe dangerous ruptures of the Commonwealth, ſcarce yet in her infancy, which cannot be without ſome inward flaw in her bowels; I began to conſider more intenſely thereon than hitherto I have been wont, reſigning myſelf to the wiſdom and care of thoſe who had the government; and not finding that either God, or the public required more of me, than my prayers for them that govern. And ſince you have not only ſtirred up my thoughts, by acquainting me with the ſtate of affairs, more inwardly than I knew before; but alſo have deſired me to ſet down my opinion thereof, truſting to your ingenuity, I ſhall give you freely my apprehenſion, both of our preſent evils, and what expedients, if God in mercy regard us, may remove them. I will begin with telling you how I was overjoyed, when I heard that the army, under the working of God's holy ſpirit, as I thought, and ſtill hope well, had been ſo far wrought to chriſtian humility, and ſelf-denial, as to confeſs in public their backſliding from the good old cauſe, and to ſhow the fruits of their repentance, in the righteouſneſs of their reſtoring the old famous parliament, which they had without juſt authority diſſolved: I call it the famous parliament, though not the harmleſs, ſince none well-affected, but will confeſs, they have deſerved much more of theſe nations, than they have undeſerved. And I perſuade me, that God was pleaſed with their reſtitution, ſigning it, as he did, with ſuch a ſignal

ſignal victory, when ſo great a part of the nation were deſperately conſpired to call back again their Egyptian bondage. So much the more it now amazes me, that they, whoſe lips were yet ſcarce cloſed from giving thanks for that great deliverance, ſhould be now relapſing, and ſo ſoon again backſliding into the ſame fault, which they confeſſed ſo lately, and ſo ſolemnly to God and the world, and more lately puniſhed in thoſe Cheſhire rebels; that they ſhould now diſſolve that parliament, which they themſelves re-eſtabliſhed, and acknowledged for their ſupreme power in their other day's humble repreſentation: and all this, for no apparent cauſe of public concernment to the church or commonwealth, but only for diſcommiſſioning nine great officers in the army; which had not been done, as is reported, but upon notice of their intentions againſt the parliament. I preſume not to give my cenſure on this action, not knowing, as yet I do not, the bottom of it. I ſpeak only what it appears to us without doors, till better cauſe be declared, and I am ſure to all other nations moſt illegal and ſcandalous, I fear me barbarous, or rather ſcarce to be exampled among any barbarians, that a paid army ſhould, for no other cauſe, thus ſubdue the ſupreme power that ſet them up. This, I ſay, other nations will judge to the laſt diſhonour of that army, lately ſo renowned for the civileſt and beſt ordered in the world, and by us here at home, for the moſt conſcientious. Certainly, if the great officers and ſoldiers of the Holland, French, or Venetian forces, ſhould thus ſit in council, and write from garriſon to garriſon againſt their ſuperiours, they might as eaſily reduce the king of France, or duke of Venice, and put the United Provinces in like diſorder and confuſion. Why do they not, being moſt of them held ignorant of true religion? becauſe the light of nature, the laws of human ſociety, the reverence of their magiſtrates, covenants, engagements, loyalty, allegiance, keeps them in awe. How grievous will it then be? how infamous to the true religion which we profeſs? how diſhonourable to the name of God, that his fear and the power of his knowledge in an army profeſſing to be his, ſhould not work that obedience, that fidelity to their ſupreme magiſtrates,

giſtrates, that levied them and paid them; when the light of nature, the laws of human ſociety, covenants and contracts, yea common ſhame works in other armies, amongſt the worſt of them? Which will undoubtedly pull down the heavy judgment of God among us, who cannot but avenge theſe hypocriſies, violations of truth and holineſs; if they be indeed ſo as they yet ſeem. For neither do I ſpeak this in reproach to the army, but as jealous of their honour, inciting them to manifeſt and publiſh with all ſpeed, ſome better cauſe of theſe their late actions, than hath hitherto appeared, and to find out the Achan amongſt them, whoſe cloſe ambition in all likelihood abuſes their honeſt natures againſt their meaning to theſe diſorders; their readieſt way to bring in again the common enemy, and with him the deſtruction of true religion, and civil liberty. But, becauſe our evils are now grown more dangerous and extreme, than to be remedied by complaints, it concerns us now to find out what remedies may be likelieſt to ſave us from approaching ruin. Being now in anarchy, without a counſelling and governing power; and the army, I ſuppoſe, finding themſelves inſufficient to diſcharge at once both military and civil affairs, the firſt thing to be found out with all ſpeed, without which no commonwealth can ſubſiſt, muſt be a ſenate, or general council of ſtate, in whom muſt be the power, firſt, to preſerve the public peace; next, the commerce with foreign nations; and laſtly, to raiſe moneys for the management of theſe affairs: this muſt either be the parliament readmitted to ſit, or a council of ſtate allowed of by the army, ſince they only now have the power. The terms to be ſtood on are, liberty of conſcience to all profeſſing ſcripture to be the rule of their faith and worſhip; and the abjuration of a ſingle perſon. If the parliament be again thought on, to ſalve honour on both ſides, the well affected party of the city, and the congregated churches, may be induced to mediate by public addreſſes, and brotherly beſeechings; which, if there be that ſainthip among us which is talked of, ought to be of higheſt and undeniable perſuaſion to reconcilement. If the parliament be thought well diſſolved, as not complying fully to grant liberty of conſcience, and the

the neceſſary conſequence thereof, the removal of a forced maintenance from miniſters, then muſt the army forthwith chooſe a council of ſtate, whereof as many to be of the parliament, as are undoubtedly affected to theſe two conditions propoſed. That which I conceive only able to cement, and unite for ever the army, either to the parliament recalled, or this choſen council, muſt be a mutual league and oath, private or public, not to deſert one another till death: that is to ſay, that the army be kept up, and all theſe officers in their places during life, and ſo likewiſe the parliament, or counſellors of ſtate; which will be no way unjuſt, conſidering their known merits on either ſide, in council or in field, unleſs any be found falſe to any of theſe two principles, or otherwiſe perſonally criminous in the judgment of both parties. If ſuch a union as this be not accepted on the army's part, be confident there is a ſingle perſon underneath. That the army be upheld, the neceſſity of our affairs and factions will conſtrain long enough perhaps, to content the longeſt liver in the army. And whether the civil government be an annual democracy, or a perpetual ariſtocracy, is not to me a conſideration for the extremities wherein we are, and the hazard of our ſafety from our common enemy, gaping at preſent to devour us. That it be not an oligarchy, or the faction of a few, may be eaſily prevented by the numbers of their own chooſing, who may be found infallibly conſtant to thoſe two conditions forenamed, full liberty of conſcience, and the abjuration of monarchy propoſed: and the well-ordered committees of their faithfulleſt adherents in every county, may give this government the reſemblance and effects of a perfect democracy. As for the reformation of laws, and the places of judicature, whether to be here, as at preſent, or in every county, as hath been long aimed at, and many ſuch propoſals, tending no doubt to public good, they may be conſidered in due time, when we are paſt theſe pernicious pangs, in a hopeful way of health, and firm conſtitution. But unleſs theſe things, which I have above propoſed, one way or other, be once ſettled, in my fear, which God avert, we inſtantly ruin; or at beſt become the ſervants of one or other ſingle perſon, the ſecret author and

and fomenter of theſe diſturbances. You have the ſum of my preſent thoughts, as much I underſtand of theſe affairs freely imparted; at your requeſt, and the perſuaſion you wrought in me, that I might chance hereby to be ſome way ſerviceable to the Commonwealth, in a time when all ought to be endeavouring what good they can, whether much or but little. With this you may do what you pleaſe, put out, put in, communicate or ſuppreſs: you offend not me, who only have obeyed your opinion, that in doing what I have done, I might happen to offer ſomething which might be of ſome uſe in this great time of need However, I have not been wanting to the opportunity which you preſented before me, of ſhowing the readineſs which I have in the midſt of my unfitneſs, to whatever may be required of me, as a public duty.

October 20, 1659.

THE PRESENT MEANS AND BRIEF DELINEATION OF A FREE COMMONWEALTH,

Eaſy to be put in Practice, and without Delay.

IN A LETTER TO GENERAL MONK.

Publiſhed from the Manuſcript.

FIRST, all endeavours ſpeedily to be uſed, that the enſuing election be of ſuch as are already firm, or inclinable to conſtitute a free commonwealth, (according to the former qualifications decreed in parliament, and not yet repealed, as I hear) without ſingle perſon, or houſe of lords. If theſe be not ſuch, but the contrary, who foreſees not, that our liberties will be utterly loſt in this next parliament, without ſome powerful courſe taken, of ſpeedieſt prevention? The ſpeedieſt way will be to call up forthwith the chief gentlemen out of every county; to lay before them (as your excellency hath already, both in your publiſhed letters to the army, and your declaration recited to the members of parliament) the danger and confuſion of readmitting kingſhip in this land; eſpecially againſt the rules of all prudence and example, in a family once ejected, and thereby not to be truſted with the power of revenge: that you will not longer delay them with vain expectation, but will put into their hands forthwith the poſſeſſion of a free commonwealth; if they will firſt return immediately and elect them, by ſuch at leaſt of the people as are rightly qualified, a ſtanding council in every city and great town, which may then be dignified with the name of city, continually to conſult the good and flouriſhing ſtate of that place, with a competent territory adjoined; to aſſume the judicial laws, either thoſe that are, or ſuch as they themſelves

themſelves ſhall new make ſeverally, in each commonalty, and all judicatures, all magiſtracies, to the adminiſtration of all juſtice between man and man, and all the ornaments of public civility, academies, and ſuch like, in their own hands. Matters appertaining to men of ſeveral counties or territories, may be determined, as they are here at London, or in ſome more convenient place, under equal judges.

Next, That in every ſuch capital place, they will chooſe them the uſual number of ableſt knights and burgeſſes, engaged for a commonwealth, to make up the parliament, or (as it will from henceforth be better called) the Grand or General Council of the Nation: whoſe office muſt be, with due caution, to diſpoſe of forces, both by ſea and land, under the conduct of your excellency, for the preſervation of peace, both at home and abroad; muſt raiſe and manage the public revenue, but with provident inſpection of their accompts; muſt adminiſter all foreign affairs, make all general laws, peace or war, but not without aſſent of the ſtanding council in each city, or ſuch other general aſſembly as may be called on ſuch occaſion, from the whole territory, where they may, without much trouble, deliberate on all things fully, and ſend up their ſuffrages within a ſet time, by deputies appointed. Though this grand council be perpetual (as in that book I proved would be beſt and moſt conformable to beſt examples) yet they will then, thus limited, have ſo little matter in their hands, or power to endanger our liberty; and the people ſo much in theirs, to prevent them, having all judicial laws in their own choice, and free votes in all thoſe which concern generally the whole commonwealth, that we ſhall have little cauſe to fear the perpetuity of our general ſenate; which will be then nothing elſe but a firm foundation and cuſtody of our public liberty, peace, and union, through the whole commonwealth, and the tranſactors of our affairs with foreign nations.

If this yet be not thought enough, the known expedient may at length be uſed, of a partial rotation.

Laſtly, if theſe gentlemen convocated refuſe theſe fair and noble offers of immediate liberty, and happy condition,

tion, no doubt there be enough in every county who will thankfully accept them; your excellency once more declaring publicly this to be your mind, and having a faithful veteran army, ſo ready, and glad to aſſiſt you in the proſecution thereof. For the full and abſolute adminiſtration of law in every county, which is the difficulteſt of theſe propoſals, hath been of moſt long deſired; and the not granting it held a general grievance. The reſt, when they ſhall ſee the beginnings and proceedings of theſe conſtitutions propoſed, and the orderly, the decent, the civil, the ſafe, the noble effects thereof, will be ſoon convinced, and by degrees come in of their own accord, to be partakers of ſo happy a government.

THE

READY AND EASY WAY

TO ESTABLISH A

FREE COMMONWEALTH,

AND THE EXCELLENCE THEREOF,

Compared with the

INCONVENIENCIES AND DANGERS

Of readmitting KINGSHIP in this NATION.

——————— Et nos
Conſilium dedimus Syllæ, demus populo nunc.

ALTHOUGH, ſince the writing of this treatiſe, the face of things hath had ſome change, writs for new elections have been recalled, and the members at firſt choſen readmitted from excluſion; yet not a little rejoicing to hear declared the reſolution of thoſe who are in power, tending to the eſtabliſhment of a free commonwealth, and to remove, if it be poſſible, this noxious humour of returning to bondage, inſtilled of late by ſome deceivers, and nouriſhed from bad principles and falſe apprehenſions among too many of the people; I thought beſt not to ſuppreſs what I had written, hoping that it may now be of much more uſe and concernment to be freely publiſhed, in the midſt of our elections to a free parliament, or their fitting to conſider freely of the government; whom it behoves to have all things repreſented to them that may direct their judgment therein; and I never read of any ſtate, ſcarce of any tyrant grown ſo incurable, as to refuſe counſel from any in a time of public deliberation, much leſs to be offended. If their abſolute determination be to inthrall us, before ſo long a Lent of ſervitude, they may

permit us a little ſhrovingtime firſt, wherein to ſpeak freely, and take our leaves of liberty. And becauſe in the former edition, through haſte, many faults eſcaped, and many books were ſuddenly diſperſed, ere the note to mend them could be ſent, I took the opportunity from this occaſion to reviſe and ſomewhat to enlarge the whole diſcourſe, eſpecially that part which argues for a perpetual ſenate. The treatiſe thus reviſed and enlarged, is as follows.

The Parliament of England, aſſiſted by a great number of the people who appeared and ſtuck to them faithfulleſt in defence of religion and their civil liberties, judging kingſhip by long experience a government unneceſſary, burdenſome, and dangerous, juſtly and magnanimouſly aboliſhed it, turning regal bondage into a free commonwealth, to the admiration and terrour of our emulous neighbours. They took themſelves not bound by the light of nature or religion to any former covenant, from which the king himſelf, by many forfeitures of a latter date or diſcovery, and our own longer conſideration thereon, had more and more unbound us, both to himſelf and his poſterity; as hath been ever the juſtice and the prudence of all wiſe nations, that have ejected tyranny. They covenanted "to preſerve the king's perſon and authority, in the preſervation of the true religion, and our liberties;" not in his endeavouring to bring in upon our conſciences a popiſh religion; upon our liberties, thraldom; upon our lives, deſtruction, by his occaſioning, if not complotting, as was after diſcovered, the Iriſh maſſacre; his fomenting and arming the rebellion; his covert leaguing with the rebels againſt us; his refuſing, more than ſeven times, propoſitions moſt juſt and neceſſary to the true religion and our liberties, tendered him by the parliament both of England and Scotland. They made not their covenant concerning him with no difference between a king and a God; or promiſed him, as Job did to the Almighty, "to truſt in him though he ſlay us:" they underſtood that the ſolemn engagement, wherein we all forſwore kingſhip, was no more a breach of the covenant, than the covenant was of the proteſtation before, but a faith-

ful

ful and prudent going on both in words well weighed, and in the true ſenſe of the covenant "without reſpect of perſons," when we could not ſerve two contrary maſters, God and the king, or the king and that more ſupreme law, ſworn in the firſt place to maintain our ſafety and our liberty. They knew the people of England to be a free people, themſelves the repreſenters of that freedom; and although many were excluded, and as many fled (ſo they pretended) from tumults to Oxford, yet they were left a ſufficient number to act in parliament, therefore not bound by any ſtatute of preceding parliaments, but by the law of nature only, which is the only law of laws truly and properly to all mankind fundamental; the beginning and the end of all government; to which no parliament or people that will throughly reform, but may and muſt have recourſe, as they had, and muſt yet have, in church-reformation (if they throughly intend it) to evangelic rules; not to eccleſiaſtical canons, though never ſo ancient, ſo ratified and eſtabliſhed in the land by ſtatutes, which for the moſt part are mere poſitive laws, neither natural nor moral; and ſo by any parliament, for juſt and ſerious conſiderations, without ſcruple to be at any time repealed. If others of their number in theſe things were under force, they were not, but under free conſcience; if others were excluded by a power which they could not reſiſt, they were not therefore to leave the helm of government in no hands, to diſcontinue their care of the public peace and ſafety, to deſert the people in anarchy and confuſion, no more than when ſo many of their members left them, as made up in outward formality a more legal parliament of three eſtates againſt them. The beſt-affected alſo, and beſt-principled of the people, ſtood not numbering or computing, on which ſide were moſt voices in parliament, but on which ſide appeared to them moſt reaſon, moſt ſafety, when the houſe divided upon main matters. What was well motioned and adviſed, they examined not whether fear or perſuaſion carried it in the vote, neither did they meaſure votes and counſels by the intentions of them that voted; knowing that intentions either are but gueſſed at, or not ſoon

enough known; and although good, can neither make the deed ſuch, nor prevent the conſequence from being bad: ſuppoſe bad intentions in things otherwiſe well done; what was well done, was by them who ſo thought, not the leſs obeyed or followed in the ſtate; ſince in the church, who had not rather follow Iſcariot or Simon the magician, though to covetous ends, preaching, than Saul, though in the uprightneſs of his heart perſecuting the goſpel? Safer they therefore judged what they thought the better counſels, though carried on by ſome perhaps to bad ends, than the worſe by others, though endeavoured with beſt intentions: and yet they were not to learn, that a greater number might be corrupt within the walls of a parliament, as well as of a city; whereof in matters of neareſt concernment all men will be judges; nor eaſily permit, that the odds of voices in their greateſt council ſhall more endanger them by corrupt or credulous votes, than the odds of enemies by open aſſaults; judging, that moſt voices ought not always to prevail, where main matters are in queſtion. If others hence will pretend to diſturb all counſels; what is that to them who pretend not, but are in real danger; not they only ſo judging, but a great, though not the greateſt number of their choſen patriots, who might be more in weight than the others in number: there being in number little virtue, but by weight and meaſure wiſdom working all things, and the danger on either ſide they ſeriouſly thus weighed. From the treaty, ſhort fruits of long labours, and ſeven years war; ſecurity for twenty years, if we can hold it; reformation in the church for three years: then put to ſhift again with our vanquiſhed maſter. His juſtice, his honour, his conſcience declared quite contrary to ours; which would have furniſhed him with many ſuch evaſions, as in a book entitled, "An Inquiſition for Blood," ſoon after were not concealed: biſhops not totally removed, but left, as it were, in ambuſh, a reſerve, with ordination in their ſole power; their lands already ſold, not to be alienated, but rented, and the ſale of them called "ſacrilege;" delinquents few of many brought to condign puniſhment; acceſſaries

puniſhed, the chief author, above pardon, though
· utmoſt reſiſtance, vanquiſhed; not to give, but to
ive laws; yet beſought, treated with, and to be
ked for his gracious conceſſions, to be honoured,
hipped, glorified. If this we ſwore to do, with
t righteouſneſs in the ſight of God, with what aſ-
nce that we bring not by ſuch an oath, the whole
of bloodguiltineſs upon our heads? If on the other
we prefer a free government, though for the pre-
not obtained, yet all thoſe ſuggeſted fears and diffi-
ies, as the event will prove, eaſily overcome, we re-
ı finally ſecure from the exaſperated regal power,
out of ſnares; ſhall retain the beſt part of our
·ty, which is our religion, and the civil part will be
ı theſe who defer us, much more eaſily recovered,
g neither ſo ſubtle nor ſo awful as a king rein-
ned. Nor were their actions leſs both at home and
ad, than might become the hopes of a glorious riſ-
commonwealth: nor were the expreſſions both of
y and people, whether in their public declarations,
everal writings, other than ſuch as teſtified a ſpirit
ıis nation, no leſs noble and well fitted to the liberty
ı commonwealth, than in the ancient Greeks or
ıans. Nor was the heroic cauſe unſucceſsfully
nded to all Chriſtendom, againſt the tongue of a
ous and thought invincible adverſary; nor the
ſtancy and fortitude, that ſo nobly vindicated our
rty, our victory at once againſt two the moſt prevail-
uſurpers over mankind, ſuperſtition and tyranny,
raiſed or uncelebrated in a written monument, likely
utlive detraction, as it hath hitherto convinced or
ıced not a few of our detractors, eſpecially in parts
ad. After our liberty and religion thus proſper-
y fought for, gained, and many years poſſeſſed, ex-
t in thoſe unhappy interruptions, which God hath
oved; now that nothing remains, but in all reaſon
certain hopes of a ſpeedy and immediate ſettlement
ever in a firm and free commonwealth, for this ex-
ed and magnified nation, regardleſs both of honour
ı, or deliverances vouchſafed from Heaven, to fall
k, or rather to creep back ſo poorly, as it ſeems the

multitude would, to their once abjured and detested thraldom of kingſhip, to be ourſelves the ſlanderers of our own juſt and religious deeds, though done by ſome to covetous and ambitious ends, yet not therefore to be ſtained with their infamy, or they to aſperſe the integrity of others; and yet theſe now by revolting from the conſcience of deeds well done, both in church and ſtate, to throw away and forſake, or rather to betray a juſt and noble cauſe for the mixture of bad men who have ill-managed and abuſed it, (which had our fathers done heretofore, and on the ſame pretence deſerted true religion, what had long ere this become of our goſpel and all proteſtant reformation ſo much intermixed with the avarice and ambition of ſome reformers?) and by thus relapſing, to verify all the bitter predictions of our triumphing enemies, who will now think they wiſely diſcerned and juſtly cenſured both us and all our actions as raſh, rebellious, hypocritical, and impious; not only argues a ſtrange degenerate contagion ſuddenly ſpread among us, fitted and prepared for new ſlavery, but will render us a ſcorn and deriſion to all our neighbours. And what will they at beſt ſay of us, and of the whole Engliſh name, but ſcoffingly, as of that fooliſh builder mentioned by our Saviour, who began to build a tower, and was not able to finiſh it? Where is this goodly tower of a commonwealth, which the Engliſh boaſted they would build to overſhadow kings, and be another Rome in the weſt? The foundation indeed they lay gallantly, but fell into a worſe confuſion not of tongues, but of factions, than thoſe at the tower of Babel; and have left no memorial of their work behind them remaining, but in the common laughter of Europe! Which muſt needs redound the more to our ſhame, if we but look on our neighbours the United Provinces, to us inferiour in all outward advantages; who notwithſtanding, in the midſt of greater difficulties, courageouſly, wiſely, conſtantly went through with the ſame work, and are ſettled in all the happy enjoyments of a potent and flouriſhing republic to this day.

Beſides this, if we return to kingſhip, and ſoon repent, (as undoubtedly we ſhall, when we begin to find the old encroachments

encroachments coming on by little and little upon our conſciences which muſt neceſſarily proceed from king and biſhop united inſeparably in one intereſt,) we may be forced perhaps to fight over again all that we have fought, and ſpend over again all that we have ſpent, but are never like to attain thus far as we are now advanced to the recovery of our freedom, never to have it in poſſeſſion as we now have it, never to be vouchſafed hereafter the like mercies and ſignal aſſiſtances from Heaven in our cauſe, if by our ingrateful backſliding we make theſe fruitleſs; flying now to regal conceſſions from his divine condeſcenſions, and gracious anſwers to our once importuning prayers againſt the tyranny which we then groaned under; making vain and viler than dirt the blood of ſo many thouſand faithful and valiant Engliſhmen, who left us in this liberty, bought with their lives; loſing by a ſtrange aftergame of folly all the battles we have won, together with all Scotland as to our conqueſt, hereby loſt, which never any of our kings could conquer, all the treaſure we have ſpent, not that corruptible treaſure only, but that far more precious of all our late miraculous deliverances; treading back again with loſt labour all our happy ſteps in the progreſs of reformation, and moſt pitifully depriving ourſelves the inſtant fruition of that free government, which we have ſo dearly purchaſed, a free commonwealth, not only held by wiſeſt men in all ages the nobleſt, the manlieſt, the equalleſt, the juſteſt government, the moſt agreeable to all due liberty and proportioned equality, both human, civil, and chriſtian, moſt cheriſhing to virtue and true religion, but alſo (I may ſay it with greateſt probability) plainly commended, or rather enjoined by our Saviour himſelf, to all chriſtians, not without remarkable diſallowance, and the brand of Gentiliſm upon kingſhip. God in much diſpleaſure gave a king to the Iſraelites, and imputed it a ſin to them that they ſought one: but Chriſt apparently forbids his diſciples, to admit of any ſuch heatheniſh government; "The kings of the Gentiles," ſaith he, "exerciſe lordſhip over them;" and they that "exerciſe authority upon them are called benefactors:

but ye ſhall not be ſo; but he that is greateſt among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that ſerveth." The occaſion of theſe his words was the ambitious deſire of Zebedee's two ſons, to be exalted above their brethren in his kingdom, which they thought was to be ere long upon earth. That he ſpeaks of civil government, is manifeſt by the former part of the compariſon, which infers the other part to be always in the ſame kind. And what government comes nearer to this precept of Chriſt, than a free commonwealth; wherein they who are the greateſt, are perpetual ſervants and drudges to the public at their own coſt and charges, neglect their own affairs, yet are not elevated above their brethren; live ſoberly in their families, walk the ſtreet as other men, may be ſpoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration? Whereas a king muſt be adored like a demigod, with a diſſolute and haughty court about him, of vaſt expenſe and luxury, maſks and revels, to the debauching of our prime gentry both male and female; not in their paſtimes only, but in earneſt, by the looſe employments of court-ſervice, which will be then thought honourable. There will be a queen of no leſs charge; in moſt likelihood outlandiſh and a papiſt, beſides a queen mother ſuch already; together with both their courts and numerous train: then a royal iſſue, and ere long ſeverally their ſumptuous courts; to the multiplying of a ſervile crew, not of ſervants only, but of nobility and gentry, bred up then to the hopes not of public, but of court-offices, to be ſtewards, chamberlains, uſhers, grooms, even of the cloſeſtool; and the lower their minds debaſed with court-opinions, contrary to all virtue and reformation, the haughtier will be their pride and profuſeneſs. We may well remember this not long ſince at home; nor need but look at preſent into the French court, where enticements and preferments daily draw away and pervert the proteſtant nobility. As to the burden of expenſe, to our coſt we ſhall ſoon know it; for any good to us deſerving to be termed no better than the vaſt and laviſh price of our ſubjection, and their debauchery, which we are now ſo greedily cheapening,

g, and would ſo fain be paying moſt inconſiderately
ſingle perſon; who for any thing wherein the pub-
ally needs him, will have little elſe to do, but to
w the eating and drinking of exceſſive dainties, to
pompous face upon the ſuperficial actings of ſtate,
ageant himſelf up and down in progreſs among the
etual bowings and cringings of an abject people, on
r ſide deifying and adoring him for nothing done
can deſerve it. For what can he more than ano-
man? who, even in the expreſſion of a late court-
, ſits only like a great cipher ſet to no purpoſe be-
a long row of other ſignificant figures. Nay, it
ell and happy for the people, if their king be but a
er, being ofttimes a miſchief, a peſt, a ſcourge of the
on, and which is worſe, not to be removed, not to
ontrolled, much leſs accuſed or brought to puniſh-
t, without the danger of a common ruin, without
ſhaking and almoſt ſubverſion of the whole land:
reas in a free commonwealth, any governor or chief
ıſellor offending may be removed and puniſhed,
ıout the leaſt commotion. Certainly then that
ple muſt needs be mad, or ſtrangely infatuated, that
d the chief hope of their common happineſs or ſafety
ı ſingle perſon; who, if he happen to be good, can
ıo more than another man; if to be bad, hath in his
ds to do more evil without check, than millions of
r men. The happineſs of a nation muſt needs be
eſt and certaineſt in full and free council of their
ı electing, where no ſingle perſon, but reaſon only
ys. And what madneſs is it for them who might
ıage nobly their own affairs themſelves, ſluggiſhly
weakly to devolve all on a ſingle perſon; and more
boys under age than men, to commit all to his pa-
ıage and diſpoſal, who neither can perform what he
ertakes, and yet for undertaking it, though royally
l, will not be their ſervant, but their lord? How
nanly muſt it needs be, to count ſuch a one the breath
ɔur noſtrils, to hang all our felicity on him, all our
ty, our well-being, for which if we were aught elſe
ſluggards or babies, we need depend on none but
l and our own counſels, our own active virtue and
induſtry?

induſtry? "Go to the ant, thou ſluggard," ſaith Solomon; "conſider her ways, and be wiſe; which having no prince, ruler, or lord, provides her meat in the ſummer, and gathers her food in the harveſt:" which evidently ſhows us, that they who think the nation undone without a king, though they look grave or haughty, have not ſo much true ſpirit and underſtanding in them as a piſmire: neither are theſe diligent creatures hence concluded to live in lawleſs anarchy, or that commended, but are ſet the examples to imprudent and ungoverned men, of a frugal and ſelf-governing democracy or commonwealth; ſafer and more thriving in the joint providence and counſel of many induſtrious equals, than under the ſingle domination of one imperious lord. It may be well wondered that any nation, ſtyling themſelves free, can ſuffer any man to pretend hereditary right over them as their lord; whenas by acknowledging that right, they conclude themſelves his ſervants and his vaſſals, and ſo renounce their own freedom. Which how a people and their leaders eſpecially can do, who have fought ſo glorioufly for liberty; how they can change their noble words and actions, heretofore ſo becoming the majeſty of a free people, into the baſe neceſſity of court-flatteries and proſtrations, is not only ſtrange and admirable, but lamentable to think on. That a nation ſhould be ſo valorous and courageous to win their liberty in the field, and when they have won it, ſhould be ſo heartleſs and unwiſe in their counſels, as not to know how to uſe it, value it, what to do with it, or with themſelves; but after ten or twelve years proſperous war and conteſtation with tyranny, baſely and beſottedly to run their necks again into the yoke which they have broken, and proſtrate all the fruits of their victory for nought at the feet of the vanquiſhed, beſides our loſs of glory, and ſuch an example as kings or tyrants never yet had the like to boaſt of, will be an ignominy if it befall us, that never yet befell any nation poſſeſſed of their liberty; worthy indeed themſelves, whatſoever they be, to be for ever ſlaves, but that part of the nation which conſents not with them, as I perſuade me of a great number, far worthier than by their means to be brought into the

ſame

ſame bondage. Conſidering theſe things ſo plain, ſo rational, I cannot but yet further admire on the other ſide, how any man, who hath the true principles of juſtice and religion in him, can preſume or take upon him to be a king and lord over his brethren, whom he cannot but know whether as men or chriſtians, to be for the moſt part every way equal or ſuperior to himſelf: how he can diſplay with ſuch vanity and oſtentation his regal ſplendour, ſo ſupereminently above other mortal men; or being a chriſtian, can aſſume ſuch extraordinary honour and worſhip to himſelf, while the kingdom of Chriſt, our common king and lord, is hid to this world, and ſuch Gentiliſh imitation forbid in expreſs words by himſelf to all his diſciples. All proteſtants hold that Chriſt in his church hath left no vicegerent of his power; but himſelf, without deputy, is the only head thereof, governing it from Heaven: how then can any chriſtian man derive his kingſhip from Chriſt, but with worſe uſurpation than the pope his headſhip over the church, ſince Chriſt not only hath not left the leaſt ſhadow of a command for any ſuch vicegerence from him in the ſtate, as the pope pretends for his in the church, but hath expreſsly declared, that ſuch regal dominion is from the Gentiles, not from him, and hath ſtrictly charged us not to imitate them therein?

I doubt not but all ingenuous and knowing men will eaſily agree with me, that a free commonwealth without ſingle perſon, or houſe of lords, is by far the beſt government, if it can be had; but we have all this while, ſay they, been expecting it, and cannot yet attain it. It is true indeed, when monarchy was diſſolved, the form of a commonwealth ſhould have forthwith been framed, and the practice thereof immediately begun; that the people might have ſoon been ſatisfied and delighted with the decent order, eaſe, and benefit thereof: we had been then by this time firmly rooted paſt fear of commotions or mutations, and now flouriſhing: this care of timely ſettling a new government inſtead of the old, too much neglected, hath been our miſchief. Yet the cauſe thereof may be aſcribed with moſt reaſon to the frequent diſturbances, interruptions, and diſſolutions, which the parliament

parliament hath had, partly from the impatient or diſaffected people, partly from ſome ambitious leaders in the army; much contrary, I believe, to the mind and approbation of the army itſelf, and their other commanders, once undeceived, or in their own power. Now is the opportunity, now the very ſeaſon, wherein we may obtain a free commonwealth, and eſtabliſh it for ever in the land, without difficulty or much delay. Writs are ſent out for elections, and, which is worth obſerving, in the name, not of any king, but of the keepers of our liberty, to ſummon a free parliament; which then only will indeed be free, and deſerve the true honour of that ſupreme title, if they preſerve us a free people. Which never parliament was more free to do; being now called not as heretofore, by the ſummons of a king, but by the voice of liberty: and if the people, laying aſide prejudice and impatience, will ſeriouſly and calmly now conſider their own good, both religious and civil, their own liberty and the only means thereof, as ſhall be here laid down before them, and will elect their knights and burgeſſes able men, and according to the juſt and neceſſary qualifications (which, for aught I hear, remain yet in force unrepealed, as they were formerly decreed in parliament) men not addicted to a ſingle perſon or houſe of lords, the work is done; at leaſt the foundation firmly laid of a free commonwealth, and good part alſo erected of the main ſtructure. For the ground and baſis of every juſt and free government (ſince men have ſmarted ſo oft for committing all to one perſon) is a general council of ableſt men, choſen by the people to conſult of public affairs from time to time for the common good. In this grand council muſt the ſovereignty, not transferred, but delegated only, and as it were depoſited, reſide; with this caution they muſt have the forces by ſea and land committed to them for preſervation of the common peace and liberty; muſt raiſe and manage the public revenue, at leaſt with ſome inſpectors deputed for ſatisfaction of the people, how it is employed; muſt make or propoſe, as more expreſsly ſhall be ſaid anon, civil laws, treat of commerce, peace, or war with foreign nations, and, for the carrying on ſome particular affairs with

with more ſecrecy and expedition, muſt elect, as they have already out of their own number and others, a council of ſtate.

And, although it may ſeem ſtrange at firſt hearing, by reaſon that men's minds are prepoſſeſſed with the notion of ſucceſſive parliaments, I affirm, that the grand or general council, being well choſen, ſhould be perpetual: for ſo their buſineſs is or may be, and ofttimes urgent; the opportunity of affairs gained or loſt in a moment. The day of council cannot be ſet as the day of a feſtival: but muſt be ready always to prevent or anſwer all occaſions. By this continuance they will become every way skilfulleſt, beſt provided of intelligence from abroad, beſt acquainted with the people at home, and the people with them. The ſhip of the commonwealth is always under ſail; they ſit at the ſtern, and if they ſteer well, what need is there to change them, it being rather dangerous? Add to this, that the grand council is both foundation and main pillar of the whole ſtate; and to move pillars and foundations, not faulty, cannot be ſafe for the building. I ſee not therefore, how we can be advantaged by ſucceſſive and tranſitory parliaments; but that they are much likelier continually to unſettle rather than to ſettle a free government, to breed commotions, changes, novelties, and uncertainties, to bring neglect upon preſent affairs and opportunities, while all minds are in ſuſpence with expectation of a new aſſembly, and the aſſembly for a good ſpace taken up with the new ſettling of itſelf. After which, if they find no great work to do, they will make it, by altering or repealing former acts or making and multiplying new; that they may ſeem to ſee what their predeceſſors ſaw not, and not to have aſſembled for nothing: till all law be loſt in the multitude of claſhing ſtatutes. But if the ambition of ſuch as think themſelves injured, that they alſo partake not of the government, and are impatient till they be choſen, cannot brook the perpetuity of others choſen before them; or if it be feared, that long continuance of power may corrupt ſincereſt men, the known expedient is, and by ſome lately propounded, that annually (or if the ſpace be longer,

ger, ſo much perhaps the better) the third part of ſenators may go out according to the precedence of their election, and the like number be choſen in their places, to prevent their ſettling of too abſolute a power, if it ſhould be perpetual: and this they call "partial rotation." But I could wiſh, that this wheel or partial wheel in ſtate, if it be poſſible, might be avoided, as having too much affinity with the wheel of Fortune. For it appears not how this can be done, without danger and miſchance of putting out a great number of the beſt and ableſt: in whoſe ſtead new elections may bring in as many raw, unexperienced, and otherwiſe affected, to the weakening and much altering for the worſe of public tranſactions. Neither do I think a perpetual ſenate, eſpecially choſen or entruſted by the people, much in this land to be feared, where the well-affected either in a ſtanding army, or in a ſettled militia, have their arms in their own hands. Safeſt therefore to me it ſeems, and of leaſt hazard or interruption to affairs, that none of the grand council be moved, unleſs by death or juſt conviction of ſome crime: for what can be expected firm or ſtedfaſt from a floating foundation? however, I forejudge not any probable expedient, any temperament that can be found in things of this nature ſo diſputable on either ſide. Yet leſt this which I affirm be thought my ſingle opinion, I ſhall add ſufficient teſtimony. Kingſhip itſelf is therefore counted the more ſafe and durable becauſe the king, and for the moſt part his council, is not changed during life: but a commonwealth is held immortal, and therein firmeſt, ſafeſt, and moſt above fortune: for the death of a king cauſeth oftimes many dangerous alterations; but the death now and then of a ſenator is not felt, the main body of them ſtill continuing permanent in greateſt and nobleſt commonwealths, and as it were eternal. Therefore among the Jews, the ſupreme council of ſeventy, called the Sanhedrim, founded by Moſes, in Athens that of Areopagus, in Sparta that of the ancients, in Rome the ſenate, conſiſted of members choſen for term of life; and by that means remained as it were ſtill the ſame to generations. In Venice they change indeed of-

tener

tener than every year ſome particular council of ſtate, as that of ſix, or ſuch other: but the true ſenate, which upholds and ſuſtains the government, is the whole ariſtocracy immovable. So in the United Provinces, the ſtates general, which are indeed but a council of ſtate deputed by the whole union, are not uſually the ſame perſons for above three or ſix years; but the ſtates of every city, in whom the ſovereignty hath been placed time out of mind, are a ſtanding ſenate, without ſucceſſion, and accounted chiefly in that regard the main prop of their liberty. And why they ſhould be ſo in every well-ordered commonwealth, they who write of policy give theſe reaſons; "That to make the ſenate ſucceſſive, not only impairs the dignity and luſtre of the ſenate, but weakens the whole commonwealth, and brings it into manifeſt danger; while by this means the ſecrets of ſtate are frequently divulged, and matters of greateſt conſequence committed to inexpert and novice counſellors, utterly to ſeek in the full and intimate knowledge of affairs paſt." I know not therefore what ſhould be peculiar in England, to make ſucceſſive parliaments thought ſafeſt, or convenient here more than in other nations, unleſs it be the fickleneſs, which is attributed to us as we are iſlanders: but good education and acquiſite wiſdom ought to correct the fluxible fault, if any ſuch be, of our watery ſituation. It will be objected, that in thoſe places where they had perpetual ſenates, they had alſo popular remedies againſt their growing too imperious: as in Athens, beſides Areopagus, another ſenate of four or five hundred; in Sparta, the Ephori; in Rome, the tribunes of the people. But the event tells us, that theſe remedies either little avail the people, or brought them to ſuch a licentious and unbridled democracy, as in fine ruined themſelves with their own exceſſive power. So that the main reaſon urged why popular aſſemblies are to be truſted with the people's liberty, rather than a ſenate of principal men, becauſe great men will be ſtill endeavouring to enlarge their power, but the common ſort will be contented to maintain their own liberty, is by experience found falſe; none being more immoderate and ambitious to amplify their power,

power, than ſuch popularities, which were ſeen in the people of Rome; who at firſt contented to have their tribunes, at length contended with the ſenate that one conſul, then both, ſoon after, that the cenſors and prætors alſo ſhould be created plebeian, and the whole empire put into their hands; adoring laſtly thoſe, who moſt were adverſe to the ſenate, till Marius, by fulfilling their inordinate deſires, quite loſt them all the power, for which they had ſo long been ſtriving, and left them under the tyranny of Sylla: the balance therefore muſt be exactly ſo ſet, as to preſerve and keep up due authority on either ſide, as well in the ſenate as in the people. And this annual rotation of a ſenate to conſiſt of three hundred, as is lately propounded, requires alſo another popular aſſembly upward of a thouſand, with an anſwerable rotation. Which, beſides that it will be liable to all thoſe inconveniencies found in the foreſaid remedies, cannot but be troubleſome and chargeable, both in their motion and their ſeſſion, to the whole land, unwieldy with their own bulk, unable in ſo great a number to mature their conſultations as they ought, if any be allotted them, and that they meet not from ſo many parts remote to ſit a whole year lieger in one place, only now and then to hold up a foreſt of fingers, or to convey each man his bean or ballot into the box, without reaſon ſhown or common deliberation; incontinent of ſecrets, if any be imparted to them; emulous and always jarring with the other ſenate. The much better way doubtleſs will be, in this wavering condition of our affairs, to defer the changing or circumſcribing of our ſenate, more than may be done with eaſe, till the commonwealth be throughly ſettled in peace and ſafety, and they themſelves give us the occaſion. Military men hold it dangerous to change the form of battle in view of an enemy: neither did the people of Rome bandy with their ſenate, while any of the Tarquins lived, the enemies of their liberty; nor ſought by creating tribunes, to defend themſelves againſt the fear of their patricians, till fixteen years after the expulſion of their kings, and, in full ſecurity of their ſtate, they had or thought they had juſt cauſe given them by the ſenate. Another way will be, to

well qualify and refine elections: not committing all the noiſe and ſhouting of a rude multitude, but permitting only thoſe of them who are rightly qualified, to nominate as many as they will; and out of that number others of a better breeding, to chooſe a leſs number more judiciouſly, till after a third or fourth ſifting and refining of exacteſt choice, they only be left choſen who are the due number, and ſeem by moſt voices the worthieſt. To make the people fitteſt to chooſe, and the choſen fitteſt to govern, will be to mend our corrupt and faulty education, to teach the people faith, not without virtue, temperance, modeſty, ſobriety, parſimony, juſtice; not to admire wealth or honour; to hate turbulence and ambition; to place every one his private welfare and happineſs in the public peace, liberty, and ſafety. They ſhall not then need to be much miſtruſtful of their choſen patriots in the grand council; who will be then rightly called the true keepers of our liberty, though the moſt of their buſineſs will be in foreign affairs. But to prevent all miſtruſt, the people then will have their ſeveral ordinary aſſemblies (which will henceforth quite annihilate the odious power and name of committees) in the chief towns of every country, without any trouble, charge, or time loſt of ſummoning and aſſembling from far in ſo great a number, and ſo long reſiding from their own houſes, or removing of their families, to do as much at home in their ſeveral ſhires, enlarged or ſubdivided, toward the ſecuring of their liberty, as a numerous aſſembly of them all formed and conſulted on purpoſe with the warieſt rotation. Whereof I will ſpeak more ere the end of this diſcourſe: for it may be referred to time, ſo we be ſtill going on by degrees to perfection. The people well weighing and performing theſe things, I ſuppoſe would have no cauſe to fear, though the parliament abolithing that name, as originally ſignifying but the parly of our lords and commons with the Norman king when he pleaſed to call them, ſhould, with certain limitations of their power, ſit perpetual, if their ends be faithful and for a free commonwealth, under the name of a grand or general council. Till this be

done, I am in doubt whether our ſtate will be ev
tainly and throughly ſettled; never likely till the
an end of our troubles and continual changes, or
never the true ſettlement and aſſurance of our
The grand council being thus firmly conſtituted
petuity, and ſtill, upon the death or default of an
ber, ſupplied and kept in full number, there ca
cauſe alleged, why peace, juſtice, plentiful trade,
proſperity ſhould not thereupon enſue through
whole land; with as much aſſurance as can be of
things, that they ſhall ſo continue (if God fav
and our wilful ſins provoke him not) even to the
of our true and rightful, and only to be expecte
only worthy as he is our only Saviour, the Meſſi
Chriſt, the only heir of his eternal father, the o
him anointed and ordained ſince the work of
demption finiſhed, univerſal Lord of all mankin
way propounded is plain, eaſy and open before u
out intricacies, without the introducement of new
ſolute forms or terms, or exotic models; ideas tha
effect nothing; but with a number of new injunc
manacle the native liberty of mankind; turning
tue into preſcription, ſervitude, and neceſſity,
great impairing and fruſtrating of chriſtian liberty
again, this way lies free and ſmooth before us;
tangled with inconveniencies; invents no new i
brances; requires no perilous, no injurious altera
circumſcription of mens lands and properties;
that in this commonwealth, temporal and ſpiritu
removed, no man or number of men can attain t
wealth or vaſt poſſeſſion, as will need the hedge
agrarian law (never ſucceſsful, but the cauſe ra
ſedition, ſave only where it began ſeaſonably wi
poſſeſſion) to confine them from endangering our
liberty. To conclude, it can have no conſiderable
tion made againſt it, that it is not practicable; le
ſaid hereafter, that we gave up our liberty for w
a ready way or diſtinct form propoſed of a free co
wealth. And this facility we ſhall have above ot
neighbouring commonwealth (if we can keep u

the fond conceit of ſomething like a duke of Venice, put lately into many mens heads by ſome one or other ſubtly driving on under that notion his own ambitious ends to lurch a crown) that our liberty ſhall not be hampered or hovered over by any engagement to ſuch a potent family as the houſe of Naſſau, of whom to ſtand in perpetual doubt and ſuſpicion, but we ſhall live the cleareſt and abſoluteſt free nation in the world.

On the contrary, if there be a king, which the inconſiderate multitude are now ſo mad upon, mark how far ſhort we are like to come of all thoſe happineſſes, which in a free ſtate we ſhall immediately be poſſeſſed of. Firſt, the grand council, which, as I ſhowed before, ſhould ſit perpetually (unleſs their leiſure give them now and then ſome intermiſſions or vacations, eaſily manageable by the council of ſtate left ſitting) ſhall be called, by the king's good will and utmoſt endeavour, as ſeldom as may be. For it is only the king's right, he will ſay, to call a parliament; and this he will do moſt commonly about his own affairs rather than the kingdom's, as will appear plainly ſo ſoon as they are called. For what will their buſineſs then be, and the chief expenſe of their time, but an endleſs tugging between petition of right and royal prerogative, eſpecially about the negative voice, militia, or ſubſidies, demanded and oftimes extorted without reaſonable cauſe appearing to the commons, who are the only true repreſentatives of the people and their liberty, but will be then mingled with a court-faction; beſides which, within their own walls, the ſincere part of them who ſtand faithful to the people will again have to deal with two troubleſome counter-working adverſaries from without, mere creatures of the king, ſpiritual, and the greater part, as is likelieſt, of temporal lords, nothing concerned with the people's liberty. If theſe prevail not in what they pleaſe, though never ſo much againſt the people's intereſt, the parliament ſhall be ſoon diſſolved, or ſit and do nothing; not ſuffered to remedy the leaſt grievance, or enact aught advantageous to the people. Next, the council of ſtate ſhall not be choſen by the parliament, but by the king, ſtill his own creatures, courtiers and favourites; who will be ſure in all their

counſels to ſet their maſter's grandeur and abſolute power, in what they are able, far above the people's liberty. I deny not but that there may be ſuch a king, who may regard the common good before his own, may have no vicious favourite, may hearken only to the wiſe and incorrupteſt of his parliament: but this rarely happens in a monarchy not elective; and it behoves not a wiſe nation to commit the ſum of their well-being, the whole ſtate of their ſafety to fortune. What need they; and how abſurd would it be, whenas they themſelves, to whom his chief virtue will be but to hearken, may with much better management and diſpatch, with much more commendation of their own worth and magnanimity, govern without a maſter? Can the folly be paralleled, to adore and be the ſlaves of a ſingle perſon, for doing that which it is ten thouſand to one whether he can or will do, and we without him might do more eaſily, more effectually, more laudably, ourſelves? Shall we never grow old enough to be wiſe, to make ſeaſonable uſe of graveſt authorities, experiences, examples? Is it ſuch an unſpeakable joy to ſerve, ſuch felicity to wear a yoke? to clink our ſhackles, locked on by pretended law of ſubjection, more intolerable and hopeleſs to be ever ſhaken off, than thoſe which are knocked on by illegal injury and violence? Ariſtotle, our chief inſtructor in the univerſities, leſt this doctrine be thought ſectarian, as the royaliſt would have it thought, tells us in the third of his Politics, that certain men at firſt, for the matchleſs excellence of their virtue above others, or ſome great public benefit, were created kings by the people, in ſmall cities and territories, and in the ſcarcity of others to be found like them; but when they abuſed their power, and governments grew larger, and the number of prudent men increaſed, that then the people, ſoon deposing their tyrants, betook them, in all civileſt places, to the form of a free commonwealth. And why ſhould we thus diſparage and prejudicate our own nation, as to fear a ſcarcity of able and worthy men united in counſel to govern us, if we will but uſe diligence and impartiality, to find them out and chooſe them, rather yoking ourſelves to a ſingle perſon, the natural adverſary and oppreſſor

preſſor of liberty; though good, yet far eaſier corruptible by the exceſs of his ſingle power and exaltation, or at beſt, not comparably ſufficient to bear the weight of government, nor equally diſpoſed to make us happy in the enjoyment of our liberty under him?

But admit, that monarchy of itſelf may be convenient to ſome nations; yet to us who have thrown it out, received back again, it cannot but prove pernicious. For kings to come, never forgetting their former ejection, will be ſure to fortify and arm themſelves ſufficiently for the future againſt all ſuch attempts hereafter from the people: who ſhall be then ſo narrowly watched and kept ſo low, that though they would never ſo fain, and at the ſame rate of their blood and treaſure, they never ſhall be able to regain what they now have purchaſed and may enjoy, or to free themſelves from any yoke impoſed upon them: nor will they dare to go about it; utterly diſheartened for the future, if theſe their higheſt attempts prove unſucceſsful; which will be the triumph of all tyrants hereafter over any people that ſhall reſiſt oppreſſion; and their ſong will then be, to others, how ſped the rebellious Engliſh? to our poſterity, how ſped the rebels your fathers? This is not my conjecture, but drawn from God's known denouncement againſt the gentilizing Iſraelites, who, though they were governed in a commonwealth of God's own ordaining, he only their king, they his peculiar people, yet affecting rather to reſemble heathen, but pretending the miſgovernment of Samuel's ſons, no more a reaſon to diſlike their commonwealth, than the violence of Eli's ſons was imputable to that prieſthood or religion, clamoured for a king. They had their longing, but with this teiſtmony of God's wrath; "Ye ſhall cry out in that day, becauſe of your king whom ye ſhall have choſen, and the Lord will not hear you in that day." Us if he ſhall hear now, how much leſs will he hear when we cry hereafter, who once delivered by him from a king, and not without wonderous acts of his Providence, inſenſible and unworthy of thoſe high mercies, are returning precipitantly, if he withhold us not, back to the captivity from whence he freed us? Yet neither ſhall we obtain or buy at an eaſy rate this

new gilded yoke, which thus tranſports us: a new royal revenue muſt be found, a new epiſcopal; for thoſe are individual: both which being wholly diſſipated, or bought by private perſons, or aſſigned for ſervice done, and eſpecially to the army, cannot be recovered without general detriment and confuſion to men's eſtates, or a heavy impoſition on all men's purſes; benefit to none but to the worſt and ignobleſt ſort of men, whoſe hope is to be either the miniſters of court riot and exceſs, or the gainers by it: but not to ſpeak more of Loſſes and extraordinary levies on our eſtates, what will then be the revenges and offences remembered and returned, not only by the chief perſon, but by all his adherents; accounts and reparations that will be required, ſuits, indictments, inquiries, diſcoveries, complaints, informations, who knows againſt whom or how many, though perhaps neuters, if not to utmoſt infliction, yet to impriſonment, fines, baniſhment, or moleſtation? if not theſe, yet diſfavour, diſcountenance, diſregard, and contempt on all but the known royaliſt, or whom he favours, will be plenteous. Nor let the new royalized preſbyterians perſuade themſelves, that their old doings, though now recanted, will be forgotten; whatever conditions be contrived or truſted on. Will they not believe this; nor remember the pacification, how it was kept to the Scots; how other ſolemn promiſes many a time to us? Let them but now read the diabolical forerunning libels, the faces the geſtures, that now appear foremoſt and briſkeſt in all public places, as the harbingers of thoſe, that are in expectation to reign over us; let them but hear the insolencies, the menaces, the inſultings of our newly animated common enemies crept lately out of their holes, their Hell I might ſay, by the language of their infernal pamphlets, the ſpew of every drunkard, every ribald; nameleſs, yet not for want of licence, but for very ſhame of their own vile perſons, not daring to name themſelves, while they traduce others by name; and give us to foreſee, that they intend to ſecond their wicked words, if ever they have power, with more wicked deeds. Let our zealous backſliders forethink now with themſelves, how their necks yoked with theſe tigers of Bacchus,

theſe

theſe new fanatics of not the preaching but the ſweating tub, inſpired with nothing holier than the venereal pox, can draw one way under monarchy to the eſtabliſhing of church diſcipline with theſe new diſgorged atheiſms: yet ſhall they not have the honour to yoke with theſe, but ſhall be yoked under them; theſe ſhall plough on their backs. And do they among them, who are ſo forward to bring in the ſingle perſon, think to be by him truſted or long regarded? So truſted they ſhall be, and ſo regarded, as by kings are wont reconciled enemies; neglected, and ſoon after diſcarded, if not proſecuted for old traitors; the firſt inciters, beginners, and more than to the third part actors of all that followed. It will be found alſo, that there muſt be then as neceſſarily as now (for the contrary part will be ſtill feared) a ſtanding army; which for certain ſhall not be this, but of the fierceſt cavaliers, of no leſs expenſe, and perhaps again under Rupert. But let this army be ſure they ſhall be ſoon diſbanded, and likelieſt without arrear or pay; and being diſbanded, not be ſure but they may as ſoon be queſtioned for being in arms againſt their king: the ſame let them fear who have contributed money; which will amount to no ſmall number, that muſt then take their turn to be made delinquents and compounders. They who paſt reaſon and recovery are devoted to kingſhip perhaps will anſwer, that a greater part by far of the nation will have it ſo, the reſt therefore muſt yield. Not ſo much to convince theſe, which I little hope, as to confirm them who yield not, I reply; that this greateſt part have both in reaſon, and the trial of juſt battle, loſt the right of their election what the government ſhall be: of them who have not loſt that right, whether they for kingſhip be the greater number, who can certainly determine? Suppoſe they be, yet of freedom they partake all alike, one main end of government: which if the greater part value not, but will degenerately forego, is it juſt or reaſonable, that moſt voices againſt the main end of government ſhould enſlave the leſs number that would be free? more juſt it is, doubtleſs, if it come to force, that a leſs number compel a greater to retain, which can be no wrong to them,

their liberty, than that a greater number, for the pleaſure of their baſeneſs, compel a leſs moſt injuriouſly to be their fellow ſlaves. They who ſeek nothing but their own juſt liberty have always right to win it, and to keep it, whenever they have power, be the voices never ſo numerous that oppoſe it. And how much we above others are concerned to defend it from kingſhip, and from them who in purſuance thereof ſo perniciouſly would betray us and themſelves to moſt certain miſery and thraldom, will be needleſs to repeat.

Having thus far ſhown with what eaſe we may now obtain a free commonwealth, and by it with as much eaſe all the freedom, peace, juſtice, plenty, that we can deſire; on the other ſide, the difficulties, troubles, uncertainties, nay rather impoſſibilities, to enjoy theſe things conſtantly under a monarch: I will now proceed to ſhow more particularly wherein our freedom and flouriſhing condition will be more ample and ſecure to us under a free commonwealth, than under kingſhip.

The whole freedom of man conſiſts either in ſpiritual or civil liberty. As for ſpiritual, who can be at reſt, who can enjoy any thing in this world with contentment, who hath not liberty to ſerve God, and to ſave his own ſoul, according to the beſt light which God hath planted in him to that purpoſe, by the reading of his revealed will, and the guidance of his holy ſpirit? That this is beſt pleaſing to God, and that the whole proteſtant church allows no ſupreme judge or rule in matters of religion, but the ſcriptures; and theſe to be interpreted by the ſcriptures themſelves, which neceſſarily infers liberty of conſcience; I have heretofore proved at large in another treatiſe; and might yet further, by the public declarations, confeſſions, and admonitions of whole churches and ſtates, obvious in all hiſtories ſince the reformation.

This liberty of conſcience, which above all other things ought to be to all men deareſt and moſt precious, no government more inclinable not to favour only, but to protect, than a free commonwealth; as being moſt magnanimous, moſt fearleſs and confident of its own

proceedings. Whereas kingſhip, though looking
yet indeed moſt puſillanimous, full of fears, full of
ıuſies, ſtartled at every umbrage, as it hath been
rved of old to have ever ſuſpected moſt, and miſ-
ed them who were in moſt eſteem for virtue and
ɔrofity of mind, ſo it is now known to have moſt
ɔubt and ſuſpicion them who are moſt reputed to be
;ious. Queen Elizabeth, though herſelf accounted
ood a proteſtant, ſo moderate, ſo confident of her
e&s love, would never give way ſo much as to preſ-
ɔrian reformation in this land, though once and
n beſought, as Camden relates, but impriſoned and
ecuted the very propoſers thereof; alleging it as her
d and maxim unalterable, that ſuch reformation
ld diminiſh regal authority. What liberty of con-
ıce can we then expect of others, far worſe princi-
l from the cradle, trained up and governed by Popiſh
Spaniſh counſels, and on ſuch depending hitherto
ſubſiſtence? Eſpecially what can this laſt parliament
ect, who having revived lately and publiſhed the
ɔnant, have reengaged themſelves, never to readmit
copacy? Which no ſon of Charles returning but will
t certainly bring back with him, if he regard the
and ſtricteſt charge of his father, "to perſevere in,
the doctrine only, but government of the church of
;land; not to neglect the ſpeedy and effectual ſup-
ſing of errours and ſchiſms;" among which he ac-
nted preſbytery one of the chief. Or if, notwith-
ding that charge of his father, he ſubmit to the cove-
t, how will he keep faith to us, with diſobedience to
; or regard that faith given, which muſt be founded
he breach of that laſt and ſolemneſt paternal charge,
the reluctance, I may ſay the antipathy, which is in
ings, againſt preſbyterian and independent diſcipline?
they hear the goſpel ſpeaking much of liberty; a
d which monarchy and her biſhops both fear and
ɔ, but a free commonwealth both favours and pro-
ɔes; and not the word only, but the thing itſelf. But
our governors beware in time, leſt their hard mea-
ɔ to liberty of conſcience be found the rock whereon
y ſhipwreck themſelves, as others have now done be-
fore

fore them in the courſe wherein God was directing their ſteerage to a free commonwealth; and the abandoning of all thoſe whom they call ſectaries, for the detected falſehood and ambition of ſome, be a wilful rejection of their own chief ſtrength and intereſt in the freedom of all proteſtant religion, under what abuſive name ſoever calumniated.

The other part of our freedom conſiſts in the civil rights and advancements of every perſon according to his merit: the enjoyment of thoſe never more certain, and the acceſs to theſe never more open, than in a free commonwealth. Both which, in my opinion, may be beſt and ſooneſt obtained, if every country in the land were made a kind of ſubordinate commonalty or commonwealth, and one chief town or more, according as the ſhire is in circuit, made cities, if they be not ſo called already; where the nobility and chief gentry, from a proportionable compaſs of territory annexed to each city, may build houſes or palaces befitting their quality, may bear part in the government, make their own judicial laws, or uſe theſe that are, and execute them by their own elected judicatures and judges without appeal, in all things of civil government between man and man; ſo they ſhall have juſtice in their own hands, law executed fully and finally in their own counties and precincts, long wiſhed and ſpoken of, but never yet obtained; they ſhall have none then to blame but themſelves, if it be not well adminiſtered; and fewer laws to expect or fear from the ſupreme authority; or to thoſe that ſhall be made, of any great concernment to public liberty, they may, without much trouble in theſe commonalties, or in more general aſſemblies called to their cities from the whole territory on ſuch occaſion, declare and publiſh their aſſent or diſſent by deputies, within a time limited, ſent to the grand council; yet ſo as this their judgment declared ſhall ſubmit to the greater number of other counties or commonalties, and not avail them to any exemption of themſelves, or refuſal of agreement with the reſt, as it may in any of the United Provinces, being ſovereign within itſelf, ofttimes to the great diſadvantage of that union. In theſe employments they may, much

much better than they do now, exerciſe and fit themſelves till their lot fall to be choſen into the grand council, according as their worth and merit ſhall be taken notice of by the people. As for controverſies that ſhall happen between men of ſeveral counties, they may repair, as they do now, to the captial city, or any other more commodious, indifferent place, and equal judges. And this I find to have been practiſed in the old Athenian commonwealth, reputed the firſt and ancienteſt place of civility in all Greece; that they had in their ſeveral cities a peculiar, in Athens a common government; and their right, as it befel them, to the adminiſtration of both. They ſhould have here alſo ſchools and academies at their own choice, wherein their children may be bred up in their own ſight to all learning and noble education; not in grammar only, but in all liberal arts and exerciſes. This would ſoon ſpread much more knowledge and civility, yea, religion, through all parts of the land, by communicating the natural heat of government and culture more diſtributively to all extreme parts, which now lie numb and neglected, would ſoon make the whole nation more induſtrious, more ingenious at home; more potent, more honourable abroad. To this a free commonwealth will eaſily aſſent; (nay, the parliament hath had already ſome ſuch thing in deſign) for of all governments a commonwealth aims moſt to make the people flouriſhing, virtuous, noble, and high ſpirited. Monarchs will never permit; whoſe aim is to make the people wealthy indeed perhaps, and well fleeced, for their own ſhearing, and the ſupply of regal prodigality; but otherwiſe ſofteſt, baſeſt, viciouſeſt, ſervileſt, eaſieſt to be kept under: and not only in fleece, but in mind alſo ſheepiſheſt; and will have all the benches of judicature annexed to the throne, as a gift of royal grace, that we have juſtice done us: whenas nothing can be more eſſential to the freedom of a people, than to have the adminiſtration of juſtice, and all public ornaments, in their own election, and within their own bounds, without long travelling or depending upon remote places to obtain their right, or any civil accompliſhment; ſo it be not ſupreme, but ſubordinate to the general power and union

union of the whole republic. In which happy firmneſs, as in the particular above-mentioned, we ſhall alſo far exceed the United Provinces, by having, not as they (to the retarding and diſtracting ofttimes of their counſels or urgenteſt occaſions) many ſovereignties united in one commonwealth, but many commonwealths under one united and intruſted ſovereignty. And when we have our forces by ſea and land, either of a faithful army, or a ſettled militia, in our own hands, to the firm eſtabliſhing of a free commonwealth, public accounts under our own inſpection, general laws and taxes, with their cauſes in our own domeſtic ſuffrages, judicial laws, offices, and ornaments at home in our own ordering and adminiſtration, all diſtinction of lords and commoners, that may any way divide or ſever the public intereſt, removed; what can a perpetual ſenate have then, wherein to grow corrupt, wherein to encroach upon us, or uſurp? or if they do, wherein to be formidable? Yet if all this avail not to remove the fear or envy of a perpetual ſitting, it may be eaſily provided, to change a third part of them yearly, or every two or three years, as was above-mentioned; or that it be at thoſe times in the people's choice, whether they will change them, or renew their power, as they ſhall find cauſe.

I have no more to ſay at preſent: few words will ſave us, well conſidered; few and eaſy things, now ſeaſonably done. But if the people be ſo affected as to proſtitute religion and liberty to the vain and groundleſs apprehenſion, that nothing but kingſhip can reſtore trade, not remembering the frequent plagues and peſtilences, that then waſted this city, ſuch as through God's mercy we never have felt ſince; and that trade flouriſhes no where more than in the free commonwealths of Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries, before their eyes at this day; yet if trade be grown ſo craving and importunate through the profuſe living of tradeſmen, that nothing can ſupport it but the luxurious expenſes of a nation upon trifles or ſuperfluities; ſo as if the people generally ſhould betake themſelves to frugality, it might prove a dangerous matter, leſt tradeſmen ſhould mutiny for want of trading; and that therefore we muſt forego

and

ſet to ſale religion, liberty, honour, ſafety, all con-
ments divine or human, to keep up trading: if,
y, after all this light among us, the ſame reaſon ſhall
for current, to put our necks again under kingſhip,
as made uſe of by the Jews to return back to Egypt,
to the worſhip of their idol queen, becauſe they falſely
gined that they then lived in more plenty and proſ-
ty; our condition is not found but rotten, both in
ion and all civil prudence; and will bring us ſoon,
way we are marching, to thoſe calamities, which at-
always and unavoidably on luxury, all national
ments under foreign and domeſtic ſlavery: ſo
we ſhall be from mending our condition by mo-
hiſing our government, whatever new conceit
poſſeſſes us. However, with all hazard I have
ured what I thought my duty to ſpeak in ſea-
and to forewarn my country in time; wherein I
ot not but there be many wiſe men in all places and
ees, but am ſorry the effects of wiſdom are ſo little
among us. Many circumſtances and particulars I
d have added in thoſe things whereof I have ſpoken:
a few main matters now put ſpeedily in execution,
ſuffice to recover us, and ſet all right: and there
want at no time who are good at circumſtances;
men who ſet their minds on main matters, and ſuf-
ntly urge them, in theſe moſt difficult times I find
nany. What I have ſpoken, is the language of that
h is not called amiſs "The good old Cauſe:" if it
ſtrange to any, it will not ſeem more ſtrange, I hope,
convincing to backſliders. Thus much I ſhould
aps have ſaid, though I were ſure I ſhould have
en only to trees and ſtones; and had none to cry
ut with the prophet, "O earth, earth, earth!" to
he very ſoil itſelf, what her perverſe inhabitants
leaf to. Nay, though what I have ſpoke ſhould
en (which thou ſuffer not, who didſt create man-
free! nor thou next, who didſt redeem us from
ſervants of men!) to be the laſt words of our
ing liberty. But I truſt I ſhall have ſpoken per-
n to abundance of ſenſible and ingenuous men;
me perhaps, whom God may raiſe to theſe ſtones to
become

become children of reviving liberty; and may reclaim, though they ſeem now chooſing them a captain back for Egypt, to bethink themſelves a little, and conſider whither they are ruſhing; to exhort this torrent alſo of the people, not to be ſo impetuous, but to keep their due channel; and at length recovering and uniting their better reſolutions, now that they ſee already how open and unbounded the inſolence and rage is of our common enemies, to ſtay theſe ruinous proceedings, juſtly and timely fearing to what a precipice of deſtruction the deluge of this epidemic madneſs would hurry us, through the general defection of a miſguided and abuſed multitude.

BRIEF NOTES UPON A LATE SERMON TITLED, THE FEAR OF GOD AND THE KING;

Preached and ſince publiſhed,

By MATTHEW GRIFFITH, D. D.

And Chaplain to the late King.

Wherein many notorious Wreſtings of Scripture, and other Falſities, are obſerved.

I Affirmed in the preface of a late diſcourſe, intitled, "The ready Way to eſtabliſh a Free Commonwealth, and the Dangers of readmitting Kingſhip in this Nation," that the humour of returning to our old bondage was inſtilled of late by ſome deceivers; and to make good, that what I then affirmed was not without juſt ground, one of thoſe deceivers I preſent here to the people: and if I prove him not ſuch, refuſe not to be ſo accounted in his ſtead.

He begins in his epiſtle to the general *, and moves cunningly for a licence to be admitted phyſician both to church and ſtate; then ſets out his practice in phyſical terms, "a wholeſome electuary to be taken every morning next our hearts;" tells of the oppoſition which he met with from the college of ſtate phyſicians, then lays before you his drugs and ingredients; "Strong purgatives in the pulpit, contempered of the myrrh of mortification, the aloes of confeſſion and contrition, the rhu-

* Monk.

barb

barb of reſtitution and ſatisfaction;" a pretty fantaſtic doſe of divinity from a pulpit-mountebank, not unlike the fox, that turning pedlar, opened his pack of ware before the kid; though he now would ſeem, "to perſonate the good Samaritan," undertaking to "deſcribe the riſe and progreſs of our national malady, and to preſcribe the only remedy;" which how he performs, we ſhall quickly ſee.

Firſt, he would ſuborn St. Luke as his ſpokeſman to the general, preſuming, it ſeems, "to have had as perfect underſtanding of things from the very firſt," as the evangeliſt had of his goſpel; that the general, who hath ſo eminently born his part in the whole action, "might know the certainty of thoſe things" better from him a partial ſequeſtered enemy; for ſo he preſently appears, though covertly, and like the tempter, commencing his addreſs with an impudent calumny and affront to his excellence, that he would be pleaſed "to carry on what he had ſo happily begun in the name and cauſe" not of God only, which we doubt not, but "of his anointed," meaning the late king's ſon; to charge him moſt audaciouſly and falſely with the renouncing of his own public promiſes and declarations, both to the parliament and the army, and we truſt his actions ere long will deter ſuch inſinuating ſlanderers from thus approaching him for the future. But the general may well excuſe him; for the comforter himſelf ſcapes not his preſumption, avouched as falſely, to have empowered to those deſigns "him and him only," who hath ſolemnly declared the contrary. What fanatic, againſt whom he ſo often inveighs, could more preſumptuouſly affirm when the comforter hath empowered, than this anti-fanatic, as he would be thought?

The Text.

Prov. xxiv, 21, "My ſon, fear God and the king, and meddle not with them that be ſeditious, or deſirous of change," &c.

Letting paſs matters not in controverſy, I come to the main drift of your ſermon, the king; which word here

either to ſignify any ſupreme magiſtrate, or elſe your utter object of fear is not univerſal, belongs not at all to many parts of Chriſtendom, that have no king; and in particular not to us. That we have no king ſince the putting down of kingſhip in this commonwealth, is manifeſt by this laſt parliament, who, to the time of their diſſolving, not only made no addreſs at all to any king, but ſummoned this next to come by the writ formerly appointed of a free commonwealth, without reſtitution or the leaſt mention of any kingly right or power; which could not be, if there were at preſent any king of England. The main part therefore of your ſermon, if it mean a king in the uſual ſenſe, is either impertinent and abſurd, exhorting your auditory to fear that which is not; or if king here be, as it is underſtood, for any ſupreme magiſtrate, by your own exhortation they are in the firſt place not to meddle with you, as being yourſelf moſt of all the ſeditious meant here, and the "deſirous of change," in ſtirring them up to "fear a king," whom the preſent government takes no notice of.

You begin with a vain viſion, "God and the King at the firſt bluſh" (which will not be your laſt bluſh) "ſeeming to ſtand in your text like thoſe two cherubims on the mercy-ſeat, looking on each other." By this ſimilitude, your conceited ſanctuary, worſe than the altar of Ahaz, patterned from Damaſcus, degrades God to a cherub, and raiſes your king to be his collateral in place, notwithſtanding the other differences you put; which well agrees with the court-letters, lately publiſhed, from this lord to the other lord, that cry him up for no leſs than angelical and celeſtial.

Your firſt obſervation, pag. 8, is, "That God and the king are coupled in the text, and what the Holy Ghoſt hath thus firmly combined, we may not, we muſt not dare to put aſunder;" and yourſelf is the firſt man who puts them aſunder by the firſt proof of your doctrine immediately following, Judg. vii, 20, which couples the ſword of the Lord and Gideon, a man who not only was no king, but refuſed to be a king or monarch, when it was offered him, in the very next chapter, ver. 22, 23, "I will not rule over you, neither ſhall my

ſon rule over you; the Lord ſhall rule over you." Here we ſee, that this worthy heroic deliverer of his country thought it beſt governed, if the Lord governed it in that form of a free commonwealth, which they then enjoyed without a ſingle perſon. And thus is your firſt ſcripture abuſed, and moſt impertinently cited, nay, againſt yourſelf, to prove, that "kings at their coronation have a ſword given them," which you interpret "the militia, the power of life and death put into their hands," againſt the declared judgment of our parliaments, nay, of all our laws, which reſerve to themſelves only the power of life and death, and render you in their juſt reſentment of this boldneſs another Dr. Manwaring.

Your next proof is as falſe and frivolous, "The king," ſay you, "is God's ſword-bearer;" true, but not the king only: for Gideon, by whom you ſeek to prove this, neither was, nor would be a king; and as you yourſelf confeſs, pag. 40, "There be divers forms of government." "He bears not the ſword in vain," Rom. xiii, 4: This alſo is as true of any lawful rulers, eſpecially ſupreme; ſo that "Rulers," ver. 3, and therefore this preſent government, without whoſe authority you excite the people to a king, bear the ſword as well as kings, and as little in vain. "They fight againſt God, who reſiſt his ordinance, and go about to wreſt the ſword out of the hands of his anointed." This is likewiſe granted: but who is his anointed? Not every king, but they only who were anointed or made kings by his ſpecial command; as Saul, David, and his race, which ended in the Meſſiah, (from whom no kings at this day can derive their title) Jehu, Cyrus, and if any other were by name appointed by him to ſome particular ſervice: as for the reſt of kings, all other ſupreme magiſtrates are as much the Lord's anointed as they; and our obedience commanded equally to them all; "for there is no power but of God," Rom. xiii, 1: and we are exhorted in the goſpel to obey kings, as other magiſtrates, not that they are called any where the Lord's anointed, but as they are the "Ordinance of man," 1 Pet. ii, 13. You therefore and other ſuch falſe doctors, preaching kings to your auditory, as the Lord's only anointed, to with-

draw

draw people from the preſent government, by your own text are ſelf-condemned, and not to be followed, not to be "meddled with," but to be noted, as moſt of all others the "ſeditious and deſirous of change."

Your third proof is no leſs againſt yourſelf. Pſal. cv, 15, "Touch not mine anointed." For this is not ſpoken in behalf of kings, but ſpoken to reprove kings, that they ſhould not touch his anointed ſaints and ſervants, the ſeed of Abraham, as the verſe next before might have taught you: he reproved kings for their ſakes, ſaying, "Touch not mine anointed, and do my prophets no harm;" according to that, 2 Cor. i, 21, "He who hath anointed us, is God." But how well you confirm one wreſted ſcripture with another! 1 Sam. viii, 7, "They have not rejected thee, but me:" groſsly miſapplying theſe words, which were not ſpoken to any who had "reſiſted or rejected" a king, but to them who much againſt the will of God had ſought a king, and rejected a commonwealth, wherein they might have lived happily under the reign of God only, their king. Let the words interpret themſelves; ver. 6, 7, "But the thing diſpleaſed Samuel, when they ſaid, give us a king to judge us: and Samuel prayed unto the Lord. And the Lord ſaid unto Samuel, hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they ſay unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I ſhould not reign over them." Hence you conclude, "ſo indiſſoluble is the conjunction of God and the king." O notorious abuſe of ſcripture! whenas you ſhould have concluded, ſo unwilling was God to give them a king, ſo wide was the disjunction of God from a king. Is this the doctrine you boaſt of, to be "ſo clear in itſelf, and like a mathematical principle, that needs no farther demonſtration?" Bad logic, bad mathematics (for principles can have no demonſtration at all) but worſe divinity. O people of an implicit faith, no better than Romiſh, if theſe be thy prime teachers, who to their credulous audience dare thus juggle with ſcripture, to allege thoſe places for the proof of their doctrine, which are the plain refutation: and this is all the ſcripture which he brings to confirm his point.

1. The reſt of his preachment is mere groundleſs chat,

ſave here and there a few grains of corn ſcattered to entice the ſilly fowl into his net, interlaced here and there with ſome human reading, though ſlight, and not without geographical and hiſtorical miſtakes: as pag. 29, Suevia the German dukedom, for Suecia the Northern kingdom: Philip of Macedon, who is generally underſtood of the great Alexander's father only, made contemporary, pag. 31, with T. Quintus the Roman commander, inſtead of T. Quintius, and the latter Philip: and pag. 44, Tully cited "in his third oration againſt Verres," to ſay of him, "that he was a wicked conſul," who never was a conſul: nor "Trojan ſedition ever portrayed" by that verſe of Virgil, which you cite pag. 47, as that of Troy: ſchoolboys could have told you, that there is nothing of Troy in that whole portraiture, as you call it, of Sedition. Theſe groſs miſtakes may juſtly bring in doubt your other looſe citations, and that you take them up ſomewhere at the ſecond or third hand raſhly, and without due conſidering.

Nor are you happier in the relating or the moralizing your fable. "The frogs" (BEING ONCE A FREE NATION, ſaith the fable) "petitioned Jupiter for a king: he tumbled among them a log: they found it inſenſible; they petitioned then for a king that ſhould be active: he ſent them a crane" (a STORK, ſaith the fable) "which ſtraight fell to pecking them up." This you apply to the reproof of them who deſire change: whereas indeed the true moral ſhows rather the folly of thoſe who being free ſeek a king; which for the moſt part either as a log lies heavy on his ſubjects, without doing aught worthy of his dignity and the charge to maintain him, or as a ſtork is ever pecking them up, and devouring them.

But "by our fundamental laws, the king is the higheſt power," pag. 40. If we muſt hear mooting and law lectures from the pulpit, what ſhame is it for a doctor of divinity not firſt to conſider, that no law can be fundamental, but that which is grounded on the light of nature or right reaſon, commonly called moral Law: which no form of government was ever counted, but arbitrary and

and at all times in the choice of every free people, or their repreſenters? This choice of government is ſo eſſential to their freedom, that longer than they have it, they are not free. In this land not only the late king and his poſterity, but kingſhip itſelf hath been abrogated by a law; which involves with as good reaſon the poſterity of a king forfeited to the people, as that law heretofore of treaſon againſt the king, attainted the children with the father. This law againſt both king and kingſhip they who moſt queſtion, do not leſs queſtion all enacted without the king and his antiparliament at Oxford, though called mongrel by himſelf. If no law muſt be held good, but what paſſes in full parliament, then ſurely in exactneſs of legality no member muſt be miſſing: for look how many are miſſing, ſo many counties or cities that ſent them want their repreſenters. But if, being once choſen, they ſerve for the whole nation, then any number, which is ſufficient, is full, and moſt of all in times of diſcord, neceſſity, and danger. The king himſelf was bound by the old mode of parliaments, not to be abſent, but in caſe of ſickneſs, or ſome extraordinary occaſion, and then to leave his ſubſtitute; much leſs might any member be allowed to abſent himſelf. If the king then and many of the members with him, without leaving any in his ſtead, forſook the parliament upon a mere panic fear, as was that time judged by moſt men, and to levy war againſt them that ſat, ſhould they who were left ſitting, break up, or not dare enact aught of neareſt and preſenteſt concernment to public ſafety, for the punctilio wanting of a full number, which no lawbook in ſuch extraordinary caſes hath determined? Certainly if it were lawful for them to fly from their charge upon pretence of private ſafety, it was much more lawful for theſe to ſit and act in their truſt what was neceſſary for the public. By a law therefore of parliament, and of a parliament that conquered both Ireland, Scotland, and all their enemies in England, defended their friends, were generally acknowledged for a parliament both at home and abroad, kingſhip was aboliſhed: this law now of late hath been negatively repealed; yet kingſhip not politively reſtored, and I ſuppoſe never

was eſtabliſhed by any certain law in this land, nor poſſibly could be: for how could our forefathers bind us to any certain form of government, more than we can bind our poſterity? If a people be put to war with their king for his miſgovernment, and overcome him, the power is then undoubtedly in their own hands how they will be governed. The war was granted juſt by the king himſelf at the beginning of his laſt treaty, and ſtill maintained to be ſo by this laſt parliament, as appears by the qualification preſcribed to the members of this next enſuing, that none ſhall be elected, who have borne arms againſt the parliament ſince 1641. If the war were juſt, the conqueſt was alſo juſt by the law of nations. And he who was the chief enemy, in all right ceaſed to be the king, eſpecially after captivity, by the deciding verdict of war; and royalty with all her laws and pretenſions yet remains in the victor's power, together with the choice of our future government. Free commonwealths have been ever counted fitteſt and propereſt for civil, virtuous, and induſtrious nations, abounding with prudent men worthy to govern: monarchy fitteſt to curb degenerate, corrupt, idle, proud, luxurious people. If we deſire to be of the former, nothing better for us, nothing nobler than a free commonwealth: if we will needs condemn ourſelves to be of the latter, deſpairing of our own virtue, induſtry, and the number of our able men, we may then, conſcious of our own unworthineſs to be governed better, ſadly betake us to our befitting thraldom: yet chooſing out of our own number one who hath beſt aided the people, and beſt merited against tyranny, the ſpace of a reign or two we may chance to live happily enough, or tolerably. But that a victorious people ſhould give up themſelves again to the vanquiſhed, was never yet heard of, ſeems rather void of all reaſon and good policy, and will in all probability ſubject the ſubduers to the ſubdued, will expoſe to revenge, to beggary, to ruin, and perpetual bondage, the victors under the vanquiſhed: than which what can be more unworthy?

From miſinterpreting our law, you return to do again the ſame with ſcripture, and would prove the ſupremacy of

of Engliſh kings from 1 Pet. ii, 13, as if that were the apoſtle's work: wherein if he ſaith that "the king is ſupreme," he ſpeaks ſo of him but as an "ordinance of man," and in reſpect of thoſe "governors that are ſent by him," not in reſpect of parliaments, which by the law of this land are his bridle; in vain his bridle, if not alſo his rider: and therefore hath not only coordination with him, which you falſely call ſeditious, but hath ſuperiority above him, and that neither "againſt religion," nor "right reaſon:" no nor againſt common law; for our kings reigned only by law. But the parliament is above all poſitive law, whether civil or common, makes or unmakes them both; and ſtill the latter parliament above the former, above all the former lawgivers, then certainly above all precedent laws, entailed the crown on whom it pleaſed; and as a great lawyer ſaith, "is ſo tranſcendent and abſolute, that it cannot be confined either for cauſes or perſons, within any bounds." But your cry is, no parliament without a king. If it be ſo, we have never had lawful kings, who have all been created kings either by ſuch parliaments, or by conqueſt: if by ſuch parliaments, they are in your allowance none: if by conqueſt, that conqueſt we have now conquered. So that as well by your own aſſertion as by ours, there can at preſent be no king. And how could that perſon be abſolutely ſupreme, who reigned, not under law only, but under oath of his good demeanour, given to the people at his coronation, ere the people gave him his crown? and his principal oath was to maintain thoſe laws, which the people ſhould chooſe. If then the law itſelf, much more he who was but the keeper and miniſter of law, was in their choice, and both he ſubordinate to the performance of his duty ſworn, and our ſworn allegiance in order only to his performance.

You fall next on the conſiſtorian Schiſmatics; for ſo you call Preſbyterians, pag. 40, and judge them to have "enervated the king's ſupremacy by their opinions and practice, differing in many things only in terms from popery;" though ſome of thoſe principles, which you there cite concerning kingſhip, are to be read in Ariſtotle's Politics, long ere popery was thought on. The

preſbyterians therefore it concerns to be well forewarned of you betimes; and to them I leave you.

As for your examples of ſeditious men, pag. 54, &c., Cora, Abſalom, Zimri, Sheba, to theſe you might with much more reaſon have added your own name, who "blow the trumpet of ſedition" from your pulpit againſt the preſent government: in reward whereof they have ſent you by this time, as I hear, to your "own place," for preaching open ſedition, while you would ſeem to preach againſt it.

As for your Appendix annexed of the "Samaritan revived," finding it ſo foul a libel againſt all the well-affected of this land, ſince the very time of ſhipmoney, againſt the whole parliament, both lords and commons, except thoſe that fled to Oxford, againſt the whole reformed church, not only in England and Scotland, but all over Europe (in compariſon whereof you and your prelatical party are more truly ſchiſmatics and ſectarians, nay, more properly fanatics in your fanes and gilded temples, than thoſe whom you revile by thoſe names) and meeting with no more ſcripture or ſolid reaſon in your "Samaritan wine and oil," than hath already been found ſophiſticated and adulterate, I leave your malignant narrative, as needing no other confutation, than the juſt cenſure already paſſed upon you by the council of ſtate.

ACCEDENCE

COMMENCED

GRAMMAR,

Supplied with ſufficient

RULES

For the Uſe of ſuch as, Younger or Elder, are deſirous, without more trouble than needs, to attain the LATIN TONGUE; the elder Sort eſpecially, with little Teaching, and their own Induſtry.

TO THE READER.

IT hath been long a general Complaint, not without cauſe, in the bringing up of youth, and ſtill is, that the tenth part of man's life, ordinarily extended, is taken up in learning, and that very ſcarcely, the LATIN TONGUE. Which tardy proficience may be attributed to ſeveral cauſes: in particular, the making two labours of one, by learning firſt the Accedence, then the Grammar in Latin, ere the language of thoſe rules be underſtood. The only remedy of this was to join both books into one, and in the Engliſh Tongue; whereby the long way is much abbreviated, and the labour of underſtanding much more eaſy: a work ſuppoſed not to have been done formerly; or if done, not without ſuch difference here in brevity and alteration, as may be found of moment. That of Grammar, touching letters and ſyllables, is omitted, as learnt before, and little different from the Engliſh Spelling-book; eſpecially ſince few will be perſuaded, to pronounce Latin otherwiſe than their own Engliſh. What will not come under rule, by reaſon of the much variety in declenſion, gender, or conſtruction, is alſo here omitted, leſt the courſe and clearneſs of method be clogged with catalogues inſtead of rules, or too much interruption between rule and rule: which

Linaker,

Linaker, ſetting down the various idioms of many verbs, was forced to do by alphabet; and therefore, though very learned, not thought fit to be read in ſchools. But in ſuch words, a dictionary ſtored with good authorities will be found the readieſt guide. Of figurate conſtruction, what is uſeful is digeſted into ſeveral rules of Syntaxis: and Profody, after this Grammar well learned, will not need to be Engliſhed for him who hath a mind to read it. Account might be now given what addition or alteration from other Grammars hath been here made, and for what reaſon. But he who would be ſhort in teaching, muſt not be long in prefacing: the book itſelf follows, and will declare ſufficiently to them who can diſcern.

ACCEDENCE

COMMENCED

GRAMMAR.

LATIN Grammar is the art of right underſtanding, ſpeaking, or writing Latin, obſerved from them who have ſpoken or written it beſt.

Grammar hath two parts: right-wording, uſually called Etymology; and right joining of words, or Syntaxis.

Etymology, or right-wording, teacheth what belongs to every ſingle word or part of ſpeech.

Of Latin Speech are eight General Parts.

Noun Pronoun Verb Participle	Declined.	Adverb Conjunction Prepoſition Interjection	Undeclined.

DECLINED are thoſe words which have divers endings; as homo a man, hominis of a man; amo I love, amas thou loveſt. Undeclined are thoſe words which have but one ending, as bene well, cum when, tum then.

Nouns, pronouns, and participles, are declined with gender, number, and caſe; verbs, as hereafter in the verb.

Of Genders.

GENDERS are three, the maſculine, feminine, and neuter. The maſculine may be declined with this article hic, as hic vir a man; the feminine with this article, hæc, as hæc mulier a woman; the neuter with this article hoc, as hoc ſaxum a ſtone.

Of the maſculine are generally all nouns belonging to the male kind, as alſo the names of rivers, months, and winds.

Of

Of the feminine, all nouns belonging to the female kind, as alſo the names of countries, cities, trees, ſome few of the two latter excepted: of cities, as Agragas and Sulmo, maſculine; Argos, Tibur, Præneſte, and ſuch as end in um, neuter; Anxur both. Of trees, oleaſter and ſpinus, maſculine: but oleaſter is read alſo feminine, Cic. Verr. 4. Acer, ſiler, ſuber, thus, robur, neuter.

And of the neuter are all nouns, not being proper names, ending in um, and many others.

Some nouns are of two genders, as hic or hæc dies a day; and all ſuch may be ſpoken both of male and female, as hic or hæc parens a father or mother: ſome be of three, as hic hæc and hoc felix happy.

Of Numbers.

Words declined have two numbers, the ſingular and the plural. The ſingular ſpeaketh but of one, as lapis a ſtone. The plural of more than one, as lapides ſtones; yet ſometimes but of one, as Athenæ the city of Athens, literæ an epiſtle, ædes ædium a houſe.

Note, that ſome nouns have no ſingular, and ſome no plural, as the nature of their ſignification requires. Some are of one gender in the ſingular; of another, or two genders in the plural, as reading will beſt teach.

Of Caſes.

Nouns, pronouns, and participles are declined with ſix endings, which are called caſes, both in the ſingular and plural number. The nominative, genitive, dative, accuſative, vocative, and ablative.

The nominative is the firſt caſe, and properly nameth the thing, as liber a book.

The genitive is engliſhed with this ſign of, as libri of a book.

The dative with this ſign to, or for, as libro to or for a book.

The accuſative hath no ſign.

The vocative calleth or ſpeaketh to, as O liber, O book, and is commonly like the nominative.

But in the neuter gender the nominative, accuſative, and

l vocative, are like in both numbers, and in the ral end always in a.

The ablative is engliſhed with theſe ſigns, in, with, of, from, by, and ſuch like, as de libro of or from the ok, pro libro for the book; and the ablative plural is ays like the dative.

Note, that ſome nouns have but one ending through all caſes, as frugi, nequam, nihil; and all words number from three to a hundred, as quatuor four, nque five, &c.

ome have but one, ſome two, ſome three caſes only, he ſingular or plural, as uſe will beſt teach.

Of a Noun.

A Noun is the name of a thing, as manus a hand, nus a houſe, bonus good, pulcher fair.

Nouns be ſubſtantives or adjectives.

A noun ſubſtantive is underſtood by itſelf, as homo a n, domus a houſe.

An adjective, to be well underſtood, requireth a ſub- ıtive to be joined with it, as bonus good, parvus le, which cannot be well underſtood unleſs ſomething d or little be either named, as bonus vir, a good man, vus puer a little boy; or by uſe underſtood, as honeſ- ı an honeſt thing, boni good men.

The Declining of Subſtantives.

Nouns ſubſtantives have five declenſions or forms of ling their caſes, chiefly diſtinguiſhed by the different ling of their genitive ſingular.

The firſt Declenſion.

The firſt is when the genitive and dative ſingular end æ, &c., as in the example following.

Singular.	Plural.
No. Voc. Abl. muſa	Nom. Voc. muſæ
Gen. Dat. muſæ	Gen. muſarum
Acc. muſam.	Dat. Abl. muſis
	Acc. muſas.

This one word familia joined with pater, mater, filius, or

or filia, endeth the genitive in as, as pater familias, but ſometimes familiæ. Dea, mula, equa, liberta, make the dative and ablative plural in abus; filia and nata in is or abus.

The firſt declenſion endeth always in a, unleſs in ſome words derived of the Greek: and is always of the feminine gender, except in names attributed to men, according to the general rule, or to ſtars, as cometa, planeta.

Nouns, and eſpecially proper names derived of the Greek, have here three endings, as, es, e, and are declined in ſome of their caſes after the Greek form. Æneas, acc. Æneam, voc. Ænea; Anchiſes, acc. Anchiſen, voc. Anchiſe, or Anchiſa, abl. Anchiſe. Penelope, Penelopes, Penelopen, voc. abl. Penelope. Sometimes following the Latin, as Marſya, Philocteta, for as and es; Philoctetam, Eriphylam, for an and en. Cic.

The ſecond Declenſion.

The ſecond is when the genitive ſingular endeth in i, the dative in o, &c.

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. Voc. liber	Nom. Voc. libri
Gen. libri	Gen. librorum
Dat. Abl. libro	Dat. Abl. libris
Acc. librum.	Acc. libros.

Note, that when the nominative endeth in us, the vocative ſhall end in e, as dominus ô domine, except deus ô deus. And theſe following, agnus, lucus, vulgus, populus, chorus, fluvius, e or us.

When the nominative endeth in ius, if it be the proper name of a man, the vocative ſhall end in i, as Georgius ô Georgi; hereto add filius ô fili, and genius ô geni.

All nouns of the ſecond declenſion are of the maſculine or neuter gender; of the maſculine, ſuch as end in er, or, or us, except ſome few, humus, domus, alvus, and others derived of the Greek, as methodus, antidotus, and the like, which are of the feminine, and ſome of them ſometimes alſo maſculine, as atomus, phaſelus; to which add ficus the name of a diſeaſe, groſſus, pampinus, and rubus.

Thoſe

Thoſe of the neuter, except virus, pelagus, and vulgus which laſt is ſometimes maſculine) end all in um, and are declined as followeth:

Sing.	Plur.
No. Ac. Vo. ſtudium	No. Ac. Voc. ſtudia
Gen. ſtudii	Gen. ſtudiorum
Dat. Abl. ſtudio.	Dat. Abl. ſtudiis.

Some nouns in this declenſion are of the firſt example ſingular, of the ſecond plural, as Pergamus the city Troy, plur. hæc Pergama; and ſome names of hills, as Mænalus, Iſmarus, hæc Iſmara; ſo alſo Tartarus, and the lake Avernus; others are of both, as ſibilus, jocus, locus, hi oci, or hæc loca. Some are of the ſecond example ſingular, of the firſt plural, as Argos, cœlum, plur. hi cœli; others of both, as raſtrum, capiſtrum, filum, frænum; plur. fræni or fræna. Nundinum, & epulum, are of the firſt declenſion plural, nundinæ, epulæ; balneum of both, balneæ or balnea.

Greek proper names have here three endings, os, on, and us long from a Greek diphthong. Hæc Delos, hanc Delon. Hoc Ilion. The reſt regular, Hic Panthus, & Panthu, Virg.

The third Declenſion.

The third is when the genitive ſingular endeth in is, the dative in i, the accuſative in em, the ablative in e, and ſometimes in i; the Nom. Acc. Voc. plural in es, the genitive in um, and ſometimes in ium, &c.

Sing.	Plur.
No. Gen. Vo. panis	Nom. Acc. Voc. panes
Dat. pani	Gen. panum
Acc. panem	Dat. Abl. panibus.
Abl. pane.	

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. Voc. parens	No. Ac. Voc. parentes
Gen. parentis	Gen. parentum
Dat. parenti	Dat. Abl. parentibus.
Acc. parentem	
Abl. parente.	

This third declenſion, with many endings, hath all genders,

genders, beſt known by dividing all nouns hereto belonging into ſuch as either increaſe one ſyllable long or ſhort in the genitive, or increaſe not at all.

Such as increaſe not in the genitive are generally feminine, as nubes nubis, caro carnis.

Except ſuch as end in er, as hic venter ventris, and theſe in is following, natalis, aqualis, lienis, orbis, collis, caulis, collis, follis, menſis, enſis, fuſtis, funis, panis, penis, crinis, ignis, caſſis, faſcis, torris, piſcis, unguis, vermis, vectis, poſtis, axis, and the compounds of aſſis, as centuſſis.

But canalis, finis, clunis, reſtis, ſentis, amnis, corbis, linter, torquis, anguis, hic or hæc: to theſe add vepres.

Such as end in e are neuters, as mare, rete, and two Greek in es, as hippomanes, cacoëthes.

Nouns increaſing long.

Nouns increaſing one ſyllable long in the genitive are generally feminine, as hæc pietas pietatis, virtus virtutis.

Except ſuch as end in ans maſculine, as dodrans, quadrans, ſextans; in ens, as oriens, torrens, bidens, a pickaxe.

In or, moſt commonly derived of verbs, as pallor, clamor; in o, not thence derived, as ternio, ſenio, ſenio, temo, and the like.

And theſe of one ſyllable, ſal, ſol, ren, ſplen, as, bes, pes, mos, flos, ros, dens, mons, pons, fons, grex.

And words derived from the Greek in en, as lichen, in er, as crater; in as, as adamas; in es, as lebes; to theſe, hydrops, thorax, phœnix.

But ſcrobs, rudens, ſtirps, the body or root of a tree, and calx a heel, hic or hæc.

Neuter, theſe of one ſyllable, mel, fel, lac, far, ver, cor, æs, vas vaſis, os oſſis, os oris, rus, thus, jus, crus, pus. And of more ſyllables in al and ar, as capital, laquear, but halec hoc or hæc.

Nouns increaſing ſhort.

Nouns increaſing ſhort in the genitive are generally maſculine, as hic ſanguis ſanguinis, lapis lapidis.

Except,

:cept, feminine all words of many ſyllables ending in
· go, as dulcedo, compago; arbor, hyems, cuſpis,
s pecudis: Theſe in ex, forfex, carex, tomex, ſupel-
In ix, appendix, hiſtrix, coxendix, filix; Greek
s, in as and is, as lampas, iaspis: To theſe add chla-
bacchar, findon, icon.
ıt margo, cinis, pulvis, adeps, forceps, pumex, ra-
imbrex, obex, ſilex, cortex, onyx, and ſardonyx,
r hæc.
:uters are all ending in a, as problema; in en, ex-
hic pecten; in ar, as jubar; in er theſe, verber,
uber, cadaver, zinziber, laſer, cicer, ſiſer, piper, pa-
r, ſometimes in ur, except hic furfur, in us, as onus,
, as caput; to theſe marmor, æquor, ador.
reek proper names here end in as, an, is, and ens,
may be declined ſome wholly after the Greek form,
ıllas, Pallados, Palladi, Pallada; others in ſome caſes,
tlas, acc. Atlanta, voc. Atla. Garamas, plur. Gara-
tes, acc. Garamantas. Pan, Panos, Pana. Phyllis,
llidos, voc. Phylli, plur. Phyllides, acc. Phyllidas.
ıys, Tethyos, acc. Tethyn, voc. Tethy. Neapolis
polios, acc. Neapolin. Paris, Paridos or Parios, acc.
ıa, or Parin. Orpheus, Orpheos, Orphei, Orphea,
heu. But names in eus borrow ſometimes their
tive of the ſecond declenſion, as Erechtheus, Erech-
Cic. Achilles or Achilleus, Achillei; and ſome-
s their accuſative in on or um, as Orpheus Orpheon,
ſeus Theſeum, Perſeus Perſeum, which ſometimes is
ıed after Greek words of the firſt declenſion; Latin,
eus or Perſes, Perſæ Perſæ Perſen Perſæ Perſa.

The fourth Declenſion.

HE fourth is when the genitive ſingular endeth in
he dative ſingular in ui, and ſometimes in u, plural
us, and ſometimes in ubus.

Sing.	Plur.
No. Ge. Vo. ſenſus	No. Ac. Vo. ſenſus
Dat. ſenſui	Gen. ſenſuum
Acc. ſenſum.	Dat. Abl. ſenſibus.
Abl. ſenſu.	

The fourth declenſion hath two endings, us us generally maſculine, except ſome few, as hæc ficus, the fruit of a tree, acus, porticus, tribus, bu and ſpecus hic or hæc. U of the neuter, as gelu veru; but in the ſingular moſt part defective.

Proper names in os and o long, pertaining to th declenſion Greek, may belong beſt to the fourth i as Androgeos, Gen. Androgeo, Ac. Androge Athos, hunc Atho, Virg.; hæc Sappho, Gen. S Acc. Sappho. Better authors follow the Lati as Dido Didonis Didonem. But Jeſus Jeſu Jeſu Jeſu.

The fifth Declenſion.

THE fifth is when the genitive and dative ſ end in ei, &c.

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. Voc. res	No. Ac. Voc. res
Gen. Dat. rei	Gen. rerum
Acc. rem	Dat. Abl. rebus.
Abl. re.	

All nouns of the fifth declenſion are of the fe gender, except dies hic or hæc, and his compoun ridies hic only.

Some nouns are of more declenſions than one, vaſis of the third in the ſingular, of the ſecond i plural vaſa vaſorum. Colus, laurus, and ſome o of the ſecond and fourth. Saturnalia, ſaturnali ſaturnaliorum, ſaturnalibus, and ſuch other nam feaſts. Poëmatum, poëmatis or poëmatibus, of t cond and third plural. Plebs of the third and plebis or plebei.

The Declining of Adjectives.

A NOUN adjective is declined with three terminati or with three articles.

An adjective of three terminations is declined lik firſt and ſecond declenſion of ſubſtantives joined tog after this manner.

S

Sing.	Plur.
N. bonus bona bonum	No. Vo. boni bonæ bona
G. boni bonæ boni	G. bonorum bonarum bonorum
D. bono bonæ bono	Dat. Abl. bonis
A. bonum bonam bonum	A. bonos bonas bona
V. bone bona bonum	
A. bono bona bono.	

In like manner thoſe in er and ur, as ſacer ſacra ſacrum, ſaturus ſatura ſaturum; but unus, totus, ſolus, alius, alter, ullus, uter, with their compounds neuter, uterque, and the like, make their genitive ſingular in ius, the dative in i, as unus una unum, Gen. unius. Dat. uni, in all the reſt like bonus, ſave that alius maketh in the neuter gender aliud, and in the dative alii, and ſometimes in the genitive.

Ambo and duo be thus declined in the plural only.

Nom. Voc. ambo ambæ ambo.
Gen. amborum ambarum amborum.
Dat. Abl. ambobus ambabus ambobus.
Acc. ambos or ambo, ambas ambo.

Adjectives of three articles have in the nominative either one ending, as hic, hæc, & hoc felix; or two, as hic & hæc triſtis & hoc triſte; and are declined like the third declenſion of ſubſtantives, as followeth.

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. hic hæc & hoc felix	Nom. hi & hæ felices, & hæc felicia
Gen. felicis	Gen. felicium
Dat. felici	Dat. Abl. felicibus
Acc. hunc & hanc felicem, & hoc felix.	Acc. hos & has felices, & hæc felicia
Voc. ô felix.	Voc. ô felices, & ô felicia.
Abl. felice or felici.	

Sing.	Plur.
No. hic & hæc triſtis & hoc triſte	Nom. hi & hæ triſtes & hæc triſtia
Gen. triſtis	Gen. triſtium
Dat. Abl. triſti	Dat. Abl. triſtibus
Ac. hunc & hanc triſtem, & hoc triſte	Ac. hos & has triſtes, & hæc triſtia
Voc. ô triſtis, & ô triſte.	Voc. ô triſtes, & ô triſtia.

There be alſo another ſort which have in the n native caſe three terminations and three articles, a acer, hic & hæc acris, hoc acre. In like manner b clined equeſter, volucer, and ſome few others, bei all other caſes like the examples beforegoing.

Compariſons of Nouns.

Adjectives, whoſe ſignification may increaſe diminiſhed, may form compariſon, whereof the two degrees above the poſitive word itſelf, The parative, and ſuperlative.

The poſitive ſignifieth the thing itſelf without paring, as durus hard.

The comparative exceedeth his poſitive in ſignifica compared with ſome other, as durior harder; a formed of the firſt caſe of his poſitive that endeth by putting thereto or and us, as of duri, hic & hæ rior, & hoc durius: of dulci, dulcior, dulcius.

The ſuperlative exceedeth his poſitive in the hi degree, as duriſſimus hardeſt; and it is formed o firſt caſe of his poſitive that endeth in is, by pu thereto ſimus, as of duris duriſſimus, dulcis dulciſſi

If the poſitive end in er, the ſuperlative is form the nominative caſe by putting to it rimus, as pu pulcherrimus. Like to theſe are vetus veterrimus turus maturimus; but dexter dexterrimus, and ſi ſiniſterior, ſiniſterrimus.

All theſe nouns ending in lis make the ſuperlati changing is into limus, as humilis, ſimilis, facilis, g lis, agilis, docilis docillimus.

All other nouns ending in lis do follow the ge rule, as utilis utiliſſimus.

Of theſe poſitives following are formed a differen of ſuperlatives; of ſuperus, ſupremus and ſummus; i rus, infimus and imus; exterus, extimus and extre poſterus poſtremus.

Some of theſe want the poſitive, and are formed adverbs; of intra, interior intimus, ultra ulterior timus, citra citerior citimus, pridem prior primus, p propior proximus.

Ot

Others from poſitives without caſe, as nequam, nequior, nequiſſimus.

Some alſo from no poſitive, as ocior ociſſimus. Some want the comparative, as novus noviſſimus, inclytus inclytiſſimus.

Some the ſuperlative, as ſenex ſenior, juvenis junior, adoleſcens adoleſcentior.

Some ending in us, frame their comparative as if they ended in ens, benevolus, maledicus, magnificus magnificentior magnificentiſſimus.

Theſe following are without rule, bonus melior optimus, malus pejor peſſimus, magnus major maximus, parvus minor minimus; multus plurimus, multa plurima, multum plus plurimum.

If a vowel come before us, it is compared with magis and maximè, as pius, magis pius, maximè pius; idoneus, magis and maximè idoneus. Yet ſome of theſe follow the general rule, as aſſiduus aſſiduiſſimus, ſtrenuus ſtrenuior, exiguus exiguiſſimus, tenuis tenuior tenuiſſimus.

Of a Pronoun.

A PRONOUN is a part of ſpeech that ſtandeth for a noun ſubſtantive, either preſent or before ſpoken of, as ille, he or that, hic this, qui who.

There be ten pronouns, ego, tu, ſui, ille, ipſe, iſte, hic, is, qui, and quis, beſides their compounds, egomet, tute, hicce, idem, quiſnam, aliquis, and ſuch others. The reſt ſo called, as meus, tuus, ſuus, noſter, veſter, noſtras, veſtras, cujus, and cujas, are not pronouns, but adjectives thence derived.

Of pronouns ſuch as ſhow the thing preſent are called demonſtratives, as ego, tu, hic; and ſuch as refer to a thing antecedent, or ſpoken of before, are called relatives, as qui who or which.

Quis, and often qui, becauſe they aſk a queſtion, are called interrogatives, with their compounds, ecquis, numquis.

Declenſions of Pronouns are three.

Ego, tu, ſui, be of the firſt declenſion, and be thus declined.

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. ego	Nom. Acc. nos
Gen. mei	Ge. noſtrum or noſtri
Dat. mihi	Dat. Abl. nobis
Acc. Abl. me	Voc. caret.
Voc. caret.	

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. Voc. tu	Nom. Acc. Voc. vos
Gen. tui	Ge. veſtrum or veſtri
Dat. tibi	Dat. Abl. vobis.
Acc. Abl. te.	

Sing.	Nom. Voc. caret	Dat. ſibi
Plur.	Gen. ſui	Acc. Abl. ſe.

From theſe three be derived meus, tuus, ſuus, noſter, veſter, noſtras, veſtras, (which are called poſſeſſives) whereof the former five be declined like adjectives of three terminations, except that meus in the vocative caſe maketh mi, mea, meum; noſtras, veſtras, with three articles, as hic & hæc noſtras, & hoc noſtras or noſtrate, veſtrate. In other caſes according to rule.

Theſe three, ille, iſte, ipſe, be of the ſecond declenſion, making their genitive ſingular in ius, their dative in i; and the former two be declined like the adjective alius, and the third like unus, before ſpoken of.

Sing.	No. ille illa illud,	Gen. illius, Dat. illi.
	No. iſte iſta iſtud,	Gen. iſtius, Dat. iſti.
	No. ipſe ipſa ipſum,	Gen. ipſius, Dat. ipſi.

Theſe four, hic, is, qui, and quis, be of the third declenſion, making their genitive ſingular in jus, with j conſonant, and be declined after this manner.

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. hic hæc hoc	Nom. hi hæ hæc
Gen. hujus	Gen. horum harum horum
Dat. huic	Dat. Abl. his
Acc. hunc hanc hoc	Acc. hos has hæc
Voc. caret	Voc. caret.
Abl. hoc hac hoc.	

Of iſte and hic is compounded iſtic, iſtæc, iſtoc or iſtuc. Acc. iſtunc, iſtanc, iſtoc or iſtuc. Abl. iſtoc, iſtac, iſtoc. Plu. iſtæc only.

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. is ea id	Nom. ii eæ ea
Gen. ejus	Gen. eorum earum eorum
Dat. ei	Dat. Abl. iis or eis
Acc. eum eam id	Acc. eos eas ea
Voc. caret	Voc. caret.
Abl. eo ea eo.	

Sing.	Plur.
Nom. qui quæ quod	Nom. qui quæ quæ
Gen. cujus	Gen. quorum quarum quorum
Dat. cui	Dat. Abl. quibus or queis
Acc. quem quam quod	Acc. quos quas quæ
Voc. caret	Voc. caret.
Ab. quo qua quo or qui.	

In like manner, quivis, quilibet, and quicunque the compounds.

Sing. Nom. quis, qua or quæ, quid, Gen. &c. like qui. So quiſquam, quiſnam, compounds.

Of quis are made theſe pronoun adjectives, cujus cuja cujum, whoſe; and hic & hæc cujus and hoc cujate, of what nation.

Quiſquis is defective, and thus declined,

No.	Quiſquis / Quicquid.	Ac.	Quicquid	Ab.	Quoquo / Quaqua / Quoquo.

Of a Verb.

A VERB is a part of ſpeech, that betokeneth being, as ſum I am; or doing, as laudo I praiſe; and is declined with mood, tenſe, number, and perſon.

Moods.

THERE be four moods, which expreſs the manner of doing; the indicative, the imperative, the potential or ſubjunctive, and the infinitive.

The indicative mood ſhoweth or declareth, as laudo I praiſe.

The imperative biddeth or exhorteth, as lauda praiſe thou.

The potential or ſubjunctive is engliſhed with theſe ſigns, may, can, might, would, could, ſhould: or without them as the indicative, if a conjunction go before or follow; as laudem, I may or can praiſe. Cum laudarem when I praiſed. Caviſſem, ſi prævidiſſem, I had bewared if I had foreſeen.

The infinitive is engliſhed with this ſign to, as laudare to praiſe.

Tenſes.

THERE be three tenſes which expreſs the time of doing: the preſent, the preterit or paſt, and the future.

The preſent tenſe ſpeaketh of the time that now is, as laudo I praiſe.

The preterit ſpeaketh of the time paſt, and is diſtinguiſhed by three degrees: the preterimperfect, the preterperfect, and the preterpluperfect.

The preterimperfect ſpeaketh of the time not perfectly paſt, as laudabam I praiſed or did praiſe.

The preterperfect ſpeaketh of the time perfectly paſt, as laudavi I have praiſed.

The preterpluperfect ſpeaketh of the time more than perfectly paſt, as laudaveram I had praiſed.

The future tenſe ſpeaketh of the time to come, as laudabo I ſhall or will praiſe.

Perſons.

THROUGH all moods, except the infinitive, there be three perſons in both numbers, as, Sing. laudo I praiſe, laudas thou praiſeſt, laudat he praiſeth; plur. laudamus we praiſe, laudatis ye praiſe, laudant they praiſe. Except ſome verbs which are declined or formed in the third perſon only, and have before them this ſign, it, as tædit it irketh, oportet it behoveth, and are called impersonals.

The verb which betokeneth being is properly the verb ſum only, which is therefore called a verb ſubſtantive, and formed after this manner.

Indicative.

Indicative.

Preſ. ſing.	I am. Sum, es, eſt, Plur. ſumus, eſtis, ſunt.
Pret. imp.	I was. Eram, eras, erat, Pl. eramus, eratis, erant.
Pret. perfect.	I have been. Fui, fuiſti, fuit, Plur. fuimus, fuiſtis, fuerunt or fuere.
Pret. plup.	I had been. Fueram, fueras, fuerat, Pl. fueramus, fueratis, fuerant.
Future.	I ſhall or will be. Ero, eris, erit, Pl. erimus, eritis, erunt.

Imperative.

	Be thou,						
Sing.	Sis, es eſto,	Sit, eſto.	Plur.	Si- mus,	Sitis, eſte, eſtote,	Sint, ſunto.	

Potential.

Preſ. ſing.	I may or can be. Sim, ſis, ſit, Pl. ſimus ſitis, ſint.
Preter. imperf.	I might or could be. Eſſem or forem, es, et, Pl. eſſemus, eſſetis, eſſent or forent.
Preter. perfect.	I might or could have been. Fuerim, ris, rit, Pl. rimus, ritis, rint.
Preterplup. with a conjunction Si	If I had been. Fuiſſem, es, et. Pl. emus, etis, ent.
Future. Si	If I ſhall be, or ſhall have been. Fuero, ris, rit, Pl. rimus, ritis, rint.

Infinitive.

Preſ. and preter-imperf.	Eſſe, to be	Preter-perfect, & pret. pluper.	Fuiſſe, to have or had been.
Future.	Fore, to be hereafter.		

In

In like manner are formed the compounds; abſum, adſum, deſum, obſum, præſum, proſum, poſſum; but poſſum ſomething varies after this manner.

Indicat. Pref. Sing. Poſſum, potes, poteſt, Plur. poſſumus, poteſtis, poſſunt. The other are regular, poteram, potui, potueram, potero.

Imperative it wants.

Potent. Pref. Poſſum, &c. Preterimperfect, Poſſem.

Infin. Pref. Poſſe. Preterit. Potuiſſe.

Voices.

In Verbs that betoken Doing are two voices, the Active and the Paſſive.

The Active ſignifieth to do, and always endeth in o, as doceo I teach.

The Paſſive ſignifieth what is done to one by another, and always endeth in or, as doceor I am taught.

From theſe are to be excepted two ſorts of verbs. The firſt are called Neuters, and cannot take or in the paſſive, as curro I run, ſedeo I ſit; yet ſignify ſometimes paſſively, as vapulo I am beaten.

The ſecond are called Deponents, and ſignify actively, as loquor I ſpeak; or neuters, as glorior I boaſt: but are formed like paſſives.

Conjugations.

Verbs both Active and Paſſive have four conjugations, or forms of declining, known and diſtinguiſhed by their infinitive mood active, which always endeth in re.

In the firſt conjugation, after a long, as laudare to praiſe.

In the ſecond, after e long, as habere to have.

In the third, after e ſhort, as legere to read.

In the fourth, after i long, as audire to hear.

In theſe four conjugations, verbs are declined or formed by mood, tenſe, number, and perſon, after theſe examples.

Indicative

Indicative Mood.

Preſent Tenſe.

Singular.			Plural.		
I	Thou	He	We	Ye	They
praiſe.	praiſeſt.	praiſeth.	praiſe.	praiſe.	praiſe.
Laudo,	laudas,	laudat,	laudamus,	laudatis,	laudant.
Habeo,	habes,	habet,	habemus,	habetis,	habent.
Lego,	legis,	legit,	legimus,	legitis,	legunt.
Audio,	audis,	audit,	audimus,	auditis,	audiunt.

Preter-imperfect tenſe ſing. Laudabam, Habebam, Legebam, Audiebam, — I praiſed, or did praiſe. bas, bat, Pl. bamus, batis, bant.

Preter-perfect tenſe ſing. Laudavi, Habui, Legi, Audivi — I have praiſed. iſti, it, Plur. imus, iſtis, erunt or ere.

Preter-pluperfect tenſe ſing. Laudaveram, Habueram, Legeram, Audiveram — I had praiſed. ras, rat, Pl. ramus, ratis, rant.

Future tenſe ſing. Laudabo, Habebo — bis, bit, Plur. bimus, bitis, bunt.

Future tenſe ſing. Legam, Audiam — es, et, Plur. emus, etis, ent.

Imperative Mood.

	Praiſe thou.	Let him praiſe.	Let us praiſe.	Praiſe ye.	Let them praiſe.
Pref. Sing.	Lauda, laudato.	Laudet, laudato.	Pl. Laudemus.	Laudate, laudatote.	Laudent, laudanto.
	Habe, habeto.	Habeat, habeto.	Pl. Habeamus.	Habete, habetote.	Habeant, habento.
	Lege, legito.	Legat, legito.	Pl. Legamus.	Legite, legitote.	Legant, legunto.
	Audi, audito.	Audiat audito.	Pl. Audiamus,	Audite, auditote.	Audiant, audiunto.

Potential

Potential Mood.

Laudem, laudes, laudet, Pl. laudemus, laudetis, laudent.

Preſent tenſe ſing. Habeam, Legam, Audiam, } as, at, Pl. amus, atis, ant.

Preterimperfect tenſe ſing. Laudarem, Haberem, Legerem, Audirem, } I might or could praiſe. res, ret, Plur. remus, retis, rent.

I might or could have praiſed.

Preter perfect tenſe ſing. Laudaverim, Habuerim, Legerim, Audiverim, } ris, rit, Pl. rimus, ritis, rint.

If I had praiſed.

Preterplu. ſing. with a Conjunction, Si Laudaviſſem, Habuiſſem, Legiſſem, Audiviſſem, } ſes, ſet, Plur. ſemus, ſetis, ſent.

If I ſhall praiſe, or ſhall have praiſed.

Future tenſe ſing. Si Laudavero, Habuero, Legero, Audivero, } ris, rit, Plur. rimus, ritis, rint.

Infinitive Mood.

Preſent and Preterimperfect tenſe. Laudare, Habere, Legere, Audire, } To { Praiſe. Have. Read. Hear.

Preterperfect & Preterpluperfect tenſe. Laudaviſſe, Habuiſſe, Legiſſe, Audiviſſe, } To have or had { Praiſed. Had. Read. Heard.

Verbs of the third Conjugation irregular in ſome Tenſes of the Active Voice.

Indicative

Indicative Mood.

Preſent Tenſe.

Singular.	Plural.
Volo, vis, vult,	Volumus, vultis, volunt.
Nolo,———	Nolumus——nolunt.
The reſt is want	ing in this Tenſe.
Malo, mavis,	Malumus, mavultis,
mavult,	malunt.

Preterit. { Volui. Nolui. Malui.

Volo and Malo want the Imperative Mood.

Imperative.

Sing. { Noli, Nolito. } Plur. { Nolite, Nolitote.

Potential.

Preſent tenſe ſing. { Velim, Nolim, Malim, } is, it, Pl. imus, itis, int.

Preterim-perfect tenſe ſing. { Vellem, Nollem, Mallem, } es, et, Pl. emus, etis, ent.

Infinitive.

Preſent. { Velle, Nolle, Malle.

Indicat. Preſ. Edo, edis or es, edit or eſt, Plur. editis or eſtis.

Imper. Ede or es. Edito or eſto. Edat, edito or eſto. Plur. Edite or eſte. Editote or eſtote.

Poten. Preterimperfect Tenſe, Ederem or eſſem.

Infinit. Edere or eſſe.

Verbs

Verbs of the fourth Conjugation irregular, in ſo Tenſes Active.

Eo, and queo with his compound nequeo, make eu and queunt in the plural indicative preſent, and in the preterimperfect ibam and quibam; their future, ibo a quibo.

Imperat. I, ito. Eat, ito. Plur. Eamus. Ite, itote. Ean eunto.

Potent. Eam, Irem, &c.

The forming of the Paſſive Voice.

Indicative.

I am praiſed.

Preſ. Sing.	Laudor, aris or are, atur,	Plur.	amur, amini, antur.
	Habeor, eris or ere, etur,		emur, emini, entur.
	Legor, eris or ere, itur,		imur, imini, untur.
	Audior, iris or ire, itur,		imur, imini, iuntur.

I was praiſed.

Preterim- perfect tenſe ſing.	Laudabar, Habebar, Legebar, Audiebar,	baris or bare, batur, Plur. bamur, bamini, bantur.

Note that the paſſive voice hath no preterperfect, nor the tenſes derived from thence in any mood.

I ſhall or will be praiſed.

Future tenſe ſing.	Laudabor, Habebor,	beris or bere, bitur, Plur. bimur, bimini, buntur.
	Legar, Audiar,	eris or ere, etur, Pl. emur, emini, entur.

Imperative.

Imperative.

	Be thou praiſed.	Let him be praiſed.	Let us be praiſed.	Be ye praiſed.	Let them be praiſed.
Preſent Singular.	Laudare, laudator.	Laudetur, laudator.	Pl. Laudemur.	Laudamini, laudaminor.	Laudentur, laudantor.
	Habere, habetor.	Habeatur, habetor.	Pl. Habeamur.	Habemini, habeminor.	Habeantur, habentor.
	Legere, legitor.	Legatur, legitor.	Pl. Legamur.	Legimini, legiminor.	Legantur, leguntor.
	Audire, auditor.	Audiatur, auditor.	Pl. Audiamur.	Audimini, audiminor.	Audiantur, audiuntor.

Potential.

I may or can be praiſed.

Preſent ſing.	Lauder, Habear, Legar, Audiar.	eris or ere, aris or are,	etur, atur, Plur. emur, amur, emini, amini, entur. antur.

I might or ſhould be praiſed.

Preterimperfect ſing.	Laudarer, Haberer, Legerer, Audirer,	reris or rere,	retur, Plur. remur, remini, rentur.

Infinitive.

Preſent and preterimperfect.	Laudari Haberi Legi Audiri	To be	Praiſed. Had. Read. Heard.

Verbs irregular in ſome Tenſes Paſſive.

EDOR, editor, or eſtur: the reſt is regular.

The verb Fio, is partly of the third, and partly of the fourth conjugation, and hath only the infinitive of the paſſive form.

Indicat. Pref. Sing. Fio, fis, fit, Plur. fimus, fitis, fiunt. Preterimperfect, Fiebam. Preterperfect it wants. Future, Fiam, &c.

Imperat.

Imperat. Fi, fito. Plur. Fite, fitote, Fiant, fiunto.
Poten. Pref. Fiam, &c. Preterimperfect. Fierem.
Infinit. Fieri.

Alſo this verb Fero, is contracted or ſhortened in ſome tenſes, both active and paſſive, as Fers, fert, for feris, ferit, &c.

Indicat. Pref. Sing. Fero, fers, fert. plu.—fertis—Preterperfect, Tuli.
Imperat. Fer ferto, &c. pl. Ferte, fertote.
Potent. Preterimperfect, Ferrem, &c.
Infinit. Ferre.

Paſſive.

Indic. Pref. Sing. Feror, ferris or ferre, fertur, &c.
Imperat. Sing. Ferre, fertor, &c.
Potent. Preterimperfect, Ferrer.
Infinit. Ferri.

Of Gerunds and Supines.

THERE be alſo belonging to the infinitive mood of all verbs certain voices called gerunds and ſupines, both of the active and paſſive ſignification.

The firſt gerund in di, as laudandi of praiſing or of being praiſed. The ſecond in do, as laudando in praiſing or in being praiſed. The third in dum, as laudandum to praiſe or to be praiſed.

Note that in the two latter conjugations the gerunds end ſometimes in undi, do, dum, as dicendi or dicundi: but from eo always eundi, except in the compound ambiendi.

Supines are two. The firſt ſignifieth actively, as laudatum to praiſe; the latter paſſively, as laudatu to be praiſed. Note that moſt neuters of the ſecond conjugation, and volo, nolo, malo, with many other verbs, have no ſupine.

Verbs of the four conjugations irregular in the preterfect tenſe or ſupines.

VERBS of the firſt conjugation form their preterperfect tenſe in avi, ſupine in atum, as laudo laudavi laudatum.

Except

Except

Poto potavi potatum or potum; neco necavi necatum or nectum.

Domo, tono, ſono, crepo, veto, cubo, form ui, itum, as cubui cubitum; but ſecui ſectum, fricui fictum, mico micui: yet ſome of theſe are found regular in the preterperfect tenſe or ſupine, eſpecially compounded, as increpavit, diſcrepavit, dimicavit, ſonatum, dimicatum, intonatum, infricatum, and the like.

Plico and his compounds form ui or avi, as explicui or explicavi, explicitum or explicatum; except ſupplico, and ſuch as are compounded with a noun, as duplico multiplico in avi only.

But lavo lavi lautum lotum or lavatum, juvo juvi, adjuvo adjuvi adjutum.

Do dedi datum. Sto ſteti ſtatum, in the compounds, ſtiti ſtitum, and ſometimes ſtatum, as præſto præſtiti præſtitum and præſtatum.

Verbs of the ſecond conjugation form their preterperfect tenſe in ui, their ſupine in itum, as habeo habui habitum.

Some are regular in their preterperfect tenſe, but not in their ſupines, as doceo docui doctum, miſceo miſcui miſtum, teneo tenui tentum, torreo torrui toſtum, cenſeo cenſui cenſum, pateo patui paſſum, careo carui caſſum and caritum.

Others are irregular both in preterperfect tenſe and ſupines, as jubeo juſſi juſſum, ſorbeo ſorbui and ſorpſi ſorptum, mulceo mulſi mulſum, luceo luxi.

Deo in di, as ſedeo ſedi ſeſſum, video vidi viſum, prandeo prandi pranſum. And ſome in ſi, as ſuadeo ſuaſi ſuaſum, rideo riſi riſum, ardeo arſi arſum. Four double their firſt letters, as pendeo pependi penſum, mordeo momordi morſum, ſpondeo ſpopondi ſponſum, tondeo totondi tonſum; but not in their compounds, as dependi dependſum.

Geo in ſi, and ſome in xi, as urgeo urſi, mulgeo mulſi

and mulxi mulctum, augeo auxi auctum, indulgeo indulsi indultum, frigeo frixi, lugeo luxi.

Ieo leo and neo, nevi, vieo vievi vietum: but cieo cievi citum, deleo delevi deletum, fleo flevi fletum, compleo complevi completum; as also the compounds of oleo, except redoleo and suboleo; but adolevi adultum, neo nevi netum, but maneo mansi, torqueo torsi tortum, hæreo hæsi.

Veo in vi, as ferveo fervi, but deferveo deferbui, conniveo connivi and connixi, movi motum, vovi votum, cavi cautum, favi fautum.

The third conjugation formeth the preterperfect tense by changing o of the present tense into i: the supine without certain rule, as lego legi lectum, bibo bibi bibitum, lambo lambi, scabo scabi, ico ici ictum, mando mandi mansum, pando pandi passum, edo edi esum or estum, in like manner comedo, the other compounds esum only; rudo rudi, fallo falli falsum, psallo psalli, emo emi emptum, viso visi visum, verto verti versum, solvo solvi solutum, volvo volvi volutum, exuo exui exutum, but ruo rui ruitum, in compound rutum, as deruo derutum; ingruo, metuo metui.

Others are irregular both in preterperfect tense and supine.

In bo, scribo scripsi scriptum, nubo nupsi nuptum, cumbo cubui cubitum.

In co, vinco vici victum, dico dixi dictum; in like manner duco; parco peperci and parsi parsum and parcitum.

In do, these three lose n, findo fidi fissum, scindo scidi scissum, fundo fudi fusum. These following, vado, rado, lædo, ludo, divido, trudo, claudo, plaudo, rodo, fisum, as rosi rosum, but cedo cessi cessum. These redouble their first letters in the preterperfect tense, but not compounded, as tundo tutudi tunsum, contundo contudi contusum, and so in other compounds. Pendo pependi pensum, dependo dependi, tendo tetendi tensum or tentum, contendo contendi, pedo pepedi peditum, cado cecidi casum, occido, recido recidi recasum. The other compounds have no supine. Cædo cecidi cæsum, occido occidi

occidi occiſum. To theſe add all the compounds of do in this conjugation, addo, credo, edo, dedo, reddo, perdo, abdo, obdo, condo, indo, trado, prodo, vendo vendidi venditum, except the double compound, obſcondo obſcondi.

In go, ago egi actum, dego degi, fatago fategi, frango fregi fractum, pango to join pegi pactum, pango to ſing panxi, ango anxi, jungo junxi junctum; but theſe five, fingo mingo pingo ſtringo ringo loſe n in their ſupines, as finxi fictum; ningo ninxi, figo fixi fixum, rego rexi rectum; diligo, negligo, intelligo, lexi lectum, ſpargo ſparſi ſparſum. Theſe double their firſt letter, tango tetigi tactum, but not in his compounds, as contingo contigi, pango to bargain pepigi pactum, pungo and repungo pupugi and punxi punctum, the other compounds punxi only.

Ho in xi, traho traxi tractum, veho vexi vectum.

In lo, vello velli and vulſi vulſum, colo colui cultum; excello, præcello, cellui celſum; alo alui alitum and altum. The reſt not compounded, double their firſt letter, fallo fefelli falſum, refello refelli, pello pepuli pulſum, compello compuli, cello ceculi, percello perculi and perculſi perculſum.

In mo, vomo vomui vomitum, tremo tremui, premo preſſi preſſum, como, premo, demo, ſumo, after the ſame manner as ſumpſi ſumptum.

In no, ſino ſivi ſitum, ſterno ſtravi ſtratum, ſperno ſprevi ſpretum, lino levi lini and livi litum, cerno crevi cretum, temno tempſi, contemno contempſi contemptum, gigno genui genitum, pono poſui poſitum, cano cecini cantum, concino concinui concentum.

In po, rumpo rupi ruptum, ſcalpo ſcalpſi ſcalptum; the reſt in ui, ſtrepo ſtrepui ſtrepitum.

In quo, linquo liqui, relinquo reliqui relictum, coquo coxi coctum.

In ro, verro verri and verſi verſum, ſero to ſow ſevi ſatum, in compound, ſitum, as inſerto inſitum; ſero of another ſignification moſt uſed in his compounds, aſſero, conſero, deſero, exero, ſerui ſertum; uro uſſi uſtum, gero geſſi geſtum, quæro quæſivi quæſitum, tero trivi tritum, curro, excurro, præcurro, cucurri curſum, the other compounds double not, as concurro concurri.

In ſo, accerſo, arceſſo, inceſſo, laceſſo, ivi itum, capeſſo both i and ivi, pinſo pinſui piſtum and pinſitum.

In ſco, paſco pavi paſtum; compeſco, diſpeſco, ui; poſco popoſci, diſco didici, quiniſco quexi, noſco novi notum, but agnoſco agnitum, cognoſco cognitum.

In to, ſiſto ſtiti ſtatum, flecto flexi flexum, pecto pexui and pexi pexum and pectitum, necto nexui and nexi nexum, plecto plexi plexum, ſterto ſtertui, meto meſſui meſſum, mitto miſi miſſum, peto petivi petitum.

In vo, vivo vixi victum.

In xo, texo texui textum, nexo nexui nexum.

In cio, facio feci factum, jacio jeci jactum, lacio lexi lectum, ſpecio ſpexi ſpectum, with their compounds, but elicio elicui elicitum.

In dio, fodio fodi foſſum.

In gio, fugio fugi fugitum.

In pio, capio cepi captum, rapio rapui raptum, cupio cupivi cupitum, ſapio ſapui and ſapivi ſapitum.

In rio, pario peperi partum.

In tio, quatio quaſſi quaſſum, concutio concuſſi concuſſum.

In uo, pluo plui and pluvi plutum, ſtruo ſtruxi ſtructum, fluo fluxi fluxum.

The fourth conjugation formeth the preterperfect tenſe in ivi, the ſupine in itum.

Except, Venio veni ventum, comperio, reperio reperi repertum, cambio campſi campſum, ſepio ſepſi ſeptum, ſarcio ſarſi ſartum, fulceo fulci fultum, ſentio ſenſi ſenſum, haurio hauſi hauſtum, ſancio ſanxi ſanctum and ſancitum, vincio vinxi vinctum, ſalio ſalui ſaltum, in compound ſultum, as deſilio deſilui deſultum, amicio amicui amictum, aperio, operio perui pertum, venio venivi venum, ſingultivi ſingultum, ſepelivi ſepultum.

Of Verbs Compounded.

These verbs compounded change a into e throughout, damno, lacto, ſacro, fallo, arceo, tracto, partio, farcio, carpo,

carpo, patro, ſcando, ſpargo, as conſpergo conſperſi conſperſum.

Theſe following change their firſt vowel into i, and ſome of them their ſupines into e, habeo, lateo, ſalio, ſtatuo, cado, lædo, cano, quæro, cædo, tango, egeo, teneo, taceo, ſapio, rapio, placeo, diſpliceo diſplicui diſplicitum; except complaceo, perplaceo, poſthabeo.

Scalpo, calco, ſalto, change a into u, as exculpo; claudo, quatio, lavo, loſe a, as excludo, excutio, eluo.

Theſe following change their firſt vowel into i, but not in the preterperfect tenſe, and ſometimes a into e in the ſupine, emo, ſedeo, rego, frango, capio, jacio, lacio, ſpecio, premo, as comprimo compreſſi compreſſum, conjicio conjeci conjectum, pango in two only, compingo, impingo: ago, in all but perago, ſatago, circumago, dego, and cogo coegi; facio with a prepoſition only, not in other compounds, as inficio, olfacio: lego in theſe only, diligo, eligo, intelligo, negligo, ſeligo, in the reſt not, as prælego, add to theſe ſuperſedeo.

Of Verbs Defective.

Verbs called inceptives, ending in ſco, borrow their preterperfect tenſe from the verb whereof they are derived, as tepeſco tepui from tepeo, ingemiſco ingemui from ingemo; as alſo theſe verbs cerno to ſee, vidi from video, fido fedi from ſedeo, fero tuli from tulo out of uſe, in the ſupine latum, tollo ſuſtuli ſublatum from ſuffero.

Theſe want the preterperfect tenſe.

Verbs ending in aſco, as pueraſco; in iſco, as fatiſco; in urio, except parturio, eſurio; theſe alſo, vergo, ambigo, ferio, furo, polleo, nideo, have no preterperfect tenſe.

Contrary, theſe four, odi, cœpi, novi, memini, are found in the preterperfect tenſe only, and the tenſes derived, as odi, oderam, oderim, odiſſe, except memini, which hath memento mementote in the imperative.

Others are defective both in tenſe and perſon, as aio, ais, ait, Plur. aiunt. The preterimperfect aiebam is intire. Imperative, ai. Potential, aias, aiat, Plur. aiamus, aiant.

Auſim, for auſus ſim, auſis, auſit, Plur. auſint.

Salveo, ſalvebis, ſalve ſalveto, ſalvete ſalvetote, ſalvere.

Ave aveto, avete avetote.

Faxo, faxis, faxit, faxint.

Quæſo, Plur. quæſumus,

Infit, infiunt.

Inquio or inquam, inquis, inquit, Plur. inquiunt. Inquiebat. Cic. Topic. inquiſti, inquit. Future, inquies, inquiet. Imperat. inque inquito. Potent. inquiat.

Dor the firſt perſon paſſive of do, and for before farris or farre in the indicative, are not read, nor der or fer in the potential.

Of a Participle.

A Participle is a part of ſpeech, partaking with the verb from whence it is derived in voice, tenſe, and ſignification, and with a noun adjective in manner of declining.

Participles are either of the active or paſſive voice.

Of the active two. One of the preſent tenſe ending in ans, or ens, as laudans praiſing, habens, legens, audiens, and is declined like fœlix, as hic hæc & hoc habens, Gen. habentis, Dat. habenti, &c. Docens, docentis, &c. But from eo, euns, and in the compounds iens euntis, except ambiens ambientis. Note that ſome verbs otherwiſe defective have this participle, as aiens, inquiens.

The other of the future tenſe is moſt commonly formed of the firſt ſupine, by changing m into rus, as of laudatum laudaturus to praiſe or about to praiſe, habiturus, lecturus, auditurus; but ſome are not regularly formed, as of ſectum ſecaturus, of jutum juturus, ſonitum ſoniturus, partum pariturus, argutum arguiturus, and ſuch like; of ſum, futurus: this as alſo the other two participles following are declined like bonus.

This participle, with the verb ſum, affordeth a ſecond future in the active voice, as laudaturus ſum, es, eſt, &c., as alſo the future of the infinitive, as laudaturum eſſe to praiſe hereafter, futurum eſſe, &c.

Participles

Participles of the paſſive voice are alſo two, one of the preterperfect tenſe, another of the future.

A participle of the preterperfect tenſe is formed of the latter ſupine, by putting thereto s, as of laudatu laudatus praiſed, of habitu habitus, lectu lectus, auditu auditus.

This participle, joined with the verb ſum, ſupplieth the want of a preterperfect and preterpluperfect tenſe in the indicative mood paſſive, and both them and the future of the potential; as alſo the preterperfect and preterpluperfect of the infinitive, and with ire or fore the future; as laudatus ſum or fui I have been praiſed, Plur. laudati ſumus or fuimus we have been praiſed, laudatus eram or fueram, &c. Potential, laudatus ſum or fuerim, laudatus eſſem or fuiſſem, laudatus ero or fuero. Infinit. laudatum eſſe or fuiſſe to have or had been praiſed; laudatum ire or fore to be praiſed hereafter.

Nor only paſſives, but ſome actives alſo or neuters, beſides their own preterperfect tenſe borrow another from this participle; Cœno cœnavi and cœnatus ſum, Juravi and juratus, Potavi and potus ſum, Titubavi and titubatus, Careo carui caſſus ſum, Prandeo prandi and pranſus, Pateo patui and paſſus ſum, Placeo placui placitus, Sueſco ſuevi ſuetus ſum, Libet libuit and libitum eſt, Licet licuit licitum, Pudet puduit puditum, Piget piguit pigitum, Tædet tæduit pertæſum eſt, and this deponent Mereor merui and meritus ſum.

Theſe neuters following, like paſſives, have no other preterperfect tenſe, but by this participle, Gaudeo gaviſus ſum, Fido fiſus, Audeo auſus, Fio factus, Soleo ſolitus ſum.

Theſe deponents alſo form this participle from ſupines irregular; Labor lapſus, patior paſſus, perpetior perpeſſus, fateor faſſus, conſiteor confeſſus, diffiteor diffeſſus, gradior greſſus, ingredior ingreſſus, fatiſcor feſſus, metior menſus, utor uſus, ordior to ſpin orditus, to begin orſus, nitor niſus and nixus, ulciſcor ultus, iraſcor iratus, reor ratus, obliviſcor oblitus, fruor fructus or fruitus, miſereor miſertus, tuor and tueor tuitus,

loquor locutus, ſequor ſecutus, experior expertus, paciſcor pactus, nanciſcor nactus, apiſcor aptus, adipiſcor adeptus, queror queſtus, proficiſcor profectus, expergiſcor experrectus, comminiſcor commentus, naſcor natus, morior mortuus, orior ortus ſum.

A participle of the future paſſive is formed of the gerund in dum, by changing m into s, as of laudandum laudandus to be praiſed, of habendum habendus, &c. And likewiſe of this participle with the verb Sum, may be formed the ſame tenſes in the paſſive, which were formed with the participle of the preterperfect tenſes, as laudandus ſum or fui, &c.

Infinit. Laudandum eſſe or fore.

Of verbs deponent come participles both of the active and paſſive form, as loquor loquens locutus locuturus loquendus; whereof the participle of the preter tenſe ſignifieth ſometimes both actively and paſſively, as dignatus, teſtatus, meditatus, and the like.

Of an Adverb.

An Adverb is a part of ſpeech joined with ſome other to explain its ſignification, as valdè probus very honeſt, benè eſt it is well, valdè doctus very learned, benè mane early in the morning.

Of adverbs, ſome be of Time, as hodie to day, cras to morrow, &c.

Some be of Place, as ubi where, ibi there, &c. And of many other ſorts needleſs to be here ſet down.

Certain adverbs alſo are compared, as doctè learnedly, doctiùs doctiſſimè, fortiter fortiùs fortiſſimè, ſæpe ſæpius ſæpiſſimè, and the like.

Of a Conjunction.

A Conjunction is a part of ſpeech that joineth words and ſentences together.

Of Conjunctions ſome be copulatives, as et and, quoque alſo, nec neither.

Some be disjunctive, as aut or,

Some

Some be cauſal, as nam for, quia becauſe, and many ſuch like.

Adverbs when they govern mood and tenſe, and join ſentences together, as cum, ubi, poſtquam, and the like, are rather to be called conjunctions.

Of a Prepoſition.

A Prepoſition is a part of ſpeech moſt commonly either ſet before nouns in appoſition, as ad patrem, or joined with any other words in compoſition, as indoctus.

Theſe ſix, di, dis, re, ſe, am, con, are not read but in compoſition.

As adverbs having caſes after them may be called prepoſitions, ſo prepoſitions having none, may be counted adverbs.

Of an Interjection.

An Interjection is a part of ſpeech, expreſſing ſome paſſion of the mind.

Some be of ſorrow, as heu, hei.
Some be of marvelling, as papæ.
Some of diſdaining, as vah.
Some of praiſing, as euge.
Some of exclaiming, as ô, proh, and ſuch like.

Figures of Speech.

Words are ſometimes increaſed or diminiſhed by a letter or ſyllable in the beginning, middle, or ending, which are called Figures of ſpeech.

Increaſed.

In the beginning, as Gnatus for natus, tetuli for tuli, Protheſis,

In

In the middle, as Rettulit for retulit, cinctutus for cinctus. Epenthesis.

In the end, as Dicier for dici. Paragoge.

Diminished.

In the beginning, as Ruit for eruit. Aphæresis.

In the middle, as Audiit for audivit, dixti for dixisti, lamna for lamina. Syncope.

In the end, as Consili for consilii; scin for scire. Apocope.

THE

SECOND PART OF GRAMMAR,

COMMONLY CALLED

YNTAXIS, OR CONSTRUCTION.

HITHERTO the eight parts of ſpeech declined and undeclined have been ſpoken of ſingle, and each ıe by itſelf: now followeth Syntaxis or Conſtruction, hich is the right joining of theſe parts together in a ntence.

Conſtruction conſiſteth either in the agreement of ɔrds together in number, gender, caſe, and perſon, ıich is called concord; or the governing of one the her in ſuch caſe or mood as is to follow.

Of the Concords.

THERE be Three concords or agreements.

The firſt is of the adjective with his ſubſtantive.

The ſecond is of the verb with his nominative caſe.

The third is of the relative with his antecedent.

An adjective (under which is comprehended both ɔnoun and participle) with his ſubſtantive or ſubſtan-ves, a verb with his nominative caſe or caſes, and a lative with his antecedent or antecedents, agree all in ımber, and the two latter in perſon alſo; as Amicus rtus. Viri docti. Præceptor prælegit, vos vero neg-ɡitis. Xenophon & Plato fuere æquales. Vir ſapit qui uca loquitur. Pater & præceptor veniunt. Yea ough the conjunction be disjunctive, as Quos neque ſidia neque luxuria vitiaverant. Celſus. Pater & præ-ptor, quos quæritis. But if a verb ſingular follow any nominatives, it muſt be applied to each of them ɔart, as Niſi foro & curiæ officium ac verecundia ſua ɔuſtiterit. Val. Max.

An

An adjective with his ſubſtantive, and a relative with his antecedent agree in gender and caſe; but the relative not in caſe always, being ofttimes governed by other conſtructions: as Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. Liber quem dediſti mihi.

And if it be a participle ſerving the infinitive mood future, it ofttimes agrees with the ſubſtantive neither in gender nor in number, as Hanc ſibi rem præſidio ſperat futurum. Cic. Audierat non datum iri filio uxorem. Terent. Omnia potius actum iri puto quam de provinciis. Cic.

But when a verb cometh between two nominative caſes not of the ſame number, or a relative between two ſubſtantives not of the ſame gender, the verb in number, and the relative in gender may agree with either of them; as Amantium iræ amoris reintegratio eſt. Quid enim niſi vota ſuperſunt. Tuentur illum globum qui terra dicitur. Animal plenum rationis, quem vocamus hominem. Lutetia eſt quam nos Pariſios dicimus.

And if the nominative caſes be of ſeveral perſons, or the ſubſtantives and antecedents of ſeveral genders, the verb ſhall agree with the ſecond perſon before the third, and with the firſt before either; and ſo ſhall the adjective or relative in their gender; as Ego & tu ſalvi in tuto. Tu & pater periclitamini. Pater & mater mortui ſunt. Frater & ſoror quos vidiſti.

But in things that have not life, an adjective or relative of the neuter gender may agree with ſubſtantives or antecedents maſculine or feminine, or both together; as Arcus & calami ſunt bona. Arcus & calami quos legiſti. Pulchritudinem, conſtantiam, ordinem in corporibus filiis factiſque conſervanda putat. Cic. Off. 1. In eo ægritudo permiſta ſunt. Sal.

Note that the infinitive mood, or any part of a ſentence may be inſtead of a nominative caſe to the verb, or of a ſubſtantive to the adjective, or of an antecedent to the relative, and then the adjective or relative ſhall be of the neuter gender: and if there be more parts of a ſentence than one, the verb ſhall be in the plural number; Diluculo ſurgere ſaluberrimum eſt. Virtutem fo-

qui

qui, vita eſt honeſtiſſima. Audito proconſulem in Ciliciam tendere. In tempore veni, quod omnium rerum eſt primum. Tu multum dormis & ſæpe potas, quæ duo ſunt corpori inimica.

Sometimes alſo an adverb is put for the nominative caſe to a verb, and for a ſubſtantive to an adjective; as Partim ſignorum ſunt combuſta. Prope centies & vicies erogatum eſt. Cic. Verr. 4.

Sometimes alſo agreement, whether it be in gender or number, is grounded on the ſenſe, not on the words; as Illum ſenium, for illum ſenem. Iſte ſcelus, for iſte ſceleſtus. Ter. Tranſtulit in Eunuchum ſuam, meaning comœdiam. Ter. Pars magna obligati, meaning homines. Liv. Impliciti laqueis nodus uterque, for ambo. Ov. Alter in alterius jactantes lumina vultus, Ovid: that is, Alter & alter. Inſperanti ipſa refers te nobis, for mihi. Catul. Diſce omnes, Virg. Æn. 2, for tu quiſquis es. Dua importuna prodigia, quos egeſtas tribuno plebis conſtrictos addixerat. Cic. pro Seſt. Pars merſi tenuere ratem. Rhemus cum fratre Quirino jura dabant, Virg.: that is, Rhemus & frater Quirinus. Divellimur inde Iphitus & Pelias mecum. Virg.

Conſtruction of Subſtantives.

Hitherto of concord or agreement; the other part followeth, which is Governing, whereby one part of ſpeech is governed by another, that is to ſay, is put in ſuch caſe or mood as the word that governeth or goeth before in conſtruction requireth.

When two ſubſtantives come together betokening divers things, whereof the former may be an adjective in the neuter gender taken for a ſubſtantive, the latter (which alſo may be a pronoun) ſhall be in the genitive caſe; as Facundia Ciceronis. Amator ſtudiorum. Ferimur per opaca locorum. Corruptus vanis rerum. Hor. Deſiderium tui. Pater ejus.

Sometimes the former ſubſtantive, as this word officium or mos, is underſtood; as Oratoris eſt, it is the part of an orator. Extremæ eſt dementiæ, it is the manner of extreme madneſs. Ignavi eſt, it is the quality

lity of a ſlothful man. Ubi ad Dianæ veneris; templum is underſtood. Juſtitiæne prius mirer belline laborum, Virg.: underſtand causâ. Neque ille ſepoſiti ciceris, neque longæ invidit avenæ. Hor. Supply partem.

But if both the ſubſtantives be ſpoken of one thing, which is called appoſition, they ſhall be both of the ſame caſe; as Pater meus vir amat me puerum.

Words that ſignify quality, following the ſubſtantive whereof they are ſpoken, may be put in the genitive or ablative caſe; as Puer bonæ indolis, or bona indole. Some have a genitive only; as Ingentis rex nomini. Liv. Decem annorum puer. Hujuſmodi pax. Hujus generis animal. But genus is ſometimes in the accuſative: as Si hoc genus rebus non proficitur. Varr. de Re ruſt. And the cauſe or manner of a thing in the ablative only; as Sum tibi natura parens, præceptor conſiliis.

Opus and Uſus, when they ſignify need, require an ablative; as Opus eſt mihi tuo judicio. Viginti minæ uſus eſt filio. But opus is ſometimes taken for an adjective undeclined, and ſignifieth needful: as Dux noble & author opus eſt. Alia quæ opus ſunt para.

Conſtruction of Adjectives, governing a Genitive.

Adjectives that ſignify deſire, knowledge, ignorance, remembrance, forgetfulneſs, and ſuch like; as alſo certain others derived from verbs, and ending in ax, require a genitive; as Cupidus auri. Peritus belli. Ignarus omnium. Memor præteriti. Reus furti. Tenax propoſiti. Tempus edax rerum.

Adjectives called nouns partitive, becauſe they ſignify part of ſome whole quantity or number, govern the word that ſignifieth the thing parted or divided, in the genitive; as Aliquis noſtrum. Primus omnium. Aurium mollior eſt ſiniſtra. Oratorum eloquentiſſimus. And oft in the neuter gender; as Multum lucri. Id negotii. Hoc noctis. Sometimes, though ſeldom, a word ſignifying the whole, is read in the ſame caſe with the partitive, as, Habet duos gladios quibus altero

te

te occiſurum minatur, altero villicum, Plaut. for Quorum altero. Magnum opus habeo in manibus; quod jampridem ad hunc ipſum (me autem dicebat) quædam inſtitui. Cic. Acad. 1. Quod quædam for cujus quædam.

A Dative.

ADJECTIVES that betoken profit or diſprofit, likeneſs or unlikeneſs, fitneſs, pleaſure, ſubmitting, or belonging to any thing, require a dative; as Labor eſt utilis corpori. Equalis Hectori. Idoneus bello. Jucundus omnibus. Parenti ſupplex. Mihi proprium.

But ſuch as betoken profit or diſprofit have ſometimes an accuſative with a prepoſition; as Homo ad nullam partem utilis. Cic. Inter ſe æquales.

And ſome adjectives ſignifying likeneſs, unlikeneſs, or relation, may have a genitive. Par hujus. Ejus culpæ affines. Domini ſimilis es. Commune animantium eſt conjunctionis appetitus. Alienum dignitatis ejus. Cic. Fin. 1. Fuit hoc quondam proprium populi Romani, longè a domo bellare. But proprior and proximus admit ſometimes an accuſative; as proximus Pompeium ſedebam. Cic.

An Accuſative.

NOUNS of meaſure are put after adjectives of like ſignification in the accuſative, and ſometimes in the ablative; as Turris alta centum pedes. Arbor lata tres digitos. Liber craſſus tres pollices, or tribus pollicibus. Sometimes in the genitive; as Areas latas pedum denûm facito.

All words expreſſing part or parts of a thing, may be put in the accuſative, or ſometimes in the ablative; as Saucius frontem or fronte. Excepto quòd non ſimul eſſes cætera lætus. Hor. Nuda pedem. Ov. Os humeroſque deo ſimilis. Virg. Sometimes in the genitive; as Dubius mentis.

An

An Ablative.

ADJECTIVES of the comparative degree engliſhed with this ſign then or by, as dignus, indignus, præditus, contentus, and theſe words of price, carrus, vilis, require an ablative; as Frigidior glacie. Multo doctior. Uno pede altior. Dignus honore. Virtute præditus. Sorte ſua contentus. Aſſe charum.

But of comparatives, plus, amplius, and minus, may govern a genitive; alſo a nominative, or an accuſative; as Plus quinquaginta hominum. Amplius duorum millium. Ne plus tertia pars eximatur mellis. Varro. Paulo plus quingentos paſſus. Ut ex ſua cujuſque parte ne minus dimidium ad fratrem perveniret, Cic. Verr. 4. And dignus, indignus, have ſometimes a genitive after them; as Militia eſt operis altera digna tui. Indigna avorum. Virg.

Adjectives betokening plenty or want, will have an ablative, and ſometimes a genitive; as Vacuus ira, or irâ. Nulla epiſtola inanis re aliqua. Ditiſſimus agri. Stultorum plena ſunt omnia. Integer vitæ, ſceleriſque purus. Expers omnium. Vobis immunibus hujus eſſe molis debitur.

Words alſo betokening the cauſe, or form, or manner of a thing, are put after adjectives in the ablative caſe; as Pallidus ira. Trepidus morte futura. Nomine Grammaticus, re Barbarus.

Of Pronouns.

PRONOUNS differ not in conſtruction from nouns, except that poſſeſſion, Meus, tuus, ſuus, noſter, veſter, by a certain manner of ſpeech, are ſometimes joined to a ſubſtantive, which governs their primitive underſtood with a noun or participle in a genitive caſe; as Dico meum unius opera rempublicam eſſe liberatam, Cic. for Mei unius opera. In like manner Noſtra duorum, trium, paucorum, omnium virtute, for noſtrum duorum, &c. Meum ſolius peccatum, Cic. Ex tuo ipſius animo, for Tui

Tui ipſius. Ex ſua cujuſque parte, Id. Verr. 2. Ne tua quidem recentia proximi prætoris veſtigia perſequi poterat. Cic. Verr. 4. Si meas præſentis preces non putas profuiſſe, Id. pro. Planc. Noſtros vidiſti flentis ocellos. Ovid.

Alſo a relative, as qui or is, ſometimes anſwers to an antecedent noun or pronoun primitive underſtood in the poſſeſſive; as Omnes laudare fortunas meas, qui filium haberem tali ingenio præditum. Terent.

Conſtruction of Verbs.

Verbs for the moſt part govern either one caſe after them, or more than one in a different manner of conſtruction.

Of the Verb ſubſtantive Sum, and ſuch like, with a nominative and other oblique caſes.

Verbs that ſignify being, as Sum, exiſto, fio; and certain paſſives, as dicor, vocor, ſalutor, appellor, habeor, exiſtimor, videor; alſo verbs of motion or reſt, as incedo, diſcedo, ſedeo, with ſuch like, will have a nominative caſe after them, as they have before them, becauſe both caſes belong to the ſame perſon or thing, and the latter is rather in an appoſition with the former, than governed by the verb; as Temperantia eſt virtus. Horatius ſalutatur poeta. Aſt ego quæ divum incedo regina.

And if eſt be an impersonal, it may ſometimes govern a genitive, as Uſus poetæ, ut moris eſt, licentia. Phædrus l. 4. Negavit moris eſſe Græcorum ut &c. Cic. Verr. 2.

But if the following noun be of another perſon, or not directly ſpoken of the former, both after Sum and all his compounds, except poſſum, it ſhall be put in the dative; as Eſt mihi domi pater. Multa petentibus deſunt multa.

And if a thing be ſpoken of, relating to the perſon, it may be alſo in the dative; as Sum tibi præſidio. Hæc

res eſt mihi voluptati. Quorum alteri Capitoni cognomen fuit. Cic. Paſtori nomen Fauſtulo fuiſſe ferunt. Liv.

Of Verbs tranſitive with an accuſative, and the exceptions thereto belonging.

Verbs active or deponent, called tranſitive, becauſe their action paſſeth forth on ſome perſon or thing, will have an accuſative after them of the perſon or thing to whom the action is done; as Amo te. Vitium fuge. Deum Venerare. Uſus promptos facit. Juvat me. Oportet te.

Alſo verbs called neuters, may have an accuſative of their own ſignification; as Duram ſervit ſervitutem. Longam ire viam. Endymionis ſomnum dormis. Paſtillos Rufillus olet. Nec vox hominem ſonat. Cum glaucum ſaltaſſet. Paterc. Agit lætum convivam. Horat. Hoc me latet.

But theſe verbs, though tranſitive, Miſereor and miſereſco, paſs into a genitive; as miſerere mei. Sometimes into a dative: Huic miſereor. Sen. Dilige bonos, miſereſce malis. Boetius.

Reminiſcor, obliviſcor, recordor, and memini, ſometimes alſo require a genitive; as Datæ fidei reminiſcitur. Memini tui. Obliviſcor carminis. Sometimes retain the accuſative; as Recordor pueritiam. Omnia quæ curant ſenes meminerunt. Plaut.

Theſe imperſonals alſo, intereſt and refert, ſignifying to concern, require a genitive, except in theſe ablatives feminine, Mea, tua, ſua, noſtra, veſtra, cuja. And the meaſure of concernment is often added in theſe genitives, magni, parvi, tanti, quanti, with their compounds; as Intereſt omnium rectè agere. Tua refert teipſum noſſe. Veſtra parvi intereſt.

But verbs of profiting or diſprofiting, believing, pleasing, obeying, oppoſing, or being angry with, paſs into a dative; as non potes mihi commodare nec incommodare. Placeo omnibus. Crede mihi. Nimium ne crede colori. Pareo parentibus. Tibi repugno. Adoleſcenti nihil eſt quod ſuccenſeat. But of the

the firſt and third ſort, Juvo, adjuvo, lædo, offendo, re-ain an accuſative.

Laſtly theſe tranſitives, fungor, fruor, utor, potior, and verbs betokening want, paſs direct into an ablative. Fungitur officio. Aliena frui inſania. Utere ſorte tua. But fungor, fruor, utor, had anciently an accuſative. Verbs of want, and potior, may have alſo a genitive. Pecuniæ indiget. Quaſi tu hujus indigeas patris. Po-ior urbe, or urbis.

Sometimes a phraſe of the ſame ſignification with a ingle verb, may have the caſe of the verb after it; as Id peram do, that is to ſay, id ago. Idne eſtis authores nihi? for id ſuadetis. Quid me vobis tactio eſt? for tangitis. Plaut. Quid tibi hanc curatio eſt rem? Id.

The Accuſative with a Genitive.

HITHERTO of tranſitives governing their accuſative, or other caſe, in ſingle and direct conſtruction: now of ſuch as may have after them more caſes than one in conſtruction direct and oblique, that is to ſay, with an accuſative, a genitive, dative, other accuſative, or ablative.

Verbs of eſteeming, buying, or ſelling, beſides their accuſative, will have a genitive betokening the value or price: Flocci, nihili, pili, hujus, and the like after verbs of eſteeming: Tanti, quanti, pluris, minoris, and ſuch like, put without a ſubſtantive, after verbs of buying or ſelling; as Non hujus te æſtimo. Ego illum flocci pendo. Æqui boni hoc facio or conſulo. Quanti mercatus es hunc equum? Pluris quam vellem.

But the word of value is ſometimes in the ablative; as Parvi or parvo æſtimas probitatem. And the word of price moſt uſually; as Teruncio eum non emerim. And particularly in theſe adjectives, Vili, paulo, minimo, magno, nimio, plurimo, duplo, put without a ſubſtantive; as Vili vendo triticum. Redimite captum quàm queas minimo. And ſometimes minore for minoris. Nam a Cælio propinqui minore centeſſimis nummum movere non poſſunt. Cic. Att. l. 1. But verbs neuter or paſſive have only the oblique caſes after them; as Tanti

eris aliis, quanti tibi fueris. Pudor parvi penditur. Which is alſo to be obſerved in the following rules.

And this neuter valeo governeth the word of value in the accuſative; as Denarii dicti quod denos æris valebant. Varr.

Verbs of admoniſhing, accuſing, condemning, acquitting, will have, beſides their accuſative, a genitive of the crime, or penalty, or thing; as Admonuit me erroris. Accuſas me furti? Vatem ſceleris damnat. Furem dupli condemnavit. And ſometimes an ablative with a prepoſition, or without; as condemnabo eodem ego te crimine. Accuſas furti, an ſtupri, an utroque? De repetundis accuſavit, or damnavit. Cic.

Alſo theſe impersonals, pœnitet, tædet, miſeret, miſereſcit, pudet, piget, to their accuſative will have a genitive, either of the perſon, or of the thing; as Noſtri noſmet pœnitet. Urbis me tædet. Pudet me negligentiæ.

An Accuſative with a Dative.

Verbs of giving or reſtoring, promiſing or paying, commanding or ſhowing, truſting or threatening, add to their accuſative a dative of the perſon; as Fortuna multis nimium dedit. Hæc tibi promitto. Æs alienum mihi numeravit. Frumentum imperat civitatibus. Quod & cui dicas, videto. Hoc tibi ſuadeo. Tibi or ad te ſcribo. Pecuniam omnem tibi credo. Utrique mortem minatus eſt.

To theſe add verbs active compounded with theſe prepoſitions, præ, ad, ab, con, de, ex, ante, ſub, poſt, ob, in, and inter; as Præcipio hoc tibi. Admovit urbi exercitum. Collegæ ſuo imperium abrogavit. Sic parvis componere magna ſolebam.

Neuters have a dative only; as Meis majoribus virtute præluxi. But ſome compounded with præ and ad may have an accuſative; as Præſtat ingenio alius alium. Multos anteit ſapientia. Others with a prepoſition; as Quæ ad ventris victum conducunt. In hæc ſtudia incumbite. Cic.

Alſo all verbs active, betokening acquiſition, likening,

or relation, commonly engliſhed with to or for, have to their accuſative a dative of the perſon; as Magnam laudem ſibi peperit. Huic habeo, non tibi. Se illis æquaunt. Expedi mihi hoc negotium: but mihi tibi ſibi, ſometimes are added for elegance, the ſenſe not requiring; as Suo hunc ſibi jugulat gladio. Terent. Neuters a dative only; as Non omnibus dormio. Libet mihi, Tibi licet.

Sometimes a verb tranſitive will have to his accuſative a double dative, one of the perſon, another of the thing; as Do tibi veſtem pignori. Verto hoc tibi vitio. Hoc tu tibi laudi duces.

A double Accuſative.

Verbs of aſking, teaching, arraying, and concealing, will have two accuſatives, one of the perſon, another of the thing; as Rogo te pecuniam. Docco te literas. Quod te jamdudum hortor. Induit ſe calceos. Hoc me celabas.

And being paſſives, they retain one accuſative of the thing, as Sumtumque recingitur anguem. Ovid. Met. 4. Induitur rogam. Mart.

But verbs of arraying ſometimes change the one accuſative into an ablative or dative; as Induo te tunica, or tibi tunicam. Inſtravit equum penula, or equo penulam.

An Accuſative with an Ablative.

Verbs tranſitive may have to their acuſative an ablative of the inſtrument or cauſe, matter or manner of doing; and neuters the ablative only; as Feri eum gladio. Taceo metu. Malis gaudet alienis. Summa eloquentia cauſam egit. Capitolium ſaxo quadrato inſtructum eſt. Tuo conſilio nitor. Veſcor pane. Affluis opibus. Amore abundas. Sometimes with a prepoſition of the manner; as Summa cum humanitate me tractavit.

Verbs of endowing, imparting, depriving, diſcharging, filling, emptying, and the like, will have an ablative,

and ſometimes a genitive; as Dono te hoc annulo. P
rima ſalute te impertit. Aliquem familiarem ſuo
mone participavit. Paternum ſervum ſui particip
conſilii. Interdico tibi aqua & igni. Libero te
metu. Implentur veteris Bacchi.

Alſo verbs of comparing or exceeding, will hav
ablative of the exceſs; as Præfero hunc multis gradi
Magno intervallo eum ſuperat.

After all manner of verbs, the word ſignifying
part of a thing may be put in the genitive, accuſativ
ablative; as Abſurdè facis qui angas te animi. Pe
animi. Diſcrucior animi. Deſipit mentis. Candet
tes. Rubet capillos. Ægrotat animo, magis quam
pore.

Nouns of Time and Place after Verbs.

Nouns betokening part of time be put after ver
the ablative, and ſometimes in the accuſative; as N
vigilas, luce dormis. Nullam partem noctis requi
Cic. Abhinc triennium ex Andro commigravit.
Reſpondit triduo illum, ad ſummum quatriduo pe
rum. Cic. Or if continuance of time, in the accuſa
ſometimes in the ablative; as Sexaginta annos n
Hyemem totam ſtertis. Imperium deponere malue
quam id tenere punctum temporis contra religio
Cic. Imperavit triennio, & decem menſibus.
Sometimes with a prepoſition; as Ferè in diebus pa
quibus hæc acta ſunt. Ter. Rarely with a genitive
Temporis anguſti manſit concordia diſcors. Lucan.

Alſo nouns betokening ſpace between places ar
in the accuſative, and ſometimes in the ablative; a
dem hinc ne diſceſſeris. Abeſt ab urbe quingentis
bus paſſuum. Terra marique gentibus imperavit.

Nouns that ſignify place, and alſo proper nam
greater places, as countries, be put after verbs of mo
or remaining, with a prepoſition, ſignifying to, f
in, or by, in ſuch caſe as the prepoſition requi
as Proficiſcor ab urbe. Vivit in Anglia. Veni
Galliam in Italiam.

But if it be the proper name of a leſſer place, as

city, town, or leſſer iſland, or any of theſe four, Humus, domus, militia, bellum, with theſe ſigns, on, in, or at, before them, being of the firſt or ſecond declenſion, and ſingular number, they ſhall be put in the genitive; if of the third declenſion, or plural number, or this word rus, in the dative or ablative; as Vixit Romæ, Londini. Ea habitabat Rhodi. Conon plurimum Cypri vixit. Cor. Nep. Procumbit humi bos. Domi bellique ſimul viximus. Militavit Carthagini, or Carthagine. Stuluit Athenis. Ruri or rure educatus eſt.

If the verb of moving be to a place, it ſhall be put in the accuſative; as Eo Romam, domum, rus. If from a place, in the ablative; as Diſceſſit Londino. Abiit domo. Rure eſt reverſus.

Sometimes with a prepoſition; as A Brunduſio profectus eſt, Cic. Manil. Ut ab Athenis in Bœotiam irem. Sulpit. apud Cic. Fam. l. 4. Cum te profectum ab domo ſcirem. Liv. l. 8.

Conſtruction of Paſſives.

A VERB paſſive will have after it an ablative of the doer, with the prepoſition a or ab before it, ſometimes without, and more often a dative; as Virgilius legitur a me. Fortes creantur fortibus. Hor. Tibi fama petatur. And neutro-paſſives as Vapulo, veneo, liceo, exulo, fio, may have the ſame conſtruction; as ab hoſte venire.

Sometimes an accuſative of the thing is found after a paſſive; as Coronari Olympia. Hor. Epiſt. 1. Cyclopa movetur. Hor. for ſaltat or egit. Purgor bilem. Id.

Conſtruction of Gerunds and Supines.

GERUNDS and ſupines will have ſuch caſes as the verb from whence they come; as Otium ſcribendi literas. Eo auditum poetas. Ad conſulendum tibi.

A gerund in di is commonly governed both of ſubſtantives and adjectives in manner of a genitive; as cauſa videndi. Amor habendi. Cupidus viſendi. Certus

eundi. And ſometimes governeth a genitive plural; as illorum videndi gratia. Ter.

Gerunds in do are uſed after verbs in manner of an ablative, according to former rules, with or without a prepoſition; as Defeſſus ſum ambulando. A diſcendo facile deterretur. Cæſar dando, ſublevando, ignoſcendo, gloriam adeptus eſt. In apparando conſumunt diem.

A gerund in dum is uſed in manner of an accuſative after prepoſitions governing that caſe; as Ad capiendum hoſtes. Ante domandum ingentes tollent animos Virg. Ob redimendum captivos. Inter cœnandum.

Gerunds in ſignification are ofttimes uſed as participles in dus; Tuorum conſiliorum reprimendorum cauſa. Cic. Orationem Latinam legendis noſtris efficies pleniorem. Cic. Ad accuſandos homines præmio ducitur.

A gerund in dum joined with the imperſonal eſt, and implying ſome neceſſity or duty to do a thing, may have both the active and paſſive conſtruction of the verb from whence it is derived; as Utendum eſt ætate. Ov. Pacem Trojano a rege petendum. Virg. Iterandum eadem illa mihi. Cic. Serviendum eſt mihi amicis. Plura dixi, quam dicendum fuit. Cic. pro Seſt.

Conſtruction of Verb with Verb.

When two verbs come together, without a nominative caſe between them, the latter ſhall be in the infinitive mood; as Cupio diſcere. Or in the firſt ſupine after verbs of moving; as Eo cubitum, ſpectatum. Or in the latter with an adjective; as Turpe eſt dictu. Facile factu, opus ſcitu.

But if a caſe come between, not governed of the former verb, it ſhall always be an accuſative before the infinitive mood; as Te rediiſſe incolumem gaudeo. Malo me divitem eſſe, quam haberi.

And this infinitive eſſe, will have always after it an accuſative, or the ſame caſe which the former verb governs; as Expedit bonos eſſe vobis. Quo mihi commiſſo, non licet eſſe piam. But this accuſative agreeth with another underſtood before the infinitive; as Expe-

dit

lit vobis vos eſſe bonos. Natura beatis omnibus eſſe ledit. Nobis non licet eſſe tam diſertis. The ſame conſtruction may be uſed after other infinitives neuter or paſſive like to eſſe in ſignification; as Maximo tibi poſtea & civi, & duci evadere contigit. Val. Max. l. 6.

Sometimes a noun adjective or ſubſtantive governs an infinitive; as audax omnia perpeti. Dignus amari. Conſilium ceperunt ex oppido profugere. Cæſ. Minari diviſoribus ratio non erat. Cic. Verr. 1.

Sometimes the infinitive is put abſolute for the preterimperfect or preterperfect tenſe: as ego illud ſedulo negare factum. Ter. Galba autem multas ſimilitudines afferre Cic. Ille contra hæc omnia ruere, agere vitam. Ter.

Conſtruction of Participles.

PARTICIPLES govern ſuch caſes as the verb from whence they come, according to their active or paſſive ſignification; as fruiturus amicis. Nunquam audita mihi. Diligendus ab omnibus. Sate ſanguine divûm, Telamone creatus. Corpore mortali cretus, Lucret. Nate deà. Edite regibus. Lævo ſuſpenſi loculos tabulaſque lacerto. Hor. Cenſus equeſtrem ſummam. Id. Abeundum eſt mihi. Venus orta mari. Exoſus bella. Virg. Exoſus diis. Gell. Arma peroſus. Ovid. But Pertæſus hath an accuſative otherwiſe than the verb; as Pertæſus ignaviam. Semet ipſe pertæſus. Suet. To theſe add participal adjectives ending in bilis of the paſſive ſignification, and requiring like caſe after them; as Nulli penetrabilis aſtro lucus erat.

Participles changed into adjectives have their conſtruction by the rules of adjectives, as Appetens vini. Fugitans litum. Fidens animi.

An Ablative put abſolute.

Two Nouns together, or a noun and pronoun with a participle expreſſed or underſtood, put abſolutely, that is to ſay, neither governing nor governed of a verb, ſhall be

be put in the ablative; as Authore ſenatu bellum geritur. Me duce vinces. Cæſare veniente hoſtes fugerunt. Sablato clamore prælium committitur.

Conſtruction of Adverbs.

En and ecce will have a nominative, or an accuſative, and ſometimes with a dative; En Priamus. Ecce tibi ſtatus noſter. En habitum. Ecce autem alterum.

Adverbs of quantity, time, and place require a genitive; as Satis loquentiæ, ſapientiæ parum ſatis. Alſo compounded with a verb; as Is rerum ſuarum ſatagit. Tunc temporis ubique gentium. Eo impudentiæ proceſſit. Quoad ejus fieri poterit.

To theſe add Ergo ſignifying the cauſe; as Illius ergo. Virg. Virtutis ergo. Fugæ atque formidinis ergo non abiturus. Liv.

Others will have ſuch caſes as the nouns from whence they come; as Minime gentium. Optime omnium. Venit obviam illi. Canit ſimiliter huic. Albanum, ſive Falernum te magis oppoſitis delectat. Hor.

Adverbs are joined in a ſentence to ſeveral moods of verbs.

Of time. Ubi, poſtquam, cum or quum, to an indicative or ſubjunctive; as Hæc ubi dicta dedit. Ubi nos laverimus. Poſtquam exceſſit ex ephebis. Cum facies vitula. Virg. Cum canerem reges. Id.

Donec while, to an indicative. Donec eris fælix. Donec until, to an indicative or ſubjunctive; Cogere donec oves juſſit. Virg. Donec ea aqua decocta ſit. Colum.

Dum while, to an indicative. Dum apparatur virga. Dum until, to an indicative or ſubjunctive; as Dum redeo. Tertia dum Latio regnantem viderit æſtas. Dum for dummodo ſo as, or ſo that, to a ſubjunctive; Dum proſim tibi.

Quoad while, to an indicative. Quoad expectas contubernalem. Quoad until, to a ſubjunctive. Omnia integra ſervabo, quoad exercitus huc mittatur

Simulac, ſimulatque to an indicative or ſubjunctive;

as,

as Simulac belli patiens erat, ſimulatque adoleverit ætas.

Ut as, to the ſame moods. Ut ſalutabis, ita reſalutaberis. Ut ſementem feceris, ita et metos. Hor. Ut ſo ſoon as, to an indicative only: as Ut ventum eſt in urbem.

Quaſi, tanquam, perinde, ac ſi, to a ſubjunctive only; as quaſi non norimus nos inter nos. Tanquam feceris ipſe aliquid.

Ne of forbidding, to an imperative or ſubjunctive; as Ne ſævi. Ne metuas.

Certain adverbs of quantity, quality, or cauſe; as Quam, quoties, cur, quare, &c. Thence alſo qui, quis, quantus, qualis, and the like, coming into a ſentence after the principal verb, govern the verb following in a ſubjunctive; as Videte quàm valdè malitiæ ſuæ confidat. Cic. Quid eſt cur tu in iſto loco ſedeas? Cic. pro Cluent. Subſideo mihi diligentiam comparavi, quæ quanta ſit intelligi non poteſt, niſi, &c. Cic. pro Quint. Nam quid hoc iniquius dici poteſt. Quam me qui caput alterius fortunaſque defendam, priore loco diſcere. Ibid. Nullum eſt officium tam ſanctum atque ſolenne, quod non avaritia violare ſoleat. Ibid. Non me fallit, ſi conſulamini quid ſitis reſponſuri. Ibid. Dici vix poteſt quam multa ſint quæ reſpondeatis ante ſieri oportere. Ibid. Docui quo die hunc ſibi promiſiſſe dicat, eo die ne Romæ quidem eum fuiſſe. Ibid. Conturbatus diſcedit neque mirum cui hæc optio tam miſera daretur. Ibid. Narrat quo in loco viderit Quintium. Ibid. Recte majores eum qui ſocium fefelliſſet in virorum bonorum numero non putarunt haberi oportere. Cic. pro Roſc. Am. Quæ concurſatio percontantium quid prætor edixiſſet, ubi cœnaret, quid enuntiaſſet. Cic. Agrar. 1.

Of Conjunctions.

Conjunctions copulative and disjunctive, and theſe four, Quam, niſi, præterquam, an, couple like caſes; as Socrates docuit Xenophontem & Platonem. Aut dies eſt, aut nox. Neſcio albus an ater ſit. Eſt minor natu quàm tu. Nemini placet præterquam ſibi.

Except when ſome particular conſtruction requireth otherwiſe;

otherwiſe; as Studui Romæ & Athenis. Emi fundum centum nummis & pluris. Accuſas furti, an ſtupri, an utroque?

They alſo couple for the moſt part like moods and tenſes, as Recto ſtat corpore, deſpicitque terras. But not always like tenſes; as Niſi me lactaſſes, & vana ſpe produceres. Et habetur, & referetur tibi a me gratia.

Of other conjunctions, ſome govern an indicative, ſome a ſubjunctive, according to their ſeveral ſignifications.

Etſi, tametſi, etiamſi, quanquam, an indicative; quamvis and licet, moſt commonly a ſubjunctive; as Etſi nihil novi afferebatur. Quanquam animus meminiſſe horret. Quamvis Elyſios miretur Græcia campos, Ipſe licet venias..

Ni, niſi, ſi, ſiquidem, quod, quia, poſtquam, poſtea-quam, antequam, priuſquam, an indicative or ſubjunctive; as Niſi vi mavis eripi. Ni faciat. Caſtigo te, non quòd odeo habeam, ſed uuod amem. Antequam dicam. Si for quamvis, a ſubjunctive only. Redeam? Non ſi me obſecret.

Si alſo conditional may ſometimes govern both verbs of the ſentence in a ſubjunctive; as Reſpiraro ſi te videro. Cic. ad Attic.

Quando, quandoquidem, quoniam, an indicative; as Dicite quandoquidem in molli conſedimus herba. Quoniam convenimus ambo.

Cum, ſeeing that, a ſubjunctive; as Cum ſis officiis Gradive virilibus aptus.

Ne, an, num, of doubting, a ſubjunctive; as Nihil refert, feceriſne, an perſuaſeris. Viſe num redierit.

Interrogatives alſo of diſdain or reproach underſtood, govern a ſubjunctive; as tantum dem, quantum ille poſcerit? Cic. Verr. 4. Sylvam tu Scantiam vendas? Cic. Agrar. Hunc tu non ames? Cic. ad Attic. Furem aliquem aut rapacem accuſaris? Vitanda ſemper erit omnis avaritiæ ſuſpicio. Cic. Ver. 4. Sometimes an infinitive; as Méne incœpto deſiſtere victam? Virg.

Ut that, leſt not, or although, a ſubjunctive; as Te oro, ut redeat jam in viam. Metuo ut ſubſtet hoſpes. Ut omnia contingat quæ volo.

Of

Of Prepoſitions.

Of Prepoſitions ſome will have an accuſative after them, ſome an ablative, ſome both, according to their different ſignification.

An accuſative theſe following, Ad, apud, ante, adverſus, adverſum, cis, citra, circum, circa, circiter, contra, erga, extra, inter, intra, infra, juxta, ob, ponè, per, propè, propter, poſt, penes, præter, ſecundum, ſupra, ſecùs, trans, ultra, uſque, verſus: but verſus is moſt commonly ſet after the caſe it governs, as Londinum verſus.

And for an accuſative after ad, a dative ſometimes is uſed in poets; as It clamor cœlo. Virg. Cœlo ſi gloria tollit Æneadum. Sil. for ad cœlum.

An ablative theſe, A, ab, abs, abſque, cum, coram, de, e, ex, pro, præ, palàm, ſine, tenus, which laſt is alſo put after his caſe, being moſt uſually a genitive, if it be plural; as Capulo tenus. Aurium tenus.

Theſe, both caſes, In, ſub, ſuper, ſubter, clam, procul.

In, ſignifying to, towards, into, or againſt, requires an accuſative; as Piſces emptos obolo in cœnam ſeni. Animus in Teucros benignus. Verſa eſt in cineres Troja. In te committere tantum quid Troes potuere? Laſtly, when it ſignifies future time, or for; as Bellum in trigeſimum diem indixerunt. Deſignati conſules in annum ſequentem. Alii pretia faciunt in ſingula capita canum. Var. Otherwiſe in will have an ablative; as In urbe. In terris.

Sub, when it ſignifies to, or in time, about, or a little before, requires an accuſative; as ſub umbram properemus. Sub id tempus. Sub noctem. Otherwiſe an ablative. Sub pedibus. Sub umbra.

Super ſignifying beyond, or preſent time, an accuſative; as Super Garamantas & Indos. Super cœnam. Suet. at ſupper-time. Of or concerning, an ablative; a Multa ſuper Priamo rogitans. Super hac re.

Super, over or upon, may have either caſe; as Super ripas Tiberis effuſus. Sæva ſedens ſuper arma. Fronde ſuper viridi.

So alſo may ſubter; as pugnatum eſt ſuper ſubterque

terras. Subter denſa teſtudine. Virg. Clam patrem or patre. Procul muros. Liv. Patria procul.

Prepoſitions in compoſition govern the ſame caſes as before in appoſition. Adibo hominem. Detrudunt naves ſcopulo. And the prepoſition is ſometimes repeated; as Detrahere de tua fama nunquam cogitavi. And ſometimes underſtood, governeth his uſual caſe; as Habeo te loco parentis. Apparuit humana ſpecie. Cumis erant oriundi. Liv. Liberis parentibus oriundus. Colum. Mutat quadrata rotundis. Hor. Pridie compitalia. Pridie nonas or calendas. Poſtridie idus. Poſtridie ludos. Before which accuſatives ante or poſt is to be underſtood. Filii id ætatis. Cic. Hoc noctis. Liv. Underſtand Secundum. Or refer to part of time. Omnia Mercurio ſimilis. Virg. Underſtand per.

Of Interjections.

CERTAIN interjections have ſeveral caſes after them. O, a nominative, accuſative, or vocative; as O feſtus dies hominis. O ego lævus. Hor. O fortunatos. O formoſe puer.

Others a nominative or an accuſative; as Heu priſca fides! Heu ſtirpem inviſam! Proh ſancte Jupiter! Proh deum atque hominum fidem! Hem tibi Davum!

Yea, though the interjection be underſtood; as Me miſerum! Me cœcum, qui hæc ante non viderim!

Others will have a dative; as Hei mihi. Væ miſero mihi. Terent.

THE END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

Luke Hanſard, printer,
near Lincoln's Inn Fields.

FEB 10 1936